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 Introduction
The Historical Background of the Civil Society Concept 
from a Theoretical Perspective
The concept of civil “society” as the realm of voluntary self-organi-
zation and association by citizens has largely been defined in contrast to 
the state. This understanding of civil society originates from late 18th cen-
tury and early 19th century Europe, during which time the rising bourgeois 
classes were in the process of emancipating themselves from the strictures 
of absolute monarchy, church and feudal estates as well as traditional bonds 
of kinship. This process was championed by philosophers such as Ferguson, 
Hegel and DeTocqueville who, each in his own way, envisioned a society of 
autonomous individuals who on a voluntary basis would group together in 
order to defend and promote their common interests, vis-à-vis the state’s 
authorities. This civil society was expected to hold the state’s authorities 
accountable to the public will.
For much of the 20th century, however, the concept of civil society 
disappeared from usage. It resurfaced again in the 1980s. Once again, the 
theme of defending or promoting citizens’ interests and rights vis-à-vis 
(potential or actual) tyrannical or oppressive state institutions was central to 
its definition. The concept was brought to the fore by dissident movements 
in the former Communist bloc countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and 
powerfully embodied by the regime-defiant heroism of figures like Lech 
Walesa from Poland and Vaclav Havel from Czecho-Slovakia.
The revival of the concept also resulted from criticism of the idea of 
state-led modernization of the so-called “Third World” countries that had 
dominated development thinking since the 1950s. During the 1980s and 
early 1990s, development experts and policy makers in the Western world 
came to see the role of the state in economic and social development in 
developing countries in an increasingly negative light. Accordingly, the 
state was criticized for its lack of accountability and representativeness, 
authoritarianism, corruption, wasteful expenditures and distortion of mar-
ket forces.
During the 1990’s, however, it became apparent that neo-liberal poli-
cies imposed by international financial institutions in the so-called “devel-
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oping” countries resulted in the dismantling of state-run programs in the 
realms of education, health and social welfare. This, in turn, had negative con-
sequences for the socio-economic position of the poor and the vulnerable 
in those societies which often led, ultimately, to general social and political 
instability. This prompted several development organizations, Western gov-
ernments and eventually the World Bank to embrace the idea of strength-
ening non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries as 
the most realistic vehicles for social development. Voluntary associations as 
expressions of authentic desires of citizens in favor of social and economic 
justice, democratization and human rights were at least potentially regard-
ed as the proper antidote to unaccountable state bureaucracies as well as 
to the threats of social disintegration and the instability that resulted from 
profit-oriented market economies. The new ideal among established West-
ern development institutions became that of partnership between market, 
state and civil society for the sake of development for the common good. 
Civil society came to be seen as the natural haven for positive human values 
in the realm of democracy, equality, freedom and human rights.1 
Such normative expectations of civil society have been criticized by 
scholars from as diverse backgrounds as Britain’s John Keane, Jude How-
ell and Jenny Pearce, Neera Chandoke from India and Maha Abdulrahman 
from Egypt. Such scholars emphasise that actually existing civil societies are 
marred by tendencies that, in many ways, represent the opposite of these 
values. First, organizations established by citizens on a voluntary basis are 
not, by definition, democracy-friendly in their structure, values and goals. 
Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party started as a voluntary organization, for instance, 
and the same applies at present to mafia organizations, Al-Qa‘ida, and the 
Ku Klux Klan. Second, civil society institutions are not always as autonomous 
from the dynamics of state and market as some idealistic voices like to hold. 
Third, civil societies invariably reflect existing socio-economic inequalities. 
Civil society organizations representing wealthier and more powerful groups 
in society usually have a greater economic, social and political clout then 
those representing relatively underprivileged sections of society.2 In this 
regard, Howell and Pearce distinguish between two different approaches 
toward civil society ideals: the dominant one underlines harmonious part-
nership between state, civil society and market economy, while the alterna-
tive approach underlines conflicting interests between grassroots associa-
tions that, on the one hand, represent underprivileged groups of society 
and, on the other, represent the state, profit-oriented companies and more 
privileged civil society forces.3
20
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Dominant approaches to civil society have also been criticized for the 
euro-centric nature of their underlying assumption that the existence of any 
civil society requires “equal, autonomous and self-determining individuals 
free from the bonds of kinship, ethnicity and faith.” As a critical response to 
such approaches, Robert Fatton responded that in the case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, civil society “has to be conceptualized as the realm of collective soli-
darities generated by processes of class-formation, ethnic “inventions” and 
religious “revelation,” and not so much by individual autonomy and self-
determination.4
This dissertation focuses primarily on the dimension of religious “rev-
elation”, faith and discourse as this is reflected in the discourse of Jordanian 
Muslim voluntary welfare associations as well as translated into practice. 
The aim is to analyze the degree to which discourses and practices reflect 
and uphold patterns of patronage and/or empowerment. When the former 
is true, relationships of dependency are reinforced through practices of aid, 
cultural activity and education; when the latter describes the nature of these 
discourses and practices, the beneficiaries may hope to become relatively 
autonomous and self-reliant citizens. Related to this issue is the question of 
the impact of traditional socio-cultural patterns on the one hand and mod-
ernization processes on the other. The same goes for the issue of individual 
autonomy versus collective identity.
Determining the “Muslim” nature of NGOs
In a country like Jordan, it is no easy matter to identify the degree to 
which a voluntary organization may be described as “Islamic” or “Muslim.” 
After all, legally speaking, an official category of “Islamic” voluntary wel-
fare associations does not exist. And Jordanian government officials as well 
as the leadership of Jordan’s General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS) 
emphasise that, according to Jordanian legislation, NGOs are prohibited 
from making any distinction between people on the basis of religion or ori-
gin, whether it concerns applicants to their services or candidates for mem-
bership. The same officials and GUVS leaders do acknowledge, however, that 
religious beliefs and a common religious discourse can be an important fac-
tor when people associate together and carry out social work within their 
community.5 It is obvious, then, that Islamic NGOs in Jordan are a sociologi-
cal and anthropological phenomenon; but not a formal and legal category. 
However, given the wide diffusion of Islamic beliefs, discourse and practice 
in Jordanian society, especially with regard to social well-being and family 
I n t r o d u c t I o n
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issues, it is also difficult to delineate Islamic NGOs from non-Islamic ones on 
a purely sociological or anthropological basis.
In terms of overlapping membership and religious ideology, some 
NGOs are affiliated with The Muslim Brotherhood Islamist movement. 
Indeed, these were often initiated by one, or more, of The Muslim Brother-
hood’s leaders and, in terms of their motivation as well as their efforts of 
Islamization toward their clients and/or the wider public, are clearly derived 
from Islamic beliefs and discourse. There are also, however, NGOs who spring 
from similarly formulated Islamic beliefs and promote similar Islamic socio-
cultural messages to their clients without having any (obvious) connections 
with Islamist movements. In this regard, it should be noted that there is not 
always a clear-cut boundary between Islamists and non-Islamist observant 
Muslims in Jordan. The Islamist movement spreads its influence in Jorda-
nian society by creating, expanding and fostering social networks through 
da‘wa, or missionary, activities in as many arenas of Jordanian social life as 
possible. Personal relationships, familial and tribal structures, mosques as 
well as institutionalized NGO work are used as vehicles by members of The 
Muslim Brotherhood as part of this process.6 As is typical of social formations 
based on social networks that, to a considerable degree, transcend the for-
mal memberships of organizations, it is impossible to determine with preci-
sion the limits of The Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in Jordanian society. 
Moreover, in determining the extent to which someone is socially included 
or excluded from membership in and/or activities of Islamist voluntary wel-
fare associations, formal affiliation to a particular religious organization, 
such as The Muslim Brotherhood, is not usually considered relevant by those 
involved within these associations. Instead, the correct ideological outlook, 
normative orientation and lifestyle are typically deemed more important.7
There are also local NGOs who combine secular with religious dis-
courses in their work for social development. Toward the international 
donor community, they present themselves as secular development orga-
nizations; while, internally, they may disseminate a religious discourse to 
get their developmental messages across to the local public. Associations 
headed or established by members of the Jordanian royal family often pro-
vide us with examples of this type of NGOs. For, it is certainly true that the 
Jordanian monarchy propagates the reform and modernization of Jorda-
nian society in accordance with the developmental values espoused by the 
global community and enshrined in the UN Millennium Development Goals 
and various other UN treaties on human, women’s, children’s and disabled 
person’s rights. Yet, at the same time, this push for modernization is publicly 
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anchored in the (Arab and Islamic) values and habits that are part and parcel 
of local society. Thus, towards the end of the 1970s, The Hashemite Fund for 
Human Development (JOHUD) headed by Princess Basma issued a fatwah 
(religious edict) from the chief Mufti of the Kingdom that permitted Muslim 
citizens to pay their zakah (Islamic wealth or poll tax) to this development 
institution.8 Moreover, JOHUD also runs a Goodwill Campaign in the name 
of the Islamic concept of ’ihsan (goodwill and charity) that is expressly based 
on Islamic values of solidarity and support for the underprivileged. The cam-
paigns’ activities are concentrated during the holy month of Ramadan.9 The 
Fund also accommodates religious objections to charging interest prevalent 
in local communities when it introduces micro-credit schemes there with 
the aim of setting up micro-businesses among poor families.10 Islamic schol-
ars are involved in giving religious lectures to convey the Fund’s message 
on developmental issues like family planning and women’s rights across. 
Ghusoon Diab al-Kareh, director of the educational program of the Young 
Women’s Muslim Association (YWMA), another “royal NGO” patronized by 
Princess Sarvath, is not entirely happy with the label “Muslim” in her associa-
tion’s name. In her experience, it does not help if one wishes to garner sup-
port in the Western world. In Jordan itself, it raises the expectation of a “cor-
rect” religious association that meticulously observes the shari‘ah. In reality, 
the association functions largely as a secular association. Muslims as well 
as Christians work there and many of the women employees are dressed in 
Western style clothes without headscarves.11 
Even foreign development organizations operating in Jordan that 
have no Muslim background whatsoever have to take local religious sen-
sitivities into account. For, instance, the British development association 
Questscope – which specializes in working with children at risk (usually 
school drop-outs from poor families with severe social problems, and at risk 
of ending up involved with crime and/or addiction problems – has chosen a 
local Islamic women’s association to implement its program of empowering 
“girls at risk.” Indeed, from the point of view of a traditional Arab community, 
nothing provides a safer place for girls than a charitable women’s associa-
tion with a strong reputation of piety and chastity.12
In other words, precise distinctions between “Islamic” and “non-Islam-
ic” NGOs cannot be made in a Muslim society, such as Jordan’s. Al-‘Afaf Wel-
fare Society is an NGO that promotes the “right Islamic approach” to marital 
life. Abdullatif Arabiyyat, also one of the leading personalities of The Muslim 
Brotherhood-based Islamic Action Front Party (IAF), is Al-‘Afaf ’s founder and 
president. The Society’s general manager (not Arabiyyat) insists, however, 
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that it cannot be labeled as “Islamic,” since “there is no such a thing as an 
Islamic association in Jordan.” Rather, he argues that, as the overwhelming 
majority of Jordanian society is Muslim, it is only “natural” for an association 
like his to give expression to Islamic values. By this argument, the general 
manager emphasizes his group’s appeal to all people in Jordanian society 
while avowedly dissociating it from political Islamic movements.13 While per-
haps a certain interest in marketing flavours his approach, this should not 
distract us from Arabiyyat’s main point: attaching labels to NGOS on the 
basis of their Islamicness should only be done with extreme caution.
Categorizing Jordanian Muslim NGOs
 1. Islamist associations.
 These are voluntary welfare associations established by representatives 
of political Islam, most often The Muslim Brotherhood Movement. Their 
discourse, in combination with their social activities, is clearly aimed at 
the Islamization of society and at countering those “alien” social phe-
nomena deemed so harmful to an Islamic way of life.
 2. Politically unaffiliated conservative associations.
 These associations engage in activities and espouse a socio-cultural 
discourse similar to that of the Islamist associations, though they dif-
fer from the Islamists on the grounds that their founders and present 
members have no, or only marginal links to political Islam.
 3. Progressive Muslim associations.
 Rather than defending and bolstering an Islamic identity in the face of 
political, social and cultural threats posed by external forces deemed 
“hostile” to Islam (as holds true for the previous categories), these asso-
ciations prefer to advocate modern reinterpretations of the Islamic 
message and, in so doing, may counter those of the traditional voices, 
in order to enable Muslims to engage fully in the modern and devel-
oped world.
 4. Secular organizations engaging in Islamic discourse.
 These are not expressly based on a certain Islamic model, but still 
engage in modernist forms of Islamic discourse in order to reach cer-
tain target groups.
24
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 5. Associations not engaging in any kind of Islamic discourse (in a 
Jordanian context, this applies solely to Western or Christian ones).
Here there follows a brief explanation of background and the types of 
social activities in which each association is engaged. For reasons of space, 
it will be given in note form. Concerning social background, it will be indi-
cated whether, ant to what extent, an association may be characterized as 
tribal, urban, rural, Palestinian and so on.14 If the data concerns a women’ s 
NGO, this will be indicated as well. All other NGOs than those established or 
run are either exclusively or overwhemingly male in membership. In terms 
of the association’ s activities, another kind of categorization will be used: 
whether they are of a multi-purpose, or of a specialized nature.
 1. Islamic Center Charity Society
– Relationship to Islamic Discourse: Islamist. Established by leading 
figures of the Islamist trend, first and foremost the leadership of The 
Muslim Brotherhood, this is widely regarded as The Brotherhood’s 
social wing. Working out of an Islamist motivation to promote the 
“Islamic way of life” as understood by The Muslim Brotherhood, 
toward their own clients as well as toward the wider public
– Social background: mixed. Palestinians as well as East Bank Jordanians 
are represented. Generally, these are significantly more urban than 
rural 
– Type of activities: multi-purpose
– Engaging in financial and in-kind aid to orphans and poor, and 
mediation and reconciliation in the case of social conflicts in families 
or the local community 
– Educational activities on: a) religion; b) childhood development; c) 
marital relationships; d) social behavior in public space; e) health 
issues; f ) vocational training
– Mediation in employment seeking and income-generating projects 
for needy clients 
– Health institutions (clinics, hospitals)
– Educational institutions (kindergartens, schools, community college 
and university) 
25
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 2. Al-‘Afaf Welfare Association
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: Islamist. Established by prominent 
Islamist politician, former IAF secretary general and Muslim 
Brotherhood member Abdul Latif Arabiyyat. Tries to Islamize society 
by disseminating Islamist discourse on marriage and family issues
– Social background: mixed in terms of ethnic background. More urban 
than rural
– Types of activity: specialized in marriage issues
– Yearly mass weddings
– Educational activities on a) religion in conjunction with; b) childhood 
development; c) marital life; d) social behavior in public space (to a 
limited extend); e) health issues
 3. Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Welfare Association
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: Conservative. Established by Mrs. 
Madiha Kokh, former head of secondary girls’ school. Active in social 
and charitable work, strongly religiously motivated in a traditional 
sense associated with and promoted through notions of da‘wa, but 
with no explicit involvement in political Islam
– Social background: women, ethnically mixed, urban
– Type of Activity: multi-purpose
– Financial aid and aid in kind to the poor
– Reconciliation and mediation of conflicts within families
– Educational activities on a) religion; b) childhood development; c) 
marital relationships; d) health issues; e) vocational training
– Limited mediation in seeking employment for clients
 4. Islamic Samma Welfare Association
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: Conservative. Links with political 
Islam seemingly absent
– Social background: tribal and rural
– Type of activities: multi-purpose
– Financial and in kind aid to the needy
– Educational activities on a) religion; b) health issues; c) vocational 
training
– Income-generating projects for needy families
– Health institutions (dental clinic)
– Educational institutions (kindergarten)
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 5. Al-Faruq Welfare Association for Orphans
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: Progressive Muslim. No binding 
relationship with a particular Islamic doctrine, but generally in 
favor of a humanistic and liberal approach toward Islam that does 
not distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims, religious or 
secular in social relationships or public life. It disseminates religious 
discourse to clients and local public in order to promote such liberal 
and modernist understandings of religion. Not in favor of the Islamist 
movement. 
– Social background: mostly Palestinian (refugee-camp based), to a 
limited extent East Bank Jordanian (village based)
– Activities: multi-purpose
– Financial and in-kind aid to orphan families (i.e. families lacking a 
regular income-provider)
– Mediation of conflicts in families and local community
– Educational activities on a) religion; b) childhood development; c) 
marital relationship; d) social behavior in public space; e) health 
issues; f ) vocational training
– Health institutions (poly-clinic)
– Educational institutions (kindergarten and primary school)
– Income-generating projects for needy families
 6. Welfare Association for the Care of Orphans
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Conservative 
– Social background: Ethnic composition unknown. East Bank Jordanian 
presence seemingly dominant. Urban 
– Type of activities: specialized (orphanage institution)
– Educational activities for orphan children on: a) religion; b) childhood 
development; c) (future) marital life; d) social behavior in public life; e) 
health issues 
– Plans for vocational training and for income generating projects for 
orphans 
 7. Young Women’s Muslim Association
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Secular (very little Islamic 
discourse at the level of the organization, aside from fund-raising 
during Ramadan)
– Social background: mixed in all respects, including the religious 
– Type of activities: specialized
I n t r o d u c t I o n
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– School and vocational training institute for mentally handicapped 
children, adolescents and young adults, institute for training young 
women to teach the mentally handicapped and home training for 
families with mentally handicapped children
 8. Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Islamist. Established by ex-IAF 
parliamentarian and ex-ambassador to Iran, Bassam Umoush. 
Personal links with the Islamic Center Charity Society as well
– Social background: tribal (of the Bani Hassan tribe), and mostly urban
– Type of activities: multi-purpose
– Financial and in-kind aid
– Mediation in tribal and familial conflicts and feuds
– Educational activities on: a) religious education; b) childhood 
development; c) marital relationships; d) social behavior in public 
space; e) health issues; f ) vocational training; g) literacy course
– Income generating projects for the needy through micro-credits 
(planned)
 9. Islamic Educational Association
– Relationship with Islamic Discourse: Islamist. Established and headed 
by Abdul Baky Gammo, one of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood 
founders. More Islamist figures, including an IAF politician, involved
– Social background: mixed, but with a significant proportion of 
Chechens, including Gammo himself
– Activities: specialized. Kindergarten and primary school
– Financial aid: school enrollment against fees according to income of 
parents. The poorest enroll on a free of charge basis
– Special educational activities on: a) religious education; b) social 
behavior in public space; c) literacy course for adults, as well as all the 
regular school subjects
 10. Umar Ibn al-Khattab Welfare Association
– Relationship with Islamic Discourse: Conservative.
– Social background: mainly Palestinian, and urban-based.
– Activities: specialized. Orphanage
– Educational Activities on: a) religious education; b) childhood 
development; c) social behavior in public space; d) health issues
28
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 11. Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: predominantly secular. It is 
also engaged, however, in the dissemination of a modernist Islamic 
discourse on issues like social development, women’s rights and 
family planning
– Social background: mixed. Headed by Princess Basma
– Type of activities: multi-purpose
– Financial and in-kind aid
– Educational activities on: a) religious education in conjunction with; 
b) women’s issues and rights; c) childhood development; d) health 
issues, including reproductive health and care for the handicapped; e) 
vocational training
– Income-generating projects (micro-credits)
– Educational institutions (kindergartens)
 12. Questscope
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Secular (Islamic discourse absent 
at organizational level). However, it does cooperate with local Islamic 
NGOs and religious individuals, including Islamists
– Social background: UK-based international NGO with local staff in 
Jordan
– Type of activities: specialized. Target group: “Children at Risk” (children 
from broken and/or socially weak families dropping out from school 
and in danger of getting involved with crime)
– Educational activities (for children) on: a) childhood development, 
including counseling; b) vocational training; c) income-generating 
projects
 13. Islamic Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa Welfare Association
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Islamist. Established and 
dominated by Muslim Brotherhood members and others involved in 
the mainstream Islamist current
– Social background: mixed. Several East Bank Jordanian founders. 
However, urban-based Palestinians dominate active membership
– Type of activities: multi-purpose
– Financial and in-kind aid
– Mediation and reconciliation in conflicts in family and neighborhood
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– Educational activities on: a) religion (including political topics such as 
Palestine and Jerusalem); b) social behavior in public space; c) health 
issues; d) vocational training
 14. Islamic Welfare Association of Salt
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Conservative. Main founders 
state-employed ‘ulama’ (Islamic religious scholars)
– Social background: East Bank Tribes (from the city of Salt and 
surroundings)
– Type of Activities: multi-purpose, though educational ones dominate
– Financial and in-kind aid (in particular during Ramadan)
– Mediation and reconciliation in conflicts within family and 
neighborhood
– Educational activities on: a) religion; b) childhood- and youth 
development; c) marital relationship and gender; d) social behavior in 
public space; e) health issues; f ) vocational training
– Income-generating projects
– Educational institutions (kindergartens)
 15. Al-’Ihsan Welfare Association
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Islamist. Founder and head 
ex-employee of the Islamic Center Charity Society
– Social background: women, mainly urban and Palestinian
– Type of Activities: multi-purpose
– Mediation and reconciliation within family and neighborhood
– Educational activities on: a) religion; b) childhood development; 
c) marital relationships – both b) and c) on the basis of informal 
counseling; d) vocational training
– Limited income-generating project
 16. Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: Conservative as well as 
progressive elements. Founded by wa‘izah, or female mosque teacher, 
with the support of Questscope (see no. 12)
– Social background: women, urban and overwhelmingly Palestinian
– Type of Activities: Specialized. Focused on “Children at Risk” (cf. no. 12)
– Mediation and reconciliation in familial conflicts, through working 
with girls and their mothers
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– Educational activities on: a) religion, mostly in conjunction with; b) 
childhood development; c) marital relationships; d) social behavior in 
public space; e) (mental) health issues; f ) vocational training
– Income-generating handicraft project
 17. Southern Society for Special Education
– Relationship with Islamic discourse: uncertain. Founded by prominent 
figure of tribal society in Ma‘an.
– Social background: members of southern Jordanian tribes.
– Type of activities: specialized (care for the physically and mentally 
handicapped).
– Financial aid and in kind aid for the needy on occasional basis
– Educational activities on: a) childhood development (of handicapped 
children), religious discourse used in order to break the shame 
among families for having such children; b) marital relationships of 
the handicapped; c) health issues pertaining to handicaps; d) limited 
vocational training and income-generating project for deaf girls.
– Health institutions: polyclinic for the handicapped, including labs, 
diagnosis, medical treatment, physio- and speech therapy and 
outreach to families with handicapped members, including home 
training. Financial rates are according to income, and the poorest are 
diagnosed and treated free of charge
– Educational institutions: primary school for the deaf
 18. Al-’Aqsa Welfare Association
– Relation to Islamic discourse: Islamist, with outspoken progressive 
tendencies. Founded and headed by Nawal al-Fa‘uri, ex-IAF and 
ex-Muslim Brotherhood member who used to be the first woman 
representative in the IAF Shurah Council and who is at present 
member of the Islamic Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami). Promotes 
interpretation of Islam in favor of women’s and children’s rights
– Social background: women, and mainly East Bank Jordanians from the 
provincial town of Madaba and surroundings
– Type of Activities: multi-purpose
– Financial and in kind aid
– Educational activities on: a) religion, especially in conjunction with; 
b) childhood development; c) marital relationships and gender; d) 
health issues; e) vocational training; f ) literacy course
– Income generating projects (through micro-credits for needy families)
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– Educational institutions (primary school for the deaf, plans for 
secondary school and vocational training for the deaf )
 19. Orthodox Association in Fuheis
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: no such discourse, since it is 
Christian. Represents the Orthodox Christian community in a social/
communal, and not so much in a religious sense
– Social background: East Bank Orthodox Christians from Fuheis
– Type of activities: multipurpose.
– Financial and in-kind aid to the needy
– Cultural activities (theatre, music, singing)
– Educational institutions (nursery)
 20. Society of the Blessed
– Relationship to Islamic Discourse: uncertain
– Social background: urban, ethnic composition unknown
– Type of activities: specialized, focused on kindergarten
– Financial aid and in-kind (mainly during the two major Islamic feasts 
‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr)
– Educational activities on: religion (Qur’anic course for adults)
– Educational institution (kindergarten)
 21. Society for the Memorization of the Qur’an 
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: Islamist (established and run by 
Muslim Brotherhood figures)
– Social background: ethnically mixed, more urban then rural, centres 
segregated according to gender.
– Type of activities: specialized (in religious learning) 
– Financial and in-kind aid (during ‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr) 
– Educational activities on: a) religion (Qur’an, Hadith, Islamic ethics), 
also in conjunction with; b) family relations; c) social behavior in 
public space 
 22. Red Crescent Society in Salt
– Relationship to Islamic discourse: conservative 
– Social background: East Bank tribes from Salt
– Type of activities: specialized (orphanage for girls from families that 
rejected them)
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The Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation takes the concept of civil society as its main theoreti-
cal focus. In Part One, we deal with the relationship between Islam and civil 
society. In Chapter One, a closer analytical look is taken at the civil society 
concept as such. It will be discussed primarily as a realm that consciously 
organizes the socio-cultural lifeworld of citizens. In Chapter Two, we discuss 
how this concept can be applied to Muslim societies and to mainstream 
Islamist currents within the modern Middle East. In Chapter Three, we move 
on to the role of Islamist NGOs in the Arab world. Here we probe the degree 
to which these organizations exist as modern institutions reflecting hori-
zontal civic (middle class-based) networks; concomitantly, we also explore 
the degree to which the same organizations promote traditional hierarchies 
and patronage.
Part Two situates empowerment and patronage within the general 
context of power relations between state and (civil) society in Jordan. Chap-
ter One describes these relations from the perspective of state hegemony 
and patronage. In Chapter Two, the perspective of four prominent types 
of non-state sociopolitical actors in Jordan – political parties, professional 
associations, organizations representing employers and laborers, and the 
Islamist movement – is highlighted. Chapter Three describes and analyzes 
the Jordanian NGO sector.
Part Three focuses more closely on the religious discourses of Jor-
danian Muslim voluntary welfare associations. We explore how these dis-
courses reflect patterns of empowerment and/or patronage. Chapter One 
puts Islamic socio-economic ethics in a historical perspective. Chapter Two 
describes and analyzes religious motivations and social ideals in the dis-
course of associations affiliated to The Muslim Brotherhood. It also describes 
the views of non-Islamist outsiders regarding these associations, given the 
controversial nature of the Islamist movement and its social and political 
clout in Jordanian society among liberals, secularists and non-Muslims. 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five describe and analyze the role of Islam in the 
discourse of associations not affiliated to The Muslim Brotherhood.
Part Four deals with the socio-economic aspects of the Muslim asso-
ciations’ social activities and the ways in which they relate to patterns of 
empowerment and patronage. Chapter One deals with the provision of 
financial and in kind aid; while Chapter Two discusses those activities ori-
ented toward employment.
Part Five endeavours to establish the extent to which the associa-
tions’ cultural and educational activities reinforce notions of empowerment 
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or dependency. Chapter One describes several cultural activities. The fol-
lowing chapter presents the educational discourse of one Jordanian Muslim 
association that specializes in religious education as an example. Chapter 
Three provides a theoretical background regarding two rather different edu-
cational approaches within specific Arab and Islamic contexts. It illustrates 
these approaches with Muslim associations’ discourses and activities related 
to child development. Chapter Four deals with a variety of discourses and 
activities within the realm of gender relations.
In the Conclusion, we address the significance of Muslim NGOs’ vari-
ous discourses and practices as these relate to their role as institutions of 
Jordanian civil society. In particular, the relationships between these NGOs 
and the more general political and social realities of patronage and empow-
erment in Jordan will be discussed.
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1. The Concept of 
Civil Society
This chapter analyzes the concept of civil society from the perspec-
tives of various theoretical approaches. From the outset, we adopt a flexible 
and dynamic understanding of civil society as a realm of voluntary activity 
involving the commitment of citizens in an associational framework. From 
this basis, the present chapter begins by describing civil society as a distinct 
domain between state and economy. Then it discusses the issue of the nor-
mative basis of civil society. The chapter ends with an exploration of how 
individualistic and community-based approaches relate to the concept of 
civil society.
Civil Society as a Distinct Domain
Various interests, ideas and beliefs present in, and emanating from, 
a society are served and promoted by a selection of ways through the civil 
society framework. Human solidarity on a voluntary basis is a basic principle 
of any civil society. Primordial relations, by contrast, such as those of family, 
tribe, region, nation or religion do not necessarily form a part of civil soci-
ety. This is because, to a significant extent, membership in such groupings 
is simply of an ascribed nature (i.e. acquired by birth and/or blood-ties) and 
not based on voluntary choice. That does not mean, however, that tribal or 
religious life is by definition excluded from the realm of civil society. Within 
such spheres, people may very well engage in common voluntary activities 
to serve their aims, interests and convictions. Such voluntary engagement 
presupposes a kind of reflexive consciousness regarding values, ideals and 
preferences on the part of individual participants. However, the idea of indi-
vidual consciousness may not be lauded above all factors, as some liberals 
are inclined to do. No individual develops his or her values, ideals or prefer-
ences entirely detached from relations with other individuals and from the 
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general social, cultural, political and economic environment in which he or 
she lives. Reflexivity always has a strongly social and contextual dimension.
In order to be defined clearly, civil society must also stand in con-
tradistinction to other spheres of political being. Since the end of the 18th 
century, it has been defined mainly in contradistinction to the state. In this 
reading, civil society is the institutional and associational expression of soci-
ety vis-à-vis the state.1 By organizing themselves voluntarily, citizens create 
a realm in which their interests, ideas, beliefs and preferences are served 
and promoted in accordance with their own desires and choices. In other 
words, a kind of counterbalance against the domination of bureaucratic 
state institutions, who are inclined to impose their own points of view, laws 
and regulations on the social domain, is provided for. Such voluntary orga-
nizations may directly oppose state institutions and/or their policies, but do 
not necessarily have to do so. What all of them do achieve, however, is to 
contribute to an institutionalized societal and cultural domain that is, to a 
greater or lesser extent, autonomous from the state.
According to certain political and social scientists, civil society should 
be distinguished from the realm of the economy as well. Cohen and Arato, 
for instance, regard civil society as the whole set of conscious, institutional-
ized and organized expressions of the “lifeworld.”2 By this term, they mean 
the socio-cultural realm of everyday human relationships, cooperation and 
solidarity guided by norms, values and cultural traditions in which individ-
ual identities are formed. Interpersonal communication is the rule in this 
sphere. This definition of lifeworld is borrowed from the German philoso-
pher Jürgen Habermas, who distinguishes it from what he considers as the 
two subsystems of state and economy. Both of these subsystems, Cohen 
and Arato argue (after Habermas), function in ways that are fundamentally 
different from the lifeworld. Neither is oriented toward social life with its cul-
tural norms, but rather is oriented toward empirical interests to be served as 
effectively and systematically as possible. In the case of the state, this inter-
est is power, which is served through a hierarchical system of sub and super-
ordination linked ultimately to negative sanctions exercised by the higher 
ranks in this system. In the case of the economy, the interest is financial 
gain – an interest that is served through systems of exchange and economic 
efficiency. In the sub-systems of state and economy, we find communicative 
patterns that are characterized by a “certain automatism,” and that share a 
more impersonal and formal nature than occurs in communication within 
the lifeworld.3
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Modern civil societies, according to Cohen and Arato, emerge when 
processes of differentiation within the lifeworld take place. Such processes of 
mutual distinction occur between factions that used to exist within one and 
the same institutional sphere. This applies to the realm of socialization, in 
which differentiation has taken place between family, on the one hand, and 
school education on the other. It applies equally to the realm of social inte-
gration, which is divided into various groups, collectives and associations. In 
the sphere of cultural reproduction, differentiation has taken place between 
the religious, the artistic and the scientific. Even the basic constituents of the 
spheres of personality, society and culture stand as differentiated from one 
another. In this process, personal identities and interpersonal relations are 
freed from the unquestionable acceptance of traditional values and institu-
tions. The production of culture is freed from the dominance of external 
social institutions. Not surprisingly, such a process results in the emergence 
of a more critical and reflexive relationship to tradition. Reflexive forms of 
association, publicity, solidarity and identity come into being. On the level 
of communication, norms, established patterns and definitions of situations 
are questioned and reinterpreted by the members of the society. Such a pro-
cess results also in a new type of voluntary association, with equal rights of 
membership, freed from kinship, patriarchal and other ascriptive restrictions 
on belonging and holding office. This type of association renews its forms of 
solidarity primarily in the free interaction of its present members.4
Such a modern civil society needs to be secured by rights that are 
legally codified.5 It also implies that, unlike in traditional settings, the tasks 
of administration of the society is separated from the lifeworld and left to 
specialized state institutions, and that the economic tasks are left to the 
enterprises and companies of the market. In this way, the lifeworld will be 
freed from the burden of the patterns of communication essential to the 
two subsystems. The latter, in turn, need also to be institutionally anchored 
within the lifeworld if they are to be responsive to its needs and demands.6
Another renowned civil society theoretician, John Keane, disagrees 
with the exclusion of the realm of the economy from that of civil society. He 
argues that the aspect of satisfaction of the material conditions of life can-
not be separated from the realm of civil society. Furthermore, he criticizes 
the proponents of a conceptual differentiation between economy and civil 
society for wrongly presuming that, in economic life, interpersonal solidar-
ity, cultural norms and social values play no role. To refute this, he points to 
phenomena of human solidarity within economic life, such as workers’ trade 
unions, the involvement of businessmen in charities or other social endeav-
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ors and the importance of social norms like trust, reliability, punctuality, 
honesty, friendship, group commitment and non-violent mutual recogni-
tion for any well-functioning market economy. On the other hand, Keane 
also acknowledges that market forces are, of themselves, blind to the social 
consequences of their own economic logic. Such consequences may be 
adverse for many individuals, social groups or even entire regions, leading 
to their marginalization and exclusion, he affirms. Furthermore, Keane con-
tinues: “market forces tend to spread into every nook and cranny of social 
life, thereby violating its plurality of voices and identities.” He concludes by 
saying that, in the final event, markets and civil societies depend on one 
another for the existence of each.7
While his conclusion may be valid, Keane’s argument overlooks the 
fact that a similar interdependence also exists between civil society and 
state, or at least a state that displays at least a minimum of accountabil-
ity and responsiveness toward the needs, interests and opinions within the 
society of which it forms a part. It is generally presumed that civil society 
cannot be anarchic, but rather needs the administrative and legal framework 
of the state in order to exist. In turn, state institutions that are supposed to 
be accountable and effective in administering and serving the needs of the 
society are, like the market itself, in need of socio-cultural norms of trust, reli-
ability, group commitment and non-violent mutual recognition. This applies 
to their internal functioning as well as to their relationships with (different 
sectors of ) the (civil) society and the economy. Basing his observations on 
the workings of regional governments in Italy, the American political scien-
tist Robert Putnam observes that, in settings where people are more pre-
pared to act collectively to achieve their shared goals (i.e. where there is a 
great measure of social capital and dense civic networks), state institutions 
as well as markets operate more effectively.8 For sure, modernity also knows 
the phenomenon of unaccountable states. The totalitarian state, in its pure, 
ideal-typical form, does not know anything like an autonomous civil soci-
ety or public sphere. Unresponsive states without any connection to a civil 
society and devoid of civic norms may assume a monstrous and tyrannical 
character in relation to their citizens, but so do unrestrained and socially 
dis-embedded markets in relation to, in particular, the more vulnerable sec-
tions of society.
In my view, the system/lifeworld dichotomy is most useful for the sake 
of analytical distinction. That is to say it allows us to distinguish between dif-
ferent kinds of communication and practice, which spring from the basic 
mechanisms of the (respective) realms of lifeworld, state, and economy. Such 
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an analytical distinction, however, should not lead us mistakenly to posit that 
there exists an actual separation between these three realms. Socio-cultural 
norms derived from the lifeworld are necessary for the effective, account-
able and socially responsible way of functioning of the institutions of state 
and market alike. And indeed, the persons working in both subsystems are 
rooted in the lifeworld and have lifeworld-related orientations, norms and 
interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, we have the intermediary institutions 
of political parties, on the one hand, and trade unions, chambers of indus-
try and commerce and employers’ organizations on the other. These institu-
tions can be regarded, in my view, as civil society institutions, since they are 
bodies of voluntary activity in which human solidarity for common interests 
and purposes is organized. Their activities and purposes, at the same time, 
reside within the subsystems of the state and economy respectively. How-
ever, these considerations do not alter the fact that such subsystems have 
their own operational logic, distinct from the lifeworld. This logic represents 
mechanisms – bureaucracy, hierarchic domination and economic efficiency 
for the sake of profit-making- that threaten the independence and integ-
rity of the civil society and lifeworld, if such mechanisms are not rendered 
responsive to the latter. As a matter of fact, the mechanisms of bureaucratic 
administration and profit-oriented efficiency do penetrate the institutions 
of modern civil society to varying degrees.
The Normative Dimension of Civil Society
Besides the institutional aspects of civil society, there is the norma-
tive dimension of civility – by which I mean a spirit of non-violence, mutual 
tolerance and respect. Civil society institutions are supposed to deal with 
one another and with citizens in general in such a spirit, regardless of differ-
ences in belief, political conviction, lifestyle and organizational affiliation.9 
There are scholars who prefer not to include this criterion of civility in the 
definition of a civil society institution. Political scientist Berthold Kuhn, for 
instance, is of the opinion that confining the concept of civil society to those 
actors proven to be democracy-friendly and non-violent is problematic, 
because such criteria cannot be accurately measured. To illustrate this point, 
he points to an organization like Greenpeace, often considered an example 
of a transnationally operating civil society force, yet capable of considerable 
violence in some of their more spectacular acts.10 Dropping the criterion of 
civility implies that organizations such as Neo-Nazi-groups, the Italian Red 
Brigades, the Ku Klux Klan, Mafia organizations and Al-Qa‘ida are all to be 
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counted among the forces of civil society, as long as their membership and 
their activities, including violent ones, have a voluntary basis and emanate 
from the grassroots of society.
The inclusion of civility among the criteria for membership in civil 
society certainly carries complications. Yet, at the very least, we might state 
that the prevalence of a spirit of civility is essential for the maintenance of 
a stable, inclusive and pluralist civil society and is, thus, a necessary ingre-
dient of it. It is important to realize, however, that (collective) actors may 
emerge in the realm of civil society that are not so civil in terms of their final 
objectives and even some of their current activities. Keane has elaborated 
on this issue. As far as final objectives are concerned, he points to 19th and 
20th century European history during which the “energies of groups, such as 
missionary movements and religious and trade union associations… fought 
for their right to survive and thrive as civil associations by using univer-
salist language that threatened the principle of plurality upon which civil 
societies thrive.”11 He emphasizes that any civil society is beset by tension, 
conflicts and contradictions between interests. In this vein, he asserts, civil 
society tends to paralyze and undermine its own pluralism.12 These tensions 
and conflicts constitute also civil society’s endogenous sources of incivility. 
Violence, according to Keane, is not simply “the anti-thesis of civil society;” 
rather, he claims that every known form of civil society tends to produce 
this same violent antithesis, thereby preventing it from becoming a haven 
of non-violent harmony.”13 
The case of Islamist currents in the Middle East shows us as well that 
the same ideology or even the same movement can give rise to peaceful and 
civil as well as to violent and uncivil trends. My own judgment is that, since 
the concept of civility does provide an important normative framework for 
a modern, democratic and pluralist civil society, the activities of civil society 
actors must conform to a minimum of civility in order to be classified within 
the realm of civil society. A certain tolerance and respect for the rights of 
others is basic in this regard. Groups whose main objectives and types of 
action contradict this distance themselves from the realm of civil society. 
However, as is the case with the system/lifeworld divide, while a distinction 
between civility and incivility can be drawn, there is no clear dividing line 
between the two phenomena. Civility may disintegrate or degenerate into 
incivility, and incivility may evolve into civility under certain circumstances. 
Yet, consensus on where the boundaries between civility and incivility lie 
is non-existent. Whether Greenpeace crosses the line of civility by taking 
physical action against objects and devices that pollute the maritime envi-
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ronment is a question that will always give rise to disagreement. To put it 
in more general terms: criteria for inclusion in the realm of civil society will 
never be precise and universally accepted, and there will always be a mea-
sure of doubt in this regard.
Civil Society: Individualistic or Communitarian?
The concept of civility relates primarily to peaceful relations among 
the individual members as well as the organizations of (civil) society them-
selves, rather than to the institutional relationship with the state as well 
as with the economy.14 This dimension touches upon another kind of con-
tradistinction: that which exists between civil society and the individual. 
Civil society is supposed to transcend the naked self-interest and egoism 
of individuals by providing for solidarity within associational frameworks. 
Virtually all classical political and social theoreticians – Saint-Simon, Comte, 
Tocqueville and Durkheim, etc. – tried to discern an associational realm for 
citizens situated between, on the one hand, “unbridled individualism” and 
the “atomization of the competitive market society,” and, on the other, a 
“state-dominated existence.”15 Hegel elaborated on this theme in particular. 
He adopted Immanuel Kant’s notion of the individual as a bearer of rights 
as well as the singular agent of moral conscience, an ethos that transcends 
individuality.16 The latter ethos should, according to Hegel, be cultivated 
through social integration of individuals in what he called “corporations:” 
voluntary associations where egoistic motivations of individuals would give 
way to collective concerns and identifications, and where individuals would 
be educated to internalize the common good and develop civic virtue.17 
This approach to good and peaceful relations between the members 
of (civil) society implies a much more active understanding of the idea of a 
civilized society than a mere cool indifference to people who are “different” 
in political conviction, religion, lifestyle, ethnic origin, and so forth. Such 
an understanding seems also to fit better with the societal visions of Isla-
mist movements, Islamic intellectuals and Muslim NGOs, who start from the 
principle of al-amr bil-ma‘ruf wal-nahy ‘an al-munkar (to order the good and 
to forbid the evil). As an illustration, the following statement by Ali Kettani, 
Secretary General of the Islamic Academy of Sciences in Rabat, Morocco, 
may serve:
I would like to differentiate between the Western concept of civil society, based 
on liberty and freedom, and that of the East, based on social justice, equality, 
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between people of different religious and ethnic backgrounds, and responsi-
bility for righting wrongs. Responsibility is an Islamic obligation. According to 
the Hadith, a person should change whatever is wrong with his hand (i.e. by his 
deeds), with his tongue (i.e. by words), or, if these prove to be impossible, at 
least with his heart.18 
Apart from the question of how such religious ideals relate to social 
practice, which is invariably problematic, Kettani touches upon two differ-
ent normative approaches toward the civil society concept. A civil society 
defined by individual freedom and liberties (often negatively formulated 
in terms of a rejection of interference by state and community) is contrast-
ed with a communitaristic one based upon religious injunctions regarding 
social responsibilities and justice. This raises the question of how a liberal 
civil society, based primarily on “individual liberty” relates to a religiously 
inspired civil society, based on “moral and social responsibility:” a “rights”-
based approach versus a “duty”-based approach. A political scientist like 
Christopher Bryant perceives a clear difference between the two types of 
(civil) society in terms of civility. According to him, civility “demands that 
in all of life outside the home, we afford each other certain decencies and 
comforts as fellow citizens, regardless of other differences between us.”
Bryant continues to observe, however, that “it [civility] is…a cool con-
cept. It does not require us to like those we deal with civilly, and as such 
it contrasts strongly with the warmth of communal, religious or national 
enthusiasms.”19 It may seem that, with their emphasis on social and moral 
duties for all individual members of society, such enthusiasm is at odds with 
a liberal pluralist approach in which the freedom, independence and pri-
vacy of the individual are central values. However, the search for a balance 
between individual liberties and collective duties has long been conducted 
by Muslims, Christians, Jews and secular people in Western and Muslim soci-
eties alike. There is no reason to think that the two approaches – one focus-
ing on individual liberties and the other on collective duties – are mutually 
incompatible.
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2. Islam/Islamism and 
Civil Society
The relationship between Islam, including Islamist movements, 
and civil society has been the subject of extensive academic debate, with 
some scholars under the impression that Islam and civil society remain fun-
damentally incompatible. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those 
who claim that, if properly implemented, Islam inherently leads to strong, 
effective and flourishing civil societies. In between the two poles, there are 
those who acknowledge the possibility as well as actual existence of “Islamic 
civil societies,” but posit no single and unequivocal relationship between 
Islam and civil society. Instead, they see positive as well as negative Islam-
ic phenomena and tendencies in terms of civil society principles. Roughly 
speaking, since I am not in favor of essentialist observations regarding the 
relationship between Islam and civil society (wholly positive or definitively 
negative approaches simplify the matter equally), this thesis identifies with 
the middle path. In this chapter, an overview of (some of ) these different 
approaches is given. This will be followed by my own analytical observations 
on the subject.
Islam as an Obstacle to Civil Society
Certain Western orientalists and Arab secularist thinkers join forces to 
argue that the Islamic religious establishment has always constituted a seri-
ous hindrance to the development of a truly civil society in the Middle East. 
Established orientalist scholars like Bernard Lewis and Eli Kedouri suggest, 
for instance, that Islamic law is inherently totalitarian and, thus, prevents 
the emergence of strong societal institutions able to check the tyranny of 
rulers.
Differently, though also pessimistic, scholars like Ernest Gellner and 
John Hall argue that Islamic law reflects the view of a tribal society that 
is, by definition, hostile towards established state authority. This hostility 
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prevents the emergence of stable states in the region and thereby also pre-
cludes the development of stable democracies and civil societies.1 Accord-
ing to Gellner, the traditional secular Muslim rulers were often weak since 
they lacked legitimacy in terms of the shari‘ah, the sacred law that was the 
domain of the ‘ulama’ (Muslim religious scholars), who constituted the reli-
gious leadership of the Muslim community. Due to this lack of legitimacy, 
he maintains, Muslim societies were always strong vis-à-vis the state, but 
that did not make them civil societies. The urban associations in those soci-
eties were of a “segmentary” nature, implying that their membership was 
ascribed by birth and therefore involuntary. Moreover, economic security 
and autonomy of citizens is, according to Gellner, a basic condition for the 
existence of any civil society. This has been lacking in non-Western, specifi-
cally Muslim societies, however, where rulers extort or confiscate the wealth 
of their subjects at whim.2 In the views of scholars like Gellner, the notion 
and reality of civil society originate in certain politico-social developments 
embedded in Western history and, therefore, cannot be applied to the Mus-
lim World.
Scholars in the Arab world are also skeptical of a Muslim civil society 
ever being realised. Indeed, in blaming Islam and its religious institutions for 
the prevalence of the despotic states in Middle Eastern history, the views of 
a selection of prominent Arab scholars, like al-Tahir Labib and Aziz al-Azmeh, 
resemble those of Lewis and Kedouri. Both sets of scholars draw attention to 
the historical legitimization of authoritarian rule in the name of Islam by reli-
giously sanctioned paradigms like the duty of obedience. Such paradigms 
were employed by religious establishments in order to promote reactionary 
religious ideologies that have generally served the interests of the rulers.3
These scholars usually exclude modern Islamist movements from their 
definitions of civil society, since they regard them as present manifestations 
of an authoritarian Islamic tradition. Al-Azmeh is vocal in criticizing Islam-
ist movements for having a populist totalitarian discourse that contradicts, 
according to him, true liberal democracy. He maintains that this discourse is 
based upon essentialist premises, defined solely in Islamic religious terms, 
regarding the “true character and identity” of “the people.” Their unitary con-
ception of society and the popular will, according to al-Azmeh, dismisses all 
contradictory interests as running counter to their understanding of soci-
ety’s essential character.4
Moreover, al-Azmeh argues, the approach of Islamists toward women 
demonstrates that their vision of an essentially Islamic society is bound up 
with notions of a traditional and patriarchal order. This order is character-
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ized by personal ties and loyalties based upon principles of allegiance and 
obedience.5
Islam as the Benefactor of Civil Society
Vehemently opposing the theories of the Western orientalists and 
aforementioned Arab secularists, we find other Arab figures who point to 
a long history of civil society in the more urbanized parts of the Arab and 
Muslim worlds. Basing their arguments on the cultural importance of turath 
(heritage), these scholars postulate that, despite – or perhaps because of 
– many occasions in which medieval and early modern Muslim authorities 
abused their religion for selfish purposes, such authorities were, in places 
like Egypt, the fertile crescent and North Africa, also opposed traditionally by 
a strong Islamic civil society under the guardianship of religious institutions 
and figures. This civil society, termed by them as mujtama‘ ahli (“popular” or 
“peoples” society), was composed of institutions like guilds that organized 
craftsmen, awqaf (endowments) aimed to serve the public good, cultural 
associations and religious groupings. These institutions used to integrate 
individuals, families and social groups in their networks. The latter protected 
the members of the community and constituted a sphere that was relatively 
autonomous vis-à-vis state-power. Through this medieval/early modern 
mujtama‘ ahli, Islam preserved its emancipatory essence. Real suppres-
sion of the Islamic umma (community of believers) with its civil institutions 
came only with the establishment of non-religious political authorities in 
the Arab-Islamic world, in particular the 20th century modern nation-state. 
Democracy and civil society in the Arab world can, according to this school 
of thought, only be (re-) established through a revival of this Islamic citizens’ 
society.6 Arab academic thinkers who follow this line of thought are often 
sympathetic to the moderate Islamist movement with its voluntary associa-
tions and institutions, which they see as a revival of the old mujtama‘ ahli.
Differences can be noted, though, in such thinkers’ views on the role 
of contemporary Islamic civil society and Islamist movements. Saif al-Din 
Abd al-Fattah Ismail, a political scientist at Cairo University, regards a revival 
of the mujtama‘ ahli in modern form as the only possible means to over-
come “the crisis of politics in the Arab world.”7 In regard to traditional forms 
of association, like tribal and familial groups, Ismail would like to preserve 
their positive elements (mutual support and security for the individual), 
while rejecting the negative elements of factionalism and nepotism.8 Here, 
the preservation of Arab and Islamic authenticity requires the “democrat-
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ic” implementation of the shari‘ah and the reduction of foreign influence 
among the “interests of the ’ummah” (community of believers), in addi-
tion to the struggle against the authoritarian state.9 For Ismail, the role of 
contemporary Islamist movements, as prominent participants in voluntary 
associations and institutions, is vital if the mujtama‘ ahli is to be revived.10 
On the other hand, his desire for an ’ummah that remains unified against 
threats from state power as well as from the forces of foreign domination 
ensures he seeks cooperation with non-Islamist political and civil forces. As a 
result, he advocates a “new social contract” to overcome the divisive intellec-
tual and political dichotomy of secular versus religious.11 Only such an alli-
ance, from Ismail’s perspective, will generate a civil society strong enough 
to resist the intervention and corruption of state authority both from within 
and without.12
Unlike Ismail, Hebba Rauf Izzat, a political science researcher at Cairo 
University and outspoken Islamist dismisses secular forces, like the leftists 
or the liberals, as politically and socially insignificant representatives of Arab 
and Muslim society. For Izzat, the Islamists represent the authentic commu-
nal spirit by virtue of their ideas. Accordingly, she points to the Islamists’ suc-
cess at developing economic, political and cultural services for Arab-Islamic 
populations as proof of their cultural authenticity. The prevailing division 
between secular nation-state and religious societies, by contrast, Izzat views 
as a deviation from the historical Arab-Islamic world. The role of a contem-
porary mujtama‘ ahli or Islamic civil society she describes as a temporary and 
transitional one: to preserve the continuity of the ’ummah and put political 
pressure on the secular state. In the end, however, when state and society 
are completely Islamized, the mujtama‘ ahli will lose its relevance and an 
organic unity between state and society will prevail.13
Historian Khalid Ziyada from Beirut University, however, envisions a 
permanent role for a modern version of an indigenous mujtama‘ ahli in a 
more democratic and just Arab world. According to him, there needs to be 
a conscious revival of the historically rooted division between, on the one 
hand, the state (as protector of order) and, on the other, the intermediary 
civil sphere (as the liberal arena in Arab and Muslim societies).14
Not only academics, but prominent Islamist political figures, like the 
exiled leader of the Tunisian Islamic Al-Nahda (Renaissance) party, Rashid al-
Ghanuchi, passionately uphold the affinity between Islam and civil society. 
To summarize, al-Ghanuchi argues that it was Islam alone that elevated peo-
ple from a state of involuntary and instinctive belonging to tribes to a state 
of voluntary allegiance to an Islamic society. For al-Ghanuchi, this society is 
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solely based on a faith that individuals embrace freely. It is administered by 
a state whose relationship with its citizens is based on bay‘ah, or a contract 
by which citizens entrust a ruler with the task to order and to forbid.15 This 
authority is, in turn, bound by Islamic law.
The Islamic faith has, according to al-Ghanuchi, a profound civilizing 
influence on believers. Therefore, it consolidates civil society. Islam declares 
all humans to be equal creations of the one and only Lord. It judges them 
according to their deeds and encourages them all to make the best use 
of God’s creation. This creation is God’s bounty from which no human is 
excluded. The authority of religion in the Islamic society is founded on the 
free exercise of ijtihad (individual interpretation) of the Islamic sources by 
the religious scholars. It is, however, the people who, on an individual basis 
as well as collectively through a freely elected parliament, decide which 
religious interpretation is to be adopted. Furthermore, Islam endows the 
believers with a conscience and a sense of responsibility to enjoin good and 
forbid evil. According to al-Ghanuchi, religious values – and, in particular, 
those relating to the concept of taqwah (fear and deference of God) – form 
the best guarantor of a civil and compassionate spirit in society. In contrast, 
secularized Western societies have, to a great extent, lost this spirit. This has 
led to the prevalence of undesirable phenomena like materialism, selfish-
ness, racism and senseless violence that invariably threaten the functioning 
of civil society. Only religion and piety, according to al-Ghanuchi, may bring 
the necessary balance, justice and peace to society. Interestingly, however, 
al-Ghanuchi avowedly prefers a secular democratic system to any kind of 
despotism, even if the latter claims to be Islamic. But his ideal remains the 
Islamic democratic system of shurah (consultation).16 In that system, the free 
and flexible exercise of ijtihad regarding the interpretation of Qur’an and 
Hadith provides the religious basis of political pluralism, freedom of expres-
sion and a representative multi-party state. A powerful belief in religiously 
sanctioned freedom even prompts al-Ghanuchi to accept parties upholding 
atheist doctrines, notably the Communists.17 His socio-political thought is 
extremely influential among moderate Islamist circles in the Arab world, as 
well as in Arab migrant communities in the West.
The Middle of the Roaders
As we have seen, when pondering the relationship between civil soci-
ety and Islam, scholars often adopt diametrically opposing positions: Islam 
either is, or is not, fundamentally compatible with the notion of civil society. 
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As in any debate, however, there exists a middle party consisting of those 
who prefer not to identify with either extreme. Yet, here too, among these 
“middle of the roaders,” there is to be found a wide diversity of views.
Civil Society as a Means rather than an End 
Some scholars view Islamist movements as actual phenomena of civil 
societies in the Arab and Muslim world that play a powerful role there, but 
find it hard to see a correspondence between these movements’ ultimate 
aims and the principles that underlie pluralist civil societies.
Emmanuel Sivan mentions several methods and strategies applied 
by Islamist movements in civil society. Among these he includes the estab-
lishment of voluntary associations that provide services to the needy, the 
creation of autonomous spaces in the realms of education, economy and 
banking where the shari‘ah is to be applied, and the ubiquity of public insti-
tutions like mosques and the legal system. However, Sivan also points to 
methods applied by Islamists that are questionable, to say the least, from 
a liberal point of view of civility. He mentions, for instance, vigilante-style 
actions to enforce “proper” Islamic behavior in terms of ritual life, dress and 
abstinence from “sinful” forms of entertainment, such as drinking alcohol. 
According to Sivans, Islamists use a mixture of persuasion and intimida-
tion in this endeavor; at times, they indulge in acts of outright violence. 
As regards the final political aims of the Islamists, Sivan observes that they 
wish to seize state power in order to use all means and modalities at the dis-
posal of the modern state (i.e. media, education and all other kinds of public 
institutions) to Islamize society completely. In Sivan’s view, the Islamists will 
liquidate democratic liberties in the name of the shari‘ah. Clearly, this entails 
a restriction of the sphere of civil society, even as compared with the present 
situation, and especially with regard to formal institutions.18
Distinguishing Moderates from Radicals
Other scholars tend to distinguish between different categories of 
Islamists as regards the civil society concept. Usually, “moderate” Islamists 
are distinguished from “radical” ones. Roughly speaking, the moderates 
correspond in discourse and practice to civil society norms and principles, 
while the radicals contradict these. The scholar who best represents this line 
of thought is perhaps Ahmed S. Mousalli, a political scientist at the American 
University of Beirut.
Mousalli reproaches the West at large for its one-sided approach 
towards the so-called Islamic fundamentalist danger. He points out that 
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Islamic fundamentalism is an “umbrella term for a wide range of activist 
discourses that tends to move from a high level of moderate pluralism, 
and thus inclusive democracy, to extreme radicalism, intolerant unitarian-
ism, and thus exclusive majority rule.” Indeed, according to Mousalli, most 
mainstream Islamist groups in the Arab world are pluralistic, democratic and 
inclusive. While only a minority of the fundamentalists are “truly exclusivist 
and adhere to the notion of change through radical programs and uncom-
promising revolutions.”19
Moderate fundamentalist trends demand to participte in the existing 
political system and societal institutions. According to Mousalli, the mod-
erate trend genuinely sees its involvement in civil society and its calls for 
pluralism as the road to salvation of the community and of individuals. In his 
view, the moderates are also generally willing to engage in a dialogue with 
the Western world.20 This implies that moderate Islamist involvement in civil 
society is not merely a matter of tactics, but a strategic and normative choice 
that also determines their ultimate political aims.
Another example of a scholar who distinguishes radical, intolerant 
and violent versions of Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamism as he prefers 
to call it) from more moderate and civil ones is Mustafa Kamil al-Sayyid, a 
political scientist based at the University of Cairo. However, his approach 
toward traditional Islamic institutions as well as modern Islamist movements 
in Egypt, including the moderate among them, seems to be more critical 
than that of Mousalli. Pointing to authoritarian and intolerant tendencies 
among certain Islamist movements, al-Sayyid lists instances and incidents 
of censorship, intimidation and assassination by Islamist groups (including 
the more moderate voices), against all opponents – in particular, he singles 
out writers, intellectuals and artists. Egyptian society, according to him, is 
presently ruled over by an arbitrary and oppressive government, while her 
civil society is increasingly dominated by Islamists with tenuous claims to 
pluralist democracy.21
This does not lead al-Sayyid to exclude a priori religious institutions 
and actors from the arena of civil society, however. For him, associations of 
religious scholars, mosque communities and parishes belong to civil society 
in much the same was as political parties, trade unions and women’s move-
ments do. In this vein, he argues for a more pragmatic and rational response 
to Islamist movements. The integration of moderate forces among the latter 
in civil and political society should not be prohibited, since al-Sayyid regards 
the disunity between secular and religious civil society forces as one of the 
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major obstacles to political liberalization. This disunity allows the existing 
authoritarian regimes to retain their hegemonic position.22
Norms of Civil Behavior
Scholars like the Egyptian political scientist Hassanain Taufiq, Ameri-
can political scientist Mahmood Monshipouri and Egyptian sociologist Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim see possibilities for including Islamist movements in the realm 
of civil society, provided that they conduct themselves according to civil 
norms. Thus, Islamists must tolerate multiple understandings of Islam and 
society, abstain from the use of violence and respect human rights. Accord-
ing to Taufiq, the realms of civil society and the public sphere must be broad 
enough to entertain free debate on questions of state structure, religion in 
politics and the Islamist response to the crisis of democracy.23 Monshipouri 
notes progress in the Islamist camp and optimistically observes that: “Islam-
ists’ views on the relationship among state, economy and society have been 
seriously rethought. Islamists treat democracy as a standard and universal 
good. They advocate a free market economy and, in Augustus Richard Nor-
ton’s words, “certainly have at least a foothold in civil society.”24
Saad Eddin Ibrahim believes that, under the right democratic condi-
tions, the Islamists may evolve into something akin to the Christian Demo-
crats in Europe or the religious parties in Israel. In his analysis, the 1980s 
and 1990s witnessed a revitalization and growth of the realm of civil society 
in the Arab world. This was due to certain factors: the growth of a better-
educated middle class; the Arab states’ inability to manage conflicts in the 
region successfully; the latter’s failure to meet the socio-economic needs of 
their populations; and the global wave of democratization. Ibrahim notes 
that while such conditions of crisis spurred civil society organizations in the 
Arab world to pressure states for greater liberalization, they also led to the 
rise of Islamic militancy. He speaks of a “three way race” between autocratic 
regimes, Islamic activists and civil society organizations. “One variant of the 
race,” according to Ibrahim, “has been the squeezing of civil society out of 
the public arena by autocratic regimes on the one hand and by Islamic activ-
ists on the other. In another variant,” he continues, “[b]oth the autocratic 
regimes and Islamic activists have attempted to win over or appropriate civil 
society organizations.”25 At the same time, he acknowledges that Islamist 
movements like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have opted for peaceful 
means in pursuing their objectives. They created in fact new organizations 
of civil society through their activities of teaching, preaching and grass-
roots work in service provision.26
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Islamic Activism and the Modernization of Society
Having surveyed a range of views on the relationship between Islam, 
Islamist movements, and the notion of civil society, we now turn to the 
impact of modernization on the role of Islamist movements in civil socie-
ties. American scholar John L. Esposito and his French colleague Gilles Kepel 
hold widely cited views on the matter. While holding certain reservations 
concerning their optimistic assessments of these movements’ prospects, the 
present thesis is to a significant extent inspired by their approaches.
According to Esposito, the political, military and socio-economic 
failures of modern secular states in the Muslim world have generated the 
resurgence of Islam as a significant socio-political alternative. Islamic move-
ments thus offer an Islamic solution as a third alternative to capitalism and 
communism. Such movements are convinced “that a modern Western bias 
or orientation, secularism and dependence on Western models of develop-
ment have proven politically inadequate and socially corrosive, undermin-
ing the identity and moral fabric of Muslim societies.”
Islamic movements, Esposito suggests, have their main membership 
base among the modern educated younger generation of professionals and 
students and among the lower middle class. These groups feel deprived of 
their social, economic and political rights by the state. They are Islamically-
oriented members of a modernizing society and committed to social and 
political activism to create a more Islamic society or governmental system. 
A small, but significant minority among them have become militant, turn-
ing to violence to overthrow existing governments, seize power and impose 
their vision of an Islamic order upon society. The majority of them, however, 
are committed to peaceful activity within civil society.
This peace-keeping majority has pursued its strategy of Islamiza-
tion of society from the bottom up through participating in, and eventually 
dominating existing civil society institutions such as the professional asso-
ciations, as well as establishing their own civil institutions and associations, 
such as charitable associations as well as whole networks of hospitals, clinics, 
mosques, day-care centers, youth clubs, legal aid societies, foreign language 
schools, banks, drug rehabilitation programs and publishing houses. These 
initiatives have become part and parcel of the mainstream of civil society in 
Muslim countries. The Islamic private voluntary associations that carry them 
have filled a void left by the state. They are an implicit critique on the inabil-
ity of the state to provide adequate services, in particular to the non-elite 
sectors of society, and an alternative to expensive private institutions as well 
as to low-quality, overcrowded public facilities. They also provide a sense of 
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community identity as well as spiritual and religious renewal. Islamic social 
activism has won many political supporters and votes in election time for 
the Islamist political parties in many Muslim countries, among the poor and 
unemployed as well as among the middle classes.27
Esposito points to the fact that in the relatively closed political sys-
tems of the Muslim world, Islamist forces have often constituted the only 
viable voice and vehicle for opposition. This being the case, they attract 
votes not only from ideologically motivated sympathizers but also from 
those who simply want to protest against the existing corrupt and authori-
tarian establishment. In a truly open political system, where strong civil soci-
ety institutions can foster the growth of competing opposition parties, the 
Islamists will lose their monopoly on opposition. As he states, “promotion of 
the values and institutions of civil society is the hedge against the perpetu-
ation of a culture of authoritarianism, secular or religious.” In this regard, 
he mentions actual phenomena of Islamist parties who have adapted their 
ideology and programs to prevalent and basically secular notions of democ-
racy, human rights and citizenship. They do so in order to compete for votes 
in relatively free elections in countries like Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Turkey, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The underlying reason is that these parties have to 
take diverse interests and constituencies into account in a relatively open 
political climate.
Not only at the level of party politics, but also in intellectual life, 
debates are taking place in the Muslim world in which the Islamic tradition 
is rethought in respect to the issue of pluralism. They are conducted against 
the backdrop of modern global discourses on human rights, democracy and 
citizenship in the Muslim world itself, as well as the permanent presence 
of Muslim migrant communities in the Western world. Esposito mentions 
names like Rashid al-Ghanuchi, Muhammad Selim al-‘Awa, Yusuf Qaradawi, 
Anwar Ibrahim, Abdulrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid. They have pro-
duced a growing body of literature in which they reinterpret Islamic princi-
ples to reconcile Islam with democracy and political multi-party systems.28 
As Esposito shows, these thinkers also come up with more liberal and egali-
tarian interpretations of the Islamic sources regarding the status of non-
Muslims in Muslim society.
Regarding gender relations, Esposito points to some reactionary 
Islamic thinkers and activists, who propagate a return to past practices 
regarding the status and social activities of women. Many others, including 
those belonging to mainstream Islamist movements like The Muslim Broth-
erhood in Egypt and Jordan and the Tunisian Renaissance Party, emphasize 
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greater gender equality, not only in piety and worship but also in education 
and employment. In these countries, women are becoming more visible in 
the councils of Islamic parties and other organizations. Islamist women are 
also increasingly found in the professions, and as administrators and staff in 
schools, clinics and voluntary welfare associations.29
Esposito acknowledges the existence in the Muslim world of forces 
that oppose democracy in the name of Islam, like the conservative Saudi 
monarchy or certain militant Islamist groups. He stresses, however, the belief 
of many others that traditional Islamic concepts, such as shurah (consulta-
tion), ijma‘ (consensus), maslahah (general welfare) and ijtihad (individual 
interpretation), provide the bases for modern Muslim notions of an indig-
enously rooted version of democracy. 30
According to Gilles Kepel, self criticism and an orientation toward 
pluralism and cooperation with other political currents have increasingly 
become the trend among, in particular, the younger intellectuals and mid-
dle class Islamists. The violence of militant Islamism, which has led to acts 
of large-scale terrorism like the attacks on Washington and New York on 11 
September 2001, is increasingly perceived by him as having reached a stale-
mate.31 Such acts, as well as the bloody cycle of Islamist terror and state 
repression in places like Algeria and Egypt during the 1990s, have made the 
more clear-sighted Islamist intellectuals, in the Muslim countries themselves 
as well as in communities of migrants and exiles in cities like London, realize 
that a rigid application of the politico-religious dogmas of their movement 
will lead to disastrous results.32 The same goes for the political, economic 
and moral debacles of Islamist regimes in countries like Afghanistan, Sudan 
and Iran.33
The disillusionment of many Islamists has caused the latter to seek 
cooperation with the secular forces of civil society, in the name of the values 
of democracy and human rights. In Kepel’s words: “they have put aside the 
radical ideology of Qutb, Mawdudi and Khomeini; they consider the jihadist-
Salafist doctrines developed in the camps of Afghanistan a source of horror, 
and they celebrate the ‘democratic essence’ of Islam.” Islamists defending 
the rights of the individual stand “shoulder to shoulder with secular demo-
crats in confronting repressive and authoritarian governments.”34
As a sociological explanation for this trend, Kepel points out that sev-
eral decades ago, the Islamist movements recruited much of their follow-
ing in the Muslim world among people born in the countryside who had 
migrated to the cities and lived through the trauma of rural exodus. This 
generation was taught en masse to read and write. They had thus been sepa-
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rated from their own rural, illiterate progenitors by a cultural gulf that radical 
Islamist ideology could exploit. Their children, however, knew nothing other 
then city life and modern educated culture. They were more likely to call 
into question the utopian dreams of their parents. The present generation 
of young Muslims growing up in the Muslim world’s cities is, by contrast, less 
enthusiastic about the traditional Islamists’ ideological advocacy of a high 
birthrate among Muslims. They want to improve their life circumstances by 
limiting the number of their children.35 Furthermore, these young Muslims are 
making use of media unknown to their parents, such as telephone, Internet 
and satellite TV-programs. Moreover, they often have relatives living abroad. 
Their horizons are usually much broader then those of their parents.36
Kepel states that Islamists who have been more successful in edu-
cational and economic life are often most interested in finding a common 
ground with secular groups and democratic ideologues. Because they view 
“opening up to the world” as the only way to survive and advance both 
politically and economically, they may gain a lot from forging links with 
their secular and Western-oriented – or even Western – counterparts in the 
middle class. However, Islamists who are economically marginalized and/
or radicalized tell a different story. They have nothing to gain from such an 
Islamist-secular middle class alliance, face many frustrations and often har-
bor volatile feelings. Many of them are to be found in jihadist-Salafist circles 
that organize themselves in secret organizations and terrorist cells, in the 
Muslim world itself as well as in Western countries.37
Islam and Civil Society: an Evaluation
As I began this chapter by stating, I believe that unequivocal answers 
regarding the relationship between religion/Islam and civil society (wheth-
er positive or negative) are mistaken either because they attribute a basi-
cally unalterable character to Arab and Muslim societies or because they 
are too particularistic and Euro-centric in their definitions of the concept 
of civil society. This assessment applies to Western orientalists as well as to 
certain Arab secularists. Both of whom postulate that Islam and its public 
institutions inherently have always precluded the emergence of a “true” civil 
society, democracy and pluralism, and that they will continue to do so in 
the future. By contrast, I agree with the proponents of the mujtama‘ ahli 
school that the idea of a “secular” civil society that excludes any form of 
religious expression from its realm is, historically speaking, too narrow an 
approach to this concept. After all, the connection between civil society and 
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laicité (the idea of a public realm free from religious interference, wherein all 
expressions of religious life are confined to the private sphere) is not even 
the product of Western history in general. Rather, it is the product of coun-
tries in which a revolutionary movement inspired enlightenment ideals has 
attempted to break the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church – the best 
known example of which is France. Other examples include countries like 
Spain, Italy, Portugal, Mexico and Brazil.38
By contrast, in countries with more diverse populations in terms of 
religion – e.g. Britain, the United States, the Netherlands and Germany – the 
relationship between church, state and society has emerged significantly 
differently. In these countries, religious communities have played a powerful 
role in the development of civil societies, which have translated themselves 
on occasion into confessional involvement in political life.39 There is no rea-
son, therefore, to exclude a priori Islamic institutions and movements from 
the realm of civil society. Rather, I favor a more flexible approach toward the 
civil society concept, as a realm of voluntary association and activity that 
is not coerced from above. According to this vision of civil society, human 
solidarity is organized or in the process of being organized for the sake of 
various interests, norms, values and ideals all emanating from the socio-
cultural lifeworld, with its cultural (including religious), socio-economic as 
well as political dimensions.
What is troubling about some of the mujtama‘ ahli advocates is that 
they tend also to fall into the trap of essentializing the character of their 
own Muslim societies. The concept of mujtama‘ ahli is formulated so as to be 
distinct from, or even so as to oppose the Western concept of civil society, 
which carries the Arabic translation of mujtama‘ madani. Its advocates often 
attribute to religion, and more in particular to Islam and its institutions, a 
central and dominant role in this indigenous civil society, since it is pre-
sumed to be in accordance with the “essential nature” of Arab and Muslim 
peoples. Such an approach may marginalize or even exclude those members 
of Arab or Muslim society who have little affinity with religious life, engage 
in religious interpretations that are different from the dominant view or are 
even outright atheists. It might be that the latter are inspired by Western 
philosophies or discourses. However, in a globalized world, the West cannot 
be excluded anymore from a Muslim civil society, as much as Islam cannot 
be excluded from contemporary Western civil society. Even the various cur-
rents within Islamism itself are strongly affected by various exogenous ide-
ologies, ranging from Leninism (as expressed in the notion of a “vanguard” 
of the Islamic revolution and state) to Fascism (as expressed in the idea 
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of the Islamic ’ummah as a “body” with its authentic “soul”) to democracy, 
human rights and pluralism (which are supposed to correspond to “authen-
tic” Islamic notions and practices). The point to be made here is that, by 
definition, civil societies are in a state of flux and are invariably affected by 
exogenous forces. Any attempt to essentialize “authenticity” always brings 
with it the danger of marginalizing and excluding those who do not con-
form to more or less fixed notions of this concept.
In this regard, it is not surprising that many secular and liberal-mind-
ed citizens of Arab states feel uncomfortable with the rise of Islamist move-
ments, even if the latter currently behave in a relatively civil manner in social 
and political life. The following expressions of secular political activists in 
Jordan about their Islamist counterparts provide an example. In response to 
a question about the Islamists’ attitude regarding civil rights and democratic 
freedoms, a human rights’ activist in Amman with leftist leanings replied 
as follows: “in the current situation, where the Islamists are an opposition 
force, we can work very well with them. But I don’t know how things would 
be if they ever reached power.”40 An activist for press freedom in Amman 
who politically defines himself as a liberal has a similar judgment: “The 
Islamic movement promotes itself now as defender of democratic rights 
and freedoms, because these enhance their own political chances. But a 
doctrine that advocates a religious state and society, you cannot really call 
that democratic. What will their attitude be if they ever come to power? We 
would be quite worried about how they themselves would deal with these 
democratic rights and freedoms.”41
According to several Jordanian political observers, there is little debate 
on the religious or secular nature of Jordanian state and society going on in 
the Kingdom at present, because it is the regime, and not a free and pluralist 
public sphere, which ensures the necessary “balance” between religion and 
secularity. In the past, the government allowed the Islamists to be politically, 
socially and culturally active in public life and organize themselves. This had 
a pacifying impact on them. At present, the state is much more restrictive 
toward new Islamist initiatives in civil society and limits their opportunities 
for expression in the public sphere. In turn, this gives a reassuring sense of 
protection to liberal, secular and Christian citizens.42
The exclusionary tendencies and mutual suspicions between Arab 
secularists and Islamists notwithstanding, in the previous two sections, we 
also found people – on the one hand, intellectuals and activists of a secu-
lar orientation, Islamist advocates, on the other – who are willing to mend 
fences: among the liberals, there are figures such as Mustafa Kamil al-Sayyid 
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and Saad Eddin Ibrahim; among the Islamists, we counted Saif al-Din Abdul 
Fattah Isma‘il and Rashid al-Ghanuchi.
The Islamist Movement as a Manifestation of the Lifeworld
In terms of the system/lifeworld divide, I regard Islamic ideologies and 
activisms basically as phenomena focused on changing the societal order, 
including the political and the economic system, on the basis of values that 
are formed in the socio-cultural realm of the lifeworld. Enlightenment-orig-
inated secular ideologies like liberalism, Marxism and social democracy are 
system-focused. Generally speaking, their views on human nature are opti-
mistic. They often presume that once the right political and economic sys-
tem is put in place by humans, the best will come out of any human being. 
Religious or spiritual movements, on the other hand, are usually inclined to 
believe that improvement of the society as a whole starts with, and results 
from, changing the beliefs, mentality and attitudes of each and every indi-
vidual and of the wider community. In particular among religious funda-
mentalists, this idea is based on the premise that the human beings’ own 
rational capability to create a better societal order is limited, and that divine 
moral injunctions are needed for the believers to create such an order.
In the case of Islam, political scientist Nazih Ayubi emphasizes that the 
original Islamic sources (of Qur’an and Hadith) have very little to say on mat-
ters of governance and state.43 Consequently, a specifically Islamic political 
order in the sense of an institutionalized state system does not really exist. 
Islam is first and foremost a message that calls upon all humans to surrender 
to the belief in the one God, which also implies following a code of moral 
behavior. However, Ayubi points out that Islamic morality is not simply a 
private morality but a public one that is collectively enforced.44 The manner 
in which this collective enforcement is to occur is a much debated topic 
within Islamist circles. While mainstream Muslim Brothers take the lifeworld 
as their starting point by stating that an Islamic state can only emerge in a 
context of personal piety and a moral community that should be developed 
from below, Islamist radicals seem to suggest that such an Islamic lifeworld 
can only be brought into being from the top down by an Islamic state.45 As 
Ayubi notes, however, Islamist contributions to the debate on the State in 
the Arab world have been very limited.46 
The French scholar Oliver Roy concurs with Ayubi. Roy stresses that 
Islamist discourse on the state rarely ventures beyond emphasizing the 
moral principles, virtues and values like honesty, selflessness and fidelity 
(all derived from shari‘ah), which all members of Islamic society, and first and 
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foremost the leaders and functionaries of its state institutions, ought to pos-
sess. No matter how Islamists believe that the Islamic state should be real-
ized, its only specifically Islamic function is pedagogic: to teach its citizens 
virtue. It is not institutional form that most counts, but the moral quality of 
each and every individual within the given institutional framework of an 
Islamic society. In Roy’s words: “[t]he goal is not the state, but [rather] devo-
tion, which is both an individual and a social practice.”47 
The same goes for Islamists’ attitudes toward economic life. Shari‘ah 
has its moral prescriptions and injunctions relating to economic life, such as 
Zakah as a tax that redistributes wealth from the wealthier to the needy, the 
prohibition of gharar, meaning any element of uncertainty in a contract and 
of riba’ (usury) and inheritance rules. But these are isolated prescriptions. 
Something like a coherent, all-encompassing and institutional Islamic eco-
nomic order does not exist. Some Islamists are inclined to embrace socialist 
or social democratic economic models, while others espouse a more capi-
talist reading of “Islamic economics” that emphasizes the right to private 
property and a market economy. As is the case with political life, Islamists 
consider respect for Islamic morals and values as the true basis for a suc-
cessful economic life. Virtuous behavior of every individual in conformity 
with the norms of the shari‘ah comes first. This implies self-limitation in the 
pursuit of material gain and redistribution of goods so that everyone’s needs 
are met.48 Ayubi describes Islamists’ contribution to thought on socio-eco-
nomic issues as even more limited than that regarding the state.49 According 
to Abu Ruman, political analyst at the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center 
in Amman, the Islamist parliamentarians in Jordan have nothing to offer in 
terms of structural solutions to Jordanian society’s socio-economic woes. 
Their contribution in parliamentary debates is largely limited to stressing 
(their interpretation of ) Islamic socio-cultural values.50
The conclusion seems to be that in spite of the Islamists’ claims of 
Islam as a comprehensive system of life offering solutions and answers to 
all kind of problems (including those related to the state and the economy) 
all solutions they offer are supposed to emanate from an Islamic ideology 
that focuses on the socio-cultural lifeworld. Such solutions invariably aim 
to subject the logics of state and economy to the Islamists’ own divinely 
ordained moral logic.
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Tradition and Modernity in the Muslim Arab Lifeworld
As explained in the previous chapter, Cohen and Arato make a dis-
tinction between a traditional and a modern lifeworld and civil society. The 
former unquestionably accepts existing patterns of authority, social organi-
zation and practice and cultural discourse, and is undifferentiated in terms 
of various social and cultural domains. The latter differentiates between 
social, cultural, economic and political institutions, each of them with its 
own mode of operation, and allows for critical and reflexive attitudes toward 
the above-mentioned existing patterns in all domains of life. In this con-
nection, the issue of the consequences of modernization processes in the 
Middle East on the traditional Muslim lifeworld and its mujtama‘ ahli may be 
raised. Subsequently, we should enquire as to how the discourses of present 
day actors of political and social Islam in the Arab world in general, and in 
Jordan in particular, relate to “civil modernity” in Cohen and Arato’s sense. 
Likewise, we shall ask to what degree the moral discourses accompanying 
the social activities of Muslim welfare NGOs in Jordan may be considered 
traditional or modern. While it is outside the scope of this chapter to provide 
a fully comprehensive analysis, some indicative answers may nevertheless 
be reached.
First of all, it is important to note that societal modernization proc-
esses in the Muslim world have not taken place in an entirely homegrown 
and indigenous fashion, as was the case in the Western world. They were to a 
large extent externally imposed, first by European imperial powers, then by 
the two superpowers of the cold war and finally by a Western – in particular 
US – dominated global economy. If we look at the impact of the imposition 
of artificially constructed nation-states on the Middle East, as well as at the 
penetration of a Western-dominated world economy on Muslim lifeworlds, 
the term “disintegration” might be more apt than “differentiation.” Even 
before the advent of direct colonial rule, modern administrative reforms 
in Middle Eastern states diminished the independence of the traditional 
scholarly religious institutions and Sufi orders, took away their economic 
base by measures like nationalizing their awqaf (endowed socio-economic 
projects)51 and other properties and turned them into state-dependent and 
government-legitimizing vehicles. Expanding state power as well as a pen-
etrating capitalist world market destroyed the relatively autonomous socio-
economic base of the traditional Muslim lifeworld. It did so by rendering 
the associations for craftsmen, professionals and merchants, in which reli-
gious scholars often played a prominent role, obsolete and superfluous. For 
sure, processes of differentiation took place in Muslim societies under the 
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impact of colonial and post-colonial modernity. This differentiation, how-
ever, seemed roughly to have taken the character of a cleavage between a 
Western-oriented, secularized and state-centered elite on the one hand and 
the traditional middle and lower classes of the society on the other. The lat-
ter were still largely rooted in their traditional lifeworld. For them, religion 
often constituted an essential basis for giving meaning to a life which suf-
fered traumatic shocks resulting from modernization processes over which 
they had no control and from which they insufficiently gained.
Such a mode of modernization, characterized by dependency and 
disempowerment, did give rise to a kind of critical reflexivity. This reflexivity, 
however, developed in a way that is somewhat different from what Cohen 
and Arato describe. The latter speak about a reflexive and critical relation-
ship of members of modern civil society toward all kinds of traditional pat-
terns. They do concede that, in the process of the emergence and develop-
ment of a modern civil society, tradition itself is not abolished altogether. 
Rather, they state that a new, reflexive, non-traditional relation to tradition 
comes into being.52 Cohen and Arato apparently base their analyses mainly 
on 19th and 20th century Western history. Middle Eastern history, however, 
must be viewed in its own right, as I endeavour to demonstrate below.
Patterns of modernization taking place during the 19th century in 
Muslim societies like those of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian state 
of Muhammad Ali (1805–1849) and his successors involved areas like state 
administration, law, economy and infrastructure. However, the top-down 
pattern of this modernization was mainly based on practical and utilitarian 
considerations pertaining to the effectiveness of state power and its eco-
nomic base. On the socio-cultural level of the lifeworld, it mainly led to the 
marginalization of the traditional ideational and normative dimensions of 
life, rather than to a reflexive and critical transformation of the latter. Mod-
ernization and traditional religious orthodoxy increasingly appeared to be 
incompatible with one another.
This incompatibility led to a crisis to which the intellectual trend of 
Islamic modernism tried to provide answers. It did so by searching for a 
synthesis between modern reason and traditional faith. Muhammad Abdu 
(1849–1905), a trained religious scholar, was the most prominent exponent 
of this emerging trend of critical reflexivity toward religious tradition and of 
the systemic modernization processes. Abdu looked to find in the message 
of the Islamic revelation a moral framework for the modern developments 
and scientific and technical progress taking place in his society. To this end, 
he reinterpreted the Islamic message and Islamic concepts to make them 
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compatible with modern and Western ideas; thus he appropriated John Stu-
art Mill’s notion of utility; democratic ideas relating to public opinion and 
parliamentary life; and scientific laws of causality determining nature as well 
as human society.53
Abdu’s thought gave rise to two, intellectually opposing trends. Some 
of his followers, like Mustafa al-Kamil and Lutfi al-Sayyid, pursued a greater 
reflexive distance from Islamic tradition by demanding a complete liberation 
of creative rationality from its weight. The other trend, represented force-
fully by Rashid Rida (1865–1935), was alarmed by this approach. Rida put 
greater emphasis on Abdu’s idea of the Islamic revelation as the all-encom-
passing moral framework for any human progress by emphasizing the need 
to return to a pristine, untainted form of Islam. This newly perfected social 
reality was to be based solely on the principles of Qur’an and sunnah.54 His 
approach represented a return to dogmatism and away from critical reflexiv-
ity. It was based on the premise that that the Islamic literary sources contain 
nothing but the absolute truth and, therefore, must be followed by believers 
in all walks of life Concomitantly, the same sources also function as bases 
from which to critique the existing political as well as religious authorities. 
It is this kind of “dogmatic reflexivity” that became the ideological basis for 
modern Islamist political and social movements.
Reflexivity and The Muslim Brotherhood Movement
The original Islamist movement in the Arab world was The Muslim 
Brotherhood, established by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1929. It emerged 
as a religion-based populist mass movement in an Egyptian society that 
was suffering the full impact of a top-down modernization process that had 
been largely dependent on the West, and, in particular, on colonial Britain.
At the political level, Egypt was nominally already independent at 
that time but remained under British tutelage, especially in the field of for-
eign and defense policy and external economic relations. Egyptian politics 
was hostage to the paralyzing power games between the British colonial 
authorities, the monarchy and the nationalist Wafd Party, and therefore 
unable to resolve the main political and socio-economic issues facing wider 
society. Political measures adopted by the royal palace, like the dismissing 
of any government or elected parliament pursuing policies deemed unde-
sirable so as to rule by decree – measures supported by many aristocratic 
landowners – reduced Egyptian parliamentary democracy to a mockery. Not 
surprisingly, ordinary Egyptians had little faith in democratic politics.
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At the socio-economic level, a massive migration from the country-
side to the cities started to develop in Egypt, due mainly to the decreasing 
availability of cultivable land and the decline of the price of cotton, Egypt’s 
main export-oriented crop, during the economic recession at the end of the 
1920s. This development, increasing in strength in the second half of the 
20th century, brought to the rural migrants psychological uprooting, social 
alienation and the dissolution of traditional patterns of social cohesion 
and control. The migrants were cut-off from their traditional settings and 
exposed to modern city life without adequate social and cultural capital; 
likewise, they were left vulnerable to the vagaries of the market in terms of 
jobs and wages. Economic recession led to a massive rise of unemployment 
and increasingly exposed the gap between the wealthy and the poor.
Thus, Egyptian society grew increasingly polarized. On the one hand, 
there was a Western-oriented and secular urban elite. On the other hand, a 
wide swathe of the population was constituted by economically impover-
ished and socially frustrated middle and lower classes, virtually all of whom 
upheld a more traditional cultural outlook. Many from the latter group had 
grown to despise the adoption of Western cultural symbols, materialist-
consumerist attitudes and the apparent moral laxity of the elite. In response 
to this, the traditionalists emphasized notions of cultural authenticity and 
“true” religious morality.
It was against this backdrop that The Muslim Brotherhood easily won 
a following. For The Brotherhood promised a better, more moral and fairer 
political, social and economic order; this was to be based on the compre-
hensive implementation of the moral values and laws derived from Qur’an 
and Hadith and enshrined in Islamic Law. Such fundamental changes were 
to be accompanied by a collective program for social welfare. The Muslim 
Brotherhood held instant appeal; it gained a mass following among the 
lower and lower middle classes as well as members of the professionally 
educated strata, intellectuals and students.55 The distinctive aspect of this 
movement’s ideology was that it did not diagnose Egyptian society’s prob-
lems merely in terms of foreign political and economic domination, as the 
leftists and nationalists had done. Rather in the policies of Western imperial-
ism and its “agents” among Egypt’s political, intellectual and religious estab-
lishments, The Brotherhood perceived a wholesale onslaught against the 
religious, moral and cultural identity of all Egyptians, and of the worldwide 
Islamic ’ummah (community of believers).56 In other words, the message of 
the Islamist revolt represented by The Muslim Brotherhood was based upon 
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the kind of “dogmatic reflexivity” developed by thinkers like Rashid Rida, and 
phrased in socio-cultural terms.
The Brotherhood’s reflexivity was critical toward many of the existing 
political, economic and cultural patterns in Egyptian society. In this regard, 
it did not spare Egypt’s long standing religious authorities based at Al-Azhar 
University. According to the leaders and thinkers of The Muslim Brotherhood, 
Azharite scholars were engaged in theoretical theological exercises that 
were irrelevant in terms of solving the problems and ills of Muslim society. In 
the words of Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Muhammad al-Ghazali, these 
scholars “had gone to sleep, and the Muslim society has followed them.”57 
As an alternative to the perceived dangers of “alien” secular discourses and 
influences as well as to the passivity of the prevailing religious establish-
ment, The Muslim Brotherhood offered a return to a blemish free form of 
Islam as it was/is reflected in the “eternal truth” of Muslim scripture and law. 
In other words, it looked to these original Islamic sources to provide for a 
solid, absolute and unquestionable “fundament” that could offer religiously 
viable answers to the problems of contemporary Muslim life. In this sense, 
The Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements in other Arab and Muslim 
countries can be described as “fundamentalist.” They share this basic atti-
tude with their counterparts in the Christian world and elsewhere.
Such fundamentalist attitudes, which reify supposedly “authentic” 
traditions in the face of real or perceived threats emanating from “alien 
powers,” do not fully accord with Cohen and Arato’s vision of modern civil 
society trends that are ready to question all traditional patterns and author-
ity in society. In the vision of Cohen and Arato, and that of their teacher 
Habermas, civil society is of a particularistic nature and highly determined 
by the Western context in which it was born – a context in which youth 
and student movements during the 1960s and 1970s rebelled against all 
existing traditional patterns, including the institutions of family, marriage 
and religion. The kind of fundamentalism espoused by movements such as 
The Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps more in line with what theoreticians, 
such as John Keane (among others) have said about civil society move-
ments with universalist pretenses. Such movements have dogmatic views 
on what would be best for all members of society, or even for humankind. 
Such views invariably clash with those of people of different interests and 
ideologies. They seem to thrive especially in political, economic, social and 
cultural conditions of crisis, fear and uncertainty. Of course, there is nothing 
specifically Middle Eastern or Muslim about these movements. Certain left-
ist and fundamentalist Christian currents in the West have displayed similar 
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tendencies, and still do so. Even liberalism, with its emphasis on individual 
freedom, and secularism, with its insistence of relegating religion to private 
life, may become dogmatic by presenting their worldviews as fixed, essen-
tial, absolute and as universally valid “truths.” Currently, we see in several 
Western countries the emergence of a kind of “enlightenment fundamental-
ism” as a reflection of anxieties and fears about the multicultural society, the 
presence of Muslims and the phenomena of Islamically inspired “fundamen-
talism” and “terrorism.”
Like the above-mentioned Western ideologies, Islamism’s dogmas 
may become more rigid under certain circumstances, and more flexible in 
others. The views of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) provide an example of extreme 
rigidity. For Qutb, humankind is divided, in Manichean fashion, between 
the forces of good and evil. Qutb’s views are clearly represented in his most 
famous work, Ma‘lim Fil-Tariq (Milestone along the Way), written while in 
prison. In this, the reader finds no room for compromise or rapprochement 
between those upholding the truth of “pure” Islam and those who would 
deviate from that vision. Indeed, Qutb indiscriminately brandishes those 
who disagree with him as kuffar (non-believers) and jahilin (ignorant) – 
among which he included the vast majority of Muslim society itself. Simi-
lar ideological and discursive patterns are to be found among the current 
jihadist-Salafist trends.
Flexibility and willingness to compromise and find a common ground 
with secular trends and non-Muslims are displayed by those Islamists who, 
as Muslim democrats, develop more open and inclusivist approaches. They 
stress the commonness of their values, ideals and aspirations with those 
of others. In the words of the leader of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front Party, 
which is affiliated to The Muslim Brotherhood: “at issue now is not whether 
people are religious or secular, whether they promote the shari‘ah or not. 
The real issue is whether they are willing to promote democracy, pluralism 
and human rights.”58 It must be noted, however, that even such inclusivist 
versions of Islamist discourse may be presented in a dogmatic fashion, in the 
framework of a scripturalist vision of Islam that has “an answer to all ques-
tions of life.”59 As Kepel remarks, these Islamists celebrate the “democratic 
essence of Islam.”60
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3. Islamist Voluntary 
Welfare Associations: 
patronage or middle class-
Based civic networks?
Islamist movements translate their vision of the Islamic message 
as the solid fundament offering answers to all problems of life into vari-
ous activities: religious preaching, ethically correcting one’s own as well as 
another’s behavior, political activity and, last but not least, organized social 
work. This social work has given rise to the establishment of numerous vol-
untary welfare associations. In this chapter, a closer look is taken at the way 
in which these Islamist NGOs function at present in the Muslim Arab world. 
First, cultural and political trends of Islamic revival during the last three 
decennia with the concomitant social networks will be highlighted as basic 
to the existence of such associations. Subsequently, the assessments of some 
scholars regarding the nature of these associations – as either patronage-
based institutions or the embodiments of relatively horizontal middle class 
networks – will be presented. Thereafter, the actual political functioning of 
these associations will be analyzed by looking at their relationship with the 
state. To finish, some observations on the political significance of these asso-
ciations as civil society institutions will be made.
Religious Revival as a New Source of Social Capital
Muslim – including Islamist – voluntary welfare associations are the 
product of a society that traditionally cherishes and cultivates religious val-
ues.1 Their role has been reinforced, however, by relatively recent trends of 
religious revival in the Arab world. These trends took place against the back-
drop of modernizing developments over the last fifty years. They include 
the development of state structures that, while modern in a bureaucratic 
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sense, are authoritarian and oppressive in a political sense, urbanization, 
the spread of mass education and mass media, globalization, and, lastly, the 
near ubiquity of the world market. The combination of these factors in many 
Muslim territories has led to serious socio-economic dislocations, a decline 
in traditional forms of social cohesion, cultural alienation and concomitant 
feelings of deprivation.2
As the French scholar of Islam Francois Burgat claims, these alienation 
processes were aggravated by the introduction of a secular culture from the 
top down: first by the European colonial powers; and later by the cultur-
ally secularist and/or politically Western-oriented elites of the newly “inde-
pendent” Arab states. This culture strongly marginalized the societal role of 
the traditional religious values. Such values continued to prevail, however, 
in the culture of the Arab societies’ middle and lower classes. Once demo-
graphic pressure and economic recession exposed the failure of these elites’ 
modernization programs to bring the bulk of the population meaningful 
prospects and prosperity, the road was paved for the ascendancy of cultural 
and political trends that drew upon traditional Islamic values, albeit in a 
form that had been profoundly adapted to modern society.3 Burgat’s coun-
trymen Roy and Kepel have pointed out that frustrated and modernly edu-
cated young (Arab) Muslims, on the one hand products of their modernizing 
and globalizing societies while, on the other, excluded from opportunities 
of social mobility and advancement felt most attracted to these trends.4
Such forms of dislocations, exclusions and (relative) deprivations 
largely emanating from the dominant systems of state and (global) market 
must have heightened the attraction of a religious discourse that emphasiz-
es the lifeworld values of community relations and the cultivation of moral-
ity in the context of daily life in a modern and urban environment. Through 
such a discourse, religious movements such as The Muslim Brotherhood 
manage to restore a sense of self-worth and social, moral and even politi-
cal orientation to various groups of people living in an often uncertain and 
frustrating (secular) modern society.
Such religious discourse also fosters, in turn, the creation, reinforce-
ment and expansion of (new forms of ) social cohesion and networks. As a 
matter of fact, Islamic discourse can be very explicit about values of social 
cohesion, such as care, compassion, honesty, trust and mutual solidarity. 
Canadian political scientist Janine Clark and others have noted such proc-
esses of creation of social cohesion and networks among the middle classes 
in countries like Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. Religious discourse is fostering 
such processes because of its appealing frame resonance in Middle East-
68
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ern societies. Wiktorowicz gives the following description of the concept of 
frame-resonance, which is derived from social movement theory:
Frames represent interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive 
tools for making sense of experiences and events in the ‘world out there.’ For 
social movements, these schemata are important in the production and dis-
semination of interpretations and are designed to mobilize participants and 
support. As signifying agents engaged in the social construction of meaning, 
movements must articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding 
that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collec-
tive action.5 
One of the forms this collective action takes is represented by the 
social work of Islamic voluntary welfare associations.
The Nature of Islamist Voluntary Welfare Associations
Do the voluntary welfare associations established by Islamists rep-
resent modern civil society institutions, or are they rather continuations of 
traditional forms of association derived from the pre-modern mujtama‘ ahli? 
Sami Zubaida counts religious associations as well as associations with a 
tribal or regional basis among the so-called “Neo-Traditional” social forma-
tions. The latter are forms of association rooted in the pre-modern societal 
formations, but are at the same time adjusted to modern conditions in their 
way of functioning. Zubaida states that the suppression of the modern types 
of political and civil associations in Middle Eastern states continues to moti-
vate individuals to seek security and prosperity through cultivating their 
primary affiliations of kin, tribe, region and, possibly transcending them, 
religion.6
Zubaida sees in the Islamic associational tradition much that is at 
odds with liberal notions of civil society as these exist in the West. Indeed, 
the traditional societal formations in the Muslim world that, for other schol-
ars, prove the existence of a relatively autonomous civil space throughout 
Muslim history were, according to Zubaida “almost uniformly patriarchal 
and authoritarian, often coercive.” Positions of authority within, as well as 
general membership of these formations were usually based upon family-
ties and inheritance from father to son. All of them stressed values of author-
ity, loyalty and obedience. He also emphasizes that patriarchal associations 
and attitudes have persisted, even if they have been reconstituted under 
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modern conditions. As examples, he mentions tribal and village associations 
in cities, formal and informal religious associations around neighborhoods, 
mosques and charities and the more invisible web of familial bonds and 
authorities. “New Islamic and Islamist social and political forces have a spe-
cial affinity with these social formations,” Zubaida writes, “and have sought 
in many places to control and colonize them.”7
Zubaida also points out that many businessmen and enterprises in 
Arab countries are related to movements like The Muslim Brotherhood. They 
contribute to social projects and charities of Islamist organizations and feed 
into Islamic social networks of patronage, conversion and mobilization. Their 
role as major employers is instrumental in this regard. Through the provision 
of social services, the Islamists engage in a moral and social colonization of 
the community at large, since the objective is to Islamize the population in 
terms of religious observance and ethical conduct. In the framework of these 
social services, the Islamists place a strong emphasis on family morality and 
the decency of women and young people. The government is content with 
these activities since they ameliorate social discontent, and the associations 
that carry them function as agents of social control. The sole governmental 
condition is that they do not venture into opposition and militancy.8
Zubaida asserts that most Islamic social projects and institutions 
are dominated by a Salafi orientation. This orientation is, in his own words, 
“much more conservative and “fundamentalist” (when compared with other, 
more democratic Islamist tendencies), more insistent on the literal reading 
of scriptures and the teaching of the historical authorities of shari‘ah. To this 
current, the ideas of democracy and civil society are either totally rejected, 
or superficially adapted to their traditionalist and organicist conceptions.”9
At least two other scholars emphasise the nature of Islamist NGOs as 
the embodiment of relatively horizontal middle class-networks, rather than 
as patronage-based institutions. The first of these is the sociologist Asef 
Bayat,10 who stresses that Islamic NGOs do not aim to mobilize their clients 
in order to wage collective struggles to improve their lot. The way in which 
they approach the urban poor is basically as deserving, but passive recipi-
ents of their services. Islamist initiatives in the domain of welfare for the 
poor are basically part of a broader endeavor aimed at the establishment of 
an all-encompassing Islamic legal, political, social and moral order. Accord-
ingly, he emphasizes that Islamism in the Middle East is primarily a move-
ment representing the relatively marginalized middle classes, rather then 
the lower classes. Islamist middle class agitators tend to activate marginal-
ized but more educated strata in the society, such as students, professionals, 
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the educated unemployed as well as groups that are socio-economically rel-
atively strong, but politically excluded. Many of the Islamist NGOs’ services, 
like those in the realms of education and health care, are financially afford-
able to those middle class groups but not to the poor. Political activation of 
the poor rarely transcends the gathering of their votes at election time.11
Bayat clearly regards the relationship of Islamist NGOs toward their 
needy clients as vertical and paternalistic. Islamists’ attitudes toward their 
fellow members of the educated but socio-politically marginalized sections 
of the middle class, however, are more egalitarian. This observation is lent 
added support by the second scholar in question, Janine Clark, a Canadian 
political scientist. Her findings show that Islamic NGOs “are embedded in a 
complex web of social networks through which they find participants – vol-
unteers, donors and employees – and secure important contacts and dona-
tions.” These social networks, she argues, are to be found in the modern edu-
cated middle class. The Islamic NGOs “cater to the middle class”, she asserts. 
“It is within these horizontal networks of clients, doctors, teachers and 
directors that ties of solidarity, trust, teamwork and a sense of mission are 
developed”, she continues. “And it is within these middle-class ties that the 
potential lies for the introduction and expansion of Islamist networks.”12
Clark explains the importance of these middle class-based social ties 
for the Islamic NGOs as follows:
The day-to-day needs of ISIs (Islamic Social Institutions, i.e. Islamic voluntary 
welfare associations) dictate that they are composed of people with the time, 
skills and/or means to devote – whether on a regular or ad hoc basis – to ISI 
activities. Their operational demands thus require a predominance of networks 
able or willing to fulfill these needs. In the case of ISIs, this social category is the 
middle classes, primarily the new middle class – doctors, teachers and other 
professionals whose needs are not being met, or are being met poorly else-
where.13 
These relatively marginalized educated middle class members par-
ticipate in the activities of Islamic NGOs – whether as formal members, 
employees, volunteers or donors – because it involves them in networks 
of gratifying social relations and mutual solidarity. These NGOs also offer 
many of these middle class participants – and especially those employed 
by the former (e.g. medical doctors, teachers or social workers) – material 
incentives: e.g. salaries that are often higher then those paid by the public 
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sector, or the usage of modern equipment. In particular, hospitals, clinics 
and educational institutions at various levels that are run by Islamic NGOs 
are important sources of employment.14
The poor recipients of Islamic NGOs, however, are excluded from 
these social networks that lie at the heart of the Islamist movement. In this 
regard, Clark points to the phenomenon that these recipients also seek the 
aid of numerous other NGOs as well as of other sources. They are not exclu-
sively bound to their Islamist “patronizers and colonizers,” to put matters 
in Zubaida’s terms. Some Islamist social projects, in particular those in the 
realm of education and health care, are commercial in nature and impor-
tant in generating income for these NGOs. They are designed for the mid-
dle classes. Islamists have, out of a strong sense of religious obligation, also 
established projects for the poor. They do not view the poor as objects of 
political mobilization, however.15
A final observation by Clark is that Islamist NGOs do not confront the 
state. They rather function as pillars of the state system vitally important 
for the implementation of policies of social welfare. These NGOs reflect the 
desires and outlooks of those sections of the middle class who are relatively 
excluded in socio-economic as well as political life. The latter do not really 
dream of revolution and of replacing the upper classes, but of having a larg-
er “piece of the state pie” and share power with those upper classes. Conse-
quently, Clark notes that, while Islamist social activism “has brought about 
significant changes in the civil society,” it has also failed “to alter the political 
structure.”16 Clark sees in the strengthening of social networks among the 
middle classes the real significance of the Islamic NGOs.17
NGOs and the State
As far as the functioning of Islamist NGOs as civil society institutions is 
concerned, the aspect of state policies and legislation vis-à-vis the NGO sec-
tor should be taken into account. Arab states are usually repressive in their 
dealings with cultural and social welfare NGOs. Strict rules and regulations 
prevent the latter from becoming pressure groups capable of opposing gov-
ernment policy. In Jordan, for instance, such associations are prohibited from 
organizing any lecture or discussion with a political content. Moreover, they 
are obliged to submit yearly reports on their activities and finances to the 
Ministry of Social Development. NGOs may not engage in any new type of 
activity without the Ministry’s consent. Officials of this Ministry pay surprise 
visits to the premises of NGOs that are under its jurisdiction. The Ministry 
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of Social Development also exercises, in coordination with the mukhabarat 
(Intelligence Agency), control over the elections to the administrative boards 
of NGOs as well as over the admittance of new members. Transgressions of 
these regulations and laws by NGOs may result in the arrest and imprison-
ment of NGO members as well as in the dissolution of the NGO in question. 
Cultural and welfare associations are thus prevented from playing a lively 
role of opposition and protest in the public sphere.18
It is obvious that such a regime of state monitoring and supervi-
sion does not create a climate conducive for openly mobilizing the poor to 
engage in political action. Whether, if this legislative and regulative regime 
did not exist, Islamic NGOs would engage in such activities is hard to tell. 
Clarks’ observation that, due to a lack of resources, the poor is unable to 
contribute to the social networks that form the basis of Islamic NGOs and of 
the Islamist movement as a whole suggests that this is unlikely. On the other 
hand, if organizing struggles or lobbying for the sake of the rights of the 
poor in the name of the Islamic message would contribute to the Islamists’ 
influence in society and their leverage vis-à-vis the state, one might easily 
ask why they wouldn’t do so. Belonging to the middle class is, of itself, not an 
obstacle to mobilizing and organizing the lower classes. Historically speak-
ing, many social movements mobilizing the lower classes have been led by 
figures from a middle class background. There are even some instances of 
Islamist movements in other Middle Eastern countries that have engaged in 
such struggles. One of them is the Hezbullah movement in Lebanon, which, 
during the 1990s, mobilized residents of the Dahiyah slum neighborhoods in 
Southern Beirut in strikes and protests. The same movement organized pro-
fessional as well as residential groups in that area to press the government 
to improve social services.19 However, repressive force by the Lebanese gov-
ernment against these Hezbullah-organized protests, resulting in death for 
some protestors, ensured this movement soon quit its activities.20 Another 
example of a social movement relying on lower and middle class support is 
al-Ghanuchi’s Tunisian Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI). Toward 
the end of the 1970s, the movement aligned itself with the General Union 
of Tunisian Workers (UGT), winning much support within the latter’s ranks, 
until once again state repression made this impossible in 1984.21
Likewise, NGOs in Jordan, including the Islamic ones, cannot engage 
in overt political mobilization of the poor due to state repression. If Islamist 
NGOs want to mobilize and politically influence the poor, for instance dur-
ing election time, they must do this in ways concealed from public view, in 
order to escape the repressive measures by security and intelligence serv-
I s l a m I s t  v o l u n t a r y  w e l f a r e  a s s o c I a t I o n s
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   73 05-02-2008   11:13:30
74
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
ices. Since many members and workers of an NGO like the Islamic Center 
Charity Society are also active in the Islamic Action Front Party, in particular 
during election time, it may not prove too difficult for them to circumvent 
the prohibition stipulating that welfare NGOs may not engage in any kind 
of political activity.22
Nevertheless, the fact that these NGOs are barred from expressing a 
political discourse in the public sphere clearly dis-empowers them. Here we 
see that Cohen and Arato’s observation of a “modernization of civil society” 
through a spontaneous process of differentiation between various institu-
tions of a political, social, cultural and economic nature simply does not 
apply. In the case of Middle Eastern countries like Jordan, it is the state which 
imposes differentiation on the institutions of civil society, not for the sake 
of the latter’s “authentic modernity” but for that of state dominance and 
control itself. In response, the educated members of this civil society may 
try to express their criticism of, and grievances toward, state policies and 
the political and socio-economic establishment of their country through all 
kinds of civil society institutions, including welfare NGOs. At least, that is 
what the state is wary of and what it wishes to prevent.
Ultimately, it seems clear that different historical trajectories of politi-
cal, social and economic development have given rise to different kinds of 
modernity; this also explains the abovementioned institutional differentia-
tion. The political environment of Middle Eastern countries, including Jor-
dan, is often characterized by authoritarian rule preventing political parties 
and other grassroots movements from playing a meaningful oppositional 
role, and imposing serious limitations on press freedom and freedom of 
expression. It is also characterized by many forms of economic, political and 
cultural dependency and/or marginality of those countries vis-à-vis West-
ern powers. This environment generates many socio-economic and politi-
cal frustrations. These frustrations, which at present are often expressed 
through the language of political Islam, seek an outlet through any possible 
means, including institutions like NGOs. In this sense, they have the ten-
dency to lead to a spontaneous bottom-up process of de-differentiation, 
in the form of a strong politicization of all realms of (civil) society, includ-
ing mosques, professional associations and welfare NGOs, which have the 
potential of turning into vehicles of political opposition. The state, in turn, 
anticipates and checks such trends by its policies of a repressive differentia-
tion and the de-politicization of civil institutions imposed from above. So 
far, Middle Eastern states seem to have been successful in this policy. This 
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is certainly the case with the repression of political expressions by welfare 
NGOs, who are remain fearful of invoking the wrath of the state authorities.
State control and repression is but one aspect of the NGOs’ relation-
ship with the state, however. Another important aspect is the reliance of the 
state on welfare NGOs – not least among these the Islamic ones – to provide 
services to subaltern as well as middle class communities. These services 
guarantee a measure of social peace and take away part of the burden of 
social care and development from the government. Both Clark and Zubaida 
have rightly pointed to this aspect. Closing down welfare NGOs would also 
involve costs for the government: it leaves a vacuum in social services with 
clearly adverse implications for the wellbeing of society. Not only is there 
the risk of sociopolitical unrest, but also of social disintegration. Orphans 
and other needy children, for instance, would receive no aid from the state, 
may drop out from school, and turn to drugs, alcohol or crime. Thus it seems 
that a kind of modus vivendi has been developed in a country like Jordan 
between the relevant governmental apparatuses and (Islamic) NGOs on the 
basis of a shared interest in social cohesion, stability and peace. The state 
gives space to the (Islamic) NGOs to institutionalize part of the (Islamic) 
socio-cultural lifeworld values of their members and workers, like piety, car-
ing, solidarity and charity, through their social welfare activities. The NGOs 
commit themselves to obeying the law and observing the official regula-
tions imposed by the state, which implies abstaining from (publicly visible 
forms of ) political activity.
The Political Significance of Islamist NGOs as Civil Society 
Institutions
The need to abstain from visible and direct forms of political activity 
that confront or oppose state authorities does not mean that Islamic NGOs 
have no political significance. The very establishment of such welfare asso-
ciations is already an expression of dissatisfaction with what the state has to 
offer in terms of social services. As political scientist Dennis J. Sullivan writes 
on Islamic NGOs in Egypt:
These groups recognize the problems society faces and do something to fix 
them. The groups also see that many of society’s problems stem from govern-
ment officials and their policies, for even when government is not responsible 
for the problems, the popular view remains that government leaders either do 
not care to fix things or just cannot do anything to solve them.23 
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Especially in the case of NGOs set up by Islamists, the aim is also to 
show that an alternative approach, based upon Islamist interpretations of 
Islamic values, offers real solutions to socio-economic problems. This can 
be a way to recruit new followers for the Islamist movement. As Zaid Abu 
Ghanimeh, Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader and administrator at the 
Islamic hospital in Amman puts it:
Our success is in building a practical model for how Islam can serve. It has raised 
the confidence of the community that Islam can solve people’s problems. That is 
why people now support the Islamic movement. Poor people, especially those 
served by the hospital, they pay us back in elections and meetings … They [the 
recipients of social services offered by Islamists] voluntarily find themselves 
morally indebted to the movement… When the movement is in elections or 
needs support, they repay the debt.24 
Showing that “Islam can solve problems” implies victory in a socio-
cultural battle against models and systems considered alien to Islam and, 
thus, incapable of solving present problems. This battle includes, according 
to Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki, “struggles over the proper 
role of Islam in society and its relative significance vis-à-vis other cultural 
codes and values. Islamic voluntary organizations engage in this conflict.” 
Wiktorowicz and Taji Farouki regard this as typical of trends that characterize 
new social movements. Such movements conduct struggles over: “meaning 
and values, reflecting a qualitative shift from direct political contention to 
the cultural arena. Struggles over power, ethnicity, values and religion are 
often waged through society and cultural discourse rather then state insti-
tutions or government decision-making bodies.” These new social move-
ments, Wiktorowicz and Taji Farouki state, “demonstrate that an alternative 
reality and way of life are possible.” Islamic NGOs, as an example of such 
social movements aim
to address socio-economic issues within an Islamic framework and challenge 
Western cultural codes … By providing goods and services, Islamists hope to 
expand networks of shared meaning so that individuals will organize their lives 
in accordance with Islamic precepts, rather then Western values and norms. 25 
Such attempts to persuade individuals to reorganize their lives 
often result in what Carrie Rosefsky Wickham calls a “transvaluation of val-
ues,” meaning a reordering of the priorities in someone’s individual life. 
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For instance, the Islamist subculture in popular neighborhoods in Cairo 
often belittles the value of secular knowledge and official diplomas gained 
through formal education. It gives priority to religious knowledge that is 
acquired in more informal ways. Likewise, Islamists may downplay the value 
of university careers, prestigious jobs and material possessions, things that 
generate social status in a society that is dominated by values of economic 
success, as less relevant. What really matters, according to the latter, is a reli-
giously and morally clean and honest way of life.26 In the words of a young 
Jordanian couple who got married in one of the collective mass weddings 
organized by the Jordanian Islamist Al-‘Afaf Welfare Association, “We do not 
care about the (material) affairs of this world. We just want to live for God.”27 
According to Wickham, such a transvaluation of values constitutes an Islam-
ist response to socio-economic frustrations like unemployment, denial of 
economic opportunities due to practices of nepotism and corruption and 
the inability to meet the expectations raised by a consumerist culture. It pro-
vides its adherents with a sense of moral superiority and may even lead to 
a decrease in fear of and deference toward the existing authoritarian state, 
since a good Muslim “is only afraid of God.”28
Scholars like Sullivan, Wiktorowicz, Taji Farouki and Wickham touch 
upon the political importance of religiously inspired NGOs. Put simply, they 
offer an alternative to governmental social services, which particularly in 
Arab countries are often characterized by bureaucratic inefficiency, a severe 
lack of quality and widespread corruption.29 In contrast to the formal author-
ities, these NGOs act out of a concern for social solidarity, and a moral sense 
of mission to improve the society and the lives of its individual members. 
Such religious lifeworld values play a role at the level of motivation, but may 
also be expressed and promoted to the beneficiaries of the NGOs’ services. 
This may take place informally, in daily interactions of NGO workers with the 
latter, or through formally organized educational and counseling programs. 
These values may also be expressed toward the general public.
As organized representatives and reflections of the lifeworld, such 
NGOs function as civil society institutions. At issue is not whether or to what 
extent they contribute to the strength and influence of oppositional move-
ments, like those of the Islamists, in order to assess their significance as civil 
society institutions. What is at issue is the very fact that the participants of 
such voluntary associations translate lifeworld values into tangible activi-
ties within an organized framework. As such, they contribute to an institu-
tionalized realm that, in principle, functions autonomously from the state 
apparatus. This realm provides a framework for the expression of a discourse 
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of social cultural values emanating from the bottom up. Such a discourse 
can be considered as basic to the raison d’être of such NGOs. Monitoring 
and supervision of NGOs by the state may neutralize potentially dangerous 
political implications that such discourses might entail. However, they do 
not really eliminate the latter at their very core.
The findings of this study suggest that Islamist as well as other Mus-
lim NGOs are indeed based upon relatively horizontal middle class networks 
in their way of functioning. That does not take away the fact, however, that 
certainly Islamist associations are, at the same time, engaged in activities 
of religious, moral and political “colonization” – in Zubaida’s terms – or even 
indoctrination, if you will, of their needy recipients. The bulk of my findings 
on these matters will be presented in the last four chapters of this study.
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   78 05-02-2008   11:13:30
Part Two
c I V I L  S o c I E t Y  I n  J o r d A n
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   79 05-02-2008   11:13:30
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   80 05-02-2008   11:13:30
81
4. State and Society 
in Jordan
 
The aim of this chapter is to describe and analyze the relationship 
between state and society in Jordan. Here we look primarily at the ways in 
which the discourses and policies of the Jordanian state toward society have 
shaped this relationship. The chapter starts by describing the consequences 
of the formation of Jordan for the tribal population of the territory in ques-
tion (the Transjordanian Emirate in the early 1920s) – at the time headed by 
the Hashemite prince Abdullah. Thereafter, the implications of the incorpo-
ration of so many Palestinians into the Jordanian state are dealt with. In the 
subsequent two sections, state practices of patronage towards the various 
segments of Jordanian society are depicted: first in terms of state discourse 
and then in terms of institutional practices of cooptation. The fifth section 
deals with the limits to democracy and pluralism in the kingdom. The sixth 
section analyzes this relationship between Jordanian state and society from 
a historical perspective. The seventh and final section deals more specifi-
cally with state hegemony over formal civil society institutions, as well as 
over public opinion in Jordan.
The Establishment of the State
“In the beginning was the state” is the apposite title of an essay by 
Laurie Brand on Jordanian civil society.1 When Abdullah, son of sharif Hus-
sein of Mecca (who belonged to the same Hashemite clan as the prophet 
Muhammad more then thirteen centuries earlier), was appointed by the 
British government as Emir (prince) of the newly established Emirate of Tran-
sjordan in the area to the east of the River Jordan, the Death Sea and the 
Wadi Araba, a sense of a common national identity was still markedly absent 
among the area’s 400,000 population. Instead, this population consisted of 
multiple communities organized according to tribal affiliations. Such affili-
ations permeated many aspects of life: economy, marriage, maintenance of 
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order and discipline, military defence and protection, marriage and sense 
of collective identity.2 Roughly half of the population consisted of semi-
nomadic Bedouins; while the other half were made up of rural villagers, 
and urban merchant and artisan families.3 The rationale for establishing the 
new state of Transjordan was informed by various British imperial interests: 
accomodating Arab nationalist aspirations, establishing a military strategic 
bridge between Egypt and the Arab Gulf region,4 and checking French ambi-
tions in the Middle East.5 Similarly, the Emirate’s foreign and fiscal policy and 
its defense were kept under British Control.6 
In fact, a dynasty was imposed by a foreign power on an area where 
there existed no modern society, in the framework of a nation state, but 
rather an amalgam of traditional tribal communities. In the early 1920s, sev-
eral tribes rebelled against the rule of the newly imposed Emir. These insur-
rections were suppressed with brutal force. Transjordan’s tribal population’s 
loyalty towards the new state had to be cultivated by means of patronage 
and cooptation. The most important method in this regard was the mass 
enlistment of tribesmen in the Arab Legion, the Transjordanian Army under 
British command. Furthermore, tribal leaders were given posts in the admin-
istrative apparatus of the new regime, received subsidies or were turned 
into landowners.7 Integration of the population into the political and mili-
tary institutions of the state made them receptive to a new discourse that 
provided legitimacy to the new polity and its leadership: that of allegiance 
to the Hashemite family in general and to the Emir (later King) as sharif 
(descendent of the Prophet Muhammad) in particular. Through such a dis-
course, a common loyalty to Islam proved helpful in creating a formative and 
burgeoning sense of national identity among the tribal population. It did so 
by stressing notions of a shared religious identity as a basis of unity and har-
mony between the tribes.8 Moreover, the direct personal style of rule of Emir 
Abdullah enabled him to function as a kind of sheikh of the tribal sheikhs, 
which once again furthered the legitimacy of the new dynasty.9 At the same 
time, the construction of a modern centralized state providing security and 
stability and enacting laws that protected the private property of merchants 
and landowners enhanced the latter’s social, economic and political status.10 
The emerging pattern of patronage between the state and the largely tribal 
population in the country was characterized by the offering of benefits and 
protection by the former to the latter, and loyalty and allegiance of the latter 
toward the former. This pattern has remained highly influential in terms of 
state-society relationships to the present day.
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Implications of the Palestinian Presence
Jordanian society underwent a profound transformation due to the 
arrival of hundreds of thousands of Palestian refugees during the Israeli-
Arab wars of 1948 and 1967, and the annexation of the West Bank to the 
Hashemite Kingdom in 1950. With the latter event, a Palestinian population 
of some 800,000 was incorporated as citizens into the Kingdom, a number 
significantly higher then that of Transjordan’s native population. Many well-
educated and skilled members of the Palestinian middle class were added to 
the still modest Transjordanian professional middle class. The average level 
of education and professionalization among the Palestinian population was 
significantly higher than that of Transjordan’s population, due to the much 
greater previous educational opportunities and bureaucratic diversification 
in Palestine as compared to Transjordan. Many of those well-educated new-
comers found jobs in the Jordanian public sector or established themselves 
in the free professions or the private sector.
At the same time, the regime imposed a Jordanian identity upon the 
new citizens of Palestinian descent.11 All public references to Palestine and 
Palestinian identity were suppressed or erased by the authorities. Pales-
tinian civil society institutions, including labor, women’s and professional 
associations, were required to label themselves Jordanian and to move their 
headquarters to the East Bank of the river Jordan. Palestinian symbols, such 
as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and traditional expressions of art, such 
as embroidery, were claimed to belong to Jordan’s heritage. Meanwhile, Pal-
estinians were largely excluded from the army and the upper levels of the 
state’s apparatus. This situation caused a great deal of resentment among the 
majority of citizens of Palestinian descent, profoundly affecting their sense 
of loyalty to, and inclusion within, the Jordanian state.12 Equally, it ensured 
that the relationship between state and society never fully stabilized; and, 
in turn, that the Kingdom’s security forces were regularly called upon to sup-
press potentially dangerous outbursts of anti-state feeling.
The rise of Palestinian nationalism and the PLO would aggravate the 
tense relationship between the state and the Palestinian section of Jorda-
nian society even further. In particular, Palestinian national identity was able 
to assert itself in the Kingdom following Jordan’s devastating defeat of 1967 
in the June war against Israel. Indeed, the Palestinian guerrilla movements 
started to use Jordan as their main basis in the struggle against Israel. At the 
end of the 1960s, a nascent Palestinian civil society, in the form of health 
care, women’s, students’, teachers’ and labor organizations started to flour-
ish in the country. This trend was aborted brutally by bloody confrontations 
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between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian guerrillas in (1970-1971), 
during which the latter were forcibly evicted from the Kingdom.
After these events, not only was the policy of suppressing public 
expressions of Palestinian identity resumed, but Jordanians of Palestinian 
descent were also increasingly barred from entering the civil service. This was 
caused by an (albeit unwritten) policy of preferential recruitment of Trans-
jordanians13 in the public sector.14 According to Adnan Abu Odeh, himself 
a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian descent who has occupied the positions 
of Minister and Political Advisor of the King, it was pressure from Jordan’s 
native tribal population, many of whose members had fought for the sur-
vival of the Hashemite Kingdom against the Palestinian guerillas, that made 
the state adopt this discriminatory policy. By allowing the state institutions, 
which were dominated by native tribe members, to conduct this policy, the 
King reinforced the presence of a loyal and strong power base among Jor-
dan’s native tribes.15 Obviously, much of Jordan’s native tribal community 
came to suspect Palestinians as potential traitors to the Kingdom and sup-
ported repressive and discriminatory policies against them.16 The general 
pattern of exclusion from the public sector must have reinforced the incli-
nations among Jordanians of Palestinian descent to focus their economic 
activities on the private sector. Consequently, Jordan’s business and bank-
ing sector became increasingly Palestinian-dominated. Due to this, many 
members of the Transjordanian community in turn came to feel deprived 
and discriminated against economically. Such mutual feelings of disparity 
and discrimination between both ethnic communities has complicated the 
development of a strong and unified civil society vis-à-vis the state even 
further.17
Up to the present day, there exists a general pattern of socio-econom-
ic division between, on the one hand, the native Jordanian tribal popula-
tion and, on the other hand, the Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The former 
controls the state apparatus; while the latter dominates the business sec-
tor. This does not imply that regime policy towards both communities is 
absolutely straightforward. Official Jordanian state discourse speaks of the 
Jordanian nation in terms of a single Hashemite family – a model of Arab 
unity that includes all citizens, regardless of ethnic origin or place of birth. 
From the beginning of the annexation of the West Bank in 1950, both banks 
and their inhabitants were proclaimed by the regime to be two branches of 
the same family.18 While it is a fact that the state has always been the larg-
est employer in the Kingdom and that the Palestinian-dominated private 
sector has largely been subordinate,19 the political and societal clout of the 
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Palestinian economic elite has been increasing from the 1990s onwards. This 
is mainly due to government policies of economic liberalization and privati-
zation.20 Developments in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, including the 
cutting by King Hussein of Jordan’s legal and administrative ties with the 
West Bank in 1988, the political liberalization process from 1989 onwards, 
King Hussein’s firm anti-war position during the (1990-1991) Kuwait crisis 
and war and a significantly improved relationship between Jordan and the 
PLO in the framework of peace negotiations with Israel have, among citizens 
of Palestinian origin, and particularly among those of the younger genera-
tion encouraged a greater sense of loyalty to the Hashemite Kingdom and 
its supreme ruler.21
At the same time, anxiety and scepticism among Jordan’s native tribal 
population regarding the Palestinians’ loyalty and sense of belonging to the 
Jordanian homeland persisted. It has manifested itself at times in an aggres-
sive form, described by Abu Odeh as “Transjordanian nationalism.” This cur-
rent is motivated by fears among Transjordanians of the Palestinian demo-
graphic “overweight” in the country. In part, such fears are fueled by claims 
of right-wing Israeli politicians (including ministers) that Jordan should 
serve as the “substitute Palestinian homeland.”22 They are also fueled by the 
dominant Palestinian position in the private sector, especially given the fact 
that the IMF-dictated economic privatization process and the concomitant 
downgrading of the public sector may lead to the economic marginaliza-
tion of large numbers of Transjordanians currently employed by the state.23 
Demands by this ethno-nationalist and anti-Palestinian trend include the 
withdrawal of citizenship from the whole or a part of the Palestinian Jorda-
nian community and the official adoption of discriminatory measures that 
would exclude Palestinians from the public sector and from political life.24
Tension and rivalry between Transjordanians and citizens of Palestin-
ian descent, although a real and serious phenomenon, should not be gener-
alized and overstated. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Center 
for Strategic studies of Jordan University in 1994, 64.9% of Transjordanians 
and 72.3% of Palestinian Jordanians believe that the interaction between the 
two communities is solid enough for them to be considered as one people.25 
Several Palestinian Jordanian informants in my own field research described 
the nature of daily interaction between members of both communities as 
peaceful and friendly, and regarded discrimination against Palestinians as 
a problem relating mainly to state policy.26 Also the King, in his proclaimed 
role as upholder of the unity of the nation and the equality of all citizens, 
has taken outspoken Transjordanian nationalists to task from time to time. 
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At one point, King Hussein accused Transjordanian nationalists of harming 
national unity, and of upholding a “very ugly chauvinistic view, which is very 
different from what is in our hearts and minds.”27 Many citizens of Transjor-
danian and of Palestinian origin cooperate together in civil society institu-
tions such as politicial parties, professional associations and voluntary asso-
ciations. Representatives of the Ministry of Social Development and of the 
voluntary sector alike emphasise the legal requirement of NGOs to serve 
all citizens without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion or sex, 
and to accept their members or employees likewise on a non-discriminatory 
basis.28 
State Discourse
The King as the Final Arbiter of State and Society
No description of state-society relations in Jordan can neglect the role 
of the King as the symbol of the nation’s unity, and as the actual manager 
and final arbiter of political life in the Kingdom. Speaking about the nature 
of the Jordanian state or regime, a distinction should be made between the 
role of the various bureaucratic state institutions on the one hand and that 
of the Royal Family and the King on the other. The latter always portrays 
itself publicly as the ultimate arbiter of the public interest and the common 
good in Jordan. This proclaimed role elevates King and Royal family above 
all tribal, ethnic, societal and political groups and factions and even above 
the state apparatus itself. In spite of its partly illusory nature – the King’s rule 
relies on a state apparatus dominated by Transjordanian tribes – this image 
has been effective in bolstering his legitimacy among the Jordanian pub-
lic in general. The American anthropologist Andrew Shryock has described 
how the immense outpouring of grief that the Jordanian public displayed 
on the occasion of King Hussein’s death demonstrated the degree to which, 
regardless of any misgiving they may have had about some of his domestic 
or foreign policies, most Jordanians identified with him and equated him 
with the country’s stability.29
On many occasions, King Hussein has played the role of arbiter, pro-
tecting the interests of citizens against abuses or neglect from state insti-
tutions. Possibly the most famous and politically significant occasion was 
the riots in response to price hikes caused by an IMF-imposed economic 
readjustment program in the towns and villages in the south of Jordan in 
April 1989. The backdrop to this outbreak of public anger was the consider-
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able grievance at levels of corruption in government circles and the general 
lack of political freedom and participation. King Hussein responded by dis-
missing the government of Zaid al-Rifai and holding general parliamentary 
elections for the first time in more then two decades.30 Other examples of 
royal intervention – by Hussein as well by the present monarch, Abdullah II 
– include the resolution of corruption cases, the pardoning of political pris-
oners,31 the provision of better housing to needy families, and intervention 
when hospitals and orphanages have failed to provide adequate services.32
“Authoritarian Pluralism”
The status of the monarchy as the final arbiter in favor of the Jorda-
nian common good is related to the pluralist model of governance practiced 
by the Hashemite dynasty. Sociologist and anthropologist Mansoor Moad-
del contrasts the regime type of the “ideological state” with that of the “ideo-
logically neutral state.” The former governs virtually all components of and 
relationships in the society by a single, uniform and solid ideology; while the 
latter rests on certain ideological presuppositions as well, but only insofar 
as they pertain to general political matters, such as the selection process 
of political leaders and legislature members and the maintenance of order. 
Unlike the ideological state, the ideologically neutral state allows for a plural-
ism of discourses and ideologies, in the society and in the state institutions 
themselves.33 Moaddel defines the nature of the Jordanian political regime 
as that of “authoritarian pluralism.” The monarchy is unquestionably authori-
tarian in the sense that it possesses the ultimate political decision making 
power in all aspects of domestic and foreign policy. However, in exercising 
this role, it is forced to take a variety of interests and pressures emanating 
from within the society into account. In this manner, different socio-political 
tendencies within Jordanian society are reflected in a variety of discourses, 
including Arab nationalism, Islamic conservatism, tribal patrimonialism and 
Western modernism. All of those are present as components of Hashemite 
state discourse itself. According to Andrew Shyrock, by employing such a 
broad, pluralist and flexible discourse, the state is able to appear as different 
things to different segments of the population.34
Various factors could account for the blend of authoritarian paternal-
ism and open-minded pluralism espoused by the Hashemite regime: the 
limited natural resource base of the Kingdom; the historical “artificiality” of 
the Jordanian nation state; the presence of two ethnic communities that 
coexist in a state of latent tension and rivalry; contradictory pressures and 
influences from neighbouring states and areas (Israel, the Palestinian ter-
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ritories, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Gulf states); and economic and military 
dependency on the West. Such factors underline the precariousness of the 
Hashemite Kingdom’s existence. Together, they have created an imperative 
for the Hashemite regime to consider carefully a variety of internal as well as 
external interests in devising its policies and shaping its discourse.
This chapter focuses especially on the internal interests, since it deals 
with internal state-society relations. Various societal groups are the bearers 
of those interests, such as the Transjordanian tribes, the Palestinians, minori-
ties of a religious (mainly Arab Christians) or of an ethnic nature (Circassians 
and Chechens),35 or of both (Armenians), the Islamist movement, which is 
mainly represented by The Muslim Brotherhood, and progressive and con-
servative trends within each of these groups.36 In response to all these dif-
ferent interests and subcultures, the Jordanian King is able to assume dif-
ferent identities. To reinforce and strengthen the loyalty of the native tribal 
population, he presents himself as a supra-tribal leader with a commitment 
to preserve Jordan’s tribal heritage.37 Vis-á-vis the Palestinians, he assumes 
the mantle of protector and supporter of their interests and national cause. 
Likewise, he emphasizes his role as a protector of the Christians and of the 
ethnic minorities. To Western-oriented liberals, he emphasizes his Western 
education, advocacy of social, cultural and political tolerance and his sup-
port for secularization. To Muslim religious trends, including the Islamists, 
he emphasizes his descent from the prophet Muhammad and his role as 
custodian of Jerusalem’s holy places.38
State Islamic Discourse
The regime’s Islamic discourse performs an important function in 
legitimizing the position of the King as the final and impartial arbiter of 
society. Thus, for instance, in response to criticism from the Islamists, who 
protested changes in the election law in 1993, King Hussein declared in a 
speech to the nation:
I would like to emphasize that my government and I, as a father and a brother 
to each citizen, do not support one side over another. I call upon you all to real-
ize that the Arab Hashemite Hussein, who has been honored by Almighty God 
to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad bin Abdullah, peace be upon 
him, is above all worldly titles and positions.39 
Comparably, King Hussein appealed to his Hashemite family back-
ground to strengthen his legitimacy among the Palestinian section of Jor-
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danian society. He did so by reminding his listeners that his tribal ancestor 
Hashim was buried in Gaza, that the Prophet Muhammad made his nightly 
journey to Jerusalem and then to heaven, that his great-grandfather Hussein 
bin Ali had “sacrificed all in the defense of the Palestinian people on their 
national soil” (in the Arab revolt against the Ottomans) and that his grandfa-
ther Abdullah, the first king of Jordan, had successfully defended Jerusalem 
against the Israelis in 1948.
Religion was also used by King Hussein in order to de-legitimize radi-
cal Islamist opponents of the regime or its policies, such as militant Islam-
ist groups perpetrating violent acts or radical preachers in mosques who 
criticize, for instance, Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel. The regime argued on 
such occasions that Islam is “exploited for political purposes.” King Hussein 
repeatedly underlined that the pulpits in the mosque should not be exploit-
ed “for purposes that have nothing to do with our doctrine and our religion.” 
According to him, “Islam shall remain clean and pure,” because “this is what 
the moderate nation, the Muslim nation, is all about.”40 Especially since the 
11th of September 2001, King Hussein’s successor, Abdullah and other gov-
ernment representatives have since emphasized the “moderate, tolerant, 
humane and just” nature of Islam that “rejects all forms of extremism and 
terror.” Conferences organized and speeches made by state representatives 
have been devoted to this theme. On the one hand, such discourse is target-
ed at local Islamist militants and their – actual or potential – sympathizers; 
on the other, it is also intended to mollify those Islamophobic tendencies in 
the West that equate Islam with terrorism and intolerance.41
The status of the royal family as descendants of the Prophet Muham-
mad obviously facilitates the process of shaping a State Islamic discourse. For 
the sake of comparison: the Egyptian regime of the ruling National Demo-
cratic Party led by president Hosni Mubarak has made use of the prestigious 
and age-old al-Azhar University to bolster its religious legitimacy. In doing 
so, it has become dependent on the latter’s religious authority. The Jorda-
nian king, however, can simply invoke his own religious authority as sharif. 
Jordan’s religious establishment of ‘ulama’ (Islamic scholars) and mosques 
is firmly under the control of the monarchical regime.42 The phrase “In the 
beginning was the state” certainly applies to the relationship between state 
and religious authority in Jordan as well.
s t a t e  a n d  s o c I e t y  I n  J o r d a n
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   89 05-02-2008   11:13:31
90
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
State Democratic Discourse
Since the start of the liberalization process in 1989, the Jordanian 
kings Hussein and Abdullah and the consecutive Jordanian cabinets have 
used the discourse of democracy, pluralism, rule of law, human rights and 
civil society to bolster regime legitimacy. From then on, regime patronage of 
Jordanian society has also involved democratic and civil society discourse. 
In fact, there exists a link between State Islamic and State Democratic dis-
course: Jordan’s parliamentary life is considered by the monarchy to be an 
“emulation of the rule of shurah” (i.e. the Qur’anic concept of consultation in 
decision making). According to King Hussein, it constituted a “revival of the 
golden ages of Arab Islamic ideals and values which made our nation the 
best nation brought to mankind.”43
 At numerous occasions, for instance in addresses to the parliament 
or the general public, King Hussein has emphasized that Jordan has imple-
mented political pluralism and democracy, that Jordan’s political life is based 
on the rule of law and that its policy is founded “on the Constitution, on the 
National Charter and on respect for human rights, freedom and dignity.” As a 
reflection of the regime concept of Jordanian nationhood as “one Hashemite 
family consisting of equal members,” King Hussein emphasized that the elec-
tions for parliament held since 1989 took place “with the participation of all 
citizens regardless of their roots or origin.” In a reaction to criticism from 
the opposition concerning the 1993 amendments of the Election Law, that 
were enacted after parliament itself was dissolved, the King stressed that 
they were made “only after a thorough dialogue by politicians, intellectuals, 
members of the media and representatives of all shades of party and politi-
cal opinion in this beloved country.” Thereby he tried to legitimize an appar-
ently undemocratic decision by making use of democratic discourse.44
Serving the National Interest
Typical of the democratic discourse employed by the regime is an 
explicit stress on “loyalty to the nation” as a prerequisite for the legitimate 
operation of political parties and civil society institutions. Loyalty to the 
nation implies, in the Jordanian case, loyalty to the monarchy as the final 
arbiter. When the Political Parties Law was enacted in 1992, thereby legal-
izing the establishment and existence of political parties for the first time in 
35 years, King Hussein decreed that political parties should place the coun-
try’s interest and the unity and cohesion of the Jordanian people above all 
other considerations.45
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During the run-up to the US-invasion of Iraq in March 2003, King 
Abdullah and his government launched the so-called “Jordan First” cam-
paign. Its guiding idea was that Jordanian parties, civil society institutions 
and citizens in general should put the interests of the Jordanian home coun-
try and its political, social and economic development at the top of their list 
of priorities. They should not be distracted from these by issues of a pan-
Arab nature, such as the Palestinian intifada and the upcoming war against 
Iraq. The Jordanian nation, it was argued, would be in a much better posi-
tion to extend a helping hand to its fellow-Arabs, including Palestinians and 
Iraqis, if it first put its own domestic affairs in order and created a strong, 
modern and unified Jordanian society. The national Jordan First Committee 
comprised, besides the King, ministers and regime-loyalist members of par-
liament, Islamic scholars, business people, academics and professionals. The 
“Jordan First” concept was aggressively promoted through the educational 
system, the media, public bill-boards and posters to be seen everywhere 
in the Jordanian streets. It was not well received, however, by the Islamist, 
leftist and pan-Arabist opposition parties who questioned the legitimacy of 
such a campaign at a time when, after dissolving parliament in the summer 
of 2001, more than 100 temporary laws were unilaterally enacted by the 
government. These laws affected, amongst others, the areas of elections and 
public freedoms.46
Promoting political, social and economic development of the Jor-
danian homeland and involving civil society organisations in this process 
remained a high priority for the regime after the US-British led invasion 
of Iraq in March 2003. On 23 October 2003, King Abdullah issued a “Letter 
of Designation” to the newly formed government of Prime Minister Faisal 
Fayez. Therein, principles of development were spelled out that underlined 
the need for inclusion and participation of political and civic institutions, 
including the parliament, political parties, professional associations, cham-
bers of commerce and industry, trade unions, media institutions, intellectu-
als, artists, women’s organizations, the youth and religious leaders.47 Prime 
Minister Faisal Fayez followed up on those instructions by paying widely 
publicized visits to the leading figures of civil society institutions in the fol-
lowing months, thereby trying to convey the image of a civil society-friend-
ly government that sought to prioritize democratic development.48 To the 
present day, typically during youth forums and meetings with students, the 
King and other royal family members as well as ministers place considerable 
emphasis on the importance of women and youth participating in the proc-
ess of political development.49
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The same regime representatives, however, also made clear that there 
are limits to state tolerance and democratic freedoms. Prime Minister Faisal 
Fayez, for instance, stated that the government’s democratic approach does 
not mean that anyone should have the chance to “harm the country and 
distort its image;” though he did not define the nature of such transgres-
sions.50 On another occasion, Fayez lashed out against some of the most 
prominent civil society institutions for not participating in the regime-led 
political development process. “The sad fact is that we have no Jordanian 
public opinion because the silent majority constitutes 90 percent of the 
population and the only voices heard are those of the professional associa-
tions, the Islamic Action Front and the leftist parties,” he asserted. “What the 
government wants from the political parties, other political and professional 
associations and civil society institutions is to do their part in encouraging 
political participation in a proactive manner,” he added. According to him, 
the civil society institutions have failed in this regard: “the professional asso-
ciations have no other concern but pan-Arab issues. They show no interest in 
what is going on at the domestic level. Theirs are private agendas.”51
The top-down character of the process of “political development” and 
the patronizing attitude of its promoters towards civil society and public 
opinion becomes especially clear when the promoters’ statements on the 
role of the media are carefully reviewed. According to Faisal Fayez, modern 
media-related laws are going to be drafted “in order to make our media free 
and responsible, a media that will not resort to character assassination, slan-
dering symbols of our homeland.” The Kingdom needs responsible media, 
according to him, that does not endanger its political and economic inter-
ests.52 According to the King himself, national interests should be a priority 
for the media’s coverage. He stressed that the media has a significant role 
to play “in educating the public on their civic duties to participate active-
ly in the Kingdom’s development, on solid work ethics and the merit of a 
cohesive society working in harmony towards the country’s goals.”53 As a 
final example of discursive paternalism toward civil society by the regime in 
the name of the “national interest,” the circular issued by Fayez’ government 
that directs political parties, professional associations and other civil society 
institutions to observe the National Banner’s Law by hoisting the flag and 
posting the King’s pictures in their offices should also be mentioned.54
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Cooptation of Society
Cooptation of Tribes
Of course, regime patronage over society in Jordan is not a matter of 
discourse alone. It is also a matter of concrete policies of cooptation vis-á-vis 
the various societal groups, with tangible consequences for their societal 
and political status in the Kingdom. The predominance of Jordan’s native 
tribal population in the state apparatus has already been mentioned. Up to 
this day, the Hashemite regime has reserved the more powerful positions in 
the state bureaucracy, the army and security apparatus for this ethnic com-
munity. Moreover, tribal and rural areas in the kingdom are disproportional-
ly represented in parliament through a distribution of electoral districts that 
is decisively in their favor.55 The Hashemite monarchy officially recognizes 
tribal leadership and respects tribal custom. A nephew of the King func-
tions as the Advisor for Tribal Affairs. He consults and represents the tribes. 
Until 1976, tribal law was officially administered in much of the country. 
Unofficially, tribal law is still administered by state institutions.56 According 
to anthropologist Richard Antoun, the “weak” nature of the Jordanian mon-
archy has led to the cooptation and protection of tribal life by the regime, 
since the latter needs to have all the allies it can find. Consequently, socio-
cultural tribal patterns of cooperation and conflict resolution in Jordan do 
not have to resist the assault of centralized state power, as happened in 
Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein and continues to happen in Syria. 
Therefore, tribal mechanisms in the field of patron-client relations, wastah57 
and peaceful resolution of conflicts continue to be relevant. They have even 
penetrated the state apparatus to a high degree.58
Cooptation by the state of the tribal population actually results in a 
high degree of discriminatory practice. Having a native tribal family name, 
or having a relative in a prominent position in the state apparatus may 
improve opportunities for things like university admission, employment in 
the state sector, forgiveness of a traffic violation or the issuance of a pass-
port. Being deprived of such fortunes – true for most citizens of Palestinian 
descent, in particular those of a modest socio-economic background – one 
may spend hours in line to renew a driving license, have greater trouble 
in finding employment and is more likely to be punished or arrested dur-
ing police-checks on the roads or in the streets.59 Even business people of 
Palestinian origin often feel obstructed in their economic activities by civil 
servants of a Transjordanian tribal background.60
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Obviously, state-coopted tribalism is of a strongly hierarchical nature 
and is, therefore, likely to result in patron-client-relationships. However, the 
kingdom’s political phase of liberalization since 1989 seems also to have 
resulted in more democratic and horizontal practices within the political and 
social life of the Transjordanian tribes. Lauri Brand has noted, for instance, 
primaries taking place within tribes to democratically elect their candidates 
for Parliamentary elections.61 This is part of a wider process of social change 
taking place in Jordan’s tribal communities, under the impact of factors like 
urbanization, education and increased physical mobility. This process under-
mines the authority of the traditional tribal elders and empowers younger 
tribesmen on the basis of the modern education they have acquired as well 
as their knowledge of and (work) experience with the workings of modern 
state institutions.62 As a result, traditional tribal sheikhs have found levels 
of obedience among the younger generation increasingly to be waning.63 
Antoun has described the emergence of a more lively tribal public sphere, 
wherein issues such as traditional tribal cultural practices and bureaucratic 
incompetence of state institutions are more freely debated and criticized, 
and voluntary associations are established.64
Cooptation of Palestinians
Regime patronage of the Palestinian section of society seems to be 
much more limited as compared to that of Jordan’s native tribes. Neverthe-
less, until Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, usually about 
half of the ministers in any Jordanian cabinet were of Palestinian origin. This 
was meant to symbolize the unity of both banks of the Jordan River under the 
Hashemite leadership.65 Also, since 1988, there have been several examples 
of Palestinians serving as ministers, the most prominent of which remains 
Tahir al-Masri. He became Prime Minister in 1991, when Jordan embarked 
on the process of peace negotiations with Israel. As a general rule, however, 
Palestinians have been excluded from the restricted decision-making group 
at the very top of the state apparatus and the military.66
In spite of this state of affairs, since it allows the great majority of them 
to become Jordanian citizens, Jordan can claim to have been more hospi-
table than most Arab countries towards its Palestinian community. It has, 
after all, provided them with a legal basis to participate and advance in the 
Kingdom’s socio-economic life. The result of such participation is that Pales-
tinians predominate not only in Jordan’s business life, but also in its profes-
sional, media, and educational sectors.67 In general, economically successful 
Palestinians have a greater loyalty toward Jordan and its dynasty than the 
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Palestinians who suffer economically. Trends of structural adjustment and 
privatization that assign a greater economic role to the market also seem 
to strengthen the political clout of the Palestinian business elite vis-á-vis 
the regime.68 As far as inhabitants of the Palestinian refugee camps are con-
cerned, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UNRWA) is responsible for their education, health care and other social 
services. The Jordanian state does, however, play a role in socio-economic 
development in the camps. It provides infrastructure like water and sewer-
age services, waste-water treatment, roads and electricity networks, hous-
ing for poor camp inhabitants and loans to poor students from the camps. 
The government has a department for Palestinian Affairs that is responsible 
for such services and coordinates with UNRWA.69 The role of the state in the 
refugee camps may ensure at least a minimum of state legitimacy among 
this politically most disaffected part of Jordan’s Palestinian community.
Cooptation of Minorities
As far as the minorities of Circassians, Chechens and Christians are 
concerned, special seats in parliament are assigned to them, through which 
they are, in fact, over-represented in relation to the size of their communi-
ties in Jordan’s general population.70 Also, in the fields of employment in the 
state and security apparatuses, and, in the case of the Christians, policies of 
internal security and protection, these minorities enjoy a special relation-
ship with the regime.71
Cooptation of Political and Cultural Islam
While the Jordanian monarchy is in favor of secular and liberal trends 
advocated by Jordan’s modernist economic elite, it also offers The Muslim 
Brotherhood legal protection.72 In the past, the Islamist movements’ reli-
giously motivated opposition against secular pan-Arab, Marxist and Com-
munist trends made it a useful ally of the Hashemite regime. At times, the 
regime has felt itself threatened by these currents; in particular this was 
the case during the 1950s and 1960s.73 At the same time, The Brotherhood 
functions as a counterweight against the more militant versions of Islam-
ism, calling for the overthrow of the monarchy, such as Hizb Al-Tahrir (Lib-
eration Party) and violent, often Al-Qa‘ida-affiliated splinter groups initially 
established by Jordanian veterans of the Afghani jihad (holy war) against the 
Soviet army during the 1980s.74
To cultivate this alliance with Jordan’s mainstream Islamist move-
ment, Muslim Brotherhood members were frequently co-opted into pres-
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tigious positions by the regime. A former Minister of Awqaf (Holy Places) 
and Islamic Affairs was Kamil Ismail al-Sharif, one of the early Brotherhood 
leaders in Egypt. Especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, the Broth-
ers enjoyed a strong influence in the Ministry of Education, where many 
of them, including a large number of The Brotherhood’s executive bureau, 
were employed. One of the most prominent Brotherhood leaders, Ishaq 
Farhan, served as Minister of Education from 1970 until 1974 and as presi-
dent of the University of Jordan from 1976 until 1978.75 Given the demise 
of secular pan-Arabist and leftist ideologies during the past decades, we 
may state that, from the regime’s point of view, the present function of The 
Muslim Brotherhood, including its extensive network of political, social and 
cultural institutions, is that of providing a non-violent and regime-loyalist 
Islamic option to disaffected sections of Jordan’s population, in particular 
the youth and urban Palestinians. By its cooperation with The Brotherhood, 
the state tries to prevent militant and jihadi versions of Islamism from taking 
root in the society.
Similar to the regime’s attitude vis-á-vis tribal culture, its position 
towards religious culture in the Kingdom has always been characterized by 
accommodation and cooptation. It never started explicitly from a secularist 
ideal, in the vein of the secular pan-Arab regimes in Syria, Iraq and Egypt, the 
Kemalist regime in Turkey or the Pahlavi regime in Iran. Part of its authority is 
palpably based upon Islam, as has been mentioned above. Existing seculari-
zation processes in the Kingdom were not forcefully imposed from above, 
but rather encouraged by the regime gradually. According to the Kingdom’s 
constitution of 1952, shari‘ah courts enjoy jurisdiction over personal sta-
tus matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody, and 
over awqaf (Islamic endowments).76 After the Islamic revolution in Iran had 
taken place in 1979, Jordanian society experienced a wave of Islamic cultural 
revival. This was expressed by phenomena such as the increased wearing of 
Islamic dress and of beards, increased mosque attendance and a mosque 
construction boom.77 The regime participated in this upheaval by policy 
measures such as increasing the amount of religious programming on state-
run television and radio, encouraging the payment of zakah through the 
Zakah Fund, which is affiliated to the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, 
enforcing bans on smoking and alcohol during Ramadan and facilitating the 
creation of the Jordanian Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment.78
It seems, however, that the Kingdom has not known a trend of reli-
gious censorship on public expressions of a degree similar to that in Egypt in 
the 1990s. The regime may even intervene at times to protect citizens from 
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aggressive manifestations of Islamic cultural revival. In 1989, for instance, 
television talk show host and women’s rights activist Toujan Feisal faced 
charges in court for apostasy and ridiculing Qur’an, Hadith and shari‘ah. The 
legal proceedings against her were initiated by certain Islamists provoked 
by a press article in which Feisal mocked the institution of polygamy. King 
Hussein intervened on her behalf and, in January 1990, the court of appeal 
exonerated her from all charges.79
Again, the status of the King as the final arbiter above all parties and 
sections may at times work to the benefit of citizen’s rights. It could even be 
stated that different sections of Jordanian society feel themselves protect-
ed by the monarchy against real or perceived threats emanating from one 
another. On the one hand, mainstream Islamists often observe that, due to 
the existence of the monarchy, they have been spared the kind of persecu-
tion suffered by Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria.80 And they are all-too 
aware of the relatively open political climate in the Kingdom as compared 
to other Arab countries. They enjoy official recognition by the state and are 
permitted publicly to perform religious, social and political activities with-
out fear of legal reprisal (as long as they do not transgress the state imposed 
limits discussed in the next section).81 On the other hand, Jordanian Muslims 
of a more secular or liberal orientation, as well as Christians, feel protected 
by the state against the perceived threat posed by the Islamist movement 
to their individual rights and freedoms in social, cultural and perhaps even 
political spheres.82 This also means, of course, that the monarchical regime 
has succeeded in playing these different forces off against one another in 
its policy of managing as well as accommodating them. Moreover, various 
profound tensions between these forces and the state do exist. These will be 
dealt with in the next chapter.
Limitations to Democracy and Pluralism
Institutions of Parliamentary Democracy
That the sort of pluralism advocated and practiced by the Hashemite 
regime is still an authoritarian one, as observed by Mansoor Moaddel, is sup-
ported by the limitations imposed on the exercise of democracy and civil 
rights in the Kingdom. To start with the formal institutions of parliamentary 
democracy: while it is true that, since 1989, Jordanian citizens have enjoyed 
the right to elect their own parliament, the power of this parliament is still 
circumscribed by monarchical privileges. The Senate, the Prime Minster and 
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the council of Ministers are still appointed by the king, who chooses individ-
uals in accordance with his own preferences and interests. In addition, the 
Constitution grants the King the power to dissolve parliament and declare 
martial law.83 The royally-appointed government may also enact temporary 
laws for as long as parliament is absent.
The last time that the King made use of his power to dissolve parlia-
ment was in June 2001.84 Parliamentary elections were initially scheduled 
for November that year, but they were postponed several times until finally 
being held on 17 June 2003.85 In the meantime, many temporary laws, some 
of them affecting civil rights, were enacted by the government. One such 
law made the holding of public events, marches and rallies conditional upon 
official prior approval of the provincial governor.86 Another stipulated the 
“permanent or temporary closure” of publications that carry “false or libel-
ous information that can undermine national unity or the country’s reputa-
tion.” Publications carrying articles that incite “crimes, strikes, illegal public 
assemblies or the undermining of public order” would be subjected to fines 
up to 5000 JD and/or prison-sentences of up to three years, to be imposed 
by the State Security court. This court does not know a right to appeal.87
The election law favors pro-regime constituencies, to be found mainly 
in tribal and rural areas and in the smaller towns, over the more opposition-
oriented and Palestinian dominated bigger cities in various ways. More on 
this will be discussed in the next chapter. Finally, the functioning of politi-
cal parties is severely hampered because of state policies that confine the 
former’s activities to the sphere of “political society” in the narrowest sense, 
while, at the same time, severely circumscribing their activities in the “civil 
society” – i.e. in terms of voluntary associations and public, grassroots activ-
ity.88
Public Protest
Holding demonstrations and public meetings by citizens in general 
is subjected to severe restrictions as well. In each case, the provincial gov-
ernor should give prior written permission. If the authorities feel that the 
meeting or demonstration implies protest against the government’s own 
policies or against that of Jordan’s allies, permission is on the whole denied. 
Occasionally, however, permission is granted, for instance in the case of 
demonstrations out of solidarity with the Palestinian intifada or against US 
intervention in Afghanistan or Iraq. In such cases, the authorities feel that it 
is wise to allow people to let off some steam. Sometimes, protest meetings 
are only allowed to take place within the premises of the organizing insti-
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tutions, such as political parties or professional associations, which greatly 
lessens their public impact. Citizens who defy the ban on a demonstration 
or a public meeting risk arrest, interrogation and sometimes physical abuse 
or torture by police or mukhabarat.89
The Press
Similar restrictions are suffered by the Jordanian press. While journal-
ists in Jordan are considerably freer than they were before the start of the 
liberalization process in 1989,90 laws relating to the press stipulate limits to 
press freedoms that ensure journalists generally to practice self-censorship. 
First of all, there is the prohibition on “disparaging the King and royal family 
members.” Second, the Jordanian armed forces and security forces (includ-
ing her police and mukhabarat) may not be harmed by publication of “news 
items, cartoons and comments.” Third, information deemed damaging to 
Jordan’s national unity is also considered off-limits. Finally, any article or 
source of information that might be read as slandering heads of state of 
Arab, Muslim or friendly nations, and anything that instigates “illegal” politi-
cal activities – such as sit-ins, strikes or gatherings held without permission 
– is also banned.91
Needless to say, such vaguely formulated red lines make Jordanian 
journalists think twice before pursuing potentially controversial topics. 
When a paper receives a “sensitive” news story through a foreign news agen-
cy, a reporter often contacts a senior official requesting a comment on the 
matter. The paper might put the official’s comment as a lead to the original 
story. In other instances, “sensitive stories” are published on inside pages or 
added to other stories.92 Since the government owns a major interest in the 
country’s main daily newspapers,93 the latter usually refrain from publishing 
material that is critical of government policy. The privately owned weekly 
newspapers may be more daring in this regard, depending on their chief-
editors. But they must also take the views of government officials regarding 
the publication of certain topics into account. If not, the journalist or (chief ) 
editor in question risks being arrested, imprisoned and interrogated.94 Defy-
ing the wishes of the authorities in these matters can lead to the closure of 
the newspaper in question.95
Religious Institutions
In our discussion of the limits to freedom of expression in Jordan, the 
religious sphere must not be omitted. The religious establishment in Jordan 
is also subject to censorship by the state. In Jordan, the phenomenon of the 
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“private mosque,” found in several other Muslim countries, does not exist. 
All mosques are controlled by the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic affairs. This 
provides the state with the means to control the flow of discourse in this 
institution that plays such an important role in Muslim social and public 
life.96
To prevent the airing of views by mosque preachers that are critical of 
government policies and to foster a docile state Islam, the Ministry of Awqaf 
has increasingly tried to control the content of the Friday sermon (khutbah). 
Since the mid-1980s, when The Muslim Brotherhood underwent a wave of 
repressive government measures, preaching has been under the supervi-
sion of the Department of Preaching and Guidance. This department resorts 
under the Ministry of Awqaf. Since then, the state has employed “balanced 
thinkers,” uncritical of the regime and its policies, as qualified preachers and 
imams to give the mosque sermons. While the hiring of preachers with a 
more oppositional and/or Islamist outlook cannot be entirely avoided, due 
to a general shortage of mosque personnel, the latter are closely monitored 
and rotated from mosque to mosque to prevent them from building a large 
following. A preacher who persists in criticizing government policies will be 
banned from the mosque for a couple of months. The Department of Preach-
ing and Guidance has the authority to grant or withhold permission to speak 
in the mosque, without specifying a reason. Any preacher who violates a ban 
to preach might be referred to the secret police. Some imams and preachers 
have found ways to circumvent governmental restrictions by masking their 
critical messages towards state policies in quotes from Qur’an and Hadith 
that serve as allusions to current political or social events. However, such 
analogies are usually so subtle that they are also lost on much of the audi-
ence and therefore have limited effect within the public sphere.97
Voluntary Associations
As a final example of limitations to democratic rights and freedoms 
in the Hashemite Kingdom, we turn to the voluntary associations. Many of 
these associations organize courses, lectures and workshops on various 
social and cultural issues. State discourse on the “separation” of the realm of 
social and cultural life from that of political life places such associations in a 
difficult position. This is because many social and cultural topics – concern-
ing, for instance, gender relations or religious/ethnic (particularly Palestin-
ian) identity – have political implications. The law on Voluntary Societies 
and Social Organizations (Law no. 33 of 1966) states that voluntary associa-
tions can only be formed “to provide social services without any intention 
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of financial gains or other personal gains, including political gains” (empha-
sis added). This limitation prevents such associations from engaging in any 
political mobilization and/or public advocacy work that may put pressure 
on the state. There are several cases of voluntary associations whose mem-
bers faced harassment, arrest and/or interrogation by the mukhabarat for 
conducting cultural activities with political import. Some associations were 
actually dissolved by the authorities for such reasons.98
A Historical Pattern of Patronage
In an attempt to describe historically the evolution of the regime’s 
attitude to Jordanian society, we must note that a combination of factors 
has produced, on the one hand, a pattern marked by authoritarian con-
trol, and, on the other, sensitivity toward various interests and ideological 
viewpoints emanating from within society. Internal stability could not be 
achieved by exercising repression and coercion alone, though this has often 
formed a significant part of the regime’s repertoire. Needs and interests in 
wider society have to be satisfied (or at least placated), and the various seg-
ments of Jordanian society co-opted whenever possible.
During the years in which the Kingdom enjoyed an abundance of 
economic support from abroad, in particular the 1970s and early 80s, when 
it received subsidies and development aid from the West (particularly the 
USA) and Arab oil states (as well as remittances from hundreds of thousands 
of Jordanian citizens working in the Gulf region), the state could co-opt the 
population by simply distributing goods and services. Thus, it granted sub-
sidies on basic commodities and the provision of public sector jobs. Accord-
ingly, popular participation in politics and democratic freedoms could be 
“bought off” by satisfying popular desires in the realm of consumption and 
economic prosperity.
This pattern could no longer be sustained when, due to the decline 
in the oil revenues of the Gulf States during the 1980s, debt and inflation 
in Jordan soared to unprecedented heights, expatriate Jordanian workers 
returned from the Arab Gulf region and unemployment started to rise. The 
Kingdom finally capitulated to an IMF-imposed structural adjustment pack-
age that was highly unpopular among the people. When, due to fuel price 
increases that were part of the structural adjustment package, members of 
the tribal population of the south of Jordan started to riot in April 1989, the 
King decided that it was time to give the wider society a voice in Jordanian 
politics. This was prudent because the protestors and rioters belonged to 
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a segment of society that formed an essential pillar of the regime.99 From 
then on, maintaining the pattern of regime patronage and cooptation of the 
population has taken a different form: providing political space to vent the 
frustrations of disaffected groups and thereby to placate them.
Patronage of Civil Society
The new form of cooptation leaves the basic patron-client relation-
ship between state and society intact or perhaps even reinforces it. For the 
regime allows autonomous spaces in the society, such as tribal structures, 
professional associations, voluntary associations, political parties and Islam-
ic movements, to continue to exist. As part of the same process, it regu-
larly listens to opinions and complaints emanating from this civil society 
and occasionally consults civil forces (such as professional associations,100 
or The Muslim Brotherhood101) in order to defuse socio-political tensions 
and unrest. However, the reins of public and political life remain firmly in 
the hands of the state. Thus, the regime defines the nature of acceptable 
and responsible attitudes and expressions in the public sphere, and it alone 
determines their limits. Yet, the laws and regulations defining those limits 
are so vague in content that they provide state authorities with consider-
able leeway to step in when they deem it necessary. Hence, if members of a 
voluntary association engage “unlawfully” in political activity, if a newspaper 
editorial criticizes the regime of a neighbouring Arab country, or if a peace-
ful demonstration is considered politically dangerous, the state can exercise 
its right to act punitively. All dealings of the state with the forces of civil 
society have the safeguarding of the monarchical regime and its hegemony 
over Jordanian society as the ultimate objective. Regime survival requires a 
certain measure of communication with forces from (civil) society, so that 
the state will not be alienated from what is going on at the grassroots and 
thereby lose its ability to control and manage them. This implies that the 
regime is open to suggestions or criticism from civic institutions such as 
women’s organizations, professional associations or human rights groups 
only when this accords with its own power interests and its own top-down 
agenda of political, social and economic modernization.102
At times, state authorities display contradictory attitudes toward local 
civil society institutions. This is due to the fact that, in many cases, the state 
itself is caught up between conflicting internal as well as external interests. 
Take the example of wastah or favoritism, a widespread practice within the 
state apparatus. By allowing this practice to continue, the regime co-opts 
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Jordan’s native tribal population, thereby cultivating an important pillar of 
regime support. However, the emergence of a globalizing and knowledge-
based economy in Jordan requires an efficient and professionally working 
state apparatus that transparently hires persons solely on a meritocratic 
basis. Therefore, it is not surprising that the King himself as well as the Prime 
Minister and other cabinet members are strong verbal opponents of the 
practice of wastah.103 At the same time, the regime relies on a state apparatus 
that largely functions on the basis of this phenomenon. Needless to say, this 
prevents it from taking effective steps to eradicate wastah. The human and 
civil rights NGO Arab Archives Institute, led by journalist Sa‘eda al-Kilani, 
gained first hand experience of this paradoxical state of affairs when it made 
recommendations to the government, on the basis of its own research and 
documentation, to combat the wastah phenomenon: government officials 
received these recommendations with open arms and agreed fully with the 
NGO’s criticisms. Little was done to translate them into practice, however.104
Another example of inconsistent state attitudes toward voices from 
the civil society is the case of the Campaign to Eliminate So-called Crimes of 
Honor. This was an NGO that gathered signatures in 1999 and 2000 to repeal 
an article in the penal code that grants reduced sentences to men convicted 
of committing honor crimes. The regime’s attitude on this issue was a sen-
sitive one, since it had repeatedly brought the country under the interna-
tional spotlight for the wrong reasons. The NGO in question faced strong 
opposition from conservative tribal as well as Islamist forces that saw in it a 
ploy to undermine the traditional social and moral fabric of Jordanian soci-
ety. A Jordanian parliament dominated by conservatives blocked a proposal 
to repeal the article in question. The monarchy, meanwhile, tried to show its 
good faith toward the Campaign as well as to the international community 
by organizing a public rally against the article. At the same time, however, 
it declared its “respect” for the decision of parliament. Regime patronage of 
the issue had, meanwhile, led to the marginalization of the public impact of 
the NGO’s campaign.105
Self-Representation of the Regime
The self-representation of the regime as the embodiment of the com-
mon good and of the supreme values of the nation is another element that 
characterizes its patronage over civil society in Jordan. This embodiment is 
expressed by the monarchy in various ways, such as through references in 
speeches to its own sharif-based status, to the national interest, to the mod-
ern values of democracy, civil society, and socio-economic development, 
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and to the empowerment of marginal social groups (women, youth and the 
poor). Likewise, members of the royal family make frequent visits to needy 
communities and Palestinian refugee camps,106 involving themselves there 
in the opening and sponsorship of charitable centers, social initiatives and 
welfare NGOs.107 Next to royal family members, governmental institutions, 
such as the Ministry of Social Development, have also initiated the establish-
ment of welfare and development associations.108 It can be safely assumed 
that the regime is motivated by a genuine desire for development of the 
nation. After all, its own interests, survival and international relationships 
are linked to the promotion of modernization processes that entail, among 
others, the development of a knowledge-based economy, the emancipa-
tion of women and youth and a transparent and participatory political and 
administrative environment.109 However, the way in which the regime imple-
ments these processes (i.e. from above) fosters a top-down model of state-
civil society relationships, in which it is the monarchy that promotes itself as 
the benevolent caretaker of the society and as its educator in modern and 
“enlightened” values.
To characterize this pattern in terms of existing civil society theories 
(albeit to do so briefly), we assume that, to some degree, the Jordanian 
model resembles the statist conception of civil society as developed by the 
early 19th century German political philosopher Hegel. According to Hegel, 
the state embodies the universal interest of society, preserves its inner bal-
ance and harmony from above and maintains a corporatist relationship with 
the civic institutions.110 The function that the Hashemite State assigns to civil 
society institutions is also reminiscent of Gramsci’s understanding of the 
nature of such institutions: the inner trenches of the established system that 
contribute to the stability of hegemony exercised by the society’s rulers.111
The Response of Civil Society to Regime Hegemony
Jordan’s licensed civil society institutions seem to be willing to play 
according to the rules of the game described above. Gone are the days 
that pan-Arab forces in the 1950s or Palestinian leftist-nationalist forces 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s openly questioned the legitimacy of the 
Hashemite monarchy, and threatened to replace it with a genuinely “popu-
lar” regime. The liberalization process that began in 1989 took place on the 
condition that the status of the monarchy (as final legal arbiter) would not 
be questioned by political and civil society forces. By and large, Jordanian 
representatives of those forces seem to acquiesce to this. Like the Jordanian 
public in general, they often appreciate the stability, security and relative 
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freedom that the Hashemite dynasty brings to Jordanian society. Many of 
them contrast the political situation in the Kingdom in a positive vein to 
that in other Arab countries. In the words of one political specialist, Schirin 
Fathi [h]ad the main thrust of the oppositional strength in the past been 
geared toward questioning Hashemite legitimacy, this has been resolved 
in the monarchy’s favor. Recent events have underlined the King’s authority 
as the guarantor of survival and stability … The sentiment is so strong that 
many Jordanians are not able to conceive of Jordan without the King.112
At the same time, there is still widespread dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing situation regarding civil rights and freedoms, and with the lack of 
a popular participation in parliament and in other political bodies. Demands 
for a fairer political climate, in which critical and oppositional voices may 
be expressed and discussed, are voiced in the media. There is also criticism 
pertaining to socio-economic policy and/or foreign policy, in particular as 
regards Jordan’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, all the main-
stream currents, including Islamists and leftists, abide by the rule that criti-
cism may be leveled at specific and concrete government policies, never at 
the monarchy itself.113 The basic pattern of a parliamentary democracy, a civil 
society and public opinion acquiescing (in public discourse and practice at 
least) in the patronage of a monarchical regime seems to be firmly in place.
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5. Political Society, 
Economic Society 
and the Role of the 
Islamist Movement
This chapter aims to illustrate further the patronizing and semi-
authoritarian/semi-liberal relationship between state and society in Jordan 
(highlighted in the previous chapter) by focusing on those civil society insti-
tutions and popular forces most often dealt with and written on within the 
media and academia. It begins with the historical development of political 
party life in the Kingdom. Subsequently, the role of professional associations 
as economic but especially as political interest groups will be explored. Then 
the role of organizations representing employers and laborers as represent-
atives of Jordanian economic society will be described. Finally, a closer look 
will be taken to the historical development of Jordan’s Islamist movement, 
especially its main current, The Muslim Brotherhood. The chapter will con-
clude with a comparison between these four categories of civic institutions 
and their role vis-à-vis society and state.
The Role of Political Parties
As in any parliamentary democracy, political parties in Jordan are 
meant to represent competing social interests and views in parliament. 
Their influence on policy-making may be exerted from within parliament 
or, if with luck, from within the governmental cabinet itself. One can argue 
that since political parties are engaged in the realm of policy – and deci-
sion – making in the sphere of the state, they do not belong to civil society 
proper.1 It could equally be maintained, however, that since parties have, 
ideally speaking, the character of citizens’ initiatives and represent the inter-
ests and opinions among (certain sections of ) the citizenry, they perform 
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the civil society function of protecting citizens’ rights and interests vis-à-vis 
the state.
Political Party Life up to the Declaration of Martial Law in 1957
The first political party in the Emirate of Transjordan was established 
in 1920 by Syrian nationalists who had fled their country when the French 
occupied it. It was called Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party). Once they 
started to criticise Emir Abdullah for his subservience to the British Empire, 
however, they were expelled from the Emirate. That was in 1924.2
On 20 February 1928, the British government officially recognized 
Transjordan as a polity separate from the British mandate administration in 
Palestine. The Emirate remained under British tutelage, however, especially 
in the fields of foreign, defense and fiscal policy. Accompanying this agree-
ment was the promulgation of an organic law creating, for the first time, a 
legislative council made up of 21 members. This council was not empow-
ered to counter government policy and the Emir could dissolve it at whim. It 
did offer a platform, however, for the expression of frustrations and political 
protest emanating from Transjordan’s predominantly tribal society. These 
frustrations and protests were related to the continuing economic marginal-
ity of Transjordan’s rural and tribal population vis-à-vis the main urban cent-
ers, as well as to the British imposition of an external administrative elite in 
Transjordan that largely consisted of officials from Palestine. The Transjor-
dan National Congress (TNC) gave a voice to these resentments. Under the 
slogan ‘Transjordan for the Transjordanians,’ the TNC tried to use the Legis-
lative Council to block the appointment of more Palestinian officials. The 
successive governments neutralized this opposition, however, by co-opting 
its members into positions within the Executive Council.3 Moreover, Emir 
Abdullah himself established his own People’s Party as a counterweight to 
this opposition. Other newly established parties represented the interests of 
one particular tribe. Most elected representatives in the council were nota-
bles and sheikhs who owned large landholdings. They dominated Transjor-
danian political life by their personal interests4 and effectively played the 
role of intermediaries between Emir Abdullah’s autocratic regime and their 
own tribal constituencies.
Nevertheless, developments of urbanization and mass education, 
leading to the emergence of a new middle class, gave rise to new ideological 
groupings in the 1930s and 1940s. Examples included The Muslim Brother-
hood, associations of intellectuals and political activists inspired by secular 
pan-Arabism,5 and the Communist Party.6 With its diverse ideological incli-
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nations, this new middle class would be greatly expanded by the arrival of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees during the 1948 war and the 
annexation of the West Bank of the Jordan River in 1950. The inclusion of a 
Palestinian population in the Hashemite Kingdom’s citizenry,7 twice as large 
as the Transjordanian one and generally more advanced in terms of educa-
tion, urbanization and political consciousness, injected a new lease of politi-
cal life into the Kingdom. This development was reflected in the Jordanian 
constitution of 1952 that explicitly recognized, for the first time, the right of 
citizens to establish political parties.8
The subsequent five years were characterized by political turmoil. 
The monarchy was weakened by the assassination of King (the previous 
Emir) Abdullah in 1951 and political currents from abroad, like Nasserism 
and Islamism from Egypt, Ba‘thism from Syria and Communism from the 
Soviet Union were increasingly promoted within the Kingdom’s civil soci-
ety, especially by Palestinians. The young King Hussein, who ascended to 
the throne in 1953, started to make concessions to these newly emerging 
opposition forces in a bid to appease them. First of all, an unpopular parlia-
ment engineered in 1954 by the authoritarian Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-
Huda was dissolved. At the beginning of 1956, the King decided to rescind 
a plan for Jordan’s entry to the Baghdad pact (an anti-Communist military 
alliance led by the United States and Britain), after violent clashes took place 
in the Kingdom’s cities between protestors against the plan and the secu-
rity forces. Moreover, he dismissed Glubb Pasha, the British head of Jordan’s 
Arab Legion and despised symbol of continued British colonial presence for 
Arab nationalists, communists and Islamists alike. Last but not least, the King 
decided to hold general elections that same year in which the opposition 
was allowed to participate.
Winning 12 seats in the 40 member parliament, the greatest opposi-
tional success during these elections was enjoyed by the National Socialist 
Party (NSP) led by Sulaiman al-Nabulsi. This party of businessmen and pro-
fessionals espoused a relatively moderate pan-Arab nationalism and anti-
colonialism, as well as liberal democratic demands pertaining to govern-
ance. Two parties that were more radical, the Ba‘th Party and the Communist 
Party, won two and three seats respectively. Their following was to a large 
extent made up of disaffected Palestinians, especially refugees. Character-
ised by a fierce anti-imperialism, they overtly opposed the monarchy and 
advocated a socialist redistribution of wealth. These three opposition par-
ties obtained most of their votes from the Palestinian population of the West 
Bank. On the conservative side of Jordan’s political map, there was the pro-
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Hashemite Arab Constitutional Party, winning 5 seats, The Muslim Brother-
hood, winning 4 seats and independent candidates mostly belonging to the 
category of tribal notables also won most of their seats on the East Bank.
The King entrusted NSP leader al-Nabulsi with the post of prime min-
ister to form and lead a new government. Much to the monarch’s dislike, 
however, al-Nabulsi opted to select Ba‘thists and Communists as coalition 
partners. The Communist and Ba‘thist ministers and deputies started to 
organize popular demonstrations in favor of their agendas and dismissed 
pro-Hashemite officials.9 Moreover, Communists were released from prison 
and the new government started to make diplomatic overtures toward the 
Soviet Union.10 When radical-influenced army units started to clash with 
Hashemite loyalists in April 1957, the King reacted forcefully. He dismissed 
the al-Nabulsi government, dissolved parliament and banned all political 
parties.11 With the support of the tribal notables, the rural propertied elites 
and even The Muslim Brotherhood, he declared martial law in May 1957,12 
thereby ending the phenomenon of official political party life in the country 
for an indefinite period of time.
Official Political Life without Parties (1957–1989)
During this period, opposition parties continued their activities 
underground, but could not operate in public anymore. Before the June war 
of 1967, elections were held twice in the Hashemite Kingdom, but candi-
dates were not allowed to run on a party ticket. When the regime deemed 
the parliament elected in 1962 to be too critical, the King dissolved it. The 
occupation of the West Bank by Israel during the 1967 war made the regime 
decide to freeze parliamentary elections for an indefinite period of time, due 
to the impossibility of holding elections in an occupied part of the Kingdom. 
When the Arab summit of 1974 in Rabat declared the PLO to be the sole and 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the King suspended par-
liament altogether, pending the resolution of the Palestinian problem.13
The period between 1967 and 1970 was an exception to the overall 
trend. The Hashemite regime’s weakness after the devastating defeat in the 
June War of 1967 against Israel allowed Palestinian guerilla movements of 
different political colors to manifest themselves openly in Jordanian civil 
society. This enabled the banned pan-Arabist and leftist parties to declare 
themselves publicly as a Jordanian coalition that backed the guerillas. All 
of this came to an end, however, when the regime managed to forcibly 
remove the PLO from the Kingdom during the violent confrontations of 
1970–1971.14Leaving Jordan without a popular representative body caused 
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considerable problems in a society with a growing, politically ambitious pro-
fessional middle class and tribal leaders accustomed to enjoying an officially 
recognized political voice. Thus, in 1978, on the advice of some of his clos-
est confidants, the King appointed a National Consultative Council (NCC) 
consisting of 60 leading figures from mainly East Bank-Jordanian society. 
An attempt was made to give this body a representative quality by appoint-
ing members from different parts of the Kingdom and from different ideo-
logical currents, including some veteran oppositionists.15 It had no binding 
decision-making authority, however.
Due to economic problems like inflation and the diminishing pur-
chasing power of the population, societal discontent increased in the King-
dom over the following years.16 Indeed, since the collapse of the oil-market 
in 1982, the Kingdoms’ economic situation as a whole started to worsen.17 To 
placate the population, in January 1984, the King decided to dispense with 
the NCC and to recall the Lower House of parliament. Since eight seats of 
the Lower House had become vacant due to the deaths of their occupants, 
popular elections were organized to fill them. It was a lively contest: women 
voted for the first time and over 100 candidates of different political colors, 
from leftists and secular pan-Arabists to tribalists and Islamists, all partici-
pated.18 The Islamists’ success was remarkable: two of the six Muslim seats 
were won by Muslim Brothers;19 while another one was gained by independ-
ent Islamist and outspoken regime-critic Leith Shubeilat. The newly elected 
representatives turned out to be vocal in opposing corruption and human 
rights violations committed by state institutions and officials. The govern-
ment responded, however, by manipulating divisions in the Lower House 
and clamping down on freedom of expression in general.20
Meanwhile, economic problems were becoming increasingly aggra-
vated. Due to a growing budget deficit, the state started to borrow from 
domestic as well as external sources. The skyrocketing debt led, in 1988, to 
a 45% devaluation of the dinar. Unemployment soared when expatriates of 
Jordanian nationality working in the Gulf region lost their jobs and had to 
return to the Kingdom. In March 1989, therefore, the government concluded 
an agreement for an economic stabilization program with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In return for stand-by credits, the government had 
to cut subsidies on several basic commodities, like cooking gas, gasoline, 
diesel fuel and beverages.21
After the announcement of these subsidy cuts, riots broke out in the 
southern city of Ma‘an, and quickly spread to other towns and villages. The 
rioters expressed themselves against the government of Prime Minister Zaid 
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al-Rifai, which they accused of flagrant corruption.22 Civil society institutions 
in the bigger cities, especially the professional associations, used this vola-
tile situation to articulate popular political demands, including democratic 
elections for a new Lower House, press freedom and broader political par-
ticipation.23 The King, feeling that he should speed up political reform to 
preserve the regime’s legitimacy, appeared on television and promised to 
hold parliamentary elections.24
The Impact of Political Liberalization since 1989
Political parties were still banned when elections for a new Lower 
House were held on the 8th of November 1989. As in 1984, however, can-
didates from all the main political currents were allowed to participate on 
an individual basis.25 Again, Islamists turned out to be the great winners. 
20 candidates from The Muslim Brotherhood won seats in the 80-member 
Lower House, while 14 independent Islamists (not belonging to a formally 
organized Islamist movement) made it to parliament, effectively creating an 
Islamist bloc of 34 deputies.26 10 candidates from the banned secular pan-
Arabist and leftist opposition parties were elected. Of the remaining depu-
ties, 22 were regarded as tribal representatives, while many others belonged 
to the liberal trend among the urban professional middle class.27
In the months after these elections, the newly appointed govern-
ment of Prime Minister Mudar Badran succeeded in creating a freer politi-
cal atmosphere. Many political prisoners were released, restrictions on 
traveling abroad for political opponents were ended, members of the press 
were given significantly more freedom, civil servants previously sacked for 
political reasons were reinstated and new civil servants no longer needed to 
be vetted by the secret police anymore, as was previously the case.28 Martial 
law was officially revoked in July 1991.29
The King was determined, however, to prevent the experience of the 
liberalization process of the 1950s, which had jeopardized regime hegemo-
ny at the time. To that end, he appointed a 60-member strong commission 
charged with drafting a National Charter that would regulate, once and for 
all, relations between state and society in Jordan. The commission’s mem-
bers were politicians from all the main political currents. The National Char-
ter was adopted on 9 June 1991 by an equally appointed 2000-delegate 
national conference with participants from various sections of Jordanian 
society. It confirmed explicitly the restoration of pluralism, democracy and 
popular participation. In return, however, it required from citizens, civil soci-
ety institutions and political parties alike to acknowledge Jordan as a legiti-
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mate independent state (thereby excluding radical versions of pan-Arabism 
from legitimacy) and to recognize the Hashemite monarchy with the King as 
the legitimate head of state.30 Thus, the Charter effectively confined opposi-
tion forces within a framework of loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy, since 
their representatives had signed up to it. At the same time, the legally non-
binding character of the document implied that the regime did not need to 
feel too constrained by the charter’s democratic principles when it wished 
to exercise political repression.31
The regime’s desire to control and contain opposition forces was also 
reflected in the new Political Parties Law, enacted in September 1992. While 
officially reinstating the principle of the multi-party system, it imposed sev-
eral restrictions on political parties. The most important were the following: 
a) voluntary associations were prohibited from promoting the interests of 
any political party; b) political parties may not be financed from abroad; c) 
they may not have organizational links with external political forces; d) their 
leaderships should be truly Jordanian.32 This legislation required a measure 
of organizational and ideological adjustment from secular pan-Arabist par-
ties. More importantly, it had serious implications for The Muslim Brother-
hood, by that time the most powerful organized political force after the 
state itself. The Brotherhood possessed a large network of voluntary associa-
tions, entertained links with sister organizations in other Arab countries and 
received external funds, from the Gulf region in particular, on a large scale.33 
This implied that it could not register as a political party in its own name. 
The Muslim Brothers decided, therefore, to establish a new Islamist party, 
called the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF). The IAF was officially registered at 
the Ministry of Interior as a political party in December 1992.34 In the follow-
ing months, several other political parties registered. Among them were the 
Jordanian Peoples’ Democratic Party and the Jordanian Democratic Popular 
Unity Party (politically oriented toward the Marxist PLO factions Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine (PFLP) respectively), the Jordanian Communist Party, the 
Jordan Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party, the Arab Progressive Ba‘th Party (the latter 
two were oriented toward the Ba‘th regimes of respectively Iraq and Syria), 
as well as several Jordanian nationalist and tribalist parties.35 Some of the lat-
ter fused in 1997 into the Jordanian nationalist and pro-Hashemite National 
Constitutional Party.36
In all, more than twenty political parties were established throughout 
the 1990s. With the exception of the IAF, however, all failed to secure signifi-
cant support from the Jordanian public.37 Again with the exception of the 
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Islamist trend, the political party map in Jordan has remained very unstable, 
with much personal bickering within parties and many splits from as well as 
coalitions between, them taking place.38
All these parties had their first chance to participate officially in elec-
tions for the Lower House in 1993. Monarchy and government were deter-
mined, however, to have a more docile parliament in place after these elec-
tions. The 1989-elected Lower House was outspokenly critical, and dared 
to discuss topics as sensitive as corruption in the highest offices of state.39 
Moreover, the regime was engaged in controversial policies like the Arab-
Israeli peace talks and the implementation of the IMF-prescribed austerity 
package agreed upon in March 1989.
On 4 August 1993, the King dissolved parliament and thirteen days 
later, the government announced its decision to adopt the one-person one-
vote system for the coming elections, instead of the old system of bloc vot-
ing. In the old system, a voter could cast his or her votes for as many can-
didates as the number of parliament seats allotted to his or her district. In 
the new system, however, voters would have to select one candidate. The 
government rightly foresaw that most voters would prefer their only vote 
to go to a representative of their own tribe, clan or family rather than to an 
ideological party candidate. This amendment came on top of an electoral 
district system, in place since 1986, which allotted significantly more seats 
to regime-loyal tribal and rural districts as compared to the opposition-ori-
ented urban areas, in relation to the size of population. Protests against the 
new system by opposition parties, first and foremost the IAF, were to no 
avail.40 Moreover, state authorities employed measures to hamper the elec-
tion campaigns of opposition parties. They transferred IAF members and 
sympathizers, for instance, from their voting districts to prevent them from 
campaigning, and speeches at election rallies of opposition parties were 
often prohibited.41
The November 1993 elections produced the results desired by the 
government. The IAF obtained sixteen seats, along with six independent 
Islamists. This created an Islamist bloc of 22 parliamentarians, meaning 12 
deputies less then the Islamist bloc in the previous parliament. Leftist depu-
ties won only two seats and no party other than the IAF won more than 
five seats. Only 34 of the total number of 80 deputies represented political 
parties. A majority of 56 deputies were to be considered outspokenly pro-
Hashemite.42
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Deliberalization after Peace with Israel
In the following years, antagonism between regime and opposition 
parties was largely determined by the conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Israel, which took place in October 1994. Five months before, eight political 
parties, including the IAF, the Communists and the Ba‘thists, had formed 
the “Popular Arab Committee for Resisting Submission and Normalization” 
to voice their protest against this development. Such close cooperation 
between Islamist and secularist forces was a novelty at the time. Protest 
demonstrations against the peace treaty took place in Amman, but the gov-
ernment responded by banning public meetings. Nonetheless, Jordanian 
opposition forces continued to voice their protest against peace with Isra-
el whenever possible.43 Popular dissatisfaction with the peace agreement 
increased when the expected economic “peace dividend” failed to material-
ize and socio-economic prospects continued to deteriorate for much of the 
population. State repression against oppositional voices also intensified; a 
1996 report of the Arab Organization for Human Rights accused Jordan of 
carrying out “arbitrary arrests, physical and psychological torture of detain-
ees, violations of freedom of expression and abuse of legislation.”44 In May 
1997, the regime amended the Press and Publications law to the effect that 
heavy fines for a range of “violations” by journalists were introduced and 
capital requirements for registering newspapers were substantially raised. 
The actual goal was to rein in the mostly opposition-oriented weekly maga-
zines. As a result, 13 weeklies were compelled to close down four months 
later.45
In addition to the general deterioration in the quality of democratic 
freedoms – freedoms of expression in the press, assembly and associations 
generally suffering as a result – corruption, the retention of the one-person 
one-vote system and alleged dangers to the nation emanating from the 
peace treaty with Israel, this amendment was cited by The Muslim Brother-
hood as a reason to boycott the November 1997 elections for the Lower 
House. The IAF, the political party wing of The Brotherhood, also called for 
a boycott.46 7 leftist and Arab nationalist parties joined in, as did the pro-
fessional associations and some independent public figures. They motivat-
ed their decision to endorse the boycott in a joint “Program for National 
Reform,” which included demands for the restoration of democracy and civil 
rights, a socially fairer economic reform program, and the annulment of the 
peace treaty with Israel.
Not all oppositionists joined the boycott. 8 independent Islamists 
managed to gain parliament seats in the 1997 elections, as well as 2 former 
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IAF deputies in the previous parliament who decided not to join the boy-
cott. Moreover, 5 leftists were elected. Candidates with a regime-loyal and/
or tribalist outlook, whether belonging to political parties or not, gained 
the rest of parliament seats.47 While largely excluded from parliamentary 
representation, Islamist as well as secular opposition parties continued to 
play a role in extra-parliamentary activities of public opposition during the 
following years. They repeatedly issued public declarations of protest on a 
variety of issues. Such issues included military cooperation of Jordan with 
countries like the USA, Britain and Israel,48 normalization with Israel in gen-
eral49 and state repression targeting for example protest demonstrations50 
or press freedom.51 Occasionally, opposition parties were involved in organ-
izing marches, for instance in solidarity with Iraq when there was a threat of 
US-British military action against that country52 or with the Palestinian strug-
gle against Israeli occupation.53 During the fall of 1999, the opposition par-
ties tried in vain to convince King and government to rescind the measures 
of closing down the Hamas office in Amman, arresting the representatives of 
this Palestinian Islamist movement and eventually deporting them.54
When municipal elections were held on 14 and 15 July 1999, the 
Islamists decided not to boycott them. The IAF won 72 council seats and 
got 7 mayors elected in 5 cities. Leftist and secular pan-Arabist candidates 
won only 6 seats. Tribal candidates were prevailing in the rural and Bedouin 
areas.55
Elections and their Aftermath in a Time of Regional Turmoil
On 16 June 2001, King Abdullah II dissolved parliament and assigned 
the government of Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb to draw up a new 
election law to hold the next elections for the Lower House.56 This new law 
increased the number of parliament seats from 80 to 104, but maintained the 
one-person one-vote system and the under-representation of urban areas 
in favor of tribal and rural areas.57 Furthermore, the government announced 
a postponement of the elections from November 2001, as originally sched-
uled, to the following year. The reason stated for the delay was the amount 
of time needed to prepare the elections in accordance with the new law.58 
It was a public secret in Jordan, however, that denying the opposition the 
chance to come out victoriously in elections was the true reason behind 
it.59
This public secret failed to remain secret for any length of time. In 
the following months, government officials stated frankly that the second 
Palestinian intifada against Israeli occupation in addition to US threats to 
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invade Iraq were the cause for the delay. They asserted that “emotionally 
charged sentiments that allow the spread of extremist agendas” by opposi-
tion candidates had to be avoided.60 It finally took until 24 February of 2003 
for the King to issue a degree ordering the elections to be held, on the 17th 
of June that year. The only further amendment introduced to the election 
law was a quota of 6 additional parliament seats reserved for women, raising 
the total number of seats from 104 to 110.61 Meanwhile, opposition parties 
continued with their usual protest activities on the issues of Palestine, civil 
rights, democracy and US intervention against Afghanistan and Iraq in the 
wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on the 11th of 
September 2001. Protest demonstrations organized by opposition parties, 
especially those by the IAF, were regularly banned by the authorities and 
sometimes led to detentions, without trial or indictment, of some of the par-
ticipants. For the sake of coordinating their activities, the parties had a High-
er Coordination Committee for Opposition Parties at their disposal; this was 
borne out of the Popular Arab Committee against Normalization with Israel 
(mentioned above). In spite of this cooperation, mutual tension between 
these parties flared up occasionally; the secular oppositionists’ resentment 
of the dominance of the Islamist IAF within the Committee was generally the 
cause.62 A significant gulf divides Islamists and secular oppositionists when it 
comes to socio-cultural issues like gender relations and the place of religion 
in politics, legislation and the public realm.
No such a gulf exists, however, when it comes to political issues of 
pan-Arab solidarity or of democracy and civil rights. When violent protests 
erupted in Ma‘an in 2002, after police units stormed the town to arrest the 
Salafist-jihadist leader Abu Sayyaf and his followers, the opposition parties 
formed a special committee to try to mediate a peaceful end to the crisis. 
The government rebuffed the mediation offer, put the insurrection down by 
force and threatened with legal action anyone trying “to politicize the issue 
of the outlaws for personal gain.”63
Tension between regime and opposition also centred on the “Jordan 
First” document. Initiated by King Abdullah, this was a blueprint for national 
political and societal development that prioritized loyalty to Jordan as a 
Hashemite Kingdom and its development over all pan-Arab concerns. Not 
surprisingly, the same document was regarded by the opposition coalition 
as a ploy to abandon support for the Palestinian struggle and to accept US 
plans for Iraq. The opposition also objected to its proposal to press political 
parties to merge into larger groups that would have to focus on domestic 
issues only.64
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Soon after the US-British invasion of Iraq in late March and April 2003, 
the Jordanian opposition parties finally agreed to take part in the elections 
for parliament slated for June that year. None of the reasons for boycotting 
the elections in 1997 had disappeared, but Islamist and secular opposition 
forces alike apparently felt that boycotting elections once again would lead 
to their continued marginalization and loss of influence with the regime.65 
The IAF choose 30 candidates to run, carefully distributed over the King-
doms’ 13 governates to guarantee the highest number of seats in parlia-
ment. Leftist and secular pan Arabists participated on a “national democratic 
list.”66
The IAF won 17 seats, a disappointing result for the party. Interesting-
ly, 8 independent Islamists made it to parliament, several of them former IAF 
members who did not agree with the relatively moderate and conciliatory 
line the party’s leadership had adopted during the last few years vis-à-vis 
the regime. Only 3 candidates from leftist and pan-Arabist opposition par-
ties were elected. The opposition’s lack of success, to a large extent, may be 
attributed to electoral apathy among Palestinian Jordanians largely due to 
continued administrative and economic discrimination against them. Tribal 
leaders, former government and security officials and former pro-govern-
ment legislators took 62 of the 110 seats. Again, tribal considerations turned 
out to be dominant in parliamentary elections.67
Nevertheless, the elections did result in the presence of a newly 
elected Lower House in which criticism of government policy could once 
again be voiced publicly. Especially opposition parliamentarians, led by the 
IAF, vehemently criticized many of the so-called “temporary laws” issued by 
the government of Ali Abu al-Ragheb during the absence of parliament, 
especially those banning public assemblies and curtailing press freedoms.68 
Other complaints voiced against subsequent governments by these parlia-
mentarians singled out their corruption, nepotism, the mixing of govern-
mental and business interests, unjust socio-economic policies and collabo-
ration with the US occupation of Iraq and with Israel.69 Battle lines in parlia-
mentary debates were of a different nature when they concerned religiously 
sensitive socio-cultural issues. When the khul‘ law – granting any woman the 
right to divorce her husband unilaterally on the provision she foregoes the 
right to financial support from him – was dealt with in parliament, Islam-
ists sided with tribal conservatives in rejecting the law. Both agreed that it 
would encourage women to “break up families” and “ruin the fabric of our 
Arab and Muslim society.” On the other hand, secular oppositionists and 
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pro-regime modernists found themselves on the same side in defending the 
same law.70
Opposition parties also continued to issue statements of protest out-
side the realm of parliament. Occasionally, they organized protest demon-
strations, especially in the case of Israeli military actions against the Palestin-
ians or against Lebanon. The Israeli assassinations of Hamas leaders Ahmed 
Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantissi in the Gaza Strip in March and April 2004 gave 
rise to massive protest demonstrations in Amman that boosted the role of 
the opposition in the street.71
Relations between the (especially Islamist) opposition and the regime 
fluctuated between mutual understanding and mutual dislike. The IAF lost 
two of its 17 deputies, Abu al-Sukkar and Mohammad Abu Fares, after the 
State Security Court convicted them in August 2006 on charges of “fuel-
ling national discord and inciting sectarianism.” These charges were based 
upon remarks they made during a condolence visit, in June 2006, to the city 
of Zarqa where they met the family of the slain leader of Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, 
Abu Mus‘ab Zarqawi, during which they eulogized him as a martyr. Zarqawi 
claimed responsibility for several (foiled and successful) terrorist attacks in 
the Kingdom, including the bombing of three hotels in Amman on 9 Novem-
ber 2005 resulting in 60 deaths. While both deputies were released from 
prison at the beginning of October 2006 by a special pardon from the King, 
they were not allowed to return to their parliamentary seats.72
The Role of Professional Associations
Professional associations may be regarded as the most powerful 
civil society institutions in Jordan. Their role has, however, a few problem-
atic aspects regarding the civil society concept. First of all, they were not 
founded by the professionals themselves but by the government. The lat-
ter regarded professional associations as a way to regulate and raise the 
standards of the various professions exercised in the Kingdom.73 They are, 
therefore, not citizens’ initiatives in the proper sense. Moreover, Jordanian 
law stipulates that any professional is required to join the association of his/
her profession in order to exercise it legally. This contravenes the basic prin-
ciple of voluntary membership of, and participation in, civil society institu-
tions. A final aspect is that many professionals in Jordan are employed in the 
public sector, something that works to the detriment of their economic and 
political independence vis-à-vis the state.74 There is, however, so much to say 
about the professional associations’ function in protecting their members’ 
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interests and lending a voice to their political opinions and grievances that 
they have to be included in any description of Jordan’s civil society.
The Professional Associations’ Legal and Internal Structures
The Professional association’s prominent status within civil society is 
derived from the heavy political, social and economic weight of the profes-
sional middle class in Jordan. This class is utterly central to the state’s overall 
objective of modernizing and developing the country on the basis of educa-
tion, knowledge and personal skills. There are, at the moment, 14 registered 
professional associations in the Kingdom.75 Their total membership report-
edly exceeds 120,000.76
According to the relevant legislation, the associations’ aims are to 
provide for an associational framework for members of the same profession, 
to preserve that profession’s principles and standards, to elevate the scien-
tific level of professionals through the provision of training courses and to 
provide services, such as health insurance and pensions, to their members 
and their families.77 Some of them also provide housing to their members 
and their families and offer them cultural programs.78 Professional associa-
tions are also legally bound to cooperate with state institutions in order to 
improve the professional practice of their members. The premiums paid by 
their members for health insurance and old age enable the associations to 
engage in investment and enterprise as well.
Apart from their legally stipulated functions, professional associa-
tions play an important role in giving expression to the political opinions 
of their membership on issues not directly related to professional life, such 
as the Palestine problem, Iraq, democracy and human rights. Their views on 
such issues are often of an oppositional nature.79
All paying members of a professional association constitute its Gen-
eral Assembly. The latter body meets on a yearly basis and elects the associa-
tion’s council as well as its president every two years. The council organizes 
the activities of education and training, and also expresses itself regularly in 
the public sphere on the kind of issues mentioned above. The presidents of 
all professional associations constitute a coordinating committee function-
ing as their umbrella. Both a single professional association and the coordi-
nating committee can establish committees specialized in aspects of profes-
sional life or in a political issue,80such as support for the Palestinian struggle, 
civil liberties or opposing US intervention in Iraq.81
The participation of the professional associations’ membership in 
their activities is limited in practice. Lack of interest as well as unemploy-
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ment among members is responsible for the phenomena of widespread fail-
ure to pay the yearly contributions or to attend the yearly general assembly. 
According to some figures, only around 20% of the members bother to show 
up at the latter event. Elections for Council and president within profession-
al associations are generally speaking of a free and democratic nature; the 
government does not interfere in them. However, these associations also 
have disciplinary committees at their disposal for members who violate 
the professional code or commit other kinds of transgressions against the 
association’s interest. These committees have the power to impose fines and 
even to expel violators from the association. Since membership in a profes-
sional association is a legal requirement for exercising a profession, the lat-
ter punishment is particularly severe.82
Oasis of Opposition in a Desert of Authoritarianism
The first professional associations in Jordan were established during 
the first half of the 1950s. These associations pertained to lawyers, dentists, 
medical doctors and engineers.83 This occurred against the backdrop of the 
annexation of the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom in 1950, which led 
to the enormous expansion of a previously very limited class of Transjorda-
nian professionals with a much larger number of Palestinian counterparts. 
The government felt that it should foster and organize this vastly expanded 
pool of human capital for the sake of the country’s economic and technical 
modernization. Not surprisingly, therefore, the newly founded associations 
were Palestinian-dominated. Expansion of educational facilities – including 
higher education – in Jordan in the subsequent decades would lead to a 
further expansion of membership in professional associations.84
The vast economic resources of the association’s membership, in 
combination with their professional skills, guaranteed already in the 1950s 
a measure of political autonomy vis-à-vis the regime. The Medical and Bar 
associations, for instance, called in 1955 for a general strike against the plan 
for Jordan’s entry to the Baghdad Pact. After political parties were outlawed 
in 1957, the professional associations gauged the attention of the public 
as the only platforms whereupon members of the illegal party organiza-
tions could still compete in elections.85 Representatives of secular pan-Arab 
currents dominated the professional associations’ political life at the time.86 
However, until 1967, they were still mainly focused on safeguarding their 
members’ social rights and professional standards.87 The devastating defeat 
for the Arabs in the June war of 1967, however, pushed the professional 
associations toward greater political involvement. They grouped together 
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to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel in a series of meetings, lec-
tures and displays.88 At the beginning of the 1970s, however, the state rees-
tablished its authoritarian control. It enacted legal amendments empower-
ing the government to dissolve the council of any professional association, 
or even a professional association as a whole, in the case of a “threat to pub-
lic security and peace” posed by the latter’s activities. So far, the government 
has not made use of this possibility, although it has repeatedly used it as a 
threat to discourage the professional associations from engaging in politi-
cal activity.89 By and large, however, the government abstained from directly 
interfering in the internal political life of the associations.90
In the course of the 1970s, the professional associations, growing in 
number with the establishment of associations for agricultural engineers, 
the veterinary medics, the geologists, the construction contractors and the 
nurses and midwives, came increasingly under the grip of currents inspired 
and supported by the various PLO factions, often of a leftist nature.91 In 
1977, their leadership established the Council of Professional Unions, which 
resumed limited political work in the public sphere.92 Their activism focused 
mainly on issues related to Palestinian rights, such as protest against the 
Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt and against Israeli occu-
pation and invasion policies, in the occupied territories or in Lebanon.93
The 1980s witnessed economic recession, which put greater pressure 
on the professional associations’ leadership to solve their members’ eco-
nomic problems, and, specifically, the rising levels of unemployment. Many 
members perceived the incumbent leadership of leftist or Arab nationalist 
political colors as paying too much attention to “grand political issues” at 
the expense of the former’s own socio-economic interests.94 This seems to 
have enhanced the chances of Islamist candidates in the elections for the 
associations’ councils and presidencies. Muslim Brothers started to compete 
in those elections in 1982.95 The pattern of a list of Islamist candidates com-
peting with a list of leftist and Arab nationalist candidates became prevalent 
within the associations.96
Another development during this decade was the associations’ 
involvement in protest against state repression. This occurred regardless 
of political color. Together with political parties and human rights activists, 
professional associations or their members issued public statements or dec-
larations on numerous occasions. These included demands to the govern-
ment for the return of civil liberties, the lifting of martial law, holding free 
and democratic elections, the release of political prisoners and freedom of 
association and of the press.97 After student demonstrations at Yarmuk Uni-
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versity in Irbid were violently dispersed by the security forces in May 1986, 
representatives of the Council of Professional Unions paid two visits to the 
Prime Minister’s office on the students’ behalf.98
Meanwhile, the professional associations continued to speak out on 
issues pertaining to the struggle for Palestinian rights and against Western 
intervention in the Arab world. In general, they regarded Western dominance 
as the main culprit for the region’s developmental problems and failures.99 
The increased politicization of the professional associations’ role led to a 
counter-reaction from the state, which clamped down on the expression 
of political dissatisfaction in general. Articles in the state-controlled press 
attacked the associations’ political role, and argued that their true function 
was to advance the interests of their members and to raise professional 
standards.100
The Impact of Political Liberalization since 1989
The liberalization process beginning in 1989 provided King Hussein 
and the government with an extra argument to urge professional associa-
tions to focus on professional affairs only and to leave the political matters 
to parliament and political parties. While the associations were not against 
the idea of “reprofessionalization,” they continued to function as a forum for 
the expression of democratic demands. They called, for instance, for the rein-
statement of regime opponents who were dismissed from their jobs during 
the martial law period. They also established a Public Freedom Committee 
that exerted its efforts for the release of political prisoners, provided legal 
aid to citizens who complained of violations of their rights and organized 
conferences on issues related to democracy and civil rights.101 The appear-
ance of numerous new newspapers and magazines since the start of the 
liberalization process expanded their possibilities to publish their opinions 
and make themselves heard.102
From the end of the 1980s onward, Islamists increasingly gained the 
upper hand in elections for council and presidency in most professional 
associations. The presidencies as well as the councils of the two major asso-
ciations, the Jordan Medical Association and the Jordan Engineers’ Associa-
tion, fell into Islamist hands.103 Islamists also came to dominate the smaller 
professional associations.104
Whether the decisive factor in the enhanced popularity of Islamist 
candidates was their ideological orientation, or whether it was their per-
sonal credibility and charisma in the eyes of the professional associations’ 
membership remains open to debate.105 The case of independent Islamist 
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and outspoken regime critic Leith Shubailat, who won the presidency of Jor-
dan Engineers’ Association in 1994 and 1996, suggests the latter possibility. 
His candidacy was supported by the leftist-nationalist list of candidates for 
the association’s council. Shubailat is a charismatic personality whose popu-
larity has been enhanced through his daring and active opposition to the 
peace treaty with Israel and his well-known criticisms of the IMF-prescribed 
program of economic reform.106
Sparked off by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 august 1990, the Gulf 
Crisis galvanized the professional associations once more into “anti-imperi-
alist” action. They saluted what they called the “liberation of the Kuwaitis” 
from US hegemony by Iraq. In the following months, they were involved in 
the organization of conferences and demonstrations in solidarity with Iraq 
and demanded a boycott of American goods. After the Gulf War against Iraq 
in January and February 1991, they organized humanitarian aid activities for 
the Iraqi population suffering under the international sanctions regime. Also 
in later instances of US-British military threats or actions against Iraq, pro-
fessional associations would voice their disapproval through issuing public 
statements or, on occasion, organizing protest marches. Another example 
of the associations’ opposition against Western hegemony was the protest 
against the IMF-prescribed economic reform policy in Jordan during the 
1990s.107
The Struggle against Normalization with Israel
Topping the list of priorities for political action among the profession-
al associations during the 1990s became resistance against the negotiation 
process and peace with Israel. They opposed a peace that, from their point of 
view, safeguarded Israel’s interests while ensuring Arabs were denied their 
substantial rights in return. With the conclusion of the peace treaty with 
Israel in October 1994, an intensive campaign was launched by the associa-
tions against “normalization with the enemy.” The intention was to preclude 
the further development of political, economic, social, cultural and military 
relations with Israel. Unsurprisingly, they boycotted any kind of organized 
meeting between Jordanians and Israelis.
Perhaps the most controversial policy adopted by the professional 
associations was their tendency to ostracise, formally as well as socially, any 
member who happened to have had contacts with Israel or Israelis. Thus, 
many professional associations threatened to expel members who refused 
to adhere to their anti-normalization policy. King and government were not 
amused by this campaign and stressed once again the associations’ duty 
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to focus on professional issues and not to interfere in “politics.” Not only 
the regime, but also press commentators and political observers criticized 
the professional associations for being undemocratic, since they denied 
individual members the right to decide whether or not to engage in con-
tacts with Israelis. In riposte, however, the associations themselves argued 
that since all of their presidents and councils were democratically elected, 
their decision to resist normalization with Israel could not be regarded as 
undemocratic.108
By the mid 1990s, the conflict between government and professional 
associations over the anti-normalization issue had escalated to the point 
where the government threatened to reconsider the obligatory member-
ship for professionals. An annulment of this requirement for professionals 
would have resulted in heavy losses of membership for the associations. In 
regard to this issue, a majority of the government-appointed Senate sug-
gested in May 1996 to address a question to the Higher Council for Inter-
pretation of the Constitution, to decide how constitutional the professional 
associations’ laws were. In the end, however, the government backed down 
from this.109
Meanwhile, the associations’ anti-normalization campaign continued. 
The Council of Professional Associations established an Anti-Normalization 
Committee.110 Along with other opposition forces, they produced blacklists 
of individuals and companies with connections to Israelis. They also con-
tinued to expel or to boycott socially members with connections to Israeli 
colleagues or known to have had any form of dealings with Israel. The gov-
ernment responded by continuing to employ expelled professionals and by 
taking legal measures against, and arresting anti-normalization activists.111 
On 7 October 2002, for instance, 3 active members of the Anti-Normalization 
Committee were arrested, including its chairman and secretary-general of 
the Jordan Engineers Association, Ali Abu al-Sukkar. The State Security Court 
charged them with “belonging to an illegal organization” and distributing 
anti-normalization material deemed “harmful to the national economy.” 
One week later, the Minister of State for Political Affairs and Information 
described the Anti-Normalization Committee as “intolerable” and “illegal 
and posing a threat to Jordan and its economy.”112 On 28 November 2002, 
the government obtained a judicial verdict from the Higher Court of Justice 
stating that “there was no legal foundation (for professional associations) 
for establishing political committees”, thereby outlawing the Anti-Normal-
ization Committee.113 Prime Minister Ali Abu Ragheb, in office between the 
summer of 2000 and the fall of 2003, threatened repeatedly to dissolve the 
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professional associations if they carried on with political activities, particu-
larly in the field of resisting normalization.114
Apart from the anti-normalization issue, professional associations 
continued to be politically engaged with other issues of regional signifi-
cance. They have played an important role in the organization of demon-
strations in solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada,115 for instance, or 
against events like the conferences held in Jordan by the World Economic 
Forum, an annual meeting of international politicians and business leaders. 
They accused the WEF of having “blood on its hands” and trying to impose 
“imperialism” on the region.116 Dealings of the Jordanian governments with 
US-appointed Iraqi representatives after the US-British invasion of Iraq have 
likewise invited the professional associations’ protest.117
The same associations continued also to engage in issues of domestic 
policy. When the government lifted subsidies on bread in the summer of 
1996, for instance, the associations put forward alternative proposals for a 
policy of economic recovery that would avoid price hikes affecting the lower 
income groups.118 Similarly, they raised their voice against the election law119 
and against repressive measures that negatively affected, for instance, press 
freedom.120
The early months of 2005 witnessed renewed tensions between pro-
fessional associations and the government. This was sparked by criticism, 
expressed by some of their representatives, of Jordan’s complicity in US 
policy in Iraq. Subsequently, the riot police broke up a rally organized by 
the associations against the Iraqi elections on 18 January 2005. Once again, 
state representatives warned the associations not to interfere in politics. On 
26 January 2005, security forces raided the professional association’s head-
quarters in Amman to prevent a meeting from taking place there.121 Moreo-
ver, Minister of the Interior Samir Habashneh prepared a draft bill implying 
disciplinary oversight by the state of the professional associations and mak-
ing any non-professional meetings organized by them, subject to written 
permission by the relevant state authority. This was heavily protested by the 
associations as well as by other opposition forces.122 At the beginning of May 
2005, government and associations reached a compromise on the issue.123
The professional associations’ oppositional attitudes notwithstand-
ing, the government makes sure to consult them when difficult decisions 
have to be made. Prime Minister Abdul Salam al-Majali, for instance, received 
the professional associations’ leaders in 1993 in order to seek support for 
peace negotiations with Israel. Three years later, Prime Minister Abdul Karim 
Kabariti had talks with them on the proposed hikes in bread prices.124 In 
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1998, King Hussein himself paid a surprise visit to the professional associa-
tions’ headquarters to discuss with them their concerns regarding their own 
freedom of (political) action as well as the deterioration of public freedoms 
in general.125 Such dialogue between the representatives of the regime and 
those of the professional associations rarely exceeds the occasional consul-
tation, however. Ultimately, it is always the government that takes its own 
policy decisions, on which the professional associations have no decisive 
influence.126
Economic Society
Employers’ Organizations
Employers’ organizations in Jordan represent their members’ inter-
ests and try to organize and support the business sector by various means. 
Moreover, they try to influence economic government policy and legislation 
in a way that serves their interests.127
The category of the Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Indus-
try deserves first mention. Similar to the professional associations, member-
ship of these institutions is a prerequisite for anyone wishing to practice 
commercial or industrial activity. The oldest civil society institution in the 
territory east of the River Jordan once used to be a chamber of commerce. 
To be specific it was the al-Salt Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1883 
when Salt was the only significant commercial center of the area to lie under 
Ottoman rule. This was followed by the establishment of the Amman Cham-
ber of Commerce in 1923, and by the al-Karak Chamber of Commerce in 
1933. By the turn of the millennium, there were 15 chambers of commerce in 
nearly all governorates of the Kingdom. The number of members amounted 
to nearly 63,000. The first Chamber of Industry was established in Amman in 
1962. Only at the end of the 1990s did Chambers of Industry in Zarqa and in 
Irbid, the second and third cities of Jordan, emerge. Chambers of Industry 
had 11,000 members by 1999.
Employers in Jordan also have voluntary associations. There are for 
instance professional associations for employers, such as the Truck Own-
ers Professional Association, established in 1963, and the Bakeries Owners 
Association, established in 1970. Employers’ voluntary associations try to 
mediate between their members and the relevant government institutions 
and they prepare studies about the impact of the prevailing conditions in 
certain areas on business opportunities. The Jordanian Businessmen Asso-
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ciation endeavors to pool the expertise of its members to foster the private 
sector and its activities for the sake of economic development. It also tries to 
promote an integrative environment for the private sector and to motivate 
businessmen and their companies to perform economic and social tasks 
that serve the interests of private sector institutions, companies and indi-
viduals. There is also an Association of Banks in Jordan.128
Trade Unions
With 200,000 members, according to figures from 1995, trade unions 
involve more people than any other sector of Jordanian civil society. In 
comparison to political parties and professional associations, however, their 
political influence is limited.129 Membership in trade unions is voluntary. 
Without exception, their by-laws stipulate as goals the defence of the legiti-
mate rights and interests of their members, the improvement of labor condi-
tions, the provision of assistance in economic and social development and 
the spreading of labor union awareness. Many of their by-laws also provide 
for the establishment of co-operations, associations, clinics and extending 
financial aid to their members. Since 1978, the Unions have a Social Security 
Fund at their disposal that pays pensions and treatment of work injuries to 
their members, as well as compensation when such injuries lead to death or 
disability.130
As was the case with the professional associations, the annexation 
of the West Bank in 1950 was the prime mover behind the emergence of 
the trade union movement in Jordan. While the Jordanian authorities reined 
in the activities of the West Bank-based Palestine Arab Workers Society, its 
activists continued its work underground. They contacted the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) to complain about the government’s refusal to per-
mit free trade union activity in the Kingdom. Pressure from the ILO, in combi-
nation with a relatively liberal policy of the newly appointed government of 
Prime Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi, led to the legalization of labor unions in 1953, 
under Jordanian labor Law 35. This law forbade them, however, to engage 
in any non-labor-related political activity. Labor activists then managed to 
register the Federation of Trade Unions in Jordan (FTUJ) in July 1954.131 This 
organization engaged in struggles for better labor conditions, such as an 
eight-hour workday,132 but also through political action, like planning dem-
onstrations against the Baghdad Pact.133 The state responded by arresting 
trade unionists and dissolving 16 of the existing 39 unions. Due to a minor 
change in the Labor Law in 1961, however, trade unions increased in number 
once again, up to 40 in 1965. High levels of unemployment after the 1967 
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war contributed to greater levels of labor unrest. Strikes in refineries and in 
cement industries in 1969 even led to intervention by the army.134
The FTUJ’s call for reconciliation between the government and the 
Palestinian guerilla organizations in 1970 in the wake of the massive military 
crack down against the Palestinian fighters in the same year was used by 
the government as a pretext to dissolve the federation’s executive commit-
tee. The government appointed a new committee instead and introduced 
changes in the federation’s constitution to give the state greater access and 
influence. The state even made sure that regime loyalists controlled the 
executive committee. In 1974, a special bureau was opened by the intel-
ligence agency to monitor labor activism. When the number of strikes for 
higher wages and improved working conditions increased in the 1970s, the 
government resorted to revising the labor law again. This empowered the 
Ministry of Labor to reorganize unions without having to consult the FTUJ. 
During the 1980s as well, the state continued to interfere heavily in the 
unions’ affairs. Candidates for the federation’s executive committee whom 
the authorities considered to be too critical were “persuaded” not to run 
for elections, and labor activists were imprisoned or dismissed from their 
jobs.135
The IMF-imposed economic readjustment measures of the 1990s 
pushed trade unions into a defensive position in terms of socio-economic 
demands.136 Moreover, the decline of the influence of leftist parties in Jordan 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union and their increased factionalization 
reflected negatively as well on the efficacy of the trade union movement. 
These parties have traditionally controlled the trade unions’ leadership. 
Unlike in the professional associations, Islamists have never played a signifi-
cant role in Jordan’s labor unions.137
In 1994, the federation was subjected to a new restructuring proc-
ess that centralized trade union decisions in the hands of the federation’s 
executive committee – a committee often inclined to curry favor with the 
government.138 Good relations with powerful figures in the state apparatus 
seem to be of use, at times, in labor disputes with employers. The Jordan 
Times regularly reports disputes regarding wages, housing or work condi-
tions. A trade union may call for a strike to realize its workers’ demands in 
these fields. Often, government figures step in to ensure an (reasonably) 
acceptable solution to both parties.139
Indeed, the possibilities for trade unions in labor disputes seem to 
have been increased once again since the start of the liberalization process 
in 1989.140 However, the business sector and employers’ organizations also 
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have their connections in the state apparatus. This can be seen from the 
impressive numbers of foreign workers in the country. Employing foreigners 
is often beneficial to employers, since it makes it easier for them to dismiss 
Jordanian employees. When Labor Minister Abdul Karim al-Dughmi sided 
with the trade unions in 1991 and pressed for a broad dismissal of foreign 
workers in an effort to reduce unemployment, he met stiff resistance from 
the private sector and was ultimately forced to resign.141 The trade unions’ 
legal possibilities of activism are, to this day, narrowly restricted to the realm 
of labor and thus tend to exclude other, more “political,” issues. Unlike pro-
fessional associations, trade unions have since the years of liberalization 
dutifully adhered to this state-imposed rule of the game.
The Islamist Movement
This section focuses on The Muslim Brotherhood, since it is by far the 
largest and most significant Islamist movement in Jordanian political and 
public life and also the most relevant in terms of the voluntary associations 
dealt with in this study. Other Islamic currents will be mentioned, but only 
in passing. The section begins, therefore, with a description of the goals, 
the organizational structure as well as the activities of The Muslim Brother-
hood.
Goals, Structure and Activities
Stated simply, The Muslim Brotherhood’s overriding goal is the 
reform of all aspects of individual, social, cultural, economic and political 
life in accordance with the shari‘ah. In this spirit, Jordanian society is urged 
to align itself with Islamic laws, morals and values. As such, the movement’s 
ethos may be summarized as follows: 1) the creation of the new Muslim 
individual in terms of “thinking and faith, ethics and feelings, mind and spir-
it;” 2) the creation of the new Muslim family, to “provide care and service 
to men, women, youth and children on equal footing;” 3) the creation of 
the new Muslim nation carried on the shoulders of the new Muslim family; 
4) the establishment of the Islamic government leading “the people to the 
mosque, and educating them on the ways of Islam;” 5) the unification of the 
Islamic world politically and an end to the current artificial disunity; 6) the 
liberation of Muslim lands currently occupied and colonized by kuffar (“non-
believers”); 7) to take the universal Islamic message to every corner of the 
earth.142 The structure of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is modeled on 
that of its Egyptian mother organization, which was established in 1928. This 
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means, first of all, that the basic unit of the organization is the ’usrah (family) 
cell. The ’usrah, which is segregated according to gender, consists of 5 to 10 
members who are supposed to develop close mutual relations resembling 
kinship bonds. They recruit new members through their own personal social 
networks. These new members have to be carefully selected on their moral 
and religious qualities and approved of by authoritative Brotherhood figures. 
4 or 5 ’usrah cells together form a division headed by a raqib (supervisor). 
The raqib, in turn, is responsible to the executive committee of The Brother-
hood’s regional branch. Regional branches exist in the main Jordanian cities, 
in Palestinian refugee camps, in universities and colleges as well as in rural 
areas. A branch’s executive committee is elected by all of its members. The 
regional executive committees, in turn, elect the members of the national 
majlis al-shurah, a consultative body of 30 members. This body is, in theory, 
the movements’ main decision-making institution and elects the national 
executive committee. In practice, however, the national executive commit-
tee controls the policy-making process. Also, in theory, the Jordanian Mus-
lim Brotherhood, like The Muslim Brotherhood organizations in other Arab 
countries, are responsible to the international movement’s General Guide 
in Egypt. Yet, once again in practice, each national organization is virtually 
independent in terms of administration and policy.143
In terms of activities, a distinction has to be made between those of 
an internal and those of a public nature. Internal activities largely consist 
of the spiritual, social and moral training of its members. Hassan al-Banna, 
the Egyptian founder of The Muslim Brotherhood movement, had this to 
say of this endeavor: “the meaning of training is an activity of interaction in 
the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) in terms of actual interaction and conduct, with 
love and affection between the members. [It is] a complete interaction in all 
matters of life.”144 This training implies that the members spend much time 
in study sessions during which they read the Qur’an and the Hadith, as well 
as works from famous Muslim Brotherhood figures like Hassan al-Banna and 
Sayyid Qutb and other like-minded Islamist thinkers.145 Memorizing, recit-
ing and understanding Qur’an and Hadith is considered important for the 
strengthening of faith in God and his revelation. The same applies to dhikr, 
understood here as praising God every day on several occasions. Frequent 
prayer and fast must lead to enhanced self-discipline and resistance against 
worldly temptations. Once a month, Muslim Brothers stay up a whole night 
to study and pray collectively. The social aspect of ritual activity is much 
emphasized: all participants are expected to unite in a collective spirit and to 
concentrate on each other. Muslim Brothers are also called upon to control 
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their emotions, repent all wrongdoings and to spend every night one hour 
to ask themselves critical questions about their worship and their behavior 
toward others.146
Central to the social morality preached in The Muslim Brotherhood 
are concepts of honesty, trustworthiness and modesty. One should over-
come selfish ambitions and negative dispositions and surrender him/herself 
to God. Fraternity and love between the believers, not for the sake of riches 
or status but solely for the sake of God, is regarded as part of the struggle 
for social change. Prayer, fasting and practicing aid to and solidarity with the 
poor are perceived as a valid means to that end. The Prophet Muhammad is 
regarded as the ultimate example of a moral way of life.147
Other internal activities are recreational and cultural outings to the 
countryside to promote group solidarity and to engage in physical exercise. 
Physical health is considered important for sound participation in The Broth-
erhood’s intellectual and da‘wah (missionary) activities and for preparation 
for military jihad, which is interpreted as defense against attacks from kuffar 
and “the Zionist enemy.”148Muslim Brotherhood activity is not restricted to its 
own inner circle, however. Its aspiration is not merely to be an inward-look-
ing sect. Rather, the internal educational program emphasizes the applica-
bility of the Islamic message to all aspects of society, including education, 
government and economy. Therefore, it has to be disseminated everywhere 
and Muslim Brothers are expected to spread the message to the public by 
delivering sermons in mosques, organizing public lectures and seminars, 
publishing books and articles, and by cultivating personal relationships 
with like-minded people. In the final instance, there is also the possibility 
of recruitment. Spreading the message implies political activity aimed at 
“informing” authorities and legislators of the “right” Islamic approach. By 
definition, this implies the establishment of all kinds of institutions, such 
as welfare associations, companies, scientific and cultural centers, schools, 
clubs and health care centers, to organize Zakah (religious tax for the needy) 
and sadaqah (the giving of general social aid) and to fight social evils like 
materialism, hedonism and (sexual) immorality. These institutions are estab-
lished on a voluntary basis and in cooperation with like-minded Muslims 
outside The Muslim Brotherhood.149
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The Initial Development of The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 
(1945–1957)
In 1945, Emir Abdullah received a delegation of Muslim Brothers who 
asked for a license to open a branch of the international Muslim Brother-
hood Movement in Transjordan. His response was favorable, and The Mus-
lim Brotherhood was licensed under the Ottoman Law of Associations as a 
charitable association.150 The wealthy merchant Abu Qura, a native of Salt, 
became the branch’s first General Guide.151
Abu Qura, who owned a trading business in Amman, was known for 
his charitable works, his great religious zeal and his interest in the Palestin-
ian cause. In 1936, he raised funds from the Amman merchant community to 
support the Palestinians in their general strike against British rule and Zion-
ist colonization. During visits to Palestine, he came into contact with mem-
bers of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and, in particular, was impressed 
by the ideas of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader al-Banna.152 When he 
approached the Egyptian Brotherhood in 1943, he was warmly welcomed 
by the latter’s leadership and even appointed to its guidance bureau. Once 
he made known his desire to establish a branch of the movement in Tran-
sjordan, the two prominent Egyptian Muslim Brothers Said Ramadan and 
Abdel Hakim Abdeen became his assistants in the endeavor. The three of 
them started to tour the Transjordanian Emirate, promoting The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s ideology and activities to the Transjordanian public through 
speeches, lectures and sermons.153
Save for the promotion of military jihad against the Zionists in Pales-
tine, the founding principles of the new organization in Jordan, published 
in 1946, were of a relatively apolitical nature. They emphasized Islamic edu-
cation and “contributing to the development of a new Arab culture” based 
on Islamic principles. The social base of the new Jordanian movement con-
sisted greatly of property owners and merchants, social strata that benefited 
from the sociopolitical stability prevailing under Hashemite rule as well as 
from economic government policy that protected private property.154 They 
were not interested, therefore, in political rebellion and felt more attracted 
toward the socio-cultural dimension of Islamist ideology. Students were an 
important target group for Brotherhood propaganda and activities. These 
activities were largely of an educational, social and athletic nature.155 The 
style of leadership and organization within the young Islamist movement in 
Jordan was at this stage largely of a personalized, informal and spontaneous 
character.156
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King Abdullah, for his part, recognized that The Muslim Brotherhood 
appealed to the religious sentiments of the population, accepted the mon-
archy and, most importantly, recognized the status of the Hashemite family 
as sharifs (descendants of the prophet Muhammad).157 Its opposition against 
the rising secular pan-Arabist trend was particularly useful to the King. Nev-
ertheless, familiar with the rebellious attitude of the Muslim Brothers in 
Egypt and the Jordanian Brotherhood’s advocacy of anti-Zionist jihad, so 
incompatible with his own policy of political compromise with the Zionists, 
he also regarded the movement with some suspicion.
Therefore, the authorities kept a close eye on the organization and, 
in the early 1950s, Abu Qura was arrested several times. Nevertheless, in 
general, the relationship was cooperative in nature and the movement was 
allowed to open several branches in various cities.158 Indeed, about 100 Jor-
danian Muslim Brothers chose to fight as volunteers in the 1948 war against 
the Israelis, until the High Command of the Arab Legion withdrew them 
from the front.159
The annexation of the West Bank in 1950 had a profound impact also 
on the subsequent development of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. On 
the formal level, there was the merger of the Palestinian Muslim Brother-
hood in the West Bank with the Jordanian organization. Especially important 
was the expansion of the professional middle class in the Kingdom, which 
also boosted the influence of professionals within the Islamic movement. 
Most prominent among them was the lawyer Muhammad Abdul Rahman 
Khalifa. He and his followers felt the need to make The Muslim Brotherhood 
more effective in its efforts to mobilize against Western imperialism as well 
as against the rising tide of secular pan-Arabism, and to do away with the 
traditional leadership style of Abu Qura and his fellows.160
The new group took control of The Brotherhood in December 1953 by 
electing Khalifa as its General Guide.161 Under the guidance of Najib Jweifil, 
an Egyptian Muslim Brother who had fled the repression of Gamal Abdul-
Nasser’s regime,162 the Jordanian movement was reorganized in a more cen-
tralized and formal fashion,163 with a greater stress on educational qualifi-
cations and professional ways of working. It started to construct its own 
network of schools and expanded its recruitment activities in existing edu-
cational institutions and among Palestinian refugees.164 Moreover, its pro-
gram became more politicized; heavier emphasis was put on the duty of the 
government to implement the shari‘ah as well as on the refusal to accept any 
system that was judged not to support Islamic principles. Unlike the Hizb 
Al-Tahrir (Liberation Party), however, a party founded in 1952 by Palestinian 
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ex-Muslim Brotherhood member al-Nabahani, which openly challenged the 
legitimacy of the Jordanian monarchy as well as all other existing regimes 
in the Muslim world in order to replace them with an Islamic caliphate, The 
Brotherhood remained loyal to the regime. It continued to insist on dialogue 
with the King of behalf of the ’ummah in Jordan to convince him to imple-
ment the shari‘ah.165
In the turbulent years of the 1950s, the role of The Muslim Brother-
hood in the Kingdom’s political life could be described as a combination of 
populist opposition to government policy with a loyal attitude toward the 
monarchy. In its public statements and its publications, The Brotherhood 
attacked various manifestations of Western imperialism, sided with the 
under-privileged and poor in Jordan and criticized state repression as well 
as the corrupt and abusive practices of government ministers.166 The gov-
ernment responded, at times, with repressive measures: its weekly news-
paper Al-Kifah al-Islami, along with other opposition media167were closed 
down, and its leaders arrested.168 However, The Brotherhood never criticized 
the monarchy itself. On the contrary, at critical junctures, it supported the 
regime against its most threatening enemies, namely the representatives of 
secular pan-Arabism and Communism. Not surprisingly, The Brotherhood 
considered both forces dangerous to its own existence.
On the one hand, The Muslim Brotherhood had (since 1954) four 
elected deputies in parliament. These had sided with the secular pan-Ara-
bists and leftists in criticizing the British political and military presence in 
Jordan169 and had denounced the Baghad Pact.170 On the other hand, its 
leadership supported King Hussein against Nasserist tendencies.171 When al-
Nabulsi of the National Socialist Party, a group with Nasserist inclinations, 
formed his government in 1956, The Brotherhood was quite happy to join 
in with the general expression of anti-Western fervor. Once King Hussein 
started to accuse this government of opening the door to Communist infil-
tration, however, the Muslim Brothers adopted a different line in support of 
the King. They held mass rallies in which they praised King Hussein’s deci-
sions on behalf of Islam and attacked the policies of the al-Nabulsi govern-
ment. When martial law was imposed in May 1957 and political parties were 
dissolved, The Muslim Brotherhood was able to continue its legal existence 
in the Kingdom as a religious and charitable organization.172 
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The Islamist Socio-Political Role under Hashemite 
Authoritarianism (1957-1989)
The Muslim Brotherhood continued to play its role as a “loyal opposi-
tion” in the subsequent three decades. Khalifa emphasized in 1960 that The 
Brotherhood was not a political party and that its members were only moti-
vated by religion.173 This religious motivation gave rise to a certain political 
discourse, however, that was expressed by Muslim Brothers in parliament as 
well as through public protests: one of opposition against increased West-
ernization of Jordanian society and calling upon the government to imple-
ment the shari‘ah.174 The movement responded to the rise of (secular) Pales-
tinian nationalism during the 1960s by emphasizing Islamic unity between 
Jordanians and Palestinians and rejecting separatism.175 The devastating 
defeat of the 1967 war was used by The Muslim Brotherhood to vehemently 
criticize the Arab socialist and nationalist regimes of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. 
It attributed the defeat to the latter’s lack of religiosity and presented the 
return of Arab Society to Islam and Islamic values as the solution.176
In the years (1967-1970), Muslim Brothers made a modest contribu-
tion to the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. When armed conflict 
broke out between the PLO factions and the Jordanian regime in 1970, The 
Brotherhood called first on both sides not to open fire on their “brothers in 
faith.” After the eviction of the PLO factions from the Kingdom, however, it 
expressed satisfaction with the expulsion of the “unbelievers” (leftist Pales-
tinian fighters).177 Once again, King Hussein recognized The Brotherhood’s 
loyalty. While he embarked on a policy of suppressing any sign of political 
opposition, he allowed The Muslim Brotherhood to continue to expand its 
activities over the following decade.178
In that period, which largely lacked the presence of a parliament, The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s formal political activity mainly took the form of par-
ticipation in government administration. In 1970, the King appointed Ishaq 
al-Farhan, a Palestinian member of the movement, as Minister of Education 
in 1970. He remained in this function until 1974.179 The presence of Muslim 
Brothers as civil servants in governmental institutions significantly increased, 
especially in the Ministry of Education and in the Ministry of Awqaf and 
Islamic Affairs.180 Al-Farhan himself was Minister of Awqaf from 1983-1985. 
He, alongside Abdul Latif ‘Arabiyyat, another leading Muslim Brother, occu-
pied several leading positions in Jordan’s system of public education during 
the 1970s and 1980s.181 Influence and control over these state institutions 
gave the professional elite of The Muslim Brotherhood more possibilities to 
promote their views on Islam and Islamic society to the Jordanian public. In 
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this endeavor, they could also link up with anti-leftist and especially anti-
Communist discourse that was endorsed by the regime and its main sup-
porter, the US administration.182
This expansion of influence extended to the public school system. 
From the 1950s onward, the Muslim Brothers criticized the state educational 
system for being poisoned by Western influences and as insufficiently reli-
gious. They advocated an Islamic educational system in which moral and 
spiritual training was integrated with intellectual training. Brotherhood 
members in the Ministry of Education were gradually able to introduce a 
stronger religious component into the state curriculum. Moreover, elemen-
tary and secondary schoolteachers who belonged to the movement attract-
ed support for it through religious education classes and by encouraging 
pupils to join Brotherhood-affiliated social clubs and scouting groups.183
University campuses were another important arena for recruitment. 
Volunteers of The Brotherhood helped new students in practical and educa-
tional matters and organized parties,184 bus trips and picnics for them. Book 
fairs and arts exhibits were held and discussion groups on Islamist themes 
were formed for students. New members were directly recruited into the 
’usrah cells in the University. These cells also distributed pamphlets and 
organized demonstrations. The Islamic bloc, which represented The Broth-
erhood in the Universities, became increasingly successful in the student 
council elections, until it held a majority in the student councils of nearly 
all faculties of the University of Jordan in Amman by the late 1980s. Not 
only males, but also Islamist females gained ground over the years and were 
elected sometimes to the student councils. Muslim Brotherhood activities in 
university campuses provided the movement also with access to the profes-
sional associations.185
A final example of state institutions as areas of Brotherhood recruit-
ment was the mosque. Muslim Brothers used the mosque for delivering ser-
mons, charity work and education as a means to build constituencies. Broth-
erhood presence in the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, which super-
vises all mosques in the Kingdom, was particularly helpful in this regard.186
Another field of expanding Muslim Brotherhood influence in Jordani-
an society was the establishment of numerous voluntary social welfare and 
cultural associations from the 1960s onward. Through such associations, 
Muslim Brothers reached the poor and underprivileged strata in society as 
well as the middle class. More about them will be mentioned in the next 
chapter.
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Reasons for the increasing appeal of The Muslim Brotherhood among 
Jordan’s citizenry are numerous and varied; here only a few of the most 
important ones can be mentioned. The drastic socio-economic transforma-
tions that took place in the Kingdom since its inception, such as urbaniza-
tion, mass education and the expanding role of the state brought a decline 
in tribal and clan cohesiveness with them. This led to a pronounced sense 
of cultural alienation among recently modernized and educated young 
Muslims.187 The relative disintegration of traditional social ties and cultural 
patterns had also important ramifications for the realm of gender and sexu-
ality. Sexual temptations were greater in a relatively anonymous modern 
urban society, and women became vulnerable to harassment from males 
in public space. At the same time, traditional notions of the woman as the 
embodiment of family honor, which makes her totally responsible for any 
(perceived) sexual misconduct, remained prevalent. Such cultural aliena-
tions were compounded by the failure of the socio-economic moderniza-
tion process to fulfill the expectations of a large part of the population. The 
economic recession, beginning in the early 1980s, ensured that increasing 
numbers of educated young people could no longer be absorbed into the 
job market and unemployment increased markedly. Economic frustrations 
were inevitably an important factor in the attraction exerted on this youth 
by The Muslim Brotherhood.188
The Islamist message is one of protest against the Westernized politi-
cal, economic and social elite that has adopted and implemented Western-
inspired development plans, yet at the same time failed to bring the bulk 
of the population prosperity and meaningful economic prospects. The 
strength of such a movement is that it is able to provide culturally alienated 
and economically frustrated (young) people a sense of identity based on 
community relations and moral values, which also includes norms of gender 
segregation and chastity, in a modern and urban environment. The fact that 
the “community” it propagates is not bound to blood ties and to locality but 
has the character of a universal ’ummah can only strengthen its appeal in an 
urbanizing and modernizing society such as Jordan.
A second reason for the initial appeal of the Islamist movement was 
a profound disillusionment with leftist and secular nationalist ideology. 
Secular pan-Arabist and socialist regimes failed during the war with Israel in 
1967 and provided no answers to the socio-economic problems in their own 
countries. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood could also take advantage of 
the frustrations of Palestinian refugees with the PLO, whose reputation was 
tarnished by accusations of corruption, by their failure to achieve any mean-
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ingful solution to the Palestinian problem and by their habit of granting 
concessions to Israel.189
A third reason was the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 
1979. Most Jordanians admired the Islamic revolutionaries in that country 
for asserting themselves as an Islamic force that successfully defied West-
ern imperialist hegemony. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership hailed this 
development as a vindication of its own ideological stand that Islam was the 
only road to true dignity and independence for Muslims. Demonstrations 
took place in Salt in support of Ayatollah Khomeini.190
The Jordanian Islamists’ sympathy with the new Islamic Republic of 
Iran was a cause of tension with Jordan’s Hashemite regime, which sided 
with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war during the (1980-1989) period. So was King 
Hussein’s half-hearted opposition to the peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt in 1979, so fiercely opposed by The Muslim Brotherhood on religious 
grounds.191 It was Jordan’s relationship with Syria, however, that would serve 
as a pretext for the regime, from the mid-1980s onward, to clamp down 
more severely on the Islamist movement.
When Jordanian-Syrian relations were of a hostile nature in the begin-
ning of the 1980s, the Jordanian Brotherhood was allowed by King Hussein 
to establish paramilitary bases near the Syrian border. Syrian Muslim Broth-
ers, who were engaged in a rebellion against the Syrian regime of Hafez al-
Asad, were trained there.192 By the middle of the 1980s, however, Jordanian-
Syrian relations improved, since King Hussein became interested in better 
economic ties with Jordan’s northern neighbor in these years of economic 
recession. Al-Asad agreed to mend fences with Jordan on condition that the 
Jordanian government clamped down on Islamist activities, especially along 
the border with Syria. King Hussein consented to this condition.193
It seems that the regime concluded that increasing Islamist influ-
ence in the state apparatus as well as in civil society and public sphere had 
emboldened the movement too much, even apart from the issue of rela-
tions with Syria. The staunchly secularist Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid al-
Rifai pushed a law through parliament that gave the government the right 
to select and dismiss mosque preachers, and to review sermons. This ena-
bled the government to prevent Muslim Brothers from preaching. Moreo-
ver, many government employees who were members of The Brotherhood 
were dismissed, and some had their passports taken away.194 Islamists even 
reported that Brotherhood members were arrested if they wanted to give a 
sermon in the mosque, and put into isolation.195
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The Islamist Movement in the Years of Liberalization
Relations between regime and Brotherhood relaxed again during the 
riots of April 1989, which took place in response to the IMF-imposed price 
hikes. Muslim Brotherhood leaders were reportedly making efforts to calm 
the volatile mood in the country, and the King thanked them in private for 
this.196
The movement was in an advantageous position during the subse-
quent campaign for the parliamentary elections of November 1989, since it 
was a legal organization that could run an efficient election campaign. Other 
political currents lacked this benefit, because they had been outlawed for so 
many years. The Brotherhood mobilized its branches and regional commit-
tees to organize electoral meetings and rallies, which often took place after 
Friday prayers in front of mosques. Men, women and children distributed its 
leaflets.197
The Muslim Brotherhood election program stated that domestic 
policy was based on God’s shari‘ah, and that all existing laws and regula-
tions in Jordan had to be revised in order to conform fully to sacred law. 
It also called for safeguarding the dignity of citizens and the freedom of 
expression, thinking, religion, press and forming trade union organizations. 
It put the blame for the economic crisis and the great disparity between rich 
and poor on the corrupt behavior of the “slothful, unproductive groups” in 
the state apparatus and on the greed of the “monopolists and the exploit-
ers.” Self-reliant economic development, a progressive tax system and the 
imposition of the zakah (Islamic wealth tax) were proposed as solutions to 
socio-economic ills. Education, media and cultural expressions had to pro-
mote Islamic morals, and un-Islamic phenomena – alcohol, drugs, dance 
halls, night clubs and so on – were to be banned. A woman was declared to 
have the right to own property, work and participate in the society’s devel-
opment “on condition that this does not overwhelm (her) duty toward her 
home, husband and children.” Moreover, the program advocated jihad as the 
only way to liberate Palestine from the “Zionist enemy” and called for unity 
between Arab and Islamic countries in the realms of foreign and economic 
policy.198 The Islamist movements’ great success in translating popular dis-
satisfaction and demands, such as a socially just solution to the economic 
crisis, greater political freedom, an end to martial law and support for the 
Palestinian intifada, into electoral gain is mentioned above in the section on 
the role of political parties.
Right after the elections, prime minister-designate Mudar Badran 
approached The Muslim Brotherhood as part of his consultations aimed at 
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forming a new government. The Brotherhood’s insistence at getting the port-
folio of the education ministry made him first decide not to include them. 
He did include some independent Islamists as ministers with politically non-
sensitive portfolios. Muslim Brothers were subsequently included, however, 
in the Royal Commission drafting the Kingdom’s new National Charter.199
Developments following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 
brought The Muslim Brotherhood at the height of its political power. While 
The Brotherhood had never been in favor of the secular Iraqi Ba‘th regime, 
the stationing of US-led Western forces in Saudi Arabia, the site of Islam’s 
two most holy shrines, in order to prepare an offensive against Iraq made 
the movement decide to join an anti-American coalition with secular pan-
Arabist and leftist forces. After Friday prayers, anti-American demonstrations 
and rallies were held by The Muslim Brotherhood from the mosques and the 
movement called on the King to support Iraq.200
The King, recognizing The Brotherhood’s popular strength, decided 
that it was necessary to co-opt it and include its voice within the govern-
ment. On 1 January 1991, the Badran government was reshuffled: Muslim 
Brothers were appointed as ministers of education, religious affairs, health, 
social development and justice.201 During the Gulf war itself, statements by 
Muslim Brothers on the conflict became increasingly fiery. The movement 
officially called on 6 February 1991 upon the Muslims all over the world to 
“support their brothers in Iraq and to purge the holy land of Palestine and 
Najd and Hijaz (i.e. Saudi Arabia) from the Zionists and imperialists.” Portray-
ing the conflict as one between opposing religions and civilizations, Muslim 
Brotherhood hardliner and deputy Abdul Mun‘im Abu Zant declared: “This 
battle is not between Iraq and America, but between Islam and the Crusad-
ers … It is not between Saddam and Bush, but between the infidel leaders 
and the Prophet of Islam.” Never before had the movement been in such a 
strong position to disseminate its discourse of Islam versus Western imperi-
alism in the Jordanian civil society and public sphere.202
After the war, The Muslim Brotherhood ministers tried to implement 
a program of Islamization of Jordanian society on the socio-cultural level. 
In this field, they were much less successful. Their efforts to impose segre-
gation between the sexes in the schools and other public institutions, to 
prohibit production and distribution of alcohol203 and to prescribe prayers 
in state schools with an anti-American content provoked an outcry in secu-
lar Jordanian circles and sparked a heated debate in the public sphere.204 In 
the end, the movement only succeeded in forbidding the national airline to 
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serve alcohol in flights to other Muslim countries and in obtaining an amend-
ment banning the licensing of recreational centers, sports clubs and swim-
ming pools that do not segregate between men and women. In cooperation 
with other groups in parliament, it also successfully introduced legislation 
against government corruption and in favor of ministerial accountability to 
parliament and citizens.205 With the convening of a US-sponsored Middle East 
peace conference in Madrid drawing closer, however, King Hussein decided 
that he needed a different kind of government. The Badran government was 
dismissed on 17 June 1991 and a new cabinet, free of Islamists, was appoint-
ed with Palestinian liberal Taher al-Masri as Prime Minister.206 From that time 
on, Jordan’s mainstream Islamist movement was further removed from the 
corridors of state power. It also became the object of government efforts 
to contain its political and social clout in Jordanian society. The Jordanian 
security apparatus continued to monitor the movement closely and its pub-
lications were extensively censored or even banned at times.207
Intimidating from The Brotherhood’s point of view were the trials tak-
ing place against more radical Islamists. One hundred suspected members 
of an armed group of Afghanistan veterans calling itself Muhammad’s Army, 
that had carried out attacks against sellers of alcohol, Christians and a Jor-
danian intelligence officer, were rounded up by the Jordanian security serv-
ice without firm evidence or charges. During their trial in September 1991, 
many of the detainees claimed that they were being tortured. In December 
1991, eighteen of the suspects were condemned to death. Later, the King 
commuted these sentences to life imprisonment. In September 1992, inde-
pendent Islamist parliamentarians Leith Shubeilat and Ya‘qub Qarrash were 
tried on charges of illegal possession of explosives and weapons, slander-
ing King and parliament and undermining Jordanian-Iraqi relations. The trial 
elicited widespread protest in Jordanian civil society and parliament. It was 
commonly accepted that the real cause was Shubeilat’s uncompromising 
stand on financial corruption in the government. The State Security court 
first sentenced the two deputies to death and then commuted these sen-
tences to twenty years of hard labor. Apparently to defuse political tension, 
the King pardoned the two men from prison two days after the verdict.208
When the Islamic Action Front Party was established in December 
1992, its Secretary General, Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarian Ishaq 
Farhan, stressed its nature as a political party open to all individuals, wheth-
er Muslim Brotherhood members or other like-minded citizens. Its politi-
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cal platform too espoused a more liberal political discourse as compared to 
The Brotherhood’ election program of 1989. While it called for the applica-
tion of the shari‘ah in all fields, it spoke of the “promotion”, rather then the 
imposition, of Islamic culture. Moreover, it emphasized the establishment of 
political pluralism, the protection of human rights and political freedoms, 
the promotion of unity and dialogue among all citizens, respect for wom-
en’s rights and broadening the role of women’s leadership in political life, 
besides the more traditional Islamist positions on combating corruption, 
ensuring social justice, Arab unity and preparing for jihad against Zionism 
and Imperialism. It was apparent from the beginning, however, that the IAF 
was controlled by The Muslim Brotherhood. When elections were held to 
the IAF Shurah Council, independent Islamists won only 18 of the 120 seats. 
Many of these independents complained that The Brotherhood had violated 
an agreement aimed at giving them a proper voice and defected from the 
party in protest.209
Developments since the Peace Treaty with Israel
The conclusion of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in Octo-
ber 1994 heightened the tension between the regime and the Islamist move-
ment. The Muslim Brotherhood always asserted that Palestine was an Islamic 
land; that Israel was created as a foreign “infection” in the Arab world; and 
that to give up any Palestinian or Islamic right over Palestine was prohibited 
by the shari‘ah. Much of Jordan’s population was dismayed by the peace 
treaty and Islamist leaders found receptive audiences in the mosques when-
ever they preached against it.210 The King’s response implied, however, that 
he considered public opposition to the peace process as synonymous with 
attacking the monarchy itself. Some IAF parliamentarians were detained 
and brought to trial for preaching in the mosque against peace with Israel.211 
Reportedly, Brotherhood hardliner Abu Zant was assaulted by the police for 
delivering a sermon in the mosque against the peace treaty.212
As the sections on political parties and professional associations have 
already pointed out, relations between regime and Islamist movement have 
remained tense during subsequent years, even if there has been room for 
negotiation and even, at times, consultation between the two sides. Islam-
ists, along with other oppositionists, continued to be exposed to different 
forms of repression – arbitrary arrests, detentions and censorship among 
these – when the authorities considered their public actions or expressions 
as having crossed certain red lines. Certainly, current regime policy in Jordan 
fails to provide them with a public forum for expression such as they used to 
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enjoy in the 1960s and 1970s in the mosque and media. A relatively recent 
and spectacular case of repression occurred on 8 September 2004, when 
security forces raided the homes of a number of senior Muslim Brotherhood 
clerics and arrested nine of them on charges of preaching in the mosques 
without official licenses. According to The Brotherhood and the IAF, the gov-
ernment acted on American instructions to prevent them from speaking out 
against the US occupation of Iraq.213
Doves and Hawks
The participation of the Muslim Brotherhood dominated Islamist 
movement, within a relatively open and inclusive political system and public 
sphere since 1989, has contributed to what Mansoor Moaddel has described 
as the “secularization of the Muslim Brothers.” That is to say, the movement 
has not been able to stick to a fundamentalist rhetoric aimed solely at edu-
cating the believers in the absolute truth of Islam through the provision of 
unquestionable solutions to all issues of life. Being engaged in relatively open 
and free debates with non-Islamists in parliament and the public sphere and 
having to win the sympathy and the votes of a largely well-educated and 
politically aware electorate required a discourse more focused on practical 
and appealing solutions to political and socio-economic issues. Narrowly 
defined religious issues like the prohibition of alcohol, gender segregation 
and ritual life would no longer suffice in the newly opened up pluralist mar-
ket of opinions and votes.
The Islamic Action Front, as a political party, was charged with adopt-
ing this new approach. The public discourse of The Muslim Brotherhood and 
the IAF thus became increasingly characterized by rational construct argu-
ments based on key concepts like “national interests,” “democracy,” “freedom 
and equality before the law,” and less by direct references to the shari‘ah.214 
This tendency was most noticeable in the IAF platform, but it also under-
pinned The Muslim Brotherhood’s call to boycott the elections in 1997. Here, 
rather than theological reasoning, lack of democracy and public freedoms, 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions and normalization with the “Zion-
ist enemy” were the main causes of complaint.215 Throughout the 1990s and 
beyond, Ishaq Farhan, one of the most prominent spokespersons of the IAF, 
repeatedly admitted that the shari‘ah provides only the general principles 
to guide humankind. “The more specific details of how to go about building 
the proper social order”, he added, “should be worked out within the specific 
context of the Islamic movement itself.”216 It is worth noting that his shift in 
approach has allowed greater cooperation with other, secular, opposition 
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forces in order to work towards common aims: political democracy, freedom 
and the struggle against US hegemony.217
This shift in tone did not take place, however, without some degree 
of internal resistance. Indeed, it gave rise to the differences between those 
described as the “hawks” and “doves” within the movement. The doves are 
pragmatists, like al-Farhan and al-Arabiyyat, who emphasize the flexible 
nature of the Islamic faith and are ready to compromise on details in order 
to realize at least some of the main goals of Islamization. More pragmatic 
than many might imagine, both figures are ready to participate in a govern-
ment that adheres to a peace treaty with Israel, as long as they can exploit 
their position in order to contain the dangerous consequences of such a 
treaty. They are, in other words, ready for the give and take of the politi-
cal arena, and will bargain with the regime itself. They are inspired by the 
Qatar-based Islamic scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s theory of a realistic practice 
of fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), an approach which emphasizes flexibility 
above other (legal) virtues. If a rigid application of a specific shari‘ah rule in 
a given context only aggravates human suffering without furthering core 
Islamic ethical principles, then one should – so the reasoning of the Doves 
goes – adopt a different, and more flexible, application. They are often pro-
fessionals who enjoy higher and secular education, in many cases in West-
ern countries. They have a relatively good relationship with the Hashemite 
regime.
Hawks, by way of contrast, hold more dogmatic beliefs and are less 
willing to be flexible. They are opposed to the Islamist movement’s full 
integration in a secular state structure, insisting that the movement should 
maintain its distance from the secular regime and other secular forces in 
order to preserve its own religious purity. They even argue that, if the secular 
regime significantly obstructs Islamization efforts, violent action against it 
is justified. The only legitimate kind of political rule, the hawks insist, is the 
rule of God, and this implies that the shari‘ah can only be applied in a full and 
complete sense. Partial implementation of the sacred law is never an option. 
Hawks usually hail from modest socio-economic backgrounds and are often 
graduates from theology faculties.
Debates between the two sides have often focused on whether the 
Islamist movement can legitimately participate in Jordanian governments. 
While doves see such participation as an opportunity to translate at least 
some of their ideals into practice, hawks condemn it as the opportunistic 
betrayal of the Islamist movement’s mission as formulated by Hassan al-
Banna.218 The Jordanian Islamist movements’ election boycott of 1997 was 
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partially due to the strong influence of hawkish Muslim Brotherhood figures 
like Hammam Said and Abu Fares, both of whom were afraid of compro-
mising the movements’ dogma by participating in elections under adverse 
political circumstances.219
By and large, however, the doves have increasingly gained the upper 
hand within The Muslim Brotherhood and IAF in recent years. This is also 
reflected in the political positions the leaderships of these organizations 
have adopted on issues like democracy, the relationship with the West and 
gender relations. Unlike the hawkish minority, the dovish leadership empha-
sizes the compatibility of the system of parliamentary democracy with the 
Islamic principle of shurah. Unlike the former, it affirms the importance 
of dialogue and fruitful cooperation with the Western world and upholds 
women’s rights to participate in the development of the society and in polit-
ical life, as volunteers, paid employees, voters, activists and even as elected 
representatives in parliament and other formal bodies.220 In February 2002, 
for example, women were elected as deputies to the 120 member Shurah 
Council of the IAF.
In terms of popularity, The Muslim Brotherhood and IAF also have to 
compete with Islamic currents outside their own organizational framework. 
By September 2001, some Islamist doves had grown profoundly dissatisfied 
with the pace of change within The Muslim Brotherhood-dominated move-
ment in terms of its aspirations towards political and social openness and 
gender equality. These members defected from the IAF and established the 
Islamic Center Party. At the other end of the spectrum, the strictly literalist 
Salafi movement refuses to recognize the legitimacy of, or to participate 
within, the existing state and the societal order in Jordan. This current is not 
officially recognized and organizes itself in informal study and friendship 
circles. Most members of these circles behave non-violently; but there is an 
extreme that does embrace methods of violence and organizes itself in Al-
Qa‘ida-affiliated cells.221 Such tendencies are, however, beyond the scope of 
this study, which deals only with those civic associations that behave non-
violently.
Conclusion
The role of the four civil society forces within the Hashemite Kingdom 
described within this chapter serves to uphold the legitimacy, hegemony 
and development strategies of the Hashemite regime. The latter needs to 
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communicate with these forces in order to keep abreast of recent trends 
and developments within wider society. Moreover, it benefits from having a 
buffer of intermediaries between itself and the society at large via which it 
may negotiate interests and ideas from either side. Indeed, in so doing, the 
regime’s own stability and hegemony is preserved. Last but not least, there 
is the requirement of working at an image of democracy and pluralism vis-á-
vis the international community. Political parties, professional associations, 
employers’ associations, trade unions and the Islamist movement help to 
fulfill these functions. At the same time, the regime wants to make sure that 
it remains fully in charge and that none of these forces will ever reach a posi-
tion from which its own policies may truly be challenged. To a great extent, 
these policies are determined by the priorities of international relations and, 
thus, are aimed at maintaining the support of foreign powers. Accordingly, 
these forces are dialogued with so that their social and political influence be 
contained. If necessary, this containment will occur through force.
Political parties are in a particularly weak position, not only vis-á-vis 
the regime, but also in terms of their standing in public opinion. Telling in 
this regard are the annual public opinion polls conducted by Jordan Univer-
sity’s Center for Strategic Studies. 90% of the respondents of a poll released 
in October 2004 did not think that the existing political parties were capable 
of representing their political, social and economic aspirations, and 84.2% 
believed that none of the existing political parties was capable of forming 
a cabinet.222 Their weak standing can be attributed to several factors. There 
is (the fear of ) political repression and restrictions to political expression in 
public that deter citizens from joining parties. There is also the predomi-
nance of personalized tribal, family, local, ethnic and religious bonds in 
political life, which arrives at the expense of ideological and programmatic 
orientations on a national level. And, finally, there is the weak position of 
parliament vis-á-vis the regime.223
Professional associations are in an ambivalent position in terms of 
their role in civil society. On the one hand, they were initiated by the regime, 
which obliged professionals to be members in order to enlist them in a state-
led effort of socio-economic and technological development. On the other 
hand, these members’ economic resources and know-how renders them 
largely independent of the state and enables the associations to become the 
prominent forum for popular grievances and oppositional ideas prevalent, in 
particular, among the Kingdom’s professional middle class. Such grievances 
and ideas are expressed on a voluntary basis, of course, which makes these 
associations perform a function of civil society. This function can be charac-
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terized as a sounding board of public opinion for the government that may 
be consulted at times. On the other hand, the state is under no obligation 
to heed the associations’ advice, warnings and protests. Especially when it 
comes to regional, foreign and economic policy decisions, the government’s 
relations with foreign donors will prevail over the associations’ oppositional 
voices. Moreover, the state tries to control and check these voices by vari-
ous repressive measures and, on occasion, by threatening the professional 
associations with dissolution. It seems to be reluctant, however, to carry out 
these threats, due to fear of alienating and provoking the influential profes-
sional middle class.
Employers’ associations and trade unions provide the state with a 
means to regulate and control class-based tensions in Jordanian socio-eco-
nomic life. Unlike the professional associations, their activities do not, gen-
erally speaking, spill over into political issues outside the socio-economic 
domain. It has always been in the employers’ interest to keep their relation-
ship with the regime on friendly terms. Since the end of the 1980s, they 
have also benefited from official policies of privatization and liberalization. 
Trade unions, on the other hand, do not have the professional associations’ 
economic resources and degree of independence at hand to confront state 
policy.
The Islamist movement performs the role of a sounding board against 
which popular frustrations and opposition – similar to that of the political 
parties and professional associations – may be heard. Moreover, since the 
1980s onward, it became the strongest force within these two types of 
political society institutions. The initial divide-and-rule policy by the regime, 
via which the Islamists were bolstered as a counterweight against secular 
pan-Arabist and leftist opposition forces, has greatly helped the Islamist 
movement in this regard. The subsequent decline of the left and political 
emboldening of the Islamists, however, ensured the state focus on limiting 
the extent of the Islamists’ influence in political and public life. It continued 
to recognize The Brotherhood, however, as a non-violent and regime-loyal 
alternative to more radical and militant versions of Islamism. The move-
ment’s ideology and political practices have also been affected by modern-
izing trends of urbanization, spread of education, growth of a professional 
middle class, political liberalization and increased participation of women 
in the labor market and the public sphere. However, its lack of a presence in 
the institutions of economic society is telling of the Islamists’ lack of vision 
and strategy in terms of socio-economic policy.
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6. Jordan’s NGO Sector
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the NGO sec-
tor in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. One can most readily distin-
guish between NGOs, on the one hand, and civil society actors, like 
political parties, professional associations, trade unions and business 
associations, on the other, most obviously in terms of what the NGOs 
do not do. For, unlike the civil society actors, the NGOs’ function is, ide-
ally speaking, not to achieve direct political or economic gain, power 
and influence on behalf of their own constituency within the sphere 
of state or economy. The primary objective of their activities is to pro-
mote the common interests and/or convictions of (groups of ) citizens 
outside of the realm of competition and struggle for direct political or 
economic power within these two spheres. They can serve this objec-
tive in various ways, such as delivering services to certain target groups 
that need them or advocacy work aimed at influencing legislation and 
policy (albeit from the outside) on behalf of a constituency. It must be 
noted, however, that in actual Jordanian practice, links between NGO 
work and competition (by NGO representatives) in the economic and 
especially political realm do exist.
NGOs in Jordan are voluntary initiatives of Jordanian citizens. 
Small associations may have a few dozens of members, while the mem-
bership of bigger ones consists of several hundreds. Usually speaking, 
however, the bulk of an NGO’s membership does not participate in its 
ongoing activities. It merely contributes financially and is invited every 
year to the association’s general assembly. The minority of active mem-
bers always make up an association’s administrative board and may, 
depending on the size and the resources of the association, also work in 
the implementation of its activities. Larger and wealthier associations 
employ staff that implements the programs and tasks decided upon by 
the administrative board.
This chapter mainly consists of an historical description of Jor-
danian NGO life. After this description, the present role of the General 
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Union of Voluntary Associations in the Kingdom will be highlighted. At 
the end, a rough classification of service providing voluntary welfare 
associations will be given.
History of the NGO sector in Jordan 
The Initial Development of NGO life in Transjordan
 During the Ottoman era, the predominantly tribal (nomadic as well 
as rural) character of the society in the territory east of the River Jordan was 
characterized by informal ways of mutual assistance, exchange as well as 
patronage. At that time, the levels of literacy, formal education, division of 
labor and civic awareness necessary for more or less formal organization of 
voluntary endeavors did not exist there. Such levels are usually linked to a 
more sophisticated money-oriented economic system and to a more perva-
sive form of state power. Modern state power does not limit itself largely to 
collecting taxes and enforcing military conscription, as the Ottoman author-
ities used to do in this peripheral part of their empire. Rather, it thoroughly 
shapes the life of the citizens through legislation, policy and bureaucratic 
regulation (though we note that in the last half century of Ottoman rule, the 
exercise of state authority in this territory was already being modernized 
along these lines).1
In 1912, the first voluntary association in the territory was set up in 
the town of Madaba, called Dur al-’Ihsan (homes of charity). It was a Greek 
Orthodox grouping exclusively dedicated to serving the Greek Orthodox 
community, especially its needy children.2 During the next two decades, 
establishing voluntary associations would remain a religious or ethnic 
minority affair: in 1925, the Orthodox Nahda (Renaissance) Association was 
established, followed by the al-Maqasid al-Hijaziyyah Association in 1931 
and the Circassian Ikhwan (Circassian Brotherhood) Association in 1932. 
The last two were established by members of two different ethnic Muslim 
minorities: the first was a group of immigrants from the Hijaz, in the west of 
what is now Saudi Arabia, who accompanied the Emir Abdullah when the 
emirate of Transjordan was established; the other were the Circassians, who 
originally arrived in the territory in the nineteenth century as refugees from 
the Caucasus. All of these associations limited their charitable activities to 
their own respective religious or ethnic communities.3
The pioneering example of the minorities would soon be followed, 
however, by a form of association by urbanized Transjordanians that was 
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more open toward the general (urban) public. The year 1937 saw the estab-
lishment of the Jordanian Youth League and the Association of the Red Free-
dom. Both of them were politically motivated. They focused their activities 
on the raising of political awareness, especially in connection with the Pal-
estinian struggle against British rule and Zionist colonization in Palestine. It 
was not surprising, therefore, that the British-backed administration of Tran-
sjordan started to monitor and control associational activity more closely out 
of concern that it could be used for political subversion.4 By 1932, the first 
Tansjordanian legislation aimed at regulating the activity of voluntary asso-
ciations was already in place, replacing the previous Ottoman legislation.5 
Not only men, but also women joined the voluntary associations. They could 
do so without undue harassment by state-control, since the state authorities 
did not regard women as potentially dangerous or subversive as men.6
The first society for women only was founded in 1944, and was called 
the Women’s Social Solidarity Society. Princess Misbah, mother of Crown 
Prince Talal, served as its president. She was also named as the honor-
ary head of another women’s society, called the Society of the Jordanian 
Women’s Federation, founded one year later. The women societies specifi-
cally focused on improving the social conditions of Jordanian women by 
raising their educational level, assisting them in the care and upbringing of 
their children and raising their awareness on health and welfare issues. They 
organized several meetings and seminars to this end. Besides such endeav-
ours, they also engaged in the more traditional activity of assisting the poor 
and needy.7
The Muslim Brotherhood, licensed in 1945 by Emir Abdullah, must 
also be mentioned in connection with voluntary welfare activism. As a vol-
untary religious society, it started to focus on the Islamic education of, in 
particular, school students. Muslim Brothers gave public lectures and organ-
ized Boy Scout clubs where social (including charitable) and athletic activi-
ties as well as religious study took place.8
The Impact of the Arrival of the Refugees
Voluntary activism for the sake of the poor and needy was boosted 
significantly by the arrival, during the 1948 war, of hundreds of thousands 
of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, particularly to the West Bank which was 
annexed to the Hashemite Kingdom in 1950. Citizens on the West as well as 
on the East Bank spontaneously established associations to distribute food 
and clothing and provide shelter to the dispossessed Palestinians, and to 
take care of the injured and the orphans among them. According to Abdullah 
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Khatib, present head of the General Union of Voluntary Societies, this popu-
lar activism took place even before the international community stepped in 
and organized UNWRA (United Nations Work and Relief Agency for Palestine 
Refugees).9 Members of previously existing associations, ranging from the 
Palestinian Young Women’s Christian Association to the abovementioned 
Jordanian women’s societies to The Muslim Brotherhood were also active in 
providing the necessary aid, including food, shelter and healthcare.10 
The Jordanian government did not ignore the developments in large-
scale aid provision to the refugees and the proliferation of voluntary welfare 
activism. In 1949, a special department for voluntary societies was attached 
to the Ministry of Health, followed by the establishment of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs in 1951.11 Among the new Ministry’s responsibilities was the 
supervision of voluntary work.12 It drafted a new law on voluntary associa-
tions in 1956 that defined regulations and registration procedures and clas-
sified them in various types for the sake of administrative oversight.13 Part of 
the policy of oversight was the development of a comprehensive and con-
trollable institutional structure for these associations. The regime’s impera-
tive of control must also be seen in the light of the prohibition of all (oppo-
sitional) political activity when martial law was declared in the kingdom in 
1957, a development described in the previous chapter. Unions between 
voluntary associations were erected on the governorate (or province) level 
in those years. In 1959, the General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS), as 
an official representative body of all voluntary associations in the Kingdom, 
saw the light.14 Its representativeness was, however, questionable from the 
point of view of the civil society principle of free will, since all registered vol-
untary associations were – and still are – legally compelled to be members 
of the GUVS.15
All these measures and developments reinforced the voluntary asso-
ciations’ role of assisting the Hashemite state in simultaneously serving and 
controlling Jordanian society. They did so by assuming part of the state’s 
burden in social care and relief and thereby contributing to maintaining 
public order and social peace in the Kingdom. Among the most prominent 
of the more recently established associations were the Jordanian Red Cres-
cent Society, established in 1951 and the Jordanian branch of the Young 
Women’s Christian Association, founded in 1950. Apart from relief to Pales-
tinian refugees, voluntary associations continued to assist needy families in 
general and provided education, orphanages and shelters for the disabled, 
hospitals for the poor and literacy programs. Between 1954 and 1959, regis-
tered local NGOs increased in number from 56 to 107.16
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One women’s association, the Arab Women’s Federation, went beyond 
the role of a mere service providing institution. It was established in 1954 
and was headed by the Jordanian lawyer Emily Bisharat. It focused on rais-
ing women’s political, economic and social awareness and campaigned to 
repeal discriminatory articles against women in the personal status, labor 
and electoral laws. Furthermore, it expressed itself on issues like solidarity 
with the Palestinian people and the struggle against Zionism and European 
colonialism. However, in 1957, the year when martial law was declared, the 
Federation was outlawed along with numerous other opposition-oriented 
bodies as well as all political parties.17
Increased Islamization of the NGO Sector and Tightening State 
Control
The voluntary associational sector continued to grow in the 1960s. 
That decade also started to witness a higher degree of institutionalization of 
Islamist social activism. Leading Muslim Brotherhood members established, 
in cooperation with some independent Islamists, the Islamic Center Char-
ity Society (ICCS) in 1963. Its president was Dr. Muhammad Abdul Rahman 
Khalifa, who was also The Muslim Brotherhood’s General Guide.18 According 
to Jordanian political scientist Sami al-Khazendar, the Society’s establish-
ment was the result of government policy pushing the Muslim Brothers to 
distinguish or even separate between their social, religious and political 
activities.19 Independent Islamist, ICCS member and engineer Raif Nijm, who 
closely cooperated with Abdul Rahman Khalifa in the Society’s project of 
building the Islamic Hospital in Amman, puts its foundation in the context 
of heightened repression of dissident political voices under the martial law 
regime. For a while, such repression led to the closure of The Muslim Broth-
erhood’s headquarters. It made The Brotherhood’s leadership focus more 
on religious and social, instead of overtly political, activities. The leadership 
decided, therefore, to systematize and institutionalize the social component 
of The Brotherhood’s work by establishing the ICCS, which is legally separate 
from the former.20 Atallah Abu-Latifeh, however, the writer of a dissertation 
on the political history of The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, puts the licens-
ing of the ICCS in a different context. He states, not unreasonably, that it was 
part of regime policy aimed at enabling the Islamists to keep Jordanian citi-
zens as far as possible from the powerful nationalist and Communist opposi-
tion through religious propaganda.21
The ICCS would soon grow into the largest voluntary welfare asso-
ciation registered at the Ministry of Social Affairs. Only associations led by 
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members of the royal family, which do not fall under the Ministry’s juris-
diction, are larger. The ICCS subsequently evolved into a nationwide NGO 
that runs schools, some institutions of higher education, medical centers, 
two hospitals and centers offering financial and in-kind aid, vocational train-
ing and (religiously inspired) educational and cultural activities to orphans 
and poor all over the country. Its greatest source of pride is the modernly 
equipped and commercially run Islamic hospital in Amman, which opened 
its doors in 1982.22
More religiously inspired Muslim voluntary associations were found-
ed from the 1960s onward, often, though not always, by Muslim Brothers 
or other politically engaged Islamists. Like the ICCS, their activity is to be 
found in the realms of health, education and poverty alleviation, in addition 
to religious awareness raising.23
The first half of the 1960s witnessed drought conditions in the King-
dom that severely affected vulnerable groups. It compelled the Ministry of 
Social Affairs as well as of local NGOs to focus on the implementation of 
supplementary food programs24- an emergency situation perhaps provid-
ing the backdrop for the phenomenal increase in the number of voluntary 
associations at the time. The year 1965 witnessed the foundation of 34 new 
voluntary associations on the east bank of the River Jordan alone.25
This increase, along with the appearance of NGOs linked to the Islam-
ist movement, may explain the drafting by the Ministry of Social Affairs of 
a new law on associations, one that was more restrictive then ever. The law 
of Societies and Social Bodies (law no. 33), enacted in 1966 and still in force, 
strictly forbids voluntary associations from engaging in any activity that can 
be interpreted as “political”, “sectarian” or “religious.” It requires the opinion 
of the governor of the governorate in question before the licensing of any 
association. Moreover, it empowers officials of the Ministry to pay surprise 
visits to the associations’ offices, check their registers and exercise personal 
control over the meetings of their general assemblies and the elections of 
their administrative bodies. It also empowers the Minister to dissolve an 
association whenever he or she perceives a transgression of rules.26 One of 
the reasons given by the Ministry to enact this law was to “discourage family, 
ethnic and religious organizations in order to ensure internal unity.”27
Obviously, associations were compelled to conform to a process of 
nation building devised from above, a process severely hampering their 
independence as civil society institutions. This seems to indicate also an 
ambiguous attitude of the state authorities toward Islamist social activism 
at the time. On the one hand, Islamists were welcomed or even encouraged 
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to counter the influence of secular pan-Arabists and leftists by establish-
ing their own presence in Jordanian civil society. On the other hand, the 
regime wanted Islamists to understand that their opportunities for expand-
ing Islamist influence in Jordanian society had its limits and that they would 
always remain subordinated to the authority of the Hashemite regime.
Social Development Discourse and Practice in an Authoritarian 
Context
The June war of 1967 had a similar impact on the need for increased 
voluntary assistance to Palestinian refugees as was the case with the 1948 
war. The subsequent three years were characterized by the presence of the 
various PLO factions using Jordan as a base in their armed struggle against 
Israel. These organizations started to influence much of Jordanian civil 
society, including the realm of voluntary aid.28 With the forced removal of 
the PLO factions from the Kingdom in the years 1970-1971, however, an 
incipient civil society dominated by Palestinian nationalism disappeared 
and the Hashemite monarchy reasserted its authoritarian hegemony over 
all of political and societal life in the country, including the voluntary asso-
ciations’ sector. This return to political authoritarianism did not preclude a 
modernizing shift in thinking about the role of these associations in soci-
ety. This shift can be described as one from traditional charity, that may be 
dependency reinforcing, to social development that is intended to struc-
turally improve living conditions for the better and to enable the needy to 
help themselves.29 It took place under the impact of global trends advocat-
ing empowerment-oriented social development. These trends affected Jor-
danian government circles, the NGO sector, media and academics alike. It 
implied conscious reflection on, and even applied scientific analysis of, the 
approaches of social development actors, among them voluntary associa-
tions. In the words of former head of the sociology department of the Uni-
versity of Jordan, Sari Nassir:
From the mid-1970s things began to change. The first half of the 1970s was 
a continuation of the 1960s in terms of handouts, etc. In the second half of 
the 1970s we started seeing an awareness that social work should not only 
be about the poor and underprivileged, nor should it only centre in the hands 
of wealthy women. [Rather] It should be done more publicly in the sense that 
young people should be involved: social work should be studied, produced in 
universities, community colleges, institutes. We started with the concept that 
you must not help people as such, but help them to help themselves.30 
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The new trend did not imply that traditional charitable approaches 
toward poverty alleviation were disappearing. As a matter of fact, to this 
day, traditional direct aid forms a prominent part of the work of local vol-
untary welfare associations in Jordan. The paradigmatic shift toward social 
development occurred first of all among those circles in closest touch with 
trends in the global development community.31 Among these circles were 
the royal family, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the leadership of the General 
Union of Voluntary Societies and academics. They gradually started to adopt 
new methods aimed at sustainable social development, such as income-
generating projects for the sake of economic empowerment of the needy 
(for instance grants or micro-credits to set up small businesses), aware-
ness raising on empowerment and rights of women and children and on 
family and public health and professional care for the handicapped. Local 
voluntary welfare associations too would increasingly adopt such methods 
over the following three decades. On the governmental level, the shift was 
reflected in a change of name of the relevant Ministry, from the Ministry of 
Social Affairs to the Ministry of Social Development, in 1979.32
Societies founded by members of the royal family like the Queen Alia 
Fund (that would later to change its name to the Jordanian Hashemite Fund 
for Human Development), established in 1977, the Noor al-Hussein Founda-
tion, established in 1985 and the Jordan River Foundation, established in 
1995, were, and still are, the most prominent and best publicized in terms 
of activities of sustainable development. The hegemonic status and interna-
tional connections of the royal family, as well as these societies’ privileged 
legal status, explain their pre-eminence. The latter exempts them from 
restrictive controls suffered by non-royal NGOs in terms of local activities 
as well as possibilities for international relations and (financial) support.33 It 
illustrates once again how the Hashemite regime maintains its paternalis-
tic dominance over Jordanian civil society even in the realm of sustainable 
development, social and economic empowerment and women’s and chil-
dren’s rights. Alongside the so-called royal NGOs, through the adoption of 
productive micro-projects, the GUVS takes seriously the role of guiding its 
member associations in the direction of social and economic empowerment 
of the needy, and of supporting them in this regard.34
In the realm of women’s activism and social development, the inter-
national women’s conference of 1975, which marked the beginning of the 
UN Decade for Women, opened a new opportunity for autonomous civil 
organizing in Jordan. A group of women, many of whom had been active in 
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the women’s rights-oriented Arab Women’s Federation (AWF) in the 1950s, 
formed a preparatory committee to celebrate the women’s year. In 1974, 
this endeavor led to the establishment and licensing of the Women’s Federa-
tion in Jordan (WFJ). Former AWF head Emily Bisharat became president of 
the new organization. Like its predecessor, the WFJ demanded full equality 
for women in the sphere of economic, social and political rights, stressed 
Arab solidarity and supported women’s effective participation in “building 
the Arab homeland.” Its leadership included women from a broad range of 
(albeit secularist) political affiliations, with Palestinians as well as Transjor-
danians in its midst. It ran training and literacy centers for women as well as 
support services for children. Moreover, it organized weekly seminars, lec-
tures, other cultural and social events as well as bazaars where the products 
of its training centers were sold. In the political realm, it published, amongst 
other things, studies on women’s rights and demanded the right to partici-
pate in debates on issues affecting those rights, such as labor, education and 
political participation.35
The state’s fear of independent civil organizing of voices critical of 
existing state policies, laws and societal structures also limited the duration 
of the WFJ’s existence. At the beginning of the 1980’s, state authorities start-
ed to harass WFJ delegates at Arab and international conferences, claiming 
that the federation was being antagonistic towards the Kingdom. In October 
1981, the Minister of the Interior ordered the organizations’ closure. From 
then, until the beginning of the 1990s, it could not operate publically.
Meanwhile, the first woman minister in Jordan, In‘am al-Mufti of 
Social Development, was determined to incorporate all women’s activities 
in the Kingdom into an organizational framework directly under the control 
of her Ministry. Activists of all existing women’s voluntary welfare associa-
tions in Jordan, with the exception of the WFJ, were invited to a meeting in 
September 1981. There, the establishment of the General Federation of Jor-
danian Women (GFJW) was proclaimed. Until today, the organization exists 
as a federation of voluntary women’s associations under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Social Development. It includes associations with a secular 
as well as those with a religious background, including some Islamist ones.36 
Its platform emphasizes the raising of women’s status through education 
and socio-economic activities. It speaks in vague and indirect terms about 
public advocacy against gender discrimination and for women’s equal rights 
as citizens.37
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Also in quantitative terms, the Jordanian sector of voluntary welfare 
associations significantly increased in the period between the 1967 war and 
the beginning of the liberalization process in 1989. The Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
Research Center’s Directory of Civil Society Organizations of the year 2002 
notes that while the associations established before 1967 represented only 
11.5% of currently existing ones, 55.4% of them were established in the years 
1968-1989. Moreover, their proliferation over the different governorates of 
Jordan significantly improved in these years and partly undid their former 
heavy concentration in the capital.38
Many of these associations served a particular community, such as 
a rural village or Palestinians originating from the same locality in Pales-
tine. They often focused on enhancing women’s educational and vocation-
al opportunities, albeit within the socio-cultural framework of what were 
regarded as “proper” (i.e. traditional) Arab family values, such as mother-
hood. According to Jordanian sociologist Musa Shteiwi, the suppression of 
political party life during this period of martial law had the paradoxical effect 
of politicizing the social climate within many voluntary welfare associations, 
since voluntary welfare work served as a substitute for overt political work in 
the case of many (often leftist or Islamist) politically engaged citizens.39
The Impact of Structural Economic Adjustment and Liberalization
From the end of the 1980s onward, two developments were deci-
sive for the further development of NGO life in Jordan: economic recession 
and the IMF-imposed economic structural adjustment program on the one 
hand, and political liberalization on the other. The Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) agreed upon with the IMF obliged the Jordanian government 
to streamline the allocations of public resources. This led to the removal of 
subsidies on several essential commodities and to the receding of public 
services, resulting in the spread of unemployment and poverty. The return 
of several hundreds of thousands of Jordanians and Palestinians from the 
Gulf States, first of all Kuwait, in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, 
only aggravated this situation.40
The regime was forced to realize, especially due to large-scale riots in 
the south of the country in April 1989, that implementing such unpopular 
socio-economic policies could not be combined with the continuation of 
an unrelentingly repressive martial law regime. More or less free general 
elections for parliament were held in November 1989, political openness 
and freedom were significantly widened and, in 1991, martial law was finally 
repealed after 34 years.
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This new political atmosphere also unleashed public debates on 
problems of development and the shortcomings of the state as a provider 
of services. In keeping with an international trend of criticizing the role of 
the state in economic and social development,41 problems stemming from 
an overgrown bureaucracy and deteriorating public services were stressed 
in these debates as manifestations of the structural limitations of the Jorda-
nian welfare state. In this contxt, NGOs would seem to have bright prospects 
for an expanded role in development as a substitute for the state’s role in 
delivering social services.42 This may also partially explain the 67% growth in 
the number of local NGOs between 1989 and 1994, as compared to a growth 
of only 24% between 1985 and 1989. The annual increase in the number of 
charitable NGOs in the (1989-1994) period was somewhere between 30 and 
50. In the four years preceding 1989, this increase had been somewhere 
between 10 and 30 only.43
The process of political liberalization since 1989 also led to a widen-
ing of organizational opportunities. Apparently, cultural NGOs, focusing on 
the dissemination of socio-cultural values, views and messages in the pub-
lic sphere, through art and/or through activities like public meetings, lec-
tures and workshops, benefited most from these new opportunities. From 
1989-1994, between 50 and 80 new cultural associations were established 
annually.44 Some of them were (and continue to be) secular in nature, such as 
the Socialist Thought Forum and the Jordanian Philosophical Society. Others 
have an Islamist background, such as the Society for the Preservation of the 
Holy Qur’an. This organization was established in 1991 by prominent Muslim 
Brotherhood members and opened centers for religious education all over 
the country. Other organizations have Islamists as well as secularists among 
their members. One example is the Anti-Zionism and Anti-Racism Society, 
the latter being headed by the independent Islamist Leith Shuabilat.45 This 
strong-willed personality has surpassed The Muslim Brotherhood with his 
overtly regime-defiant public statements on issues, such as the absence of 
democracy, human rights, public accountability and struggle against (and 
the regime’s collaboration with) Western imperialism and Zionism. For these 
reasons, he gained much respect and popularity in and beyond Islamist cir-
cles, and, in particular, among secular and left-oriented oppositionists.
The liberalization process also facilitated the development of a new 
NGO generation. Associations belonging to it specialize in specific public 
issues, such as democratization, human rights, gender equality, freedom 
of the press, the environment, consumer protection and family planning. 
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Their strategy and approach are characterized by public advocacy, aware-
ness campaigns and networking on such issues. Some of them take the 
form of research and study centers. They often claim a political, ideological 
and financial distance from the government. Their social basis is, generally 
speaking, the modern and well-educated urban middle class whose ranks 
have been significantly expanded during the past several decades of socio-
economic development in the kingdom. This societal stratum is most closely 
connected to global developments and has the best opportunity to get in 
touch with foreign (often Western) development actors and rights-based 
institutions.46 Examples of such associations are numerous and include: the 
Arab Organization for Human Rights in Jordan (est. 1990); Mizan (Law Group 
for Human Rights, est. 1998); the Jordanian Society For Citizen’s Rights (est. 
1998); the Arab Archive Institute for Research and Studies (which focuses 
on issues related to civil society, democracy and human rights, est. 1999); 
the Jordan Environment Society (est. 1998); the Jordanian Society for the 
Control of Desertification and Badia Development (est. 1990); the Friends 
of the Environment Society (est.1995); the National Society for Consumer 
Protection (est. 1989); and the Center for Defending the Freedom of Journal-
ists (est. 1998).47
Notable in this regard is also the recent reappearance of the women 
activist WFJ, effectively closed down in 1981, under the name of the Jorda-
nian Women’s Union (JWU). Leftist women dissatisfied with the more tradi-
tional charitable orientation of the GFJW joined the JWU and captured its 
leadership in the union’s 1993 elections. Like its predecessor, the JWU focus-
es on campaigning against laws that discriminate against women. During 
the 1990s, it opened legal aid centers for women, launched an awareness 
campaign on violence against women that included a violence hotline and 
offered women counsel on their rights and (social) options in various ways. 
Unlike the GFJW, the JWU has an individual membership base and is not a 
federation of local women’s voluntary welfare associations.48
Controversy over Foreign Funding and Limitations of Liberalization
The connections entertained by many such middle class-based advo-
cacy associations with foreign – often Western – donor institutions have 
their problematic and controversial aspects. According to Sa‘ida Kilani, head 
of the Arab Archives Institute, such NGOs do not manage to develop strong 
relations with the lower and lower middle classes of Jordanian society and 
also lack the local donor support enjoyed by especially Islamist welfare insti-
tutions. The overtly political character of these NGOs’ work deters potential 
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local donors, due to continued fear in Jordanian society of getting involved 
in opposition-oriented political activity that is vulnerable to criminalization 
and persecution by the authorities.49
This makes these NGOs highly dependent on the (financial) support 
of foreign, normally Western, donors. As a result, the latter can exercise a 
highly decisive influence on the agendas of the local NGOs they support. 
This may be at the expense of the NGOs’ local priorities. Such external influ-
ence has caused several Jordanian NGOs shift their attention, for instance, 
from supporting poor and needy target groups to rights-oriented programs 
aimed at a well-educated middle class audience.50
Moreover, external support from especially Western countries makes 
local NGOs vulnerable to accusations of betraying national, Arab or Islamic 
interests. The Kingdom’s far-reaching dependence on foreign powers and 
its resultant international vulnerability, of which politically engaged citizens 
of various political stripes are only too well aware, can easily give rise to 
suspicions of selling out Jordanian and Arab society’s interests to Western 
attempts of domination, whenever an NGO receives Western support. Such 
sensitivities have sometimes led to fierce debates in the media on the issue 
of foreign funding of NGOs dealing with issues of public policy, human and 
civil rights or gender equality.51 If the Western philanthropic donor involved 
also happens to work in Israel, a “Zionist connection” is easily construed. 
Accusations of (indirect) Israeli or US imperialist involvement can have seri-
ous repercussions for a Jordanian NGOs’ local reputation.52
Unsurprisingly, certain Islamist as well as secular pan-Arabist and 
leftist oppositionists are often involved in spreading rumors and suspicions 
of “Zionist” or “US imperialist” involvement in the work of some advocacy 
NGOs. This was the case, for instance, when professional associations, them-
selves dominated by these opposition forces, pulled out of a conference on 
democracy building on the suspicion that its organizers had “normalized 
with Israel and been complicit in the Zionist conspiracy.”53
State authorities and regime supporters also use the “illegitimate for-
eign support” argument in their efforts to silence certain advocacy NGOs. In 
2000, for instance, the Public Freedoms and Citizens’ Rights Committee of 
the outspokenly regime-loyal Jordanian parliament requested the govern-
ment to “investigate the ‘legitimacy’ of local Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions …and research institutions which receive foreign funding,” complain-
ing that the funds were being used to “tarnish the country’s reputation.”54 
Another example is that of press freedom activist Nidal Mansur, previously 
the editor-in-chief of the weekly Al-Hadath newspaper. The Jordan Press 
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Association cancelled his membership on the grounds that he had illegally 
received “funds from abroad” during his time working for the Center for the 
Defence of the Freedom of Journalists. Mansur, who could not thereafter 
continue his work as a journalist, is convinced that it was instigated by the 
secret police.55
Even apart from the question of foreign funding, several NGOs of a 
cultural or advocacy nature have continued to suffer from state-repression, 
especially when the liberalization process stagnated from the mid-1990s 
onward. Repressive measures against NGOs by the authorities, on the basis 
of the above mentioned Law no. 33 or similar laws and regulations, con-
tinued to take place on a regular basis. Some of these were motivated by 
suspicions of “illegal” political activity. Women from the Center of Women’s 
Studies, for instance, were brought in by the secret police for questioning 
because they had discussed the role of women in elections in the Center’s 
premises. The secret police considered discussion of electoral strategy as 
unlicensed political activity for a cultural association. In another incident, 
that took place in 1997, the Ministry of Culture ordered the dissolution of 
the Karak Cultural Forum after outspoken Islamist regime critic Leith Shubei-
lat criticized the government in a lecture at the organization.56
Wiktorowicz writes that the most frequent cause of dissolution of 
local NGOs in Jordan is prompted by the latter’s failure to provide relevant 
information and detailed reports to the authorities.57 It seems, however, 
that accusations of such failure can also serve as a pretext to close down 
an association that is considered politically subversive. In September 2002, 
the Jordanian Society for Citizen’s Rights was dissolved, officially for fail-
ure to provide yearly reports on its finances and activities and for refusing 
to allow officials of the Ministry of Interior to enter the association’s office. 
Fawzi Samhuri, the Society’s former president, dismisses this reasoning as 
either irrelevant or invalid. He is convinced that the true reasons for closure 
were related to the Society’s activities of protest against discriminatory and 
oppressive state policies targeting citizens of Palestinian origin and against 
institutionalized authoritarianism in the state structure.58
Another tactic of regime-control of a (potentially) critical NGO com-
munity is cooptation and patronage of the issues raised by such NGOs. If 
the government can declare a controversial issue to be of concern, and thus 
assume control over any activities aimed at tackling it, the issue is likely 
to lose its subversive potential. Several advocacy NGOs, for instance, have 
been successfully enlisted by government institutions in widely publicized 
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“reform” efforts in the area of human rights, gender equality and the envi-
ronment, under the leadership of the relevant government institution for 
sure. International pressure on such issues makes their adoption by the 
regime all the more likely.59
Monarchy or cabinet may also establish its own institutions work-
ing on issues that were originally raised by civil society groupings. A cur-
rent example is the National Centre for Human Rights which functions as a 
government-affiliated ombudsman and regularly publishes critical reports 
on issues such as prison conditions, children’s rights and (mis)behavior of 
authorities.60 In the area of gender relations, female members of the royal 
family, first and foremost Princess Basma, the late King Hussein’s sister, have 
taken the initiative of patronizing lobbying activities for women’s rights. She 
did so by establishing and heading the Jordanian National Commission for 
Women and the Jordanian National Forum for Women in the mid-1990s. Both 
organizations aim to upgrade the legal status of women, to improve their 
political participation and to increase their involvement in development. 
They do so, of course, within the framework of the existing socio-political 
power structures in the Kingdom and of what is regarded as the traditional 
unity and values of the “Arab family.” Appreciation of such royal efforts dif-
fers in Jordanian civil society. While a relatively progressive Islamist women’s 
rights activist like Nawal Al-Fa‘uri hails Princess Basma’s and other royal fig-
ures’ engagement with women’s issues, many left wing women are inclined 
to see it as an undue interference of the regime in women’s affairs.61
Recent Developments in the Sector of Social Welfare NGOs
Since the end of the 1980s, widespread poverty and unemployment 
have contributed to the continuous growth of the more traditional sector of 
service-providing voluntary welfare associations. These associations remain 
active in the realms of charity and social counseling for the underprivileged. 
A significant number of them also promote the socio-economic empower-
ment of target groups like the poor and women, and, through activities like 
lectures and workshops, seek also to raise the wider public’s awareness on 
various social, health and religious issues. Islamists continue to be prominent 
in this sector. They continue to try to preserve or even to expand their ideo-
logical, socio-cultural and political influence in Jordanian society through 
establishing such NGOs. For four months during 1991, of course, five minis-
ters in the cabinet of Prime Minister Mudar Badran belonged to The Muslim 
Brotherhood, as part of a regime effort to appease and co-opt the Islamist 
movement (then at the height of its popular appeal). One of these minis-
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ters was Yusuf al-Azm, Minister of Social Development. During his brief term 
in office, he allowed the registration of more than fifty Islamic voluntary 
welfare associations, some of which did not meet the legal requirements. 
Indeed, reportedly he tried to push through seven religious associations on 
his last day in office alone.62 The establishment of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society by 
prominent Muslim Brotherhood member Abdul Latif Arabiyyat two years 
later was an important addition to the community of Islamist NGOs. This 
NGO is specialized in marriage and family issues and has organized well-
publicized annual mass weddings, intended as a model of a “better Islamic 
society” of chastity, social solidarity and harmony.63
The demise in state welfare services, unemployment and economic 
recession has also accelerated the growth of a different category of volun-
tary welfare associations: kinship-based associations. Family ties – whether 
of a close or more distant nature – turn out to be highly instrumental in 
forming associations of social solidarity. For wealthier family members con-
tribute to the welfare of the less fortunate ones, and kinship ties can be used 
in seeking employment. Moreover, such associations provide their founders 
and heads with a means to acquire social prestige and perhaps even the 
ability to obtain the electoral support of a constituency along kinship and 
tribal lines. More than Islamist associations (with an ideological basis that 
implies the criticism of Jordanian society and politics), the non-ideological 
kinship-based associations apparently contribute to the de-politicization 
and fragmentation of Jordanian civil society.64
Most prominently present in the realm of voluntary welfare provision, 
especially in terms of media attention, remain the associations founded and 
patronized by members of the royal family. Princess Basma’s JOHUD runs 
dozens of community development centers, especially in impoverished rural 
areas of the Kingdom. Since these areas are inhabited by tribes constituting 
the traditional bedrock of support for the regime, from the point of view of 
the monarchy’s hegemony, patronizing development efforts there pays off. 
From 1991 onward, the Fund has organized an ongoing National Philanthro-
py Campaign. Basing itself on the Islamic values of solidarity and support, 
the Campaign enlists the participation of a wide range of national institu-
tions such as government ministries, chambers of commerce and industry, 
universities, the media, the banking sector, scouting clubs, the GUVS and 
The Muslim Brotherhood. On the one hand, it engages in direct aid to poor 
families, in urban and rural areas as well as in Palestinian refugee camps, 
such as food, clothing, free medical services, equipment for the disabled, 
school supplies for children and scholarships for university students. On the 
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other hand, it tries to foster sustainable development by offering such fami-
lies financial resources and equipment to assist them in starting their own 
small businesses or other income generating projects.65
Similar activities are carried out by other royally sponsored societies. 
In addition, the Jordan River Foundation, patronized by Queen Rania, spe-
cializes in issues of child protection and development.66 In the following sec-
tion, however, a closer look will be taken at the GUVS as a body representing, 
as well as controlling, “ordinary” voluntary welfare associations.
The Role of the General Union of Voluntary Societies
Aims, Organizational Structure and Function
The stated aims of the GUVS, as an official representative body of all 
voluntary welfare associations registered at the Ministry of Social Develop-
ment, include the following: 1) setting the general policy for voluntary asso-
ciations; 2) cooperating and coordinating with other institutions, of an offi-
cial as well as a civil society nature, in the voluntary social field; 3) support-
ing voluntary associations by means of financial subsidy, technical advise 
and training; 4) providing information related to social work and voluntary 
associations to anyone interested; 5) contributing to the funding and estab-
lishment of productive micro-projects and providing job opportunities to 
needy citizens by voluntary associations; and 6) offering aid to emergency 
social cases, in cash or in kind.67
The GUVS consists of 12 unions of voluntary associations on the gov-
ernorate level.68 Each governorate union has at least three representatives in 
the general assembly of the GUVS. Once every three years, the 61-member 
assembly elects, in turn, an 18-member executive committee of the nation-
wide union.69 The annual report, in 2002/3, of GUVS’ executive committee 
mentions 777 local voluntary associations all over the Kingdom that are 
enlisted as members.70
According to Arafat Tamimi, Deputy Secretary General and Director 
of Development and International Relations of the Union, the GUVS has, 
since the turn of the 21st century, been engaged in a strategy of fully “inte-
grated development.” This includes the themes of employment, education, 
healthcare, agriculture, emancipation of women, care for the handicapped, 
the establishing of sound income-generating projects and the promotion 
of democratic decision-making. The GUVS provides counsel, training and 
financial support in these fields to those voluntary associations regarded 
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as capable to carry out the relevant projects. Besides, it implements its own 
projects in this regard.
The union’s financial resources consist of the membership contribu-
tions by its member associations, its own National Charity Lottery, invest-
ment in profitable (building) projects and the support of international and 
transnational aid institutions like UNICEF and OXFAM. All of its member 
associations receive a subsidy from GUVS in turn. The GUVS itself is finan-
cially independent of the Jordanian government.71
Assisting State Control and Disciplining
The GUVS plays an important role in the official overseeing of vol-
untary associations by the Ministry of Social Development. This Ministry 
consults the GUVS on decisions regarding whether or not to register new 
associations or to allow an association to expand its activities. However, the 
Ministry is not bound to follow the advice of the GUVS representatives in 
this regard and has, at times, rejected GUVS recommendations. The Union 
assists the Ministry in terms of providing information on its member associa-
tions. GUVS researchers gather this information through data collection and 
statistical analysis. Such data include all kinds of details of a voluntary asso-
ciation’s organizational work, finances and performance.72 The Union’s own 
evaluation of an association’s performance can be consequential for the 
financial subsidy it provides the latter.73 Besides, the gathered data enable 
the Ministry to regulate the NGO community according to the conclusions 
it draws from them.74
GUVS as a Body of Representation and Lobbying
The role of the GUVS in assisting the state in terms of disciplinary 
control and oversight (combined with the fact that every voluntary welfare 
association registered at the Ministry of Social Development is obliged to be 
a member), suggests that it is not a genuine civil society organization, since 
a basis of voluntary membership is lacking, and the function of control is 
usually attributed to state institutions (rather than civil society associations). 
There is, however, another side to the coin. As indicated when discussing 
professional associations in the last chapter, compulsory membership in a 
state-imposed structure does not necessarily rule out voluntary types of 
activity. In the case of the GUVS, its leadership tries to lobby the government 
for the sake of its own activities and for those of member associations, even 
though the ultimate power of decision-making rests with the government.75 
This position often implies tension and (latent) conflict in the Union’s rela-
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tionship with state institutions. There is complaint within the GUVS about 
the Ministry of Social Development and the frustrating impact of the latter’s 
rules and regulations on the voluntary associations’ sector’s freedom and 
flexibility in carrying out their programs and activities.76
Some of these undesired regulations and controls pertain to receiv-
ing donations from abroad. Deputy Secretary-General Tamimi emphasizes 
the Union’s desire to deal directly with foreign donors as well as to receive 
transnational donations directly, while the Ministry insists that it is the sole 
legitimate channel for such donations. Tamimi, however, views the Minis-
try as inefficient, customer unfriendly and even corrupt in its functioning; 
accordingly, he prefers not to deal with it in the field of foreign donations.77
The union’s head, Abdullah Khatib, speaks about the suffocating hier-
archy in the Ministry of Social Development, where officials are more con-
cerned with pleasing their superiors than with efficiently serving civil society 
and the general public. During one interview with him, he went as far as talk-
ing about “the regime” when referring to oppressive state policies, instead 
of using the more neutral term “government.” The Union does not have the 
possibility, however, to voice its protest freely and overtly in the Jordanian 
public sphere.78 Indeed, Khatib handed this author an unpublished English-
language document in which angry protest against government policy and 
legislation aimed at controlling and dominating the voluntary association’s 
sector was expressed, and a list of fifteen principles demanding the rights 
of these associations as equal and autonomous partners in social develop-
ment was included.79 Referring to a draft for a new law on voluntary welfare 
associations, he was quoted in the Jordan Times as saying: “the people who 
wrote this draft were only driven by their concern to control the sector, by 
their security mania. Should this draft be enacted, we would not have an 
NGO sector – we would have a GONGOs (i.e. Government Organised NGOs) 
sector.”80
In this connection, we can agree with anthropologist Richard Antoun 
that, for the sake of understanding the relationship between civil society and 
state in a country like Jordan, a pattern of mutual entanglement between 
state and civil society through a web of, often ambivalent, social relations 
is more useful than a model of dichotomy. In the former model, patterns of 
ambivalence, tension and conflict exist side by side with the possibility of 
accommodation.81 This is reflected in the functioning of the GUVS. For, on 
the one hand, it assists the state in its role of controlling and disciplining civil 
society; yet, on the other hand, it seems to suffer from this very same role 
and to harbor considerable resentments against the state. Indeed, Khatib’s 
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resentment of the regime – a regime in which he personally is entangled 
– extends even to the so-called royal NGOs. The latter receive, in Khattib’s 
own words:
a lot of support from Western aid agencies and the World Bank, but they aren’t 
that effective. Of the money they get, 32 percent reaches the poor but the 
rest is spent on things like salaries, all kinds of benefits for its employees, pri-
vate purposes, et cetera. We can safely call it corruption. But they know how to 
present themselves very nicely to foreign donors.82 
To make matters more complicated, however, representatives of some 
royal NGOs complain about bureaucratic obstacles and difficulties in their 
contacts with the Ministry of Social Development.83 This lends credibility to 
the idea that, while they are established and patronized by royal figures, 
they do possess certain traits of civil society institutions in terms of their 
position vis-à-vis existing bureaucratic government structures.
Classification of Voluntary Welfare Associations
To indicate different types of voluntary associations that are mem-
bers of GUVS and registered at the Ministry of Social Development, classifi-
cation could be made on the basis of activities as well as the backgrounds 
of their membership. Hani al-Hourani of the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research 
Center distinguishes a more traditional category of multi-purpose associa-
tions and the more advanced category of specialized associations. Multi-
purpose societies, accounting for 82.7% of all registered voluntary welfare 
associations according to figures in 1999, offer several types of services. This 
often includes helping poor families, orphans and needy students, offer-
ing vocational training for especially young women, establishing kindergar-
tens, solving social problems and differences in family and local community, 
providing awareness raising, education and health services and sometimes 
employment and small-scale business opportunities for the needy. Special-
ized associations, on the other hand, focus on one (main) type of target 
group and/or activity and usually strive for complete professionalism in this 
specific endeavor. One can think here of associations serving the disabled 
or the orphans, and of those running schools or working on family planning. 
Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society, organizing mass weddings and organizing work-
shops and seminars on marriage and family issues is also an example in this 
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category. According to the figures of 1999, specialized associations account-
ed for 17.3% for the total number of voluntary welfare associations.
While all voluntary welfare associations are legally obliged not to dis-
criminate against any applicant for membership or for service on grounds, 
such as religion, origin or sex, citizens of a common background do often 
associate together and focus on serving people sharing this background. 
Hence, in Jordan, many associations established on a family, clan, tribal or 
(actual or original) village basis carry out several of the activities mentioned 
above, mainly, if not exclusively, in the service of their own social group. 
Likewise, there are still the associations representing and serving ethnic 
minorities, such as the Circassians, the Chechens, the Armenians and the 
Kurds. About 12% of voluntary welfare associations registered in 1999 were 
women’s associations with, unsurprisingly, women as their target group. 
Many of them focused on the raising of women’s awareness on issues relat-
ing to their lives (particularly child care) and on providing women with voca-
tional training opportunities. Some of them expressly deal with women’s 
legal rights as well. Last but not least, there are religious associations, of a 
Christian or Muslim nature. Serving underprivileged groups in various ways, 
and establishing health and educational services are characteristic of the 
approach of both groups. According to Hani Hourani of Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
Research Centre, there were 18 Christian associations and 27 Muslim associ-
ations by the end of 1999.84 As pointed out in the introduction, however, dis-
tinguishing between religious and non-religious associations is neither an 
easy nor self-evident matter in a country like Jordan. The religious motives 
and social ideals (as determinants of the religious character) of these asso-
ciations are central to the theme of the next part of this study.
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7. Islamic Social Welfare 
Discourse and Practice: 
an historical perspective
To portray the work of Muslim NGOs in Jordan as only instrumental to 
the political aims of the Islamist movement would be a severe injustice to the 
longstanding Islamic tradition of solidarity with and care for the underprivi-
leged: the needy, orphaned, sick and widowed. Social practices pertaining 
to this tradition have for centuries been underpinned by numerous Qur’anic 
’ayat and hadiths, according to which believers are to give generously and to 
help those in need. Indeed, according to religious sources, such practices are 
necessary in order for Muslims to win the favor of God and to enter paradise. 
In this chapter, we discuss the current Islamic discourse around the concepts 
of zakah and sadaqah, and the related notion that serving the poor is equal 
to serving God. This discourse is often central to the way in which Jorda-
nian Muslim NGOs explain their own motivations and social ideals. In the 
subsequent three chapters, these motivations and ideals will be discussed 
in the case of three different categories of Muslim NGOs: The Muslim Broth-
erhood-dominated Islamists; current, politically unaffiliated conservative 
Muslim NGOs; and progressive Muslim NGOs. It must be noted that all data 
presented in this chapter was obtained from my interviews with the NGO’s 
representatives. My interaction with them as a Western and non-Muslim 
researcher will necessarily have affected the nature of these data.
Zakah as a Binding Obligation
Many religious exhortations promoting social solidarity revolve 
around the duty of paying zakah. Zakah emerged as a wealth tax in the early 
Muslim community in Medina that was led by the Prophet Muhammad him-
self. According to several Qur’anic verses, eight categories of people are to 
benefit from the proceeds of this tax: the poor, the needy, zakah administra-
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tors, potential converts and Muslims “at risk” of renouncing Islam, manu-
mitted slaves, debtors, people fighting “for the sake of God” and travelers.1 
Socially zakah was rooted in tribal Arabian customs that obliged anyone of 
sufficient means to assist orphans, widows, the sick and the undernourished. 
Under the Prophet Muhammad’s leadership, however, the early Muslim com-
munity established a supra-tribal polity in the city of Medina from the year 
622 C.E. onward. All Muslims that were financially stable were ordered to pay 
zakah to the bayt al-mal, the new Islamic state’s treasury. Zakah became one 
of the five pillars of faith upon which every Muslim is expected to base his 
or her religion. As such, it was (and is) distinguished from sadaqah, which 
denotes more informal and unspecified forms of charity for the needy. While 
not mandatory (unlike zakah), engaging in sadaqah is also strongly encour-
aged by scripture and Hadith.
Not long after the Prophet’s death, the payment of zakah became a 
source of disagreement, at times even violence within the burgeoning Mus-
lim ’ummah. Preferring to keep matters in their own hands, recently con-
verted tribes, for instance, resisted the centralization of taxes by the caliph.2 
Another controversy concerned the question over which kind of property 
zakah had to be paid. Initially, all assets were taxed. However, in response to 
demands among propertied Muslims to limit tax collections, the third cal-
iph Uthman decided to tax only certain kinds of assets, mainly agricultural 
outputs. Payments over other kinds of wealth were apparently left to the 
individual Muslim’s conscience.3
Aside from how to enforce the duty of paying zakah, Muslims have 
in subsequent centuries, and up to the present day, viewed zakah as a mat-
ter of conscience and moral obligation. The word zakah is derived from the 
Arabic root z + k + h, the meaning of which is most strongly connected 
to “purification” The general idea behind the institution of zakah is that, in 
giving up a portion of one’s wealth (usually 2 and a half percent), one “puri-
fies” the rest of it, as well as one’s own spirit – since the zakah functions as 
a restraint on one’s selfishness, greed and indifference to others’ sufferings. 
The recipient, in turn, is purified from jealousy and hatred of the well off. 
Furthermore, actual basic human needs of the poor, like food and clothing, 
are supposed to be met through the observance of this religious duty by 
the economically better off. In several ways, then, zakah is believed to have 
a purifying impact on the ’ummah.4 In societal terms, this purification may 
be regarded as resulting in social stabilization and harmony between the 
economic classes. The poor and the needy are, according to Islamic doctrine, 
entitled to receiving zakah. This entitlement or haq (right) enables them to 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   174 05-02-2008   11:13:36
175
accept it without loss of dignity. Paying the zakah concomitantly enables 
the rich to soothe their conscience and not to feel guilty about their privi-
leged socio-economic status. Historical studies on Muslim societies in the 
Ottoman empire have demonstrated that voluntary zakah transfers used 
to flow to the most visible poor, such as the servants of the donors or the 
beggars who lived in the latter’s own neighborhoods, rather than toward 
the neediest. Little thought was given to the challenges of overcoming the 
sources of need.5
Contemporary zakah practices are often of a fundamentally different 
nature. While donating zakah is still a voluntary affair in most Muslim coun-
tries,6 the spending of it now has a much wider – even transnational – reach. 
It has also become increasingly motivated by notions of socio-economic and 
cultural development of the community as a whole. Hence, the emergence 
of Islamic banks as well as of modern-style NGOs in the Muslim world has sig-
nificantly contributed to a much wider and comprehensive Islamic approach 
towards aiding the needy. Islamic banks receive zakah donations as well as 
“halal-ized” money.7 With such funds, a great variety of social projects for the 
benefit of needy Muslim communities are supported, ranging from relief aid 
after natural disasters to the establishment of religious and cultural cent-
ers.8 Ideas of promoting the empowerment and economic self-reliance of 
the needy have also been translated into ways of spending zakah donations 
by Islamic banks as well as by Muslim NGOs. According to ‘ulama’ like Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi – a popular Islamist thinker with roots in the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood – zakah funds may be used to help an individual set up his own 
business. Both Islamic banks and Muslim NGOs are participating in the trend 
of shifting from traditional charitable aid to supporting the launching of 
small and medium-sized businesses by needy families themselves.
On the discursive plain, the traditional Islamic idea of the “right” of 
the poor to assistance from the rich is expanded through the notion that 
the latter face the moral duty to help the former rid themselves of their 
own state of dependency, become self-supporting and, therefore, fully inte-
grated (socio-economically) into an economically secure Muslim society. In 
the Islamic economic order envisioned by such thinkers, banks and NGOs, 
Islamic aid guarantees the morality of certain financial practices through 
their “halalization,” and micro-credits for the poor so as to compensate for 
the inequalities produced by a competitive market. According to this ideal, 
business and solidarity should be integrated so as to lead to the increased 
circulation of wealth. Solidarity allows the poor to make their own living by 
setting up their own businesses or by other means (such as vocational train-
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ing). Improving their own living standards might enable them later, in turn, 
to generate funds for charitable activities themselves.9
Whether non-Muslims can also be eligible beneficiaries of zakah is a 
matter of debate between Islamic scholars as well as Islamic NGOs.10
Sadaqah as a Moral Duty
It is often assumed that the difference between zakah and sadaqah 
is merely that the former is obligatory, whereas the latter is voluntary. Many 
socially committed Jordanian Muslims disagree with this assumption, how-
ever. They argue that every believer has a moral obligation to engage in 
sadaqah when confronted with other people’s need and capable of helping 
them. According to a local teacher of social work at Jordan University in 
Amman, for instance, sadaqah refers to any voluntary effort to improve the 
welfare of the community. Every Muslim is duty-bound to perform it, even 
the poor themselves. A poor person does not need to offer financial support, 
but may help others in different ways, such as by engaging in voluntary work 
or assisting the old and handicapped in his or her own neighborhood. For, 
such efforts are also to be classified as sadaqah. At the same time, the basic 
human needs of food, clothing and housing will be guaranteed for all in 
society if this moral duty of mutual help is to be fully implemented by all.11 
The teacher in question grew up in a small rural village in the north of Jor-
dan and had himself known poverty in his childhood. When he lived in the 
city of Irbid later on, he used to help poor relatives and neighbors by bring-
ing them into contact with wealthy donors, or by helping them to apply for 
financial assistance from the National Aid Fund, which resides within the 
Jordanian Ministry of Social Development.12
Mahmoud Sartawi, lecturer in shari‘ah and fiqh at the Shari‘ah Faculty 
of Jordan University, concurs that sadaqah is a moral obligation that every 
Muslim ought to practice on an ongoing and regular basis. There are also 
special occasions when sadaqah ought to be given, for instance as a means 
of atonement (ghafara) for sins that one has committed, or the duty to feed 
ten poor persons if one has made an oath to God, but failed in practice to 
keep it (yamin).
Some parts of the Qur’an are universalistic and compassionate in tone 
regarding the well-being of humankind in general. Others emphasize dif-
ferences with non-Muslims, condemning the kufar and mushrikun outright 
and, on occasion, the Jews and even Christians. Therefore, countless differ-
ent interpretations of the Qur’anic message exist. Sartawi clearly advocates 
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the universalistic line when he stresses that the shari‘ah-based principle of 
mutual help and solidarity with people in need is boundless. Everybody in 
need deserves help, regardless of skin color, origin, nationality or religion. In 
support of this position, he cites a Qur’anic principle: “the Children of Adam 
(i.e. humanity in general) are honored and provided for by God” (Q. 17:70). 
Sartawi emphasizes that this verse, as well as the title of the Qur’anic chapter 
from which it is derived, Surah al-’Insan (Chapter of the Human) speaks of 
human beings in general, and not of Muslims in particular. In ’ayat 8 and 9 of 
this Surah, the believers are admonished to feed the poor, the orphans and 
the captives, in spite of the formers’ own love for the food in question, and 
without expecting any reward or thanks. According to Sartawi’s interpreta-
tion, the call to Muslims to feed their captives, or prisoners of war, shows 
that even enemies of the ’ummah deserve due respect as human beings and 
ought to be helped when they are in need.13
Other Jordanian Muslims active in the realm of social welfare also 
emphasize the universal nature of the Islamic duty to help those in need. 
Arafat Tamimi, Deputy Secretary General and Director of Development 
Projects and International Relations of the General Union of Voluntary Soci-
eties in Jordan, stresses that the Qur’an disapproves of pre-Islamic tribal 
habits to serve only one’s own family or tribe. Working for human welfare, 
as Scripture prescribes it, must therefore benefit all in society, regardless of 
gender, origin and faith.14
This universality of the sadaqah principle notwithstanding, the 
shari‘ah also stipulates, according to Sartawi, certain priorities in terms of the 
beneficiaries of aid. Qur’an and Hadith mention three categories of recipi-
ent who are always entitled to aid and support from any believer: relatives, 
neighbors and fellow Muslims. The duty to help one’s relatives is expressed 
in ritual form during a religious feast like ‘Id al-Fitr, when brothers, sisters, 
uncles, aunts, (grand) parents and (grand) children visit one another, wish 
each other a happy ‘Id and exchange gifts in money or in kind.15 The Islamic 
duty to support one’s relatives is sometimes used by Jordanians of a tribal 
background to justify prevailing patterns of tribal solidarity.16 As is the case 
with relatives, the duty to help people living in one’s own neighborhood 
pertains to all possible needs, no matter if it concerns food, money, health 
or emotional and moral support. Sartawi stresses that in these two forms of 
solidarity, with relatives and neighbours respectively, no discrimination on 
the basis of faith or origin is permitted. However, Muslims also have a spe-
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cial duty to support their coreligionists in need, and ought to cooperate in 
religious as well as in worldly matters.17
The hadith states that sadaqah may not be given to persons who – 
financially or physically, and depending on the nature of aid – are capa-
ble of providing for themselves. Indeed, Sartawi regards the emphasis on 
shouldering responsibility for oneself as an Islamic legitimation of mod-
ern approaches that foster economic empowerment of the needy, such as 
income generating projects or vocational training.18 Likewise, several rep-
resentatives of Muslim NGOs in Jordan cite, as a religious rationalization of 
such approaches, a specific hadith in which Muhammad states that it is bet-
ter to give an axe to an able-bodied needy person who asks for help to make 
his own living than to give him bread.19
Serving the Needy is Serving God
Thus, as it has been described above, the principle of sadaqah 
demands that, from the perspective of many religiously and socially com-
mitted Muslims, the religious duty of aid and support to the needy cannot 
be reduced to the formal rule that, each year, a Muslim must pay 2.5% of 
his/her assets as zakah. According to them, paying zakah as well as giving 
sadaqah ought to express a spiritually motivated attitude of selflessness and 
living and acting fi sabil li-llah (for the sake of God). In the absence of the 
correct niyyah (intention), the act of helping and supporting the needy has 
no merit.
All other religious obligations are usually considered to be expres-
sions of this same spiritual disposition. This view has a long tradition and has 
been highlighted by Islamic scholars during the middle ages. In his book on 
charitable activism in the Muslim World, Jonathan Benthall mentions Islamic 
scholar and religious judge Al-Mawardi (d. 1058), who wrote on this mat-
ter in his Kitab ’Adab al-Dunyah wal-Din (translated by Benthall as The Book 
of Right Conduct in Matters Worldly and Religious). Prayer, according to al-
Mawardi, is to maintain the right mood of fear of God and religious ardor, 
which transcends the ego. Fasting helps the believer to have pity on the 
poor, so that we want to feed them, as well as to tame the bodily appetites. 
Pilgrimage to Mecca stimulates repentance for sins and, through the rigors 
of the journey, reminds of the value of generosity and hospitality toward 
travelers. Zakah, finally, comforts the poor, frees them from isolation, despair 
and jealousy and makes the well off respectful of the formers’ social rights. 
Mawardi’s approach did not challenge prevalent social structures, but was 
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focused on improving the mentality and behavior of the believers in line 
with Islamic principles.20
In a sense, this approach toward social welfare and justice is still 
prevalent among present day proponents of Islamic social welfare activism. 
According to Sartawi, the performance of religious rituals should not be a 
mechanic or automatic affair. Prayer or fasting during Ramadan, he empha-
sizes, must be done with the sincere intention to surrender oneself to God 
and cultivate the proper behavior in social life. God accepts neither prayer 
nor fasting from someone with a selfish, dishonest and/or aggressive mental 
disposition. Islam, Sartawi argues, means modesty and rejection of selfish-
ness, which must be reflected in ones social behavior as well.21
Islamic socio-economic ethics as described above are rooted in the 
belief (shared equally by Christians and Jews) that all wealth on earth belongs 
to God.22 Here, human beings are merely trustees over wealth. Whatever we 
possess must be used to bring us closer to God. This implies social solidar-
ity since, as one hadith warns, he who sleeps with a full stomach, while his 
neighbor goes hungry will be deprived of God’s mercy.23 This does not mean 
that these ethics accord with the communist denial of the right to possess 
means of production or distribution. Several Qur’anic verses do tolerate a 
measure of economic inequality. Many Muslims explain such tolerance by 
arguing that differences among human beings are inevitable in any soci-
ety and these translate themselves also into differences in socio-economic 
status. However, they often stress that these differences are tolerable only 
within the framework of the Qur’anic principle of the dignity and funda-
mental equality of all human beings or bani Adam (Children of Adam). In 
socio-economic terms, this means that the human individual has the right to 
possess and enjoy wealth, provided that this happens in moderation. Wealth 
must not, of course, be fetishized. Qur’anic verses, such as ayat 1 and 2 of 
Surah al-Takathur and others from Surah al-Humazah, fiercely condemn the 
unfettered multiplication of wealth and warn that those who engage in such 
practices will end up in hellfire. Monopolization and ostentation of wealth 
will be punished as well.24
Since it is only God who provides humankind with all the resources 
it needs to survive and to prosper, the human being is indebted to Him, 
and obliged to serve Him in prayer, sacrifice and performing the zakah as 
well as engaging in sadaqah. All such ways of serving God are regarded as 
expressions of taqwah (piety) and unselfishness. It is this spirit that is most 
important; and not the physical or material aspects of the deeds in and of 
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themselves.25 Indeed, Qur’an 2:245 states that gifts to the poor are a “loan 
to God.”26
The concepts of sadaqah and zakah are so closely intertwined with 
notions of purity and moral rectitude that all also apply to other realms of 
life, i.e. faithfulness to one God, the “correct” performance of rituals, marital 
fidelity and faithfulness to promises.27 Advocates of Islamic welfare activism 
(including various established scholars), individual social workers and mem-
bers of Muslim voluntary welfare NGOs stress that faith and good works are 
indivisible and cannot be separated from one another. “The merit of one’s 
actions depends upon one’s intentions” is confirmed in a hadith, supported 
by the Qur’an and plays an important part in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). 
Conversely, the same also applies: no belief can be sincere if it is not lived 
up to by the right kind of social behavior and good deeds. Thoughts as well 
as actions, they maintain, must be guided by taqwa or fear of God and good 
conscience. Hypocrisy and lip service are strongly condemned in the Qur’an 
(through the terms fisq and nifaq). Zakah, therefore, is both an act of social 
solidarity and an affirmation of faith. Muslim social welfare activists stress 
that this faith has to be lived, not by withdrawing oneself from the exist-
ing imperfect world, as ascetics in Christianity and other religious traditions 
have tended to do, but by practicing it in the real world.28
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8. Social Welfare Discourse 
of Islamist NGOs
Islamic ethics pertaining to social welfare as they were depicted 
in the last chapter can be regarded, in Max Weber’s terms, as the guiding 
Wertrationalität1 (value-rationality) of discourses and practices cherished 
by members and workers of Muslim NGOs in Jordan. This is not to say that 
their activities can solely be explained in terms of this Islamic version of 
value rationality. Motivations of the individual actors within the NGOs are 
usually much more complex. First of all, Islamic discourses are not isolated 
from external influences. Muslim NGOs’ discourses and practices are influ-
enced by global development discourses that are not specifically Islamic 
and originate, to an important extent, from the West. At the same time, tribal 
and state discourses also have their impact on these NGOs’ discourses. And 
last but not least, motives informed by value-rationality are naturally inter-
twined with other motivations, such as those of a self-serving, emotional or 
traditional nature.
This study, however, takes the NGOs’ religious discourse as its point 
of departure, since it focuses on the role of voluntary associations as joint 
expressions of the normative reflexivity of (groups of ) citizens, and the 
role of religion, in this case Islam, in this reflexivity. Reflexivity of citizens 
and of civil society institutions is to a great extent determined by shared 
values, principles and ethical ideals emanating from the lifeworld that are 
consciously held in common. This normative and ethical reflexivity becomes 
value rationality when translated into activities. The Islamic value rational 
discourses on social welfare, as it is espoused by these NGOs, will first be 
described and analyzed. Where possible, attention is going to be paid to 
the relationship between this and other value rational discourses, or to that 
between value rational and other types of motivation that inform the NGO 
members’ and workers’ activities. The analysis will take place in terms of the 
reflexivity expressed in these discourses on social religious motivations, on 
(the “right”) attitudes toward the needy and on ideals pertaining to the envi-
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sioned Islamic order. In this chapter, the religious discourse of those NGOs 
closely related to The Muslim Brotherhood, will be dealt with. Since the 
activities of the Islamist movement, including those in the sphere of social 
welfare, are controversial among other circles in Jordanian society, such as 
those of secular and/or liberal Muslims and of Christians, discourses of the 
latter about the Islamist NGOs will be described later on in the chapter.
Acting for the Sake of God
During the ‘Id al-Adha feast in February 2003, Salah Qandil Shakir, the 
son of the president of the Islamic Charity Center Society (ICCS), accompa-
nied me on a visit to Al-‘Abura Center, one of the ICCS centers for orphans 
and poor in Amman, to witness the distribution of mutton to orphan families 
(families without at least a father) and other needy clients. On our way to the 
center, he began to explain the meaning of ‘Id al-Adha. Commemorating the 
obedience shown by the prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) on being commanded 
by God to sacrifice his son to Him, as well as God’s mercy in eventually allow-
ing Ibrahim to sacrifice a sheep in lieu of his son, this feast symbolizes a 
Muslim’s readiness to give up the most precious thing in life for God – fi sabil 
li-llah – a readiness which every Muslim ought to possess. In other words, to 
dedicate one’s own life and one’s daily actions to the service of God, rather 
than to follow one’s own whims and self-interests at the expense of God’s 
will and commandments.2
The phrase fi sabil li-llah, for the sake of God, may be regarded as the 
central tenet in the value-rational discourse of The Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Islamist NGOs. At times, they explicitly connect it with the concept of 
jihad, as a selfless exertion of the will in a sacred effort, be it social, political 
or military in nature.3 Their representatives often regard adherence to this 
principle as the distinguishing feature between “Islamic” and “non-Islamic” 
NGOs. In the words of the treasurer of the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Asso-
ciation in Zarqa: “there are so many welfare associations in Jordan whose 
performance is very poor, because their leading personalities only think 
about their own interests and their own prestige […] the opposite of such 
a mentality is the true selfless effort in social work, to work fi sabil li-llah. 
Such a motivation leads to success,” thereby linking value-rationality with 
the equally Weberian idea of means-end rationality denoting successful 
and efficacious activity. By way of illustration he added, referring to the fact 
that the interview took place on a holiday: “if I had thought only of myself, I 
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would not have invited you to come for this interview. I would have decided 
to spend the day in my home to take a rest.”4
Islamist associations regard the principle of working fi sabil li-llah 
as the rationale guiding their daily work practices. As Salah Qandil Shakir 
stated about the work culture within the ICCS:
Prevailing practice (within the ICCS) is to give yourself and your energy for the 
cause of aiding the poor and the Islamic message. It is not about one’s own 
honor or status; it is about serving faith and the community. It is wrong to 
impose oneself as a president, or as any other kind of functionary … of course 
there is competition when there are elections for the administrative board (of 
the ICCS), but this happens not out of selfish motives, but is part of the effort to 
serve the work of the organization. The winner of the elections will be assisted 
afterward by the losers in his job, because not personal honor and winning or 
loosing is at issue here, but working for Islam.5 
It is hard to determine precisely what this idealised picture tells us 
about the practical state of affairs within the ICCS. That the reality is prob-
ably less rosy can be derived from what members of another Islamist asso-
ciation with many connections with ICCS figures have to say on the matter. 
According to them, internal ICCS-politics is characterized by heavy disputes 
and bloc formation. These disputes are mostly about personal matters, such 
as questions pertaining to who has the right to occupy which function.6 But 
regardless of the question of the relationship between ideal and practice 
(never a straightforwardly positive one), it is, from the point of view of value 
rationality, meaningful to stress the centrality of the fi sabil li-llah principle 
in Islamist NGOs’ discourse in terms of, for instance, unity of purpose. Such 
a value is contrasted with practices prevailing in other associations that are 
not considered to be specifically Islamic. According to Saleh Azioud, public 
relations officer of the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare association, the strong 
orientation toward personal honor in traditional Bedouin culture is respon-
sible for many conflicts within voluntary welfare associations of a tribal 
background. Conflicts about the results of elections to the administrative 
boards of such associations may lead to violence, even killing, he maintains. 
Financial fraud may take place as well. Associations guided by the Islamic 
spirit, Azioud asserts, work in accordance with the values of mutual respect, 
cooperation and prioritizing work for the charitable cause over personal 
considerations.7 Likewise, female workers of Al-‘Abura Center characterize 
the prevailing work climate as one characterized by a “team spirit of broth-
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ers and sisters.” One of them stresses that they are working with each other 
“in a cooperative and brotherly manner, within the framework of the teach-
ings of Islam.” They described unity for the sake of success and improvement 
of the center’s activities as the guiding rationale for their daily work.8
From the centrality of the fi sabil li-llah principle flows the denial of 
fiqh’s solid distinction between the realm of ‘ibadat (i.e. forms of worship) 
and mu‘amalat (i.e. all religious duties pertaining to relationships between 
people). In the words of Salah Kandil Shakir: ‘ibadat are not a question of 
rituals only. Helping the poor, being sexually faithful to your wife in mar-
riage, to go to the toilet in accordance with the right prescriptions (such as 
those related to hygiene and asking God for protection) are all ‘ibadat. When 
Abu Nur (the chief social worker of Al-‘Abura Center) does his job, he asks 
Allah to accept his efforts. To behave oneself in the right way also improves 
ones’ prospects for the next life.”9
Acting fi sabil li-llah is associated with uprightness, moral straight-
ness, honesty and sincerity, since everything one does is watched and will 
be judged upon by God. As one donor of ICCS center Al-‘Abura stated:
Everything you do will be judged by God … two angels, one on your right 
shoulder and the other on your left, are watching. The right one registers your 
good deeds, the left one the bad. On this basis, God judges … What counts is 
that I am sincere and honest in my deeds, and that I don’t lie or cheat. Even if 
one does something in hiding, God is watching everything.
According to the donor, the intention of serving God and ones’ fellow 
human beings must be pure and sincere. This implies that one should not 
act in the interests of one’s own prestige; and that the dignity of the recipi-
ent should always be respected.10 Similarly, personnel of an ICCS clinic in 
Marka, one of Amman’s eastern suburbs, emphasize with pride that the rates 
for consults, treatments and medicine “are fixed, and patients always know 
what they are up to.” The latter pay according to their level of income, and 
orphans don’t pay anything. According to the doctor who guided me on that 
visit, other private clinics engage in corrupt practices and may try to swindle 
wealthier patients, but Islamic clinics are “always straight.”11
One may question whether the Islamists’ incentives in helping others 
are always of such a selfless nature, or whether they involve some degree of 
prestige seeking. In fact, top level ICCS people are sometimes very attached 
to their prestige in terms of professional, political or social achievements. 
According to the ICCS president, charitable benefactors may serve as a 
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“model” to others in serving other people.12 It is, after all, difficult to conceive 
of someone serving as a public model without deriving some element of 
personal prestige from it. The same kind of ambiguity exists in regard to the 
Islamists’ political influence. Two days before the parliament elections of 15 
June 2003, the accountant of Al-‘Abura Center told me that he was making 
efforts in his spare time to campaign for the candidates of the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF). He emphasized that the Islamist candidates “are known among 
the population for their high morality, their sincerity and their motivation 
to work for God…other candidates are often suspected of only looking after 
their own interests.”13 Abdul Latif Arabiyyat, one of the prominent IAF leaders 
and president of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society emphasizes that the IAF members 
want to serve the welfare of society and the cause of a modern, accountable 
and transparent law state. He denies, however, that there exists a (direct) 
connection between Islamist activities in the realm of social welfare on the 
one hand and the political role of the IAF on the other, since these social 
welfare activities are not carried out for the sake of any “worldly benefit” 
and happen only “for the sake of God.” The only hope for reward that the 
Islamic volunteers in the cause of human welfare may hold to is the ’ajr, or 
God’s permission to live in paradise after death.14 The reality is, however, that 
the Islamists’ (public and political) prestige has been greatly enhanced by 
their social welfare activities. Of course, it is impossible to establish the exact 
nature of peoples’ motives, but the idea that the Islamists are also enjoying 
the prestige and that their social (as well as political) activities serve as a 
means to promote it does not, perhaps, appear too far fetched.
Value Rational versus Affective Motivations
“I and the supporter of orphans (will be) in paradise like these two 
(neighboring fingers)” is a statement of the Prophet Muhammad as related 
in a hadith. This hadith is highly popular as a source of inspiration for welfare 
work among figures of NGOs as diverse as The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated 
ICCS15 and the much more secular oriented Young Women’s Muslim Associa-
tion (YMMA), which is sponsored by princess Sarvath, wife of Prince Hassan, 
the brother of the late King Hussein.16 The connection between engaging in 
charitable activities for the needy and one’s prospects in the afterlife is fre-
quently mentioned by Muslim NGO representatives. As Azioud of the Islamic 
Bani Hassan Welfare Association puts it:
s o c I a l  w e l f a r e  d I s c o u r s e  o f  I s l a m I s t  n g o s
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   185 05-02-2008   11:13:37
186
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
Since it is written in the Qur’an that he who sleeps comfortably at home while 
his neighbor suffers from hunger will not enter paradise, we are exerting our 
efforts for the poor, because we prefer not to sleep while others suffer from 
hunger. We like to enter the gardens of Paradise as well.17 
Likewise, members and friends of Al-‘Afaf Society emphasize that by 
helping others, one comes closer to God. Doing welfare work, they empha-
size, is related to the question of entering paradise or hell.18 A woman who 
teaches cooking to orphan girls at Al-‘Abura Center explains her religious 
motivation as follows: “hoping to gain entrance to paradise through my 
belief in God. This means that I gain the reward from God for my work.”19
Islamic value-rational discourse on working for the sake of God and 
for divine reward is often closely intertwined with affective motivations 
of compassion and solidarity with the needy. The same donor of Al-‘Abura 
Center who spoke about being watched in everything one does by God also 
stated: “you have to help the poor. I can’t be happy if my neighbor suffers 
from hunger, doesn’t have clothes and is needy.”20 
The voluntary supervisor of the women’s committee of Al-‘Afaf Socie-
ty gave the following account of what first engaged her in Islamic voluntary 
welfare activism:
My inspiration to do social work came when my children were in primary school. 
One day, there was a party in this school that I attended as one of the mothers. 
A song was sung about the value of family life and what parents give to their 
children. One of the attending pupils was an orphan boy, who started crying. I 
and the other mothers went to the boy to see what happened to him, and tried 
to console him. It turned out that the song made him feel sad since he had only 
a mother (and no father), who lived in such dire circumstances that she couldn’t 
give him much. Together with the other mothers, I started to do things for him, 
so that he would get everything in life he needed, including education. Now 
this boy is studying in the university. It was this event that made me realize that 
more efforts were necessary to bring about change in the lives of people.21 
Other indications for compassion as a motive for doing welfare work 
could be derived from a remark made by Azioud on feeding poor people 
during Ramadan: “If one helps the poor, one makes them happy, which gives 
happiness to oneself as well.”22 The supervisor of Al-‘Abura Center’s female 
section stressed as a positive point in her work the aspect of working with 
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and helping human beings, and as a negative point the “mental pressure 
from the clients in terms of their persistence when they ask for something 
for their children, and feeling sorry for their situations and the lack of some-
body to support them.”23 The above indicates that motives of social workers 
in Islamist NGOs are at least as much of an affective nature as that they are 
of a value rational nature.
Value rational aspects of the Islamist NGO workers’ motivations are 
not independent from the affective aspects. Many of them cite from Qur’anic 
’ayat and the Hadith corpus on the value of compassion and care for fellow-
human beings as a rationalization for their social activities, for instance. 
The director of the ICCS-center in Al-Baqa‘a refugee camp spontaneously 
mentioned examples from the Hadith pertaining to the need of Muslims 
to be “brothers” for one another, and the duty to love one’s “brothers” and 
neighbors as oneself.24 A couple who participated in a wedding organized 
by Al-‘Afaf Society and is befriended with the Society’s general manager also 
mentioned the Hadith stressing that one should treat one’s neighbor as if s/
he is one’s heir. They explained the meaning of it as a stress on the impor-
tance of consideration with neighbors, who should be treated as members 
of one’s own family. If a neighbor is in need of anything, he or she should be 
helped, and one should share what one has with him or her. If someone is 
sad, one should comfort and console them.25 The director of Al-‘Abura center 
mentions the Hadith urging the believer to treat others as he or she likes 
to be treated by others. Respect, dignity and mercy have to be accorded to 
all fellow humans regardless of faith, as well as to animals and to plants.26 A 
woman social worker of ICCS-center Abu Dhur in the Nasr area in Amman 
even explicitly stated to Danish researcher Marie Juul Petersen that “Islam 
says that when you do something, do it out of love, not because you have 
to do it.”27
 Obviously, many members and workers of Islamist NGOs make no 
distinction between humanitarian and religious considerations in engag-
ing in welfare work. “There is one thing I want you to remember: there is no 
difference between Islam and social work,” the treasurer of the Islamic Bani 
Hassan Society told me at the end of my visit.28 A worker of the ICCS-cent-
er for orphans and poor in Jabal Nazeef, a poor neighborhood in Amman, 
emphasized that Islam “calls upon the believers not (just) to think about 
their own interests, but to be socially active and serve the well being of the 
community.”29 We may derive from such statements that, in the value-ration-
al reflexivity of workers and participants of Islamist NGOs, the true moral 
distinction is not between other-worldly religious and inner-worldly secular 
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humanitarian action, but between self-interested motivations on the one 
hand and selfless motivations characterized by true and sincere solidarity 
on the other. They equate the latter type of motivation with working fi sabil 
li-llah, for the sake of God.
A possible clue to the answer to the question of innerworldly versus 
otherworldly motivations in doing welfare work may be provided by draw-
ing a parallel with the case of the Protestant entrepreneurs of the 17th and 
18th century, about whom Max Weber wrote in his Protestant Ethics and 
the Spirit of Capitalism. One could ask the question whether these entre-
preneur’s primary motivation in their business activities was the wish to be 
predestined by God to go to heaven – since Protestant (especially Calvinist) 
theologians stress that hard work and success in business are indicative of 
divine predestination – or whether they also possessed the right capitalist 
attitude or spirit for entrepreneurial activity independent of such beliefs. 
Establishing peoples’ motives with certainty is usually a very hard thing to 
do, but we may well assume that these entrepreneurs possessed the appro-
priate mental disposition for capitalist activity regardless of their religious 
beliefs. Likewise, the Islamist social welfare workers are often in the posses-
sion of (affective) dispositions and inclinations which makes them amenable 
to do social work. However, the conviction that they receive the ’ajr (reward 
in the afterlife) contributes to their motivation. As the director of Al-‘Abura 
Center once informed me: the primary motivation for work is social, but 
one’s religious faith also “embellishes” this.
In this regard, it is also important to realize that motivations are 
never a strictly individual affair. They are shaped by the social environment. 
Bedouin tribesmen internalize their mental and behavioral patterns of social 
solidarity in the communal environment in which they grow up, as rural vil-
lagers, members of ethnic minorities and Palestinian refugee camp dwell-
ers.30 At the same time, it is true that religious discourse is an important 
communicative element within such patterns. It may be stated that, within 
the Islamist NGOs, religious discourse is often used with a greater degree of 
consciousness and purposefulness in terms of da‘wah (Islamic mission) than 
is the case in more traditional settings.31
Understandably, there is considerable sense of power gained by 
delivering a service to people who, through their own lack of money, and/
or material and/or knowledge resources are dependent on your help. In this 
regard, Steven Feierman characterizes aid activities in pre-colonial Africa as 
follows: “a peculiar combination of caring and dominance, of generosity and 
property, of tangled rights in things and in people, all in a time and place 
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where the strong would not let the weak go under, except sometimes.”32 The 
British anthropologist Jonathan Benthall rightly emphasizes the universality 
of this “double-edged” nature of kindly help by stating that it equally applies 
to the modern philanthropic West.33 As regards Islamist NGOs in Jordan, they 
often use their aid activities in order to obtain a measure of ideological, 
religious and moral dominance over their clients. The precise nature of this 
dominance will be described in more depth in Chapters 11 and 14. Here, it 
suffices to say that the sense of power and dominance could also be regard-
ed as an expression of affective motivation, since it is driven by the world of 
emotions. It may also be expressed, in value rational discourse, through the 
use of patronizing language towards needy clients for instance.
The Just Islamic Society
On the level of value rational discourse, NGO participants link their 
motivations in doing social welfare work with broader ideas on the “ideal” 
or “best” society. It goes without saying that, for Islamist social activists, 
the best society is the “truly” Islamic society, governed by the laws, morals 
and values of the shari‘ah. In this regard, it must be emphasized again that 
Islamists’ societal visions are grounded first and foremost in religious moral 
injunctions on how believers should behave in their social lives. Institutional 
arrangements in the spheres of state, economy and society are often regard-
ed as of secondary importance.
It seems then, that Islamist societal ideals are still, to a large extent, 
pervaded by traditional views on the moral duties of the believer. The Ira-
nian religious thinker and philosopher Abdul Karim Soroush has pointed 
to the duty-oriented nature of traditional religious thought in general. He 
states that even where Qur’an and Hadith speak on some occasions about 
the rights of individuals, this is always put in the general moral framework 
of the societal duty for all to respect and fulfill those rights. Soroush con-
trasts the traditional religious societal vision, which is based upon a view 
on human beings as duty-bound “guests” living in the world by the grace of 
a merciful and compassionate God – who owns it, is its only master and to 
whom they are morally indebted – with the modern secular vision of a soci-
ety actively shaped by human intervention in a systematic and “scientific” 
way. According to the second vision, the human agent, rather than God, is 
owner and master of the world. Through his rational interventions and his 
construction of technological, political, economic and social systems, the 
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human agent him- or herself guarantees and promotes peoples’ prosperity, 
welfare and rights.34
Soroush’s characterization of traditional religious vision regarding 
society certainly applies to the realm of social welfare, where Qur’anic dis-
course, as described in the previous chapter, connects the “rights” of the 
needy to be supported and taken care of with an urgent call to the wealthier 
believer to respect and fulfill such rights. The extent to which present day 
Islamist movements can be classified as representatives of an age-old reli-
gious “tradition” or as phenomena of a modern society is a matter of con-
troversy. It is obvious from statements by representatives of Islamist NGOs 
as well as from their publications, however, that much of their social welfare 
discourse is put in the traditional religious language of performing duties 
and responsibilities fi sabil li-llah.35
Islamists claim that the fulfillment of those duties by all members of 
society will greatly enhance communal welfare and, ultimately, bring added 
prosperity for all. They do acknowledge that, in modern (Muslim) societies, 
modern and institutionalized ways of guaranteeing social welfare are ben-
eficial and even, on occasion, necessary. Thus, in terms of social welfare, they 
often contrast European social welfare systems positively against the state 
of affairs in the Arab world. The latter they view as seriously lacking in effica-
cy and justice due to the prevalence of corrupt and self-serving regimes.36
At the same time, however, Islamist NGOs insist that true social wel-
fare in a religious sense can never be a matter of systems and institutions 
alone. It is the sincere intention of the believers to contribute to the gen-
eral welfare fi sabil li-llah that gives welfare activities their true validity and 
legitimacy. Muslim Brotherhood and ICCS representatives believe that a 
properly Islamic state should institutionalize the payment of zakah as a legal 
obligation for all Muslim citizens living above a certain minimal subsistence 
level. At the same time, they believe that the duty of zakah, in its true and 
original meaning, can only be preserved if it springs from the right spiritual 
motivation. To be specific, zakah should only be given “from the heart.”37 
Non-institutionalized and informal sadaqat in various forms and a (modern) 
revival of the traditional institution of awqaf (religious endowments with 
social objectives) will also contribute to a society wherein poverty no longer 
exists.38 Unlike the mentality of charitable benefactors in Muslim societies of 
medieval and early modern times, for whom the overcoming of poverty as 
a societal phenomenon was of little if any interest, modern Islamist social 
activists regard the eradication of poverty as one of their ultimate objec-
tives. As the director of the ICCS center for orphans and poor in Al-Baqa‘a 
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refugee camp argued, “hunger, thirst, homelessness and nudity (lack of 
clothing)” are ethically unacceptable conditions and Muslims have a duty 
to help one another.39
Thus, in terms of social welfare, the ideal Islamic society is based 
on a spirit of mutual care and support. The general vision of that society 
is summed up quite comprehensively in the explanation of Mufid Sarhan, 
general manager of Al-‘Afaf Society, of the meaning of the Islamic term ‘afaf. 
This term means, according to him:
cleanliness and moral purity in a general sense. It means avoiding adultery, but 
also entertaining good relationships with others, being at peace with yourself, 
and dealing with others in a good, honest and trustworthy way. Islam loves 
sharing, togetherness and tolerance…Islam is asking for morality and rela-
tionships on the basis of respect and humanity, and not of power and force. 
Muslims want good, human relationships with people that are not based upon 
self-interest. It is a duty for a Muslim to help other people, also the non-Mus-
lims. Even animals have to be helped and treated well. Islam means helping 
others.40 
Apart from a self-evident horizontal dimension, this kind of mutual 
solidarity also has a vertical dimension in the sense of the strong having to 
support the weak and the rich having to support the poor. In the words of 
a worker of the ICCS center for orphans and poor in Jabal Nazeef: “The rich 
man has to support the poor and fulfill their needs, the big person has to 
take care of the small person and the strong of the weak.”41 The philosophy 
of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society stresses that that this principle has to be imple-
mented first of all within the family. From their point of view, this applies not 
only to the nuclear family, but to the extended family as well. It vehemently 
rejects the phenomenon that is widespread in urban Western society of the 
isolated nuclear family that looks only after its own affairs. In Al-‘Afaf Soci-
ety’s vision, grown-up children have to take care of their parents, even if the 
former are married and have children themselves. According to the Society’s 
president Arabiyyat, a retirement home is not a suitable place for old people 
to live. He told me that, while still living as a PhD-student in Texas in the USA, 
he had heard from an Arab American friend that his mother lived in such an 
institution. Arabiyyat’s response to him, as related to me, was: “the way you 
treat your parents is the way you will be treated later on. If you take care 
of your parents well, they will take care of you. And the Prophet Muham-
mad has said that if you take care of your parents well, you will enter para-
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dise with them.”42 In the same vein, Sarhan praises the quality of relations 
and the frequent mutual visits among brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts and 
grandparents within the Arab extended family. He contrasts this with the 
atomization of individualized Western society, noting with pride that there 
are hardly any retirement homes in Jordan. He also praises the traditional 
norm that obliges wealthy relatives to support their needy ones financially 
and by other means. Islam, he stresses, endorses customs like these. “Really,” 
he argued, “how much easier would life be, how soon all [social] problems 
would diminish, if only the Islamic message were [consistently] applied.”43
It is this ideal of an Islamic (extended) family model, wherein soli-
darity is the rule, that should stand in Islamist association’s discourse as an 
example of solidarity between the rich and poor in society at large. Accord-
ing to Arabiyyat:
It is not good if rich people spend all their money on prestigious objects and 
if they care mainly about their (social) status. They should rather spend their 
money on the well-being of the poor, by financing the education and study 
of young people from needy families, for instance, and by paying for medical 
treatments that poor persons cannot afford, or by any other means. An attitude 
of modesty and compassion with the fate of others closes the gap between rich 
and poor and works for the benefit of all in society.44 
Generally speaking the members and workers of Islamist NGOs cite 
narrowing of the gap between rich and poor as the goal to which this verti-
cal solidarity between the socio-economic classes should lead. Sheikh Abu 
Baqi Gammo, president of the Islamic Educational Welfare Association in 
Zarqa and one of the founders of Jordan’s chapter of The Muslim Brother-
hood, spoke about the prophet Joseph who, while he was in Egypt, helped 
the poor and could not be happy when he saw others suffering. “If Islam 
were consistently applied in Jordan and in other Arab countries,” he main-
tains, “the problem of poverty would be solved. There would be no needy 
people living next to people who dwell in palaces. There would be no war (or 
conflict). Islam is the ideal and perfect system.” As an illustration, he stressed 
that if his association lacks anything in money, for instance to pay the tuition 
fees for children from poor families to attend the school run by the associa-
tion, he will cover the expenses from his own pocket.45 Likewise, the director 
of the ICCS center for orphans and poor in Al-Wihdat refugee camp spoke 
about the Islamic duties stipulated in the Qur’an and the Hadith to elevate 
the poor, needy and orphans from their state of suffering and want toward 
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a better and higher level. By taking care of the poor through the payment 
of zakah and sadaqah, the rich prevent conflict and tensions within society, 
and harmony will be preserved, he argued. Asked whether those zakah and 
sadaqah consist simply of gifts in money and in kind, his answer was that 
this is not enough. Rather, he mentioned the efforts of his center to foster 
the self-reliance of orphans and poor children and their families by support-
ing the children in their school education and by offering them computer 
courses and income-generating projects.46
One of the goals stated by ICCS top-representatives is to improve 
the situation of the poor by promoting their socio-economic self-reliance 
through programs in the field of vocational training and income generating 
projects.47 They consider the enhancement of productivity among all-able 
bodied members of the society as an important key to (Islamic) social jus-
tice. Likewise, the president of the female Al-’Ihsan Welfare Association in 
Zarqa, who had been working for the ICCS before she established her own 
association, regarded it as part of her Islamic mission to urge her poor cli-
ents to make use of opportunities to work and not to expect the association 
indefinitely to provide them with handouts.48
The Islamists’ views on social justice are brought into sharper focus 
when we consider what these actors regard as social injustice. As one may 
expect, they condemn the unfair distribution of wealth that characterizes 
many Arab and Muslim societies as well as others. They usually explain this 
state of affairs as being the result of Western imperialist designs to keep the 
Arab nations and the Muslim ’ummah weak and divided. They also point out 
that in spite of the Arab countries’ possession of the richest natural resourc-
es on Earth, they nevertheless suffer great social problems and injustices. 
In the words of the supervisor of the female section of the ICCS center for 
orphans and poor in Al-Wihdat Refugee camp: “Arabs live in the richest area 
of the world in terms of natural resources, but at the same time they [many 
of them] live in poverty. This is unjust, this is oppression.”49 Islamist social 
activists in Palestinian refugee camps point also to the plight of Palestinian 
refugees, the usurpation of their land and their expulsion by the “Zionist 
Aggressor.” This they contrast, of course, with the sluggishness and apathy 
of the global political community in seeking to address the Palestinians 
plight.50
Wealthy Arab accomplices of the prevailing socio-economic unjust 
state of affairs are also targets of the Jordanian Islamists’ criticism, especially 
those living in the Gulf region. When it comes to the Wahhabi Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, such criticism is often mixed with theological recriminations 
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of nifaq (hypocrisy). To illustrate the true nature of The Muslim Brotherhood, 
one of The Brotherhood’s executives, Abu Mahfuz, contrasted his own life-
style with that of regime-sponsored ‘ulama’ in Saudi Arabia:
We as Muslim Brothers provide an example to the people [of an honest and 
modest way of life]. I myself live in Zarqa among the [ordinary] people in a two 
room apartment. I have no telephone in my house, no satellite TV and no car. I 
use the bus when I go to my job in Amman. That’s why the people accept me as 
one of them. Compare this to the attitude of ‘ulama’ close to the regime in Arab 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia. They live comfortable lives, are alienated from 
the rest of the people, yet they tell them what is halal [religiously sanctioned] 
and what is haram [religiously forbidden]. They are hypocrites!”51 
Another target of the Islamists is the practice of wastah (favoritism/
nepotism) that prevails within the Kingdom’s state apparatus. The Islamists 
morally condemn the greed of many civil servants as well as the bureaucratic 
hierarchy that stifles any interest in genuinely serving Jordan’s citizens. They 
contrast this with the Islamic voluntary associations’ efforts of service on the 
basis of following one’s “inner voice and conscience.” Government officials, 
according to Abu Mahfuz, “get their salaries from a hierarchic government 
institution and do everything solely to satisfy their superiors. The people of 
the associations, however, work with an awareness of the afterlife in their 
minds.”52 Likewise, Atef Julani, chief editor of the Islamist Al-Sabeel weekly 
states: “government officials are often working too much out of official tasks 
and orders, and do their jobs mainly for the sake of their own salaries, while 
people from the private associations work out of their heart, their inner con-
viction to serve the poor and the common interest. This makes them more 
effective. They don’t work for their own interests, for what they get in return, 
but for God.”53 According to ICCS president Qandil Shakir, Islamic societies 
“are really working from their hearts, from a motivation from inside. They 
don’t work out of a formal duty to follow (bureaucratic) rules and regula-
tions.”54
In terms of socio-economic systems, Jordanian Islamist social activ-
ists regard capitalism as well as communism as unjust. The treasurer of the 
Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa Welfare Association in Amman, that was founded at 
the beginning of the 1960s by Muslim Brotherhood figures, stresses that it 
rejects, on the basis of Qur’an and Hadith:
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the capitalist as well as of the communist societal model. In a capitalist soci-
ety, you have social classes and a hierarchy between the better-off and the 
needy, while in an Islamic society everybody is equal regardless of what he 
owns. Communism is to be rejected as well, because it wants to abolish private 
property. Islam defends private property, but stipulates that it has to be used 
for the sake of general welfare.55 
Islamism is especially opposed to neo-liberal versions of capitalism 
imposed on the Muslim and Arab worlds by Western-dominated interna-
tional institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. What sort of socio-eco-
nomic system do Islamists and their NGOs then propagate? What are their 
positions on the role of the public sector, the private sector and the civil 
society in the ideally envisioned Islamic socio-economic order?
In spite of the Islamists’ description of Islam as a perfectly just system, 
I have not come across any elaborate and coherent visions on this topic 
among them. Rather, only the most general statements were given indicat-
ing a preference for a third way between socialism and capitalism, and for 
the need for complementary and harmonious relationships between all the 
actors within the state, the market and the civil society in order to make a 
prosperous and just Islamic society possible. In a regional, national as well 
as global sense, the need for economic redistribution from the rich in favor 
of the poor is emphasized. Likewise, the need for economic self-reliance 
and unity in the Arab and Muslim worlds and for there to be an economic 
exchange between the Western and the Muslim world is well appreciated. 
The Muslim Brotherhood executive and general manager of Al-Sabeel week-
ly, Al-Mahfuz, states that Muslims believe in the same political values as 
Western societies. Such values include democracy, pluralism, human rights 
and freedoms, women’s rights, peace and the market economy. At the same 
time, he emphasizes that an Islamic economic policy entails a quasi social-
ist redistribution of wealth and socio-economic opportunities through the 
implementation of the practice and principles of zakah and sadaqah.56 He 
also suggested to me that Jordanian Islamists in general disliked the capital-
ist pursuit of financial gain, in particular that of riba’ (interest).57
In response to a question about his view on the type of social welfare 
systems to be found in countries like The Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, 
IAF leader Arabiyyat stated simply: “what is good is good.” By this remark, he 
suggested that Islam is open to any concept, practice or system in the world 
that accords with its own ethical principles. Asked about his view on the 
respective roles of state and civil society institutions in the alleviation of 
s o c I a l  w e l f a r e  d I s c o u r s e  o f  I s l a m I s t  n g o s
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   195 05-02-2008   11:13:38
196
poverty and social development, his answer was that both are needed and 
should complement one another. By way of illustration, he explained that 
a decent hospital that is open to the public needs the state for the provi-
sion of the right infrastructure and a clean environment, but the efforts of 
morally motivated volunteers are needed as well. “The IAF wants to enable 
and encourage people to improve their own situation as well as to help oth-
ers,” he concluded.58 According to workers of the ICCS center in Al-Baqa‘a 
refugee-camp, a just Islamic society depends on the believers’ willingness to 
help and support one another. The latter should not depend for everything 
on the government. An Islamic government, they say, will distribute zakah 
among the poor, the orphans, the widows, the travelers and the mujahi-
din (military fighters in the cause of Islam). Muslim citizens, meanwhile, will 
engage in sadaqah of all possible kinds.59
Views of this kind suggest that the perfectly just Islamic society can-
not simply be organized by the state from the top down, and that a profound 
moral commitment to the welfare of the society by all believers is needed. 
Such ideological understandings attribute supreme status to a religiously 
defined socio-cultural lifeworld or civil society in any truly Islamic society, 
and consider the role of the state as an important facilitator, but also as lim-
ited in its (moral) scope.
Members of Islamist NGOs may have their criticisms about the way 
government institutions function in the realm of social welfare.60 At the 
same time, however, they realize perfectly well that they owe their own 
space in civil society to this very malfunctioning of government institutions, 
since they provide the needy as well as the middle class with an alternative, 
possibly less bureaucratic and less corrupt, system of services. Hence, they 
do everything possible to protect and defend this space.61 On the level of 
religious discourse, we see once again that the perfect Islamic system so 
much lauded and praised by Islamists boils down to a moral and ethical sys-
tem of injunctions, responsibilities and duties pertaining to honesty, integ-
rity, accountability, justice and fairness. Every individual believer must fully 
adhere to it in all spheres of life, including the (civil) society, the state and 
the market. In other words, all of these spheres have to be moralized and 
Islamized. Yet, when it comes to the structural and institutional setup within, 
and among these different spheres, we do not find anything like a coherent 
and elaborate theory of a caliber like those developed by world-famous eco-
nomic thinkers such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, Ken-
neth Galbraith or Milton Friedman. Particular socio-economic systems may 
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be borrowed, adopted and adapted from any corner of the world deemed to 
be in agreement with the ethical injunctions of Islam.
Outsider’s Discourse on the Islamist NGOs
The highly value-laden and moralizing social discourse of the Islam-
ists and their NGOs in Jordan raises certain expectations among the Jorda-
nian public pertaining to their actual practices. Those practices are rarely 
as pure as the social and ethical ideals by themselves, however. Jordanian 
views from outside The Muslim Brotherhood Islamist movement on the 
Islamist NGOs and their practices range from respect for the Islamists’ appar-
ently lofty ethical code and sincere attempts to alleviate the suffering of the 
needy to expressions of hostility and accusations of hypocrisy. The following 
paragraphs place the Islamists’ social discourse and description of their aims 
(as described above) within the wider perspective of Jordanian opinions on 
the Islamists. The focus will be on Jordanian outsiders of a well-educated 
background. My respondents included social scientists, political activists 
and members and workers of other voluntary welfare associations.
Sympathizers
Some Jordanian scholars belong to the more positive evaluators of 
the role and the function of Islamist NGOs. They emphasize the religiously 
grounded moral motivations of the members and the workers of these asso-
ciations, and suggest that such motivations make their work more efficient 
and less susceptible to corruption. Political scientist Sami al-Khazendar has 
carried out research into the social networks of Islamists, including their 
social welfare NGOs, to find out how these relate to their political activities. 
Though considering himself as neither sympathizer with, nor opponent of, 
the Islamist movement, al-Khazendar’s assessments are generally positive. 
His main observation is that, unlike his previous assumptions, workers and 
members of Islamist NGOs are not primarily motivated by considerations of 
political gain.
Al-Khazendar’s findings suggest that Islamist NGOs distinguish them-
selves from others in their informal approach to spiritual care. In addition to 
financial and material aid, they provide their needy clients with solace and 
moral support. They do so by pointing to the potential of divine reward in 
the afterlife and by stressing that the Prophet Muhammad had once been a 
poor man and an orphan. According to al-Khazendar, this approach makes 
the needy clients more patient, yet not necessarily more passive. On the 
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contrary, Islamist NGOs also encourage the poor to be economically active 
and to find jobs.62
Al-Khazendar does not deny that the Islamists’ social activities have an 
important political function. His findings confirm that the “selfless” efforts of 
Islamist NGO members or workers help Islamists to gain votes. Such voters 
like to give something in return to their benefactors, and see this as a way to 
help secure the continued existence of the services in question. In general, 
al-Khazendar contends, the poor do not see a connection between political 
ideology and activism on the one hand and charity on the other. They simply 
consider themselves to be entitled to the Islamist NGOs’ social services given 
their own disadvantageous socio-economic situation.63
Al-Khazendar maintains that the Islamist NGOs’ strong and religiously 
motivated resolve in social work compensates for their political impotence 
vis-à-vis the state. While the services of government institutions are plagued 
by bureaucratic red tape, corruption and self-serving officials, Islamist wel-
fare associations are inspired by a sincere enthusiasm and a high morale.64
In addition to the positive religious and moral aspects of their work, 
there are, according to cultural anthropologist Muhammad Tarawneh, 
strong organizational structures within Islamist NGOs that entail an effec-
tive system of internal monitoring. Likewise, he notes the role of local social 
networks as an important explanation for the Islamist NGOs’ dedication to 
activities relating to the alleviation of poverty, and for the relative absence 
of corruption among them. According to his observations, it is often rela-
tives, friends and/or neighbors who work together in such NGOs. These peo-
ple are closely acquainted with one another and are often part of the wider 
social network encompassing the local community in which they work. The 
great measure of social control within these local communities makes sure 
that corrupt practices within these NGOs are strongly discouraged.65
The American social scientist Robert Putnam distinguishes between 
two different kinds of social capital: those of a bonding and those of a bridg-
ing nature. Bonding social capital is limited to the members of a certain iden-
tity group based upon tribe, religion, political conviction, class, ethnic origin 
or anything else, and excludes outsiders. Bridging social capital, in contrast, 
is open to people across such divides.66 Tarawneh himself states that, in prin-
ciple, the Islamist NGOs provide aid to all the needy regardless of religious 
background or practice – thus are both bridging and bonding. At the same 
time, he does not rule the possibility out that in actual practice, NGO work-
ers do discriminate on the basis of criteria of “religious bonding.”67
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A more defensive approach regarding the Islamist NGOs was expressed 
to me by functionaries of the GUVS. Among its largest member organiza-
tions are Islamist NGOs. These functionaries regard religious convictions and 
discourse among NGOs as relevant only in terms of motivation and condu-
civeness to cohesion and cooperation among their members. They deny any 
impact on the NGOs’ services and argue that they should only be judged on 
the basis of the quality of those services.68 The Union’s head, al-Khatib, who 
considers himself a pious Muslim though not an Islamist, questions the very 
concept of Islamist or Islamic NGOs. According to him, it is wrong to see NGOs 
like the ICCS and Al-‘Afaf Society as extensions of The Muslim Brotherhood 
movement. They are first and foremost voluntary welfare associations like 
any other. Furthermore, he stresses that there is nothing special about their 
religious discourse, since religious aims – such as closing the gap between 
the rich and the poor, and the right of the poor to share in the wealth of 
the rich – underpin the ideology of all voluntary welfare associations in Jor-
dan. Khatib tried to convince me that the principle of non-discrimination in 
terms of services and membership is not merely an official stipulation, but 
actual practice followed by the NGOs. In this regard, he mentioned to me the 
presence of Christians among the donors of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Association’s 
mass-weddings, as well as the “good work” of the ICCS-run Islamic Hospital 
in Amman and its Fund for Poor Patients. He does not believe, however, that 
practices related to da‘wah play a major role in the activities of NGOs estab-
lished by Islamists. He expressed to me his fear of NGOs being stigmatized 
by the Islamist label in the post 9/11 2001 context.69
The observation that the religiously motivated social endeavors of 
members and workers of Islamist NGOs enjoy wide respect and sympathy 
among the Jordanian public seems justified. Indeed, this is even true among 
people who do not feel attracted to Islamism as a political movement. One 
teacher at a training institute for social work at Jordan University told me 
that he did not feel any real affinity with any of the existing political groups 
and currents in Jordan, including the Islamists. Yet, he added that he appre-
ciated the social work of Muslim Brotherhood-initiated NGOs and assumed 
that the dedication to religious goals and principles and the accompanying 
self-sacrifice made their work more effective. 70
Neutral Views
Several of the human rights and civil rights activists, as well as aca-
demic experts in Jordanian civil society affairs, with whom I spoke, observed 
that many Jordanian citizens assume that religiously inspired groups work 
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in an honest fashion and will not engage in financial fraud. This makes these 
citizens more inclined to donate money or other things to these groups in 
particular. In terms of the Islamist NGOs’ political role, they affirm that can-
didates of the Islamic Action Front Party make use of the trust these NGOs 
generate in order to gain votes during their election campaigns. They put 
this into perspective, however, by stressing that this also applies to non-
Islamist candidates: anybody known in his or her local community for his or 
her efforts to promote the well-being of the community, to protect the poor 
and the rights of Jordan’s citizens has a better chance of getting elected 
than those without this reputation. Thus, not surprisingly, all use their social 
networks to that end.71
Political scientist Abu Ruman of the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Cent-
er ascribes one specifically Islamist function to the Islamist NGOs: their role 
in The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy of the Islamization of Jordanian soci-
ety. By implementing this grand strategy, The Brotherhood hopes to pre-
pare the soil, eventually, for the creation of a “truly Islamic” government. By 
providing their social services, Islamist NGOs create, maintain and foster a 
social network of sympathizers, Abu Ruman stresses. An association such 
as Al-‘Afaf Society, for instance, attracts prospective married couples who, 
to a greater or lesser extent, are drawn to the Islamist ideology and to the 
pious forms of lifestyle propagated by this association. Indeed, people who 
are employed by Islamist NGOs, and are therefore working with them on a 
daily basis, are increasingly likely to join Islamist circles. The same may apply 
to the needy recipients of the Islamist NGOs’ services. This may affect their 
voting behavior during election time.72
According to press freedom activist Nidal Mansur, director of the 
Center for the Defense of the Freedom of Journalists and a secular liberal 
in his political orientation, social work is a convenient channel for politi-
cal propaganda, because it generates all kinds of social networks through 
which political messages can be transmitted. Needy applicants for aid from 
Islamist social or medical institutions, for instance, may be sent to Islamist 
leaders to gain exposure to their discourse about the “better Islamic society 
and state.” ICCS centers for orphans and the poor can utilize the goodwill 
they generate to disseminate political propaganda in areas in which they 
are working. Since, due to state repression, they are not able to do this in 
public, ICCS workers use informal contacts. Female Islamist social workers 
or Islamist male workers’ wives can, for instance, talk to other women in the 
neighborhood about politics and elections and convince them that the IAF 
candidates stand for the “right Islamic” policy. Islamist teachers often have 
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personal contacts with the families of their school-pupils, which they can 
also utilize for the sake of political propaganda.73
Hostile Views
Other secular-oriented scholars and activists view Islamist NGOs view 
in a much more negative light. Based upon the findings of this research, 
I would distinguish two different themes in their criticism: the theme of 
exclusivity, with its implications of discrimination and intolerance, and that 
of moral hypocrisy. A scholar like the sociologist Musa Shteiwi detects the 
existence of both themes in the political objectives that he ascribes to the 
Islamist NGOs. Hence, he is extremely skeptical about all claims that actions 
have been based upon a sense of social solidarity and/or responsibility for 
the common good. Rather, he is convinced that their purpose is mainly to 
build up and maintain a political following for the Islamist movement.74 
Shteiwi is also convinced that these associations are guided by an attitude 
of religious exclusivity toward their target groups. They certainly help only 
Muslims, he asserts, and are also disinclined to help any non-observant Mus-
lim. If they do help others, it must be for aims of da‘wah, conversion and 
political mobilization.75
Several secular Jordanian activists working in the realm of human 
rights, women’s rights and/or social welfare regard the Islamists and their 
NGOs as a threat and as opponents of the changes they themselves advo-
cate. With regret, they often note that the Islamist movement has come to 
dominate much of Jordanian civil society by infiltrating so many of the exist-
ing societal institutions, and through the spread of these voluntary asso-
ciations. By so doing, they maintain, the Islamists have cultivated a close 
relationship with a large part of the Jordanian population, in particular the 
underprivileged and deprived. Likewise, human rights activist Sa‘ida al-
Kilani attributes the Islamist NGOs’ success to their sources of income, such 
as the Islamic hospital in Amman, schools and Islamic banks, donors from 
other Arab and Muslim countries as well as to the wide social networks they 
have managed to build up. These networks, she states, provide them with a 
vast pool of support and cooperation on the basis of wastah mechanisms. 
She and like-minded activists view the activities of Islamist NGOs as manipu-
lative and reactionary in nature, describe their da’wah activities as a “catas-
trophe,” and lament that secular progressive forces, such as the women’s 
movement, have not developed the same capability as the Islamists to reach 
the underprivileged masses through consciousness-raising efforts.76 Some 
of these activists mention divine punishment and hellfire as means of pres-
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suring people to adopt a religious life style, including the performance of 
rituals and the wearing of Islamic dress.77
Members and workers of voluntary welfare associations who carry 
out activities similar to those of the Islamist NGOs, but who strongly disa-
gree with the Islamist movement’s program of “Islamization”, for political or 
religious reasons, have their own grudges against them. Due to the sensitiv-
ity of the topic, I will refer to them anonymously. Representative figures of 
a Greek Orthodox welfare association, for instance, look at Islamist NGOs in 
the perspective of the general relationship between Muslims and Christians 
in Jordan. They describe this majority-minority relationship as one that is 
too often characterized by unease and mistrust. They note positive relation-
ships with “good Muslims,” who are open toward the local Christian com-
munity and the West and treat people regardless of their faith. They stress, 
however, that a great many other Muslims are suspicious of the Christians 
and consider them as a potential fifth column in the service of the policies 
of Israel and the United States. They mention moments of Muslim hostility 
toward Christians that have, in the past, led to bombing attacks by “fanat-
ics” against Churches and liquor stores. These representatives also classified 
Muslim Brothers among these fanatics. One of them stated:
Thank God, the security forces have foiled [most of ] these attacks; the Christians 
are protected very well by the Hashemite royal family. Look what has happened 
to Christians in other Arab countries, such as Egypt, or Algeria where monks 
have been slaughtered. We are fortunate here in Jordan, but without the pro-
tection and the support of the Hashemite family, the Christians wouldn’t enjoy 
this degree of security here.” 
This association has only Christians among its donors, although not 
all of them are Orthodox. It does not approach Muslims for donations. “We 
know how they would respond if we asked them for donations,” the Asso-
ciation’s president told me. “Maybe they would give something, but they 
wouldn’t do it from their hearts.” When I spoke to them about the social serv-
ices of Islamist NGOs, the Orthodox Association’s representatives made a 
dismissive gesture with their hands. “They only help Muslims,” they asserted. 
“Christians never benefit from them.” By way of contrast, they proudly indi-
cated the inclusion of two Muslim families on their own list of beneficiaries. 
And there was no mistaking a sense of Christian superiority when I informed 
them that the Muslim Al-’Aqsa Welfare Association in Madaba, a small town 
to the southwest of Amman, had, like they were planning to do, established 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   202 05-02-2008   11:13:38
203
a social club for the elderly. Their reaction was initially one of surprise. There-
after, they dismissed the project as unlikely to be of any significance: “well, 
we can very well imagine how these Muslims are doing this. Surely, they 
don’t offer all the services to old people that we offer. They are probably just 
drinking coffee there!”78
Equally dismissive of the Islamists are some members of liberal Muslim 
NGOs. These accuse Islamist NGOs of hypocrisy, exclusivism and of exploit-
ing the aid relationship with the needy. In the words of the president of one 
of these liberal NGOs:
In fact, the ICCS centers are blackmailing the needy, because they withhold the 
aid from them if they refuse to participate in their (religious) programs. And 
this is wrong, it is abusing the needs of people, like prostitution… the ICCS 
centers are stuffing the orphans and their families full with a biased religious 
program. 
According to him, the distinction in religious approach between his 
own society and that of the ICCS is that, for the latter, religion serves as 
a totalizing and politicized ideology. This, he insists, is reflected in their 
approach toward their clients. In the case of the former, however, religion is 
merely one important element in a diversified social and cultural program 
that focuses on the empowerment of the needy.79 He claims that ICCS cent-
ers for orphans and poor are oriented toward political and religious indoctri-
nation and patronization of their clients, and reinforce their state of depend-
ency.80
Workers of this Society used to have discussions with their counter-
parts at an ICCS center on the coordination of aid to their respective cli-
ents. They reported that, during those discussions, the executives of the 
ICCS center wanted to use aid in order to push the orphans to participate 
in their Qur’anic lessons (as well as other religious activities), and generally 
to adopt a more religious lifestyle. They also alleged that the center abuses 
images of the afterlife, paradise and hell to cajole and threaten clients into 
following their doctrine. Female clients, for instance, would be pressured to 
adopt the Islamic dress.81 Basing themselves on the information from some 
of their own Society’s clients who had also received support from the ICCS 
center, they also mentioned that ICCS clients were told to vote for Islam-
ist candidates in the elections for parliament or for the municipality.82 The 
ICCS would even use its aid-relationship with their clients to summon them 
to demonstrations organized by the IAF in order, for example, to protest 
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against the US occupation of Iraq or in support of the Palestinian Intifada. 
One of them expressed the opinion that the ICCS line of policy “is not Islamic 
at all,” because of its lack of religious and moral sincerity and the exploitation 
of the needs of others for the sake of political gain, influence and power. 83
Such critics do sometimes distinguish between the motives of the 
leadership of ICCS and The Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand and that 
of ordinary workers in the ICCS centers on the other. They often describe the 
latter, on the basis of their own experience, as people mainly motivated by 
the need to make a living for their families as well as by the desire to help 
needy members of their own community.84 “One has to distinguish between 
the ordinary ICCS workers, people belonging to the middle ranks and the 
top functionaries,” stressed the president of the abovementioned Society. 
In his view, there are among the ICCS workers a significant number of peo-
ple who are sincerely committed to helping the needy. His own Society has 
been able to cooperate well with such people.85
Islamist Social Work: a Genuine Social Endeavor 
or an Instrument of Political Hegemony?
What may be derived from the statements and views of the Jordanian 
outsiders on the Islamist movement is the importance they attach to the role 
of religious faith and discourse in Islamist voluntary welfare associations. 
Only their evaluation of this role is different. While the more positive com-
mentators see a positive relationship between these NGOs’ religious faith 
and discourse and values of social solidarity, cooperative action, compas-
sion and care, the more hostile critics suggest that their religious discourse 
is merely a cover for very worldly aims of power, domination and wealth 
cherished by the Islamist leadership.
Religious discourse as employed by Islamist NGOs obviously serves to 
mobilize (middle class) people and resources as well as to reach needy cli-
ents. Does this mean that Islamist NGOs are mere instruments of the Islamist 
movement at large to serve its hegemonic political aims and that they can-
not, therefore, be considered as genuine social and charitable initiatives? 
Closely related to this question is another: are Islamist NGOs religiously and 
politically manipulative, even coercive toward their clients, as some of their 
critics maintain? This in turn prompts us to inquire how exclusivist Islamist 
NGOs are in their approach toward clients.
Studies of Islamist welfare services and grassroots activities in Leba-
non and in Palestine suggest that a more inclusive and nondiscriminatory 
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approach toward clients has turned out to be much more beneficial for 
the public reputation and therefore the long-term political interests of the 
movements connected to them. Joseph Al-Agha, expert on the Lebanese 
Hezbullah movement, writes that the latter has built a network of infrastruc-
ture, civil institutions and social welfare in order to broaden its support base 
among the masses. These services are not only confined to Shi‘ites or Mus-
lims; numerous Christians of various denominations benefit from them too. 
According to the American scholar August Richard Norton, Hezbullah has 
“high quality social and health services, which have a reputation for being 
corruption free and nondiscriminatory.”86 No wonder that Hezbullah has 
managed to gain electoral support even among certain Christian communi-
ties in Lebanon. Likewise, the International Crisis Group (ICG) mentions in its 
report on Islamist social welfare activism in the occupied Palestinian territo-
ries that UN officials in the Gaza Strip confirmed that “Islamic social welfare 
organizations refrain from demanding allegiance to Hamas as a condition 
quid pro quo for services.”87 The ICG writes further:
Hamas seeks to derive prestige and political profit from social welfare activism 
precisely by maintaining the professionalism and integrity of such institutions 
rather than politicizing them. It appears to understand better than others that 
if schools and medical clinics developed a reputation as recruitment centers, 
and services were provided in exchange for support, the crown jewels of the 
Islamist movement would be irretrievably debased in exchange for short-term 
gains of dubious value.88 
These examples suggest that Jordanian Islamist NGOs would pay the 
Islamist movement no great service by telling clients to support the Islamic 
Action Front as a condition to receiving aid. Given the popularity they have 
gained over recent decades, it seems, generally speaking, more plausible to 
assume that the Islamist approach toward the political influencing of clients 
– as well as the wider public – through voluntary welfare associations has 
been of a more sympathetic, subtle and gradual nature. As Abu Ruman and 
other observers of Jordanian civil society and Islamist movement observe: 
the Jordanian Islamists exert mild pressure by building up social networks 
through the provision of social services and jobs. For the sake of public rep-
utation, the Jordanian Islamists need to preserve the image of incorrupt-
ibility, impartiality and a non-discriminatory nature of their social services, 
an image that representatives of the Jordanian Islamist Movement try very 
hard to convey.89
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Observations like these should not distract us from a reality in which 
favoritism and nepotism seem to be practiced within Islamist NGOs. This 
invariably occurs along religious and political lines. Raif Nijm, an architect 
who used to supervise the construction of the Islamic Hospital in Amman, 
head of the latter’s Fund for the Poor and the Sick and ICCS member, observes 
that the prevailing mentality within ICCS centers is to prioritise clients known 
to be involved within the Islamist movement whenever special forms of aid 
need are allocated (for instance in the field of employment, education or 
training). Those clients who are politically non-involved, but at least have a 
reputation for being pious and observant Muslims are second choice; while 
non-observant Muslims come next; and non-Muslims barely get a look-in.90
This criticism, as well as those from several of the non-Islamist observ-
ers and analysts mentioned above, suggests that the mainstream Islamist 
movement in Jordan has developed its own subculture, distinct in values 
and lifestyle from many other circles in Jordanian society – the Islamist 
populist claims of representing “the authentic culture and interests of the 
people” notwithstanding. Examples of conflicts between Islamist norma-
tive socio-cultural demands and the preferences of other Jordanians, for 
instance regarding gender segregation or the consumption of alcohol, have 
already been mentioned in Chapter 2. For a further illustration consider the 
fact that, in spite of the protests by IAF parliamentarians against the “waste-
ful and immoral undertaking” of the pan-Arab song festival Superstar, in 
which Jordanian singer Diana Karazon was the celebrated winner in 2003, 75 
% of Jordanian households are estimated to have watched the event on TV. 
Even many Islamists are aware that focusing on such kind of socio-cultural 
Puritanism does not enhance the Islamist movement’s standing in public.91 
Rather the opposite: populist Islamist claiming to represent “true” Islam and 
“true Arab cultural authenticity” only antagonize other sections of Jordan’s 
public already irked by the formers’ Islamization of the public sphere. Many 
remain apprehensive about the usage of religious discourse by a movement 
for the sake of hegemonic political aims.
This phenomenon can be situated in terms of class. To be specific, 
the Jordanian Islamist movement, as Janine Clark states, focuses primarily 
on winning the sympathy and support of the relatively well-educated Jor-
danian middle class. This endeavor has undeniably been successful but also 
faces certain limits. Such limits are due to the fact that this middle class is 
deeply divided in terms of political orientation as well as social and cul-
tural preferences. (Middle class) opponents of the comprehensive Islami-
zation project as advocated by the Islamists, especially when they are civil 
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society or social welfare activists themselves, are resentful of the Islamists’ 
and Islamist NGOs’ success in reaching the lower classes with their religious 
discourse. In other words, the abovementioned cultural battle implies even 
a (middle class) struggle for ideological and discursive hegemony over the 
lower classes and their socio-cultural lifeworld.
This struggle certainly contributes to patterns of bonding and exclu-
sivity in the Islamist NGOs’ social practice, pertaining to potential members 
as well as to prospective clients. Such practices are not an officially stated 
policy on the part of the ICCS or other Islamist NGOs, however. Indeed, it 
could not be so, given the stipulations in Jordanian legislation forbidding 
such discrimination. And it is most probably not carried out in a uniform 
fashion in terms of degree and nature by these NGOs or by their workers. 
According to the experiences of members of a non-Islamist association, like 
Al-Faruq Society in Irbid, openness toward and readiness to cooperate with 
outsiders “differs from ICCS center to ICCS center, and from ICCS worker to 
ICCS worker.”92
To conclude: sincerity in social and charitable work and Islamist aims 
of sociopolitical hegemony are not, of themselves, mutually exclusive. Islam-
ist NGOs could not have become so successful nor enjoy such strong rela-
tionships with significant parts of the communities if their activities had not 
been carried out by members and workers known to be sincerely motivated 
by a spirit of empathy, care and compassion for the needy. Such qualities 
ensure that these members are deeply respected by, and embedded within, 
the local community with all its many social networks. It is, however, just 
because of this sincere social enthusiasm, religious drive and local embed-
dedness that the NGOs have been so beneficial to the aims of the Islamist 
movement by influencing and dominating a significant part of Jordanian 
public opinion and civil society. As Jonathan Benthall and Steve Feierman 
note, caring and dominion are not necessarily opposed to one another – 
rather, in certain contexts, they sit very comfortably side by side.93
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9. Politically Unaffiliated 
and Conservative 
Muslim NGOs
The main difference between the category of Muslim NGOs analyzed 
in this chapter and the Islamist ones is that the former have apparently few (if 
any) links with the founders and present members of the Islamist movement. 
Therefore, they cannot be considered part of any direct effort to implement 
the programs or strategies of an expressly political movement, such as The 
Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks the comprehensive Islamization of society. 
It has to be kept in mind that, in a strictly formal and technical sense, no rec-
ognized voluntary welfare association in Jordan, not even the ICCS, is affili-
ated to The Muslim Brotherhood or, for that matter, to any other political or 
religious movement. Looking at the overlap in membership and/or leadership 
between such associations and the Islamist movement and its social networks 
is the only way to find evidence of these links. Here, individual figures carry 
importance, not explicitly formulated official structures. In this regard, Waleed 
Hammad, researcher at the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, observes:
Even when these Islamic movements and groups exercise actual influence over 
these charitable, social and voluntary societies, the latter are still independent 
from the Islamic groups because they enjoy an independent legal entity. In 
fact, the degree of influence these Islamic groups can exercise on the societies 
depends on the personal role of the leaders of these Islamic groups in running 
these societies.1 
Often, the difficulty lies in determining whether or not there is such 
a degree of personal overlap that an NGO should be seen as part of the 
Islamist movement. My own fieldwork experiences lead me to agree with 
Hammad’s methodological observation that this difficulty derives from the 
(political) sensitivity of the matter as well as from obstacles the researcher 
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faces in obtaining detailed personal information about members, which is a 
sensitive matter as well.2 It has to be noted in this regard that due to the state 
of political repression in Jordan, political convictions and certainly active 
political involvement of people are often considered to be private, intimate 
and even “taboo” subjects in the context of welfare NGOs. The fact that per-
sonal overlap between voluntary associations and the Islamist movement is 
a diffuse matter, and exists to a greater or lesser degree from one association 
to another, implies that a clear-cut line of demarcation between Islamist and 
non-Islamist NGOs may not be drawn. The International Crisis Group (ICG) 
has written something similar about Muslim NGOs in Palestine:
Because Islamic social welfare organizations are formally independent entities, 
their political affiliations are not immediately apparent. Some are politically as 
well as legally independent. Others are affiliated with a political entity, such as 
Hamas, Fatah or the PA itself. Affiliation, in turn, is often a matter of degree.3 
The Islamic Welfare Society of Salt
This “matter of degree” may give rise to bewilderment in the case of 
some Muslim NGOs. The Islamic Welfare Society in Salt, a relatively old city 
situated between Amman and the Jordan valley, is a case in point. This asso-
ciation engages in various activities, including charitable aid for the needy, 
but focuses mainly on programs of (Islamic) education and da‘wah. When I 
mentioned this NGO to a local inhabitant of Salt who espoused atheist and 
leftist convictions, he responded: “do you know that this association is affili-
ated to The Muslim Brotherhood movement?”4 This is not the way the mem-
bers of this association itself like to present themselves to outsiders. Months 
before, when I asked the general manager of this association, Muhammad 
Shawmali, the question about a possible affiliation with a movement like 
The Muslim Brotherhood, his answer was that the latter is mainly politically 
oriented, and that this is not the approach of the association. In the past, 
he stated, The Muslim Brotherhood used to be more engaged with purely 
religious activities, but at present, when one listens to sermons of Imams 
from that movement, one notices that they are “almost always about poli-
tics.” The general manager did not fail to mention that Jordanian authorities 
strictly forbid political activities by voluntary welfare associations.5 He did 
concede that the association had a Muslim Brotherhood member among its 
administrators, but added that he found him “a little bit extreme.”6 Shawmali 
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certainly may not be considered an adversary of The Muslim Brotherhood 
movement as a whole. Rather, he emphasized that The Brotherhood knows 
relatively moderate as well as more radical figures, that it enjoys a good 
relationship with the government and that it abstains from the use of any 
violence.7 Mentioning “unfair” accusations emanating from the West, he also 
seemed mildly defensive about Islamism in general. He as well as the chief 
voluntary worker at the association were convinced, for instance, that the 
massacres committed in the 1990’s in Algeria by militants (mainly of the GIA) 
were not the work of Islamists but of other forces, since “Islamists don’t do 
such things” (i.e. attack and kill innocent people).8
Members of this association also share the idea, so often espoused by 
Islamists, of a global conspiracy against Islam. According to this, the United 
States and “the Jews” have joined forces to launch their offensive against the 
’ummah. Like the Muslim Brothers, Shawmali is convinced that “it is Islam 
that gives the Muslims and the Arabs their strength.” “Before the advent of 
Islam”, he asserted
The Arabs were still weak and divided, and were battling one another. Islam 
united them, and enabled them to establish a flourishing empire and civiliza-
tion. Strong and flourishing Islamic empires have existed, up to the Ottoman 
Empire. But this empire was destroyed and cut into pieces.9 
He was clearly of the opinion that a worldwide plot is responsible for 
this state of affairs, a plot in which the Jews play a predominant role:
The Jews are controlling the media in the United States and elsewhere, they 
spread lies and convey the false image of Israel as an innocent underdog that 
is threatened by the Arab countries and therefore deserves support… The Jews 
have always played a negative role, they have always been known for their lies 
and their deceptions, also in Europe. They have killed many prophets who are 
also the prophets of the Christians. Naturally, the Christians of Europe have 
always despised the Jews… everything that is Islamic is against Israel, that 
is why they [the Jews] are determined to make Islam vanish from the earth. 
Muslims fall prey to persecution in various places of the World: they have been 
slaughtered in Bosnia, in Chechnya, in Kashmir and so on.10 
Arabs and Muslim, according to Shawmali, are “targeted and threat-
ened by a hostile campaign and are denied their rights.” They are deceived 
and deprived of their rights by the Americans, the Jews and the world media 
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as well as by their own regimes. The West, in particular the United States 
and Israel, try to eliminate every truly independent Muslim regime. That is 
why the Americans have used their military to push Iraq back into a state 
of bondage, he made clear. He even stated that the worldwide campaign 
against Islam takes place in Jordan itself. He voiced the rumor that Britons 
were at work at Jordan’s Ministry of Education to scrutinize the religious cur-
riculum at Jordan’s public schools. These foreign inspectors allegedly order 
the omission of any reference to politically laden Islamic terms, such as jihad, 
and leave only politically uncontroversial matters, like those pertaining to 
ritual obligations, in the curriculum.11
The present state of Islam in Jordan, in Shawmali’s view, has grown so 
weak that many people are just nominal Muslims and do not practice their 
religion in any concrete sense. Islamic social trends have even been made 
suspicious in the country. Many Jordanian parents, he told me, are reluc-
tant to send their children to Islamic centers and educational institutions 
out of fear that they may get involved in the Islamist movement or even in 
terrorism and face trouble with the authorities.12 Such politico-religious dis-
course makes one almost think that the Islamic Welfare Society of Salt is an 
Islamist association. It should not be forgotten, however, that conceptions 
and conspiracy theories like these are by no means limited to the Islamist 
movement. They are widespread in Jordanian society and give expression 
to a real sense of anger, frustration, helplessness and vulnerability, no mat-
ter how fallacious, dangerous and anti-Semitic such perceptions may be. I 
have heard a very similar discourse on the Jews and their role in anti-Arab 
conspiracies among Christian Jordanians who were supporters of the pro-
Saddam Hussein Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba‘ath Party.
The Society’s Religious and Social Origin
What distinguishes the leadership of this conservative Muslim asso-
ciation from that of the Islamist associations mentioned in the previous 
chapter is its traditional religious background. The leaders of Islamist NGOs 
are generally urban middle class professionals, such as educators, doctors 
or engineers that are often active, to a greater or a lesser degree, in The 
Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Islamist movement. Ostensibly, the main 
founder of the Islamic Welfare Association of Salt (also the grandfather of 
the general manager) is not an Islamist activist, however. He used to be a 
state-employed mufti in the city of Salt. In this capacity, he provided fatawa 
(religious edicts) as answers to questions of people pertaining to their daily 
social lives. As a mufti, he used to play an authoritative social role in the local 
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community of Salt: he concluded marriages, served as a mediator in local 
disputes and made efforts to prevent them from turning into blood feuds; 
he was also headmaster of a secondary school and aided, financially and 
in kind, the poor and needy. His brother served as a qadi (Islamic judge) in 
the state-run shari‘ah court of Salt. Their family belongs to a long lineage of 
state-employed religious scholars and jurists going back to Ottoman times. 
The general manager did not fail to stress the good relationship his grand-
father enjoyed with the late King Hussein.13 Apparently, it was the traditional 
religious and social prestige he enjoyed in the local community of Salt that 
enabled him to gather representatives of the various tribes and clans there 
to establish the Islamic Welfare Society, and not the backing of a political 
movement.14
Traditions of Shari‘ah and Fiqh
During my conversations with Shawmali, he repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of the Islamic scholarly traditions of shari‘ah and fiqh that 
his grandfather and ancestors used to represent. Indeed, he glorified this 
tradition, repeatedly mentioning that the true Islamic scholars of past ages, 
including his grandfather, used to spend up to forty years studying the tra-
ditional Islamic sciences. He lamented that modernization and seculariza-
tion of Jordanian and Arab societies had brought the marginalization of this 
tradition. “In the past,” he maintained:
children used to learn to memorize all of the Qur’an but at present, they learn 
in the public schools to memorize only two pages a year. In Islamic schools 
such as those belonging to Dar al-Arqam [the ICCS-run chain of kindergartens, 
primary and secondary schools], this might be a bit more, like five pages, which 
is still not much. And at present, unlike in the past, you are already recognized 
as a sheikh once you have completed your four year shari‘ah program at the 
university as a student. 
Interestingly, he rejects the Islamist assertion that only the original 
sources of Qur’an and Hadith really matter as textual authorities. In contrast, 
he regarded the Islamic scholarly traditions of the muhaddithun (collectors 
of ahadith) and fuqaha’ (Islamic Jurists) as of immeasurable importance to 
modern Muslims.15 On the basis of his religious stance, Shawmali and other 
members of the association are outspoken opponents of anything that 
smacks of Wahhabism. They reproach this current, as well as its intellectual 
predecessors like and Ibn Hanbal (d. 855 CE) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 
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CE), for obliterating all the “valuable theological and legal scholarly work” 
carried out after the time of the Prophet Muhammad. “They even regard the 
generation of tabi‘un (the generation of believers after the Prophet and his 
companions) as just ordinary people,” Shawmali said with a sense of indig-
nation.16
Dry Religion without Spirit
The criticism by the Islamic Welfare Association of Salt’s members of 
Wahhabism as well as of a newer Islamic current with a similar literalist ori-
entation – present day Salafism, pertains not only to views on Islamic intel-
lectual history and authority. They also attack these trends for their religious 
and moral “dryness” and “hollowness.” In the general manager’s words:
They [the Wahhabis and Salafis] read the Qur’an and the Hadith in such a literal 
fashion that they don’t know any flexibility. When a hadith tells us, for instance, 
that the Prophet Muhammad wore a long white robe, they conclude from this 
that all Muslims should follow this practice. Islam, however, is a religion meant 
to be fit for any time and any place. In Jordan, for instance, it is cold in winter. 
In that season, such kind of clothing is definitely not appropriate…the ideas of 
currents like those of the Salafis and Wahhabis have made their religious convic-
tions very dry, as just a system of rules and stipulations devoid of any spirit. They 
put too much emphasis on [physical and outward] form and disregard [spiritual 
and inward] substance. Spirituality is however of vital importance in observ-
ing the rules of Islam. Learning precisely how to perform the salah [prayer], for 
instance, only makes sense if you understand the meaning of it, and if you per-
form it with your heart and soul. It may never be reduced to a mechanic affair. 
And this one-sided emphasis on all kinds of literally conceived rules and details 
may easily lead to intolerance as well. So you have these people who declare 
everybody who does not think and act exactly as they do a kafir (non-believer). 
As has been expressed by violent groups like al-Takfir wal-Hijra…both deviant 
Sufis on the one hand and Wahhabis and Salafis on the other have superficial 
views on Islam. But the point is to find a balance: a combination between the 
rules of the faith on the one hand and spirituality on the other.17 
Sufism True and False
In Shawmali’s view, upholding such a combination is what serious 
Sufis are doing. These are Islamic mystics who, in his description, “conscien-
tiously follow the ‘ibadat, have a deep knowledge of Islam and live a truly 
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moral life.” He told me that he had met several of them in Syria and that he 
deeply respects and admires them.18 Members of his own family and lineage, 
including the Society’s founder, were and are practicing Sufis of the Naqsh-
bandi order. He himself highly appreciates this order for its cultivation of a 
sincere surrender to God through practices like dhikr (inwardly and continu-
ously repeating God’s name in order to remember his greatness). Through 
this practice, the believer admits God entirely into his heart so that he will 
enter Him, as he explained it. True Sufis dedicate their whole inner spirit to 
God. Asked whether he regarded himself as a Sufi, he answered: “I hope to 
become one someday.”19 He noted that, in the vicinity of Salt, there is the 
tomb of the prophet Joshua. It used to be the focus of a practice of saint 
worship; every year, the people of Salt and its surroundings would gather 
there to pray for sufficient rain in the winter. The tradition has died out, and 
Shawmali mentioned with regret the marginalization of Sufism and even its 
demonization in the modern Jordanian public sphere – many present-day 
Jordanians regarding Sufism as a “false” form of Islam.20
According to Shawmali, false or degenerated forms of Sufism are pro-
moted by so-called sheikhs who are not truly dedicated to God, but think 
only of themselves. Some, Shawmali says, get rich by asking ignorant people 
to pay huge sums for their help.21 Others are interested merely in the prestige 
that so-called “miracles” (nothing more than tricks) will win them. False Sufi 
orders, in countries like Egypt and Syria, engage in sinful ecstatic practices 
like dancing, drinking wine, “sorcery” and even sexual escapades, accord-
ing to Shawmali. They violate the basic rules of Islam. It is revulsion against 
such deviant practices (that wrongly claim to be Sufi) that has given rise 
to the equally erroneous, though intellectually and theologically opposing 
movements of Wahabism and Salafism. The true Sufi, by contrast, is a deeply 
devoted, spiritual and modest individual who shuns all forms of egocen-
trism and (worldly) self-interest.22 In other words, s/he is the perfect model 
of someone living fi sabil li-llah, for the sake of God.
Shawmali believes that the kind of sincere and deep faith in (and sur-
render to) God as is advocated by the Sufis may lead to the ability to perform 
miracles defying the causal laws of nature. He mentioned in this regard the 
– Biblical and Qur’anic – reports on miracles performed by Moses and Jesus. 
He also mentioned instances in the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, 
such as the battle of Khaybar between the early Muslims and the Jews near 
the city of Medina. In that battle, Ali, cousin and son-in law of the Proph-
et, reportedly defeated the Jews while carrying a heavy gate as a shield. 
Another instance related to another of the Prophet’s Companions taken as 
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prisoner of war by the kuffar, who drank the poison of a snake without suf-
fering any ill effects. Consequently, his captors became convinced of the 
truth of Islam. Furthermore, Shawmali mentioned instances from his own 
life experience, such as that of a religious sheikh who, by reading a certain 
’ayah over a cancer patient brought him to health, thus confounding the 
medical doctors who had all but given up hope; and of his own grandfather 
who was once able to open the door to a prayer room with a different key 
after praying for God’s help.23
Social Islam
Here again we see a basic point of convergence in religious discourse 
between the Islamic Welfare Association of Salt and Muslim Brotherhood-
affiliated NGOs: the motivational principle of living, acting and working fi 
sabil li-llah. In social work, not worldly self-interest should be the motivating 
force, but dedication and service to the divine. This, according to Shawmali, 
is not simply a matter of following specific rules and stipulations. Rather, it 
stands for a general attitude in life: the duty to help anybody in trouble or 
need. Through such a lifestyle, one obtains ’ajr in the next life. Any religion 
sanctions this principle, he states, but in secularized societies it has been rel-
egated to the margins. Nonetheless, he is of the opinion that divine reward 
does not pertain exclusively to the afterlife, but also to the present one. If one 
treats others well and helps them, he believes, one will be treated well and 
helped by others in return.24 The chief volunteer named Abdul Latif, another 
of the Society’s prominent figures, equates working fi sabil li-llah with the 
selfless motivation to work for the common good in general and the poor 
and needy in particular. Such social work may be carried out on the basis of 
a paid job and earning one’s own bread, he states, as long as the motivation 
for the work itself is pure. It may not get mixed up with corrupt practices and 
selfish interests in enhancing one’s own status and public prestige.25
According to members of the Society, it is a lifestyle of social solidar-
ity and moral uprightness that originally enabled the Muslim ’ummah to 
become strong and successful. The ’ummah used to be reigned by a spirit of 
’ithar (mutual love, kindness and self-sacrifice for one another’s wellbeing). 
This spirit resulted in a culture in which social ties, cohesion and coopera-
tion were valued highly.26 Islam as a belief and a lifestyle was not spread by 
conquest and force, although the Muslims’ military successes created the 
conditions for its dissemination. Nor was it spread by mere verbal preach-
ing. There is no way to impose the Islamic faith from the outside. It may only 
come from within, from peoples’ inner spirits. It was first and foremost the 
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example of pure moral behavior by the Muslims who had come to the non-
Muslims’ territories previously taken (or “liberated”, in Shawmali’s words) by 
the Muslim armies that inspired the native peoples there to become Muslim. 
Many of these Muslims were merchants. They acted faithfully in accordance 
with the religious injunctions to be honest and transparent in all their (com-
mercial) dealings with the local people, asked fair prices and shunned any 
kind of deceit and fraud. They were just and respected the local peoples’ 
rights.
The Muslim rulers did not oppress their subject-peoples. On the con-
trary, they implemented a just system in their territories, Shawmali main-
tains. The jizyah (poll tax) that the Muslim rulers demanded from their non-
Muslim subjects was a very fair tax, since the proceeds were used to develop 
services for the whole population. Another example he mentioned was Cal-
iph Umar, who refused to pray in Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulcher. 
In Shawmali’s reading, Umar did so out of respect for the rights and sover-
eignty of the local Christian community. At present, he laments, the spirit 
of ’ithar has largely been lost and, if we look at the prevailing hypocrisy, 
corruption and deceit in the contemporary Arab societies, we should not be 
surprised that the latter do not serve as models attracting others to Islam, 
but rather as the opposite.27
On the basis of these beliefs, the members of the Society are con-
vinced that the aspect of mu‘amalat (social dealings) between the believ-
ers, and even between the latter and other humans, deserves the highest 
priority in Islamic tarbiyyah (religious and moral education and training). 
Indeed, they consider them to be more important in God’s eyes than the 
‘ibadat. Unjust and wrong behavior and disregarding other peoples’ rights 
brings damage to society here and now. It has to be rectified in the present 
life. If those responsible do not do this, God will not forgive them on judg-
ment day. Non-observance of ‘ibadat, on the other hand, may be forgiven for 
those who sincerely repent this on the last day.28
According to the Society’s members, a morally pure lifestyle, fi sabil 
li-llah, is also believed to be an indispensable condition for the engagement 
in military jihad. The only legitimate motive to engage in jihad is to serve 
God’s Will. The only legitimate targets are those who attack and threaten 
Islam. In no way may self-interest and selfish instincts interfere in this holy 
struggle. Shawmali mentioned the example of caliph Umar, who had man-
aged to overpower and disarm a kafir soldier in battle. The latter then spat 
in Umar’s face. Umar was enraged and on the verge of killing him. Despite 
his wounded pride, he decided not to do it, out of obedience to God’s ruling 
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that no captured soldier should be killed. The enemy soldier in question was 
reportedly so impressed by the caliph’s moral attitude that he converted to 
Islam afterward. Moreover, Shawmali refers to a related Islamic injunction 
prohibiting the mujahidin from killing any woman, child or old person and 
to cut trees and damage or plunder property.29
The true Islamic society, according to the members, is a just and bal-
anced one. Honesty, harmony and solidarity between believers are vital in 
the establishment of a true Islamic society. Islamic rules and stipulations are 
not for their own sake, but in order to safeguard this general social harmony 
and well-being.30 This also implies that Muslims are exonerated from observ-
ing certain rules if, in a particular context, this does more harm than good 
to human well-being or health. In the case of a food shortage, for instance, 
believers may eat pork if they have no other option. The Prophet Muham-
mad absolved wounded people or the chronically ill from the religious stip-
ulation to ritually purify themselves before prayer, so that the cold water did 
not exacerbate their condition. Travelers and sick people do not have to fast 
during the holy month of Ramadan. The same applies to a pregnant woman, 
who may endanger the survival or health of the embryo in her womb by 
fasting.31
The Islamic Welfare Society of Salt’s practical focus is on Islamic 
da‘wah, or the call to the “right Islamic way of life” through its educational 
programs, rather than on aid to the needy. Its members certainly do sub-
scribe to the principle of solidarity with and care of the poor as a religious 
aim in itself. Shawmali stresses, however, that social problems endangering 
the morality and the wellbeing of Muslim society are by no means limited to 
the needy. As he states:
Problems with alcohol, drugs and sex are also to be found among the rich. If 
we take the problem of pornography, we can say that pornographic material 
is not freely available here in Jordan in the supermarket or the video shop, as 
it is in Western countries. But it does enter the [Jordanian] living room through 
the Internet, which can have dangerous consequences for teenagers. They 
may become oversexed. It may even lead to rape. In a rich neighborhood like 
Abdoun in Amman, young people experiment a lot with drugs and alcohol. If 
a boy there returns home in a drunken state, he may go to rape the Sri Lankan 
maid who is working in the house. This shows that (moral and social) awareness 
raising and Islamic education is important for all strata of society in order to 
counter all forms of immorality.32 
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In other words, the Society’s members believe that, regardless of their 
varying socio-economic circumstances, all Muslims are equally in need of 
learning how to counter threats to the socio-cultural fabric of the Muslim 
lifeworld. Again, this religious approach (stressing above all else one’s social 
morality) is wholly in agreement with the tone adopted by movements 
like The Muslim Brotherhood, and in particular with the more flexible and 
liberal versions of Islamism espoused by thinkers such as Yusuf al-Qarada-
wi.33 A point of divergence between the Islamic Welfare Society of Salt and 
The Brotherhood seems to be the question of political involvement. Even 
if Shawmali shares much of The Brotherhood’s convictions regarding the 
present, troublesome political and social state of the ’ummah in Jordan and 
elsewhere, the nature of his response to this state of affairs seems differ-
ent. While The Muslim Brotherhood translates this concern into an active 
political involvement, Shawmali expresses an inclination to turn away from 
politics, out of disgust at its corruption and at his own impotence to change 
matters. Instead of miring himself in politics, Shawmali prefers to devote 
all his energy to da‘wah-activities of a social and cultural nature.34 In other 
words, he seems to advocate a non-political form of Islam. This non-political 
Islam is self-consciously distinct from the Salafi literalist focus on religious 
rules and stipulations. Instead, it promotes a spiritual vision of the com-
mon good close in spirit to the ideas of some of the more moderate Mus-
lim Brothers. This vision does acknowledge the validity and importance of 
Islamic shari‘ah-based rules, but seeks to contextualize these within a spir-
itual framework that emphasises the social, including emotional, well-being 
of every believer and of the ’ummah as a whole.
The Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Welfare Association
The Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Welfare Association in Wadi Sir, an old vil-
lage to the southwest of Amman that became physically as well as admin-
istratively incorporated into the metropolis of the capital during the past 
decades, is a women’s association led by Madiha Kokh, an elderly woman of 
Circassian origin. Until the beginning of the 1970s, she used to be the head 
of the secondary school for girls. Afterward, she opened her own primary 
school and kindergarten. She was also a very active person in the religious, 
social and charitable life of her local community. Her social involvement 
apparently gained her enough credit and social capital to be able to estab-
lish the abovementioned association in the beginning of the 1980s. She did 
this together with (female) friends of Circassian, East Bank Jordanian as well 
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as Palestinian origin. The association provides charitable aid to needy mem-
bers of the community. It also organizes lectures for women on various reli-
gious, social and health issues, such as the performance and the meaning of 
rituals, the marital relationship, the upbringing of children, family planning 
and how to deal with cancer. The president is not a political activist, and 
does not see any connection between the work of her association and politi-
cal movement-driven programs of Islamization, such as those advocated by 
The Muslim Brotherhood. In her own words, she is “just doing her duty, in 
obedience to God.” This self-evident duty is social solidarity.35
Kokh’s religious background and education may not be as sophisticat-
ed as that of the Islamic Welfare Association of Salt’s founder and its general 
manager. The nature of her religious social discourse, however, boils down 
to much the same: empathy with others is the key element. She summed up 
this element in succinct fashion with the following observation:
A hadith states that when a part of the body is sick, the whole body is. One has 
to share one another’s feelings; one cannot feast when one’s neighbor has just 
died. As a Muslim, one has to help others and share with one another and not 
to damage or to hurt anyone. The one who prays but hurts other people at the 
same time can never be a good Muslim.”36 
Needless to say, she is able to mention many examples drawn from 
the Hadith as well as several Qur’anic ’ayat enjoining believers to treat oth-
ers well and never to hurt them. Thus, she mentioned, for instance the ’aya 
that states that anyone who sleeps with a full stomach while his neighbor 
suffers from hunger will not enter paradise.37 And the hadith that states that, 
if one possesses a date, one should share it with the needy. “Selfish people 
will not be blessed. You must give even the best you have to a needy person,” 
she stressed.38
As is the case with the association in Salt, the social discourse of the 
Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Welfare Association is based on the basic rules of 
the shari‘ah. Kokh mentioned stipulations related to the zakah, which multi-
plies in value when it is paid during the month of Ramadan, and to sadaqah, 
which, according to a hadith, has to be paid to ten poor persons by someone 
who has sworn an oath but failed to keep it.39 As in the case of the associa-
tion in Salt, such stipulations are placed in a wider social, moral and emo-
tional framework and not simply put across as a dry list of “do’s” and “don’t’s.” 
Togetherness and social cohesion are of supreme importance. Kokh insists, 
for instance, that the performance of the salah should preferably take place 
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in a group, since that makes it much more valuable. All Muslims are equal 
in prayer, regardless of socio-economic status. Likewise, the ’iftar meals that 
the Association organizes during Ramadan are meant to create a warm fam-
ily atmosphere for all those invited. Poor as well as rich women are invited, 
and a spirit of equality regardless of socio-economic status is meant to be 
stressed. However, putting ideals into practice is often far from easy. This can 
be derived from the Kokh’s mentioning of the poor woman’s “shyness” in an 
environment of middle class women at such feasts.40 This doesn’t weaken 
her conviction that all Muslims are equal. She rejects as sinful the idea that 
voluntary welfare associations may be based on ethnic clustering since Islam 
absolutely forbids believers to discriminate on the basis of racial origin. Like-
wise, the idea that differences in class and education could be a hindrance 
to intimate ties and friendship between people is rejected. “Education,” she 
explains, “consists of someone’s life experience and understanding, [and] not 
on having an official diploma.”41 Islam’s egalitarian principles have, accord-
ing to the associations’ members, also an economic bearing: charging rent 
to debtors is unfair because that brings them into or keeps them in a state 
of poverty; the needy should, preferably, be enabled to make their own liv-
ing and improve their own situation. Indeed, the latter is described as better 
even than worship.42
Like other Muslim NGOs, the Islamic Anwar al-Huda Association stress-
es Islam’s approval of the values of honesty and sincerity, and its rejection of 
falsehood, cheating, fraud and corruption.43 In this regard, Kokh stated that 
she didn’t regard Jordanian society as a “good Islamic one,” due to the spread 
of immoral practices such as lying, cheating, boundless greed and corrup-
tion.44 Her answer to this state of affairs is a “positive moral approach,” in 
which people are taught how to live in a moral way, called upon to perform 
good deeds and reminded of the resulting divine reward. She also praises 
Arab cultural habits relating to social cohesion, neighborliness, ties of friend-
ship and social control. Preachers who are too “tough” in their sermons, ser-
monizing solely on hell and divine punishment and focusing exclusively on 
what is forbidden, hold no appeal for her.45
The Umar Ibn al-Khattab Association
The Umar Ibn al-Khattab Association in Zarqa, an industrial and Pal-
estinian-dominated working class city to the north east of Amman, encom-
passes an orphanage for children who lost one or both of their parents. Its 
current president, Wael al-Taher, is an engineer by profession. In the 1970s, 
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he used to live in Saudi Arabia, working there as director of the Department 
for Export at the Saudi Ministry of Finance while also running a trading com-
pany of building materials. After his return to Jordan, he became increas-
ingly engaged in the social life of Palestinians originating from the northern 
West Bank city of Jenin, which is also his own place of origin. After a couple 
of years, he joined the association, which is mainly composed of Palestin-
ians originating from the northern West Bank. He became its president in 
September 2001.46
The members of the association regard themselves as a “Muslim NGO,” 
but like to distance themselves from the Islamist movement and from any 
political approach toward Islam. Like the other Muslim NGOs, they describe 
their motivation in mixed social and religious terms, between which they 
apparently do not distinguish. The main supervisor and guide of the orphan 
children described this motivation as a desire to “care for children nobody 
else is caring for.” This is to be done, of course, for the “sake of God.” Al-Taher 
added that “Muslims are brothers, and brothers should help one another, 
whether they ask for it or not.” According to the members’ own description, 
the Islamic nature of the association is furthermore expressed in shari‘ah-
based practices of gender separation: boys and girls sleep in separate rooms 
once they have reached the age of 10; and the female group leaders work 
with the children on the upper floor of the building while the (administra-
tive and technical) male staff works downstairs. The latter may only come 
upstairs if they notify the female workers in advance by calling them. Reli-
gion is also an important part of the educational programs for the orphans. 
The members of this NGO share the idea that a hostile campaign is being 
globally played out against Islam. “Muslims only want to do good,” the main 
supervisor clarified. “It is hostile forces threatening Islam who portray our 
religion as something bad.”47
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen three main examples of politically unaf-
filiated Muslim NGOs that base themselves on Islamic religious traditions in 
terms of motive and/or social ideals. Even if the voluntary associations dealt 
with in this section are not affiliated – or not affiliated strongly – with Islam-
ism as a political movement, we notice among them a lack of satisfaction 
with the world and the society in which they live. That society has moved 
away from true religion, its members forget too often the religious values of 
mutual care, solidarity and compassion; instead, they engage in lying and 
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corruption for the sake of self-interest and do not (sufficiently) take care of 
orphans. The members of the NGOs discussed above wish to improve the 
society and the fate of the needy on the basis of the social and moral legacy 
of Islam. In the process, they create new bonds and a new sense of commu-
nity. By applying this legacy, the social fabric and cohesion of the ’ummah 
will be restored and Muslims will once more enjoy the security, solidarity and 
moral direction they need. This conviction is what makes these associations 
socially conservative in nature. Unlike the Islamist associations, however, 
the NGOs dealt with in this chapter are founded and/or led by persons who 
derive their authority from something other than partisan political activity. 
This could be through a prominent engagement in the traditional Islamic 
sciences, by occupying the position of head of a school, enjoying a reputa-
tion as a successful, generous businessman or through any other capacity 
(though this is not to imply that such bases of authority never play a role in 
the workings of Islamist NGOs).
This category of associations is an expression of an Islamic cultural 
trend that is wider than Islamism the political movement. As was described 
in Chapter 1, from the 1970s onward a trend promoting the need for there 
to be a “return to Islam” became increasingly visible in Jordanian society. 
Certainly, the Islamist movement benefited greatly from this trend; yet, 
even large parts of Jordanian society that are not nominally supportive of 
this movement have been affected by it. Indeed, it is possible to compare 
this revival with the trend of social, cultural and political rebellion of the 
younger generation in Western countries against the older generation and 
the societal establishment during the 1960s and early 1970s. That trend has 
certainly known well-defined and organized socio-political movements, but 
it has also affected a great many people who were not directly involved in 
those movements.
While in terms of their socio-cultural discourse, the voluntary associa-
tions in question are hard to distinguish from ones affiliated to The Muslim 
Brotherhood, these associations are obviously distinct from Salafi groups in 
their orientation. The latter try to decontextualize Islam by adhering to an 
absolutely literal (self-consciously “pure”) understanding of religious texts, 
while the Muslim voluntary welfare associations emphasize work within 
the prevailing social, cultural and political context. This makes the latter 
more pragmatic, not to mention flexible and sensitive when trying to apply 
Islamic teachings to Jordanian society. Such an approach could be oriented 
mainly toward conserving and reviving age-old religious traditions, as the 
NGOs described in this section mainly do, or toward explicitly and overtly 
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reinterpreting and modifying those traditions along modernist lines. NGOs 
of the latter orientation will be dealt with in the next chapter.
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   224 05-02-2008   11:13:40
225
10.  Progressive Muslim 
NGOs
As with the distinction between “Islamist” and “non-Islamist” Muslim 
NGOs, the terms “conservative” and “progressive” voluntary welfare associa-
tions must only be applied with a degree of caution. Roughly speaking, the 
discourse of (relatively) conservative associations is primarily oriented toward 
the protection, strengthening and development of what may be considered 
Islamic tradition and heritage. In other words, it is focused on defending 
the Muslim lifeworld against (perceived) menaces emanating from (secular) 
modern society considered to be alien to Islamic – and therefore authentic 
– values. Such menaces usually involve temptations such as (free or openly 
exposed) sexuality and eroticism, drugs and alcohol and of materialism, con-
sumerism and socially disintegrating individualism. The vision of progressive 
associations, on the other hand, is determined more by dissatisfaction with 
conservative or traditional interpretations of the Islamic faith, and by the need 
to change and modernize such interpretations. NGOs belonging to the latter 
type usually interact more intensively with foreign and international institu-
tions, such as Western (but sometimes also Muslim) development-agencies, 
UNICEF, UNIFEM or foreign embassies, and with the social welfare and devel-
opment discourses of the latter. The religious discourses of these NGOs are 
deeply affected by this interaction. They are less focused on (cultural) conser-
vation and protection vis-à-vis external influences and more on (socio-cultur-
al and religious) progress and change in tandem with such influences. This 
usually implies working for greater social, and especially gender, equality.
Conservative and Fundamentalist versus Progressive and 
Modernist
The distinction made here between conservative and progressive 
Muslim NGOs is partly inspired by a theoretical approach concerning the 
distinction between so-called “fundamentalism” and so-called “modernism.” 
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Roughly speaking, these theories depict fundamentalism as a tendency 
oriented toward “Islamizing Modernity” and modernism as one oriented 
toward “Modernizing Islam.” According to political scientist Ahmed Mous-
alli, both currents are similar in that they aim to raise Muslim consciousness 
and to induce a “social and political movement attaining material, political 
and spiritual progress.” Mousalli states: “a new reading of Islam becomes, 
for both the modernists and the fundamentalists, the basic condition for 
starting a modern process of reformulating Islamic history and reforming 
Islamic civilization.”1 In other words, both stress the importance of human 
agency in improving the prospects of the believers, in this life as well as in 
the hereafter. Indeed, this is what all Muslim NGOs dealt with in the present 
study are doing.
In the words of Mousalli, the difference between fundamentalism and 
modernism relates primarily to the fact that:
the process of regeneration [of religious understanding] is for the modernists 
always tentative, because it depends on a relative science, whereas the process 
of regeneration for the fundamentalists, especially the radicals, is always abso-
lute because it depends on an absolute text …While the modernist entertains 
and judges the authentic in terms of the new [science], the fundamentalist sub-
jects the new to the authentic [revelation]. The fundamentalist uses authentic-
ity as the yardstick to measure all things, while the modernist uses the new as 
the yardstick.”2
This difference implies, in my view, that the religious understand-
ing of the fundamentalists is conservative in the sense that it is orient-
ed toward the conservation and restoration of “authenticity,” no matter 
how self-defined and constructed this may be, in the face of what is 
considered to be alien.3 Authenticity serves here as a firm and immuta-
ble religious anchor. Unquestioning belief in an unchanging and eter-
nal revelation must, according to fundamentalists, be the first and ulti-
mate starting point for believers in the modern world. Modern means 
and understandings should be judged, and possibly used, in accord-
ance with it. Modernists, however, postulate that revelation can only be 
understood and acted upon in modern times from the perspective of 
modern knowledge, understandings and developments. According to 
them, revelation cannot be understood and implemented unquestion-
ably in its own right.4
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The same difference has important bearings in terms of the question 
how Muslims should deal with knowledge, understandings and discourses 
originating from non-Muslim sources. According to fundamentalists and con-
servative Muslims, the latter cannot and should not affect the basic under-
standing of the Islamic message. Such foreign knowledge, understandings 
and discourses confirm this message at best, or have to be rejected as false 
at worst. As a Muslim Brotherhood founder in Jordan and the president of a 
Jordanian Islamist welfare association stated: “The Islamic faith is not devel-
oping. It is already developed” (i.e. it was perfected from the outset).5 Mod-
ernists, however, believe that the understanding and practical application 
of Islamic moral teachings must be developed and modernized in line with 
the modern philosophy and politics of especially the West.6
19th Century modernist theologians and intellectuals, such as Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu from Egypt and Sayyid Ahmed 
Khan from India were, according to Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talatoff:
impressed by the achievements of the West, ranging from scientific and tech-
nological progress, the Newtonian conception of the universe, Spencer’s soci-
ology, and Darwinian evolutionism, to Western style of living. They all argued 
that Islam as a world religion was thoroughly capable of adapting itself to the 
changing conditions of every age, the hallmarks of the perfect Muslim com-
munity being law and reason.”7 
In terms of political and social development, they:
favored democracy and constitutionalism, and the de facto separation of reli-
gion from politics; and formulated modernist discourse on women by reject-
ing polygamy and male domination. The Islamic fundamentalists, in contrast, 
rejected the notion of social evolution and portrayed the West as having an 
aggressive political system, exploitative and materialistic economic institu-
tions, and decadent culture. Rather than attempting to reform and modernize 
Islam, they aimed at Islamizing virtually all social institutions. They rejected the 
separation of religion from politics, defended Islamic political hierarchy in soci-
ety and male domination and polygamy in the family.8 
Such apparently contrasting observations are nuanced by Moaddel 
and Talatoff: “neither fundamentalism nor modernism should be considered 
as rigid categories. Given favorable sociopolitical and cultural conditions, a 
formerly strong fundamentalist movement could transform in a modern-
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ist direction.”9 The same scholars mention examples of Islamist movements 
and figures in Jordan and Iran who have come to embrace more democratic 
and pluralist visions of politics and society. In this regard, an authority on 
Islamism like Gilles Kepel speaks of a new brand of Islamists who celebrate a 
perceived “democratic essence” of Islam.10 Another well known scholar, Asef 
Bayat, calls this trend “post-Islamism.”11 The irony is here that, while Islamists 
may define the Islamic revelation as an absolute yardstick with which to 
judge political and social concepts, global phenomena and recent develop-
ments, they move much closer to modernist opinions and standpoints once 
they rethink and reconceive of this yardstick in more liberal, democratic and 
inclusive terms.
In other words: the distinction between (conservative) fundamentalist 
visions and (progressive) modernist visions is often blurred. My own distinc-
tion between the categories of conservative and progressive associations is, 
therefore, necessarily a relative one. The NGOs that I termed “conservative” 
in the previous chapter also have aspects of progress in their discourses, as 
should become apparent in the following chapters. At the same time, NGOs 
that will be dealt with in this chapter sometimes have conservative features 
and may at times be defensive regarding certain Islamic values. My distinc-
tion is based upon the more predominant tendency in the NGOs’ discourse, 
as well as in the way it is reflected in their activities. This predominant ten-
dency is greatly determined by the social background and life histories of 
the founders and the members of these associations: those of the more pro-
gressive associations often came from a social environment wherein there 
was a greater opportunity and inclination to interact and cooperate with 
non-Islamic local, foreign and international institutions.
Al-Faruq Welfare Society for Orphans
This Society was established in 1991 by mostly well-educated inhabit-
ants of the Palestinian refugee camp in the northern city of Irbid. Its found-
ers and members are of different political leanings. Equally, some of them 
are secular, whereas others more religious in their socio-cultural convic-
tions and lifestyle. There are some Christians among them as well. In gen-
eral, they adhere to the basically secular Palestinian national movement as 
represented by its umbrella organization, the PLO. The Society’s forerunner 
was the Club for Orphans at the Youth Center of the camp. Youth Centers 
in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan are formally under the supervision 
of the Jordanian Ministry of Youth Affairs. Several of the Society’s founders, 
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including its president, used to be social workers in the Youth Center and 
the Club for Orphans. The latter was serving orphan boys of the camp in 
the realm of sports, recreational and cultural activities as well as supporting 
them in their school education. The Club for Orphans gradually separated 
itself organizationally and financially from the Youth Center. This was par-
tially due to disagreements related to the usage of donated money. Accord-
ing to the Society’s president, Hassan Harb, money donated specifically for 
the service of the orphans was used by the Youth Center for other goals. 
He regarded this as a violation of the donations’ waqf, which is the Islamic 
term for religious endowment.12 For another part, the workers of the Club 
as well as other camp inhabitants realized the need for a more comprehen-
sive approach toward the problems of orphans. They decided to establish 
a Society that would offer expanded services to the families of orphans as 
a whole.13 The Society came to encompass a polyclinic as well as services in 
the realm of income, employment, health, family and housing situation, rec-
reation and social, medical and religious education. Its main center is in the 
Irbid refugee camp. However, two smaller affiliates have been established 
in Husn refugee camp, which is to the south of Irbid, and in a village to the 
north of the city.14
Islam’s Place in the Discourse of Al-Faruq Society
Needless to say, Islam has a prominent place in the discourse of the 
Society. It is less dominant and all-pervading in terms of motivation and 
ideals, however, than in those of the NGOs dealt with in previous chapters. If 
Al-Faruq Society’s members speak about religion, they do so with a greater 
degree of reflexive distance and relativism, and not from the starting point 
that certain things are binding and unquestionable. Asked about the role of 
Islam in the society’s activities, Harb replied as follows:
For sure, we are Muslims, and our religion knows the principle of takaful 
(social care and solidarity with the poor and the needy). But our society is in 
the first place a human undertaking: everybody will be helped regardless of 
a distinction on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, religion or whatever; we 
have Pakistanis and other foreigners among our recipients,15 and we have 
Jordanians, Palestinians, Christians and Muslims. Our aim is not the dissemi-
nation, let alone the imposition, of a certain religious or Islamic message. Of 
course, religious values play a role, but only in a general sense. First there is the 
relationship between humans as humans. After all, we all belong to bani adam 
(humankind).16 
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This humanist perspective notwithstanding, the presence of moti-
vational Islamic discourse becomes obvious during special events, such as 
the ’iftar meals (meals breaking the fast during Ramadan), organized by the 
Society. At one such meal, held in a big rented hall, I witnessed a group 
of men performing the salah on a platform. After the prayer, a couple of 
speeches were given. One of them was religious in nature and dealt with 
social and charitable work and donating money that had to be undertaken 
fi sabil li-llah. The speaker stressed that this will lead to the attainment of the 
’ajr or divine reward. Donations could be made during the meal and had to 
be registered by the donors themselves on a small form. On the top of this 
form, the Qur’anic ’ayah 26 of surah al-baqarah (Q.2:26) was elaborately writ-
ten. The aya states that anyone who gives wealth for the sake of God causes 
its multiplication, like a seed that grows into seven new plants, each one of 
which will carry one hundred new seeds. The Muslim Brotherhood-based 
ICCS frequently refers to this ayah during its fundraising campaigns. Asked 
about the significance of such religious language, some of the members 
explained it in terms of “the culture of the people” which is strongly imbued 
by a religious consciousness and by the belief that one can obtain ’ajr in 
the afterlife through giving for the sake of God.17 A remarkable difference 
between the discourse of Islamist and more conservative Muslim NGOs and 
that of the Faruq Society’s representatives is that the latter did not speak 
about religious duty as if its performance were self-evidently binding upon 
everyone. Their main point was that religious discourse is an important part 
of the heritage, society and culture of “the people here.” Terms and expres-
sions such as “God says,” “the Qur’an enjoins us to,” or “the Hadith tells us to” 
were thus much less likely to be heard. The fact that they were talking to 
a foreign and non-Muslim researcher must have influenced their own dis-
course at that moment, but it still denotes a certain degree of relativism and 
“objectification” of the place of Islam in that discourse.18
Also during other conversations, some members pointed to the differ-
ence between Islamic and Western motivational approaches toward social 
work. They stressed that the Muslim approach is distinct from the Western 
one in the sense that the former is based upon the conviction that engaging 
in good works is done for God’s sake and will lead to Paradise whereas the 
latter is framed in a more secular and humanist perspective. They did not 
believe, however, that the Muslim approach is necessarily at odds with the 
secular humanist one predominating in the West.19
Religious consciousness was also reflected sometimes in the Society’s 
employees’ discourse. A gynecologist working in the Society’s polyclinic, 
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for instance, voiced the widespread opinion in Jordan that Arab society’s 
religious character makes it more moral and secure, and less vulnerable to 
crime, than secularized Western societies.20 On the other hand, members of 
the Society, including its president, were eager to emphasize that the Soci-
ety does not consider any religious belief as incumbent upon its members 
and workers. Such beliefs may provide the personal momentum for partici-
pants in the Society’s activities, but they are not required. The Society as a 
whole is not bound to any particular religious belief, ideology or current. 
Its overriding goal to which all of its members and workers must subscribe 
is human welfare and development.21 This is also reflected in the clothing 
women workers of Al-Faruq Society wear. Women working in ICCS centers 
all wear Islamic costumes with long dresses and headscarves and several 
of them even wear the niqab or face veil. Most of the women workers of 
Al-Faruq Society do wear headscarves, but none of them wears the niqab 
and are mostly dressed in traditional Palestinian costumes or simply wear 
trousers.
Empowerment, the Local Lifeworld and Islam
From the perspective of Al-Faruq Society’s members, promoting 
human welfare means fostering the empowerment of the target group. 
In this endeavor, they regard it as of utmost importance to learn from the 
insights of international and foreign (often Western) institutions. If deemed 
suitable, they also like to adopt the latter’s development programs. The Soci-
ety has adopted, for instance, educational programs from UNICEF aimed to 
foster the empowerment and self esteem of parents and children.22
Furthermore, the Society has contacted international development 
agencies and listened carefully to their discourses on micro credit for the 
sake of economic empowerment of needy families. It was planning, at the 
end of my fieldwork, to implement this principle.23 It has also applied to the 
European Union for a subsidy to implement a project on civic education 
dealing with matters like democracy, human and civil rights.24
Moreover, the Society has received support from the embassies of 
Japan and Canada and from the Mennonite Central Committee to develop its 
polyclinic.25 Obviously, its approach is not to impose a dogmatic and essen-
tialist vision on the public and neither does it consider suspicious anything 
foreign or non-Muslim. On the contrary, social evolution and development 
of the community as a whole and the target group of “orphan families” in 
particular is stated as the overriding goal, and any knowledge or approach 
that prove helpful regardless of origin should be adopted.
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This development should take place, however, in a spirit that is in 
harmony with the socio-cultural lifeworld of the community. When it comes 
to gender roles within the family, for instance, the Society advocates con-
sciousness raising of the local community that is geared toward a gradual 
change of traditional habits in the direction of more equality and respect for 
women’ rights. It does not see the propagation of the more radical Western 
feminist ideas on the wholesale abolition of gender roles as appropriate, 
given their large distance from the social cultural beliefs and habits in the 
local community.26 Harb does not, however, reject such ideas out of hand 
on the basis of the sacredness of the shari‘ah or divine revelation. He sim-
ply underlines the need to be cautious in advocating changes in family and 
gender relationships in a socio-culturally conservative society.27 Unlike fun-
damentalists and conservative Muslims, he does not cherish the vision of 
an immutable and essentialist Islam as the (only real) basis of the lifeworld 
that should be strengthened in the face of alien threats. His vision of the 
lifeworld is an evolutionary and progressive one, and open to influences 
from the outside, including non-Muslim, world.
The Society’s members and workers do consider the Islamic faith an 
important part of the local community’s socio-cultural lifeworld, and one 
that should be reflected in the Society’s activities. They may castigate the 
ICCS for manipulating its clients with a biased religious ideology, but they 
too attach high importance to lessons in Qur’an reading for the children of 
client families.28 The Society’s president accused the ICCS of abusing the aid 
relationship to push female clients to wear the Islamic dress, but also con-
ceded that he and the other members of Al-Faruq Society “like it” if a woman 
puts on the hijab (headscarf ).29 The nature of the Society’s Islamic discourse 
is, however, considerably more inclusive, anthropocentric and rights-orient-
ed than that of an ICCS-center like Al-‘Abura. According to the chief (female) 
social worker of the Society, modern principles on human, women and chil-
dren’s rights that are enshrined in international treaties are all confirmed by 
the Qur’an and the Hadith and emanate from God.30 In the Society’s activi-
ties of raising awareness on improving the life circumstances of the family 
and on the rights of women and children, ’ayat from the Qur’an or hadiths 
are often quoted to confirm the modern insights of (secular) psychologists, 
social workers, pedagogues and social scientists.31 Islamist NGOs are usually 
inclined to do the reverse: they quote the insights of such experts in order 
to confirm the truth of the revelation.
Ultimately, in Al-Faruq Society, religion is (re-) interpreted in terms of 
a vision of human progress and development since, according to the Soci-
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ety’s members, it stands for human progress and development. Religion 
is at the same time viewed upon as a means to communicate progressive 
messages to the target group. It serves to convince the latter that modern 
and emancipatory approaches toward gender relations or the upbringing of 
children are in harmony with the message of Islam.
In light of the above, it is not surprising that, for the religious lec-
tures organized by the Society, it prefers to invite modern educated ‘ulama’ 
who have progressive and inclusive theological views on society and who 
encourage believers to be tolerant and humane. The Society has no need for 
“those old-fashioned ‘ulama’ employed by the Ministry of Awqaf.”32
The inclusive and “modernist” character of the Islamic discourse 
espoused by Al-Faruq Society’s members may take other forms as well. 
They may adopt, for instance, ideas from secular political ideologies and 
liken them to Islamic beliefs. Harb once told me that he had read some of 
the writings of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin and had not 
found their ideas so different from those of Islam. He referred to a statement 
from Lenin according to which it is best to drink from one’s own “clean glass” 
instead of someone else’s dirty one. This stands, according to him, for sexual 
fidelity in gender relations, something that Islam also calls for.33 While disa-
greeing with communism’s materialist and atheist philosophical underpin-
nings, he sees many similarities between communist and socialist visions 
on social justice and those of Islam, such as the idea of human cooperation 
in socio-economic life on the basis of equality and that society’s members 
give to one another in accordance with their economic abilities and receive 
according to their needs, in a spirit of mutual solidarity. He likened this to 
Islamic socio-economic morality, which forbids the charge of interest and 
illegal self-enrichment and promotes fair and transparent economic trans-
actions between people on the basis of equality and free will. Based upon 
this ideological vision, with its leftist as well as its Islamic inspiration, he 
rejects neoliberal economic measures like the imposition of price hikes by 
the International Monetary Fund on products that are essential to Jordan’s 
less fortunate citizens as “unfair, illogical and unreasonable.”34
Such blending of ideas and beliefs – borrowed from Islam on the one 
hand and from leftist ideology on the other – is not uncommon in the milieu 
of Palestinian refugee camp dwellers. It is not unusual in Palestinian refu-
gee camps in the Kingdom of Jordan to hear young men – possibly wearing 
T-shirts with Che Guevara on them – espousing their admiration for Karl 
Marx before then referring to the Qur’an. In this milieu of dispossession and 
socio-economic deprivation, left wing orientations and Islamism have been 
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competing with one another for adherents. A significant number of refu-
gee camp inhabitants may have been caught in the tide of religious cultural 
revival, but remained at the same time faithful to their leftist ideals and did 
not turn to Islamism as a socio-political movement.
The Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association
A voluntary welfare association with a similarly “modern” and empow-
erment-oriented approach toward its target group but with a different socio-
cultural and ideological background is the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association. 
This association is based in the working class Hashemiya quarter near the 
city of Zarqa. It is a religious women’s association headed by a woman work-
ing concomitantly as an officially licensed wa‘izzah, or religious teacher, in 
a mosque. She is trained and supported by British development organiza-
tion Questscope. The Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association works for girls from 
socially weak families with low incomes that live in the local community. 
These are broken families, or families where the father may suffer from an ill-
ness, or alcoholicism, or fails to earn a sufficient income. Most such families 
face severe problems in terms of communication between their members; 
and verbal and/or physical abuse of women and children is also generally 
rampant among them.35 The association tries to empower the girls in ques-
tion through various activities, such as literacy courses, income-generating 
handicraft projects, recreational activities and counseling on daily life issues 
for the girls and their mothers. These counseling sessions are conducted by 
the head herself as well as by a psychologist and a nurse, and take place on 
an individual as well as on a group basis.
Many of the associations’ members, including its head, used to be 
active in the gender-mixed Islamic Bir Al-Sab‘a Welfare Association,36 but 
broke away due to differences over the aim of an income-generating project. 
The leadership of the previously mentioned association wanted to use the 
proceeds of this project to cover its own running costs, while the (female) 
dissenters who later on established the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association 
insisted on devoting the rewards of the project to their target group. The 
membership of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar association is predominantly Pal-
estinian in origin.
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Islam’s Role: Conservation for the Sake of Empowerment and 
Progress
To a certain degree, the discourse of the Association’s president and 
other members represents Islamic authenticity-based conservatism. The 
president herself wears a niqab, and other members of the association don 
some version of Islamic dress, wearing at least the hijab. In her capacity as 
the association’s president, she fulfills her role as a religious teacher in the 
same way as she behaves in the mosque. In both places, she emphasizes that 
being a wa‘izzah involves translating the teachings of the Qur’an, the Sun-
nah (traditions on the sayings and the acts of the prophet), fiqh and ‘aqida 
(religious doctrine) into the practice of daily social life. A wa‘izzah does not 
engage in academic theological exercises. Rather, she supports people on 
a religious basis in dealing with their own daily problems and dilemmas. 
According to her, Jordanian and Arab society has drifted away from religion 
due to the impact of Western political, economic and cultural hegemony. 
They have been affected by the influences and temptations of consumerism, 
materialism and hedonism and thus have lost much religious knowledge.37 
Lack of religious knowledge is, according to her, responsible for the fact 
that many people, including those of her own target group, are seduced by 
traditional, but non-Islamic ‘adat (habits) that are based on ignorance. “And 
that is why”, she states, the women of the association “work at raising the 
people’s consciousness of the true Islamic message, [by] transforming nega-
tive attitudes and behaviors into positive ones.”38 It is this criticism of tradi-
tional habits and advocacy of ’islah (reform) in the direction of emancipation 
and empowerment that gives the association’s discourse clearly progressive 
overtones.
Many of the ‘adat the association is fighting through its conscious-
ness raising efforts have to do with gender discrimination. Its members are 
vehemently opposed to the traditional mentality that accords preferences 
to boys over girls in areas like gaining attention from the parents, nutrition, 
educational opportunities and choice of marriage partners. Islam means 
gender equality and respect for women’s rights in all those aspects of life, 
these women insist. It also means the right of the woman not to be abused, 
and to be treated with kindness and respect by her husband.39 They also 
stress the women’s right to work outside the home and earn a salary, though 
they refrain from questioning the (religious as well as traditional) concep-
tion of the responsibility of the husband to act as primary breadwinner for 
family. And since women must enjoy equal opportunities to education at 
all levels, they must also have the opportunity to use their skills in the labor 
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market and to serve their society, according to the president. Interpretations 
asserting that Islam prevents women from doing this are simply wrong, she 
insists.40 Transforming negative attitudes to positive ones relates also to the 
relationship between parents and children. The association makes efforts to 
transform this relationship away from heartless authoritarianism and abuse 
and toward greater empathy, partnership and understanding between 
them. The impact of Questscopes’ philosophy on childhood development is 
here clearly discernible.41
The Associations’ empowerment-oriented philosophy also has a 
socio-economic dimension. The Islamic duties of zakah and sadaqah are 
aimed at the alleviation of poverty, the association’s president insists. This 
means that those who are unable to work or do not earn sufficient money 
must be supported in their livelihoods. However, it also means investment 
in productive undertakings for those who can work, in order to bring about 
a lasting improvement of living conditions. It is clear that, from the per-
spective of the association’s members, the alleviation of poverty does not 
simply mean traditional charity. Rather, it means progressive development. 
They support this approach by references to religious sources: the hadith 
stressing that an able bodied needy person should be given an axe to make 
his own living rather than a piece of bread, and the Qur’anic call of “’Iqra’!” 
(“Recite!”), which they interpret as a call for the gathering of knowledge and 
educational advancement of and by all Muslims. In particular, they empha-
sise this search for knowledge in the context of the disadvantaged and the 
underprivileged in society. They also place the Islamic prohibition on riba’, 
or charge of interest, within the same context. According to them, riba’ is 
unfair to the poor. In this regard, the president pointed to the injustice of the 
prevailing economic world system, in which poor countries are deprived of 
their development chances due to their debt and interest burden.42
The Al-’Aqsa Association
Like the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar association, Al-’Aqsa Association in 
Madaba, a small town of around 30 KM to the southeast of Amman, was 
established and is run solely by women. Unlike the former, the latter is of a 
multi-purpose nature and does not exclusively focus on one target group. 
First of all, it encompasses a primary school for deaf children. It also imple-
ments income-generating projects for women of needy families and engag-
es occasionally in traditional charitable aid. Moreover, it has a social club 
for the elderly. Finally, it works towards awareness-raising on religious, edu-
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cational, social, health and political affairs among socially disadvantaged 
families, and organizes courses and lectures on the same issues for the wider 
public. Its members and workers belong predominantly to Madaba’s East 
Bank local community. What is particularly unusual about this association is 
the political background of its founder and president, Nawal Al-Fa‘uri.
The Political Career of a Post-Islamist Woman
On one level, Al-Fa‘uri could be regarded as a typical post-Islamist 
in the terms coined by Asef Bayat. From a very young age, she has been 
politically as well as socially active in society, and her religious convictions 
are nominally derived directly from the Qur’an and Hadith. Her interest in 
Islamic reformism made her decide to join The Muslim Brotherhood when 
she was only 14 years old. She did this without notifying her parents, who 
would not have allowed her to do so. In 1992, she became involved in the 
establishment of the Islamic Action Front Party. In the following year, she 
was elected as the first female member of the majlis al-shurah (the inter-
nal parliament) of this political party. Her personal charisma was apparently 
strong enough to overcome gender barriers and stereotypes within the local 
society, which is of a largely provincial and tribal nature, as well as within the 
Islamist movement to muster the necessary support and get elected as a 
representative of Madaba’s IAF section within that council.43
Nawal Al-Fa‘uri was, in part at least, attracted to The Muslim Brother-
hood because of its program of tarbiyyah. She appreciated the profound 
study of the Islamic faith there, the discovery of Islamic morals and values 
and the endeavor to find the right mental balance as a believer. What made 
her a dissident within Jordan’s mainstream Islamist movement was her frus-
tration with the conservatism and socio-political strategies of exclusivism of 
many among The Brotherhood’s leadership. She had great difficulty with the 
latter’s inclination to shun political and social interaction with anyone who 
is obviously outside the Islamist movement. In contrast, Al-Fa‘uri has always 
been of the opinion that dialogue with others, including non-Muslims, is of 
the utmost importance. Islam, she emphasizes, calls on all believers to be 
kind and friendly toward others, and to maintain good relations with them. 
She has also had problems with certain political decisions by The Muslim 
Brotherhood leadership. She could not agree with The Brotherhood’s and 
the IAFs’ boycott of the elections for parliament in 1997. This boycott had a 
lot to do with the desire of hardliners not to compromise the movement’s 
ideological dogmas. Al-Fa‘uri, however, believed that participation in the 
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political process, opening up to other political forces and making the neces-
sary compromises was vital for the development of an Islamic society.
Perhaps the largest bone of contention between the more conserva-
tive Muslim Brotherhood members and Al-Fau‘ri has concerned the issue 
of gender. Al-Fa‘uri considers the promotion of women within the Islam-
ist movement as well as within Jordanian political, social and economic 
life in general as her main mission. For Al-Fa‘uri, women’s participation in 
all aspects of public life has to be expanded, including the assumption of 
leadership roles. The Brotherhood’s leadership however, and, in particu-
lar, conservative hardliners like Hammam Sa‘id and Abu Fares, would not 
hear of this. According to them, the time was not appropriate for women to 
become political leaders and representatives. Al-Fa‘uri was stunned by their 
reasoning. She rather found that the Islamist movement was running out of 
time in issues of gender. She argued that the impact of globalization and of 
modernizing developments in realms like education, labor market and other 
aspects of society made it more urgent than ever to promote women’s role 
in public life, including political life and including the Islamist movement. 
If not, she contended that the Islamist movement would quite simply lose 
touch with modern developments. According to Al-Fa‘uri, moreover, the 
conservatism of The Muslim Brotherhood in issues relating to gender is not 
merely ideologically motivated. Rather, she maintains that self-interest and 
political expediency also comes into play: such leaders represent socially 
conservative constituencies that do not like to see emancipatory develop-
ments in the status of women to take place.44
Al-Fa‘uri revoked her membership of The Muslim Brotherhood in 
1993. In 1997, she ceased her activities in the Islamic Action Front Party and 
revoked her membership of that party in 2001. In the same year, she became 
one of the founders of the self-professedly, moderate Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami, 
The Islamic Center Party.45 That party stands, in her own words, for “a demo-
cratic and progressive Islam that is in agreement with the demands and the 
developments of modern times, including the issue of women’s rights.”46
Islamic Modernism and Renewalism
In short, Nawal Al-Fa‘uri’s political biography denotes what we might 
call a modernist version of Islamic reformism that opposes exclusivist and 
socially conservative tendencies within the Islamist movement. “As Muslims, 
we need to look at the world around us, and open ourselves up to what 
is taking place there,” she states. Muslims who isolate themselves from the 
wider world, develop fanatical attitudes and even resort to violence are 
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drifting away from the right path, according to her. This kind of modernism 
is linked in her discourse to outspoken positions on Islamic renewal based 
upon the original sources. Islamic knowledge can never be merely theoreti-
cal, but has to be practiced in everyday life, she maintains in line with the 
teachings of The Muslim Brotherhood. She adds that it has to be interpreted 
and practiced according to its “true and original meaning” and not accord-
ing to all kinds of traditional habits and convictions that have nothing to do 
with religion.47 The interpretation and application of the original message of 
Qur’an and Hadith must always be re-adjusted to the demands of the time 
through the process of ijtihad (independent reasoning). Ijtihad must be per-
formed by qualified experts who, according to Al-Fa‘uri (if few others), can 
include women as well as men. It must be applied to all those Qur’anic ’ayat 
or ahadith that lend themselves to multiple interpretations.48
In the light of these renewalist convictions, it is not surprising that 
she has named the primary and secondary school she founded more then 
twenty years ago after one of the greatest historical proponents of this line 
of thought: the 14th century Islamic thinker Ibn Taymiyyah.49 Unlike the 
Wahhabis, however, Al-Fa‘uri emphasizes Taymiyyah’s advocacy of inde-
pendent (re) interpretation of Qur’an and Hadith rather than the former’s 
inclination to use him as an advocate of their own rigid approach toward 
these sources.
Al-Fa‘uri’s relatively progressive, inclusive and politically and socially 
“bridging” version of Islamic reformism has translated itself on the social level 
into active involvement and cooperation with various non-Islamist institu-
tions, local, foreign, as well as international. On the local level, she became 
involved in Jordan’s National Commission for Women, which is chaired by 
princess Basma.50 This institution is, among other things, engaged in the 
modernization of Jordanian shari‘ah-based family law in order to eliminate 
or amend certain articles that are discriminatory to women.51 Furthermore, 
she also chairs the General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW) in the 
Governorate of Madaba (see the chapter on Jordan’s NGO sector). She was 
also a member of the Jordanian delegation to the International Women’s 
Conference in Beijing in 1995. She came into contact with UNIFEM, the UN 
organization for women, and wrote a booklet on its request dealing with 
how internationally enshrined women’s rights relate to the message of 
Islam. The question of Islam and gender was also the topic of a booklet she 
wrote on behalf of the “Higher Population Council,” a government institu-
tion active in the realm of reproductive health and family planning, and of 
the UNDP office in Jordan. Moreover, her association has received support 
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from the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development and from the 
embassies of the United Kingdom and Canada in the implementation of 
income-generating projects for needy families. Last but not least, she has 
participated in conferences on Muslim-Christian dialogue organized by the 
Council of Europe.52
Islam, Gender and Family
Unsurprisingly, a major part of Al-Fa‘uri’s Islamic reformist discourse 
deals with the issue of gender. Besides the religious message, she is motivat-
ed by concern for (and frustration with) the present state of affairs pertaining 
to women in Jordan. She is disturbed about the insurmountable obstacles 
women face in obtaining positions of leadership in public institutions and 
in political life. In a more general sense, she is angered by the persistence of 
traditional habits that continue to deny women full participation in society. 
According to her, traditional beliefs stating that, a woman’s place is limited 
to her home and family, that the education of women is less important than 
that of men, that a woman should never travel alone, and that she should 
not work outside the home are merely ‘adat with no tangible connection 
to the real Islamic message. “It is incredible that people are still sticking to 
such beliefs in the present time!” she exclaimed to me. Women, she argues, 
are denied their rights and kept down, especially in a traditional community 
such as that of the provincial town of Madaba. This oppression is justified in 
the name of Islam. The problem, Al-Fa‘uri maintains, is that Islam has always 
been interpreted by self-appointed conservative male authorities who have 
justified the oppression of women in religion’s name. Believers, men and 
women alike, should study the sources of Islam by themselves, know what 
is written there and never allow themselves to be misled regarding religion 
by other people. No human being on earth can be the yardstick of life, only 
God Himself can be this. Women, therefore, must be called upon to follow 
God and His message, and not to follow humans, including men.
According to Al-Fa‘uri, the Qur’an is clear about equal rights for both 
sexes in terms of participation in society and politics.53 She derives this con-
clusion from verses like the first ’ayat of Surah al-Nisa (Q. 4:1), which states 
that men and woman are created from one and the same figure, Adam. She 
derives the same axiom from the fact that the Qur’an addresses its call to 
a righteous and moral life to all believers, regardless of sex. Men as well as 
women are called upon “to enjoin the good and to prohibit evil,” without 
any difference, she stresses. ’Ayat two and three of Surah al-Ahzab confirm 
that believers, men as well as women, have to worship and follow only God. 
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Moreover, the Prophet Muhammad states in a hadith that women are the 
sisters of men.
Shari‘ah grants women rights that are equal to those of men in the 
economic sphere, Al Fa‘uri maintains. The Muslim woman has an equal right 
to own and to dispose of property, and to engage in trade. In public and 
political life, the will and the opinion of the woman counts as equal to those 
of men, she insists. Al-Fa‘uri also singles out for honorary mention several 
examples of women from the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad or that 
of the first caliphs. The first partner and supporter of the Prophet was his 
wife Khadija. The first Muslim martyr, in a battle between the ’ummah and 
its enemies, was an elderly woman, Sumayyah. Another woman, Bint Ka‘ab, 
played a prominent role as a warrior under the Caliph Abu Bakr in the so-
called riddah wars against unfaithful tribes (632-634 C.E.). Al-Fa‘uri presents 
all of these emancipatory views and interpretations with the same degree of 
certainty as the much more conservative Muslim ‘ulama’ and Islamist ideo-
logues state their own positions. (The degree to which either may be said to 
be “correct” in their interpretations remains, of course, beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.)
Her emphasis on gender equality should not distract us from the fact 
that Al-Fa‘uri does accept the validity of certain gender-based role differenc-
es within the family sphere. These differences are, according to her, derived 
from physiological differences between men and women. Since only women 
will get pregnant and deliver babies, they are emotionally better disposed 
than men to take care of the children, raise them and create a warm and 
happy atmosphere in the house. The husband, in turn, has a better disposi-
tion to work outdoors and take care of his family in terms of income and 
material affairs. It is in recognition of such differences, Al-Fa‘uri states, that 
the Qur’an describes men as the caretakers and maintainers of women (Q. 
4:34). Yet, she puts this ’ayah in the context of a husband-wife relationship 
that is characterized by complementarity in equality. God has created both 
sexes for a reason, she argues. This reason is that differences between men 
and women enable a fruitful cooperation between both on the basis of com-
plimentary roles and characteristics. That is why the primary duty of the man 
in the family sphere is that of providing for the family’s income and mate-
rial well being, and why that of the woman is to be mother and housewife 
providing for the family’s emotional well being. For this reason, ’ayat 4 and 5 
of Surah al-Nisa’ confirm woman’s right to maintenance and good care from 
the husband, according to Al-Fa‘uri. The wife has a right to her husband’s 
income, while any income she herself may earn is for her alone.
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Such differences between the roles of the sexes are mitigated in Al-
Fa‘uri’s discourse by the woman’s right to equal participation in the public 
realm, as well as by the husbands’ duty to assist his wife in matters pertain-
ing to household tasks and raising the children. Once the husband returns 
home from his job, he must cooperate with his wife in thinking about all the 
matters pertaining to the household and raising the children, and help her 
in carrying out these tasks. According to Al-Fa‘uri, the Prophet Muhammad 
has done so in his own family, but present day Arab men have completely 
forgotten this. They are idle inside the home, while forbidding the women 
of their household to work outdoors. This, of course, is against the spirit of 
Islam.
In Al-Fa‘uri’s interpretation of the Islamic message, the differences 
between both sexes are purely physiological; in terms of spirit, they are 
equal. Like men, women are independent spiritual beings. Like a man, a 
woman must be free in the choices she makes in life, such as whether or 
not she wants to work (provided that this does not conflict with her role as 
mother and housekeeper), or whether or not she wants to believe in God. 
If she opts to believe in God and in the message of Islam, she is, like a male 
Muslim, only bound to follow God’s injunctions and not those of other peo-
ple, including those of men. From this, there follows the idea that marital 
life must be based upon cooperation and mutual respect for one another 
partner’s rights, opinions and will. Islamic teachings that have traditionally 
been explained as a duty of obedience of the wife toward her husband are, 
in reality, about cooperation, consultation and partnership between both, 
she maintains.54
Apart from her discussion on gender, the raising and educating of 
children is another issue on which Nawal al- Fa‘uri and the Al-’Aqsa Associa-
tion focus in their endeavors at religious reform and development. Herself a 
pedagogue by training, Al-Fa‘uri and her association – like the Khawla’ Bint 
Al-Azwar Association – focus on the childrearing habits of mothers. In par-
ticular, they emphasise the need for these mothers to have greater respect 
for their children’s needs, perceptions and opinions. The association also 
promotes family planning for the sake of the well being of the family in gen-
eral and the mother in particular. Family planning is, according to Al- Fa‘uri, 
in accordance with the teachings of Islam.55
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Conclusion
The three associations dealt with in this chapter share the convic-
tion that the right application of religious teachings naturally fall in line 
with internationally established humanitarian goals and principles. In this 
view, the ’ummah should not be inwardly oriented and isolationist; rather, 
it should focus on interaction and cooperation with the outer world. Even 
though these NGOs do conceive of religion as representing values, ide-
als and rules of morality that are eternally valid, they stress that, in their 
translation into practice, these must evolve according to the needs and the 
imperatives of our time. Their practical approaches do not simply focus on 
protecting and defending the Muslim lifeworld against “external” threats 
emanating from secular modernity or the non-Muslim world by asserting 
a conservatively conceived Islamic authenticity. Rather, they focus on the 
need to bring the understanding and application of the Islamic message in 
line with the demands of a modern present and future. What is noticeable 
from all three associations is their rights-oriented approach in this endeavor. 
Relatively conservative Muslim NGOs lay greater emphasis on the observa-
tion of religious duties in ritual and social life. The NGOs dealt with in this 
section, by way of contrast, do not deny such duties, but their goals are 
more pronouncedly focused on promoting the rights of women, children 
and needy people and on raising their awareness of their own rights and 
opportunities. The fulfillment of these rights is the goal of their develop-
ment approach.
Differences between the three pertain first of all to the background of 
their founders and members. Al-Faruq Society is, in its background, the most 
secular. Neither supporters of political Islam nor religious functionaries or 
experts have been prominent in this society (if involved at all). The driv-
ing force behind Al-Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association, however, is a pious 
mosque teacher. Al-’Aqsa Association is established and led by an independ-
ent-minded adherent of political Islam who came to oppose conservatism 
and exclusivism within Jordan’s mainstream Islamist movement and pro-
motes a modernist and rights-oriented version of the Islamic message.
The question of what this means in terms of the “modernism versus 
fundamentalism” theories with which we began this chapter is significant. 
Al-Faruq Society is probably the closest to the definition of a modernist 
organization. It considers Islam mainly as an important element of Arab 
society’s cultural and ethical heritage, an indispensable yet at the same time 
evolving part of the process of human progress, development and mod-
ernization. The Islamic revelation and its injunctions are dominant in the 
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discourse of Al-Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association. They interpret the goals 
of this revelation, however, as the promotion of human dignity and social 
justice through the empowerment of the deprived. At the same time, they 
perceive the knowledge and the observance of this revelation as under 
threat from external forces. Indeed, they attribute the apparent backward-
ness, obscurity and underdevelopment of much of Muslim society and its 
religious understanding to this state of affairs.
The revelation is also at the core of the discourse of Al-’Aqsa Soci-
ety. Its charismatic president seems to be less worried, however, about the 
contamination of Islam and the ’ummah by forces, discourses and under-
standings emanating from outside the Muslim world. On the contrary, she 
regards it as of the utmost importance to keep in touch with the outside 
world, benefit from the best of its developments, understandings and dis-
courses and to reform the ’ummah’s interpretation and application of the 
Islamic faith accordingly. Apparently, she assumes that true faith in the 
Islamic sources and their ethical teachings should ensure that Muslims are 
confident enough to interact and, where possible, cooperate meaningfully 
with others. Thus, she arrives at a position much akin to modernism through 
a broad and inclusive version of Islamist ideology that, nonetheless, contin-
ues to take the revelation as the yardstick for all aspects of life.
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11.  Financial and 
In-Kind Aid
This chapter describes the forms via which direct aid is provided by 
Muslim NGOs in Jordan to the needy: the poor, unemployed, orphans and 
widows. My observations of aid practices will be presented by way of illus-
tration. As much as this is possible, these practices will be analyzed in light 
of the religious discourses described in the previous chapter. It must be said, 
however, that the impact of Islamic motivational discourses on the giving of 
aid is difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. It simply cannot be 
demonstrated that such discourses achieve a more moral state of being – i.e. 
one in which there is greater self-sacrifice, unity of purpose, brotherly coop-
eration, purity of intention and honesty – than could be achieved from the 
practice of other religious, ideological or ethical traditions. Reference will 
be made, however, to discourse on ideals of social solidarity, harmony and 
cohesion as has been dealt with in part three, in an effort to demonstrate 
how they relate to the Muslim NGO’s aid practices. The concepts of depend-
ency, discipline and empowerment will figure highly in the analysis of the 
practical approaches toward such ideals.
Aid Distribution during Ramadan
On the 17th November 2003, during the month of Ramadan, dozens 
of women assembled in front of the premises of the Islamic Bani Hassan 
Welfare association in Zarqa. There they stood, chatting loudly with one 
another, obviously anxious about something or other. When the treasurer 
and general manager of the association opened the door for me, the look 
on his face conveyed deep concern – though he soon managed to compose 
himself, treating me to a broad smile. The association’s members and work-
ers in the building were also clearly worried. In the hall, a copious quanitity 
of sacks and bags had been placed in rows. They all contained food items 
such as rice, pasta, sugar, bottles of sesame oil, cans of fish, tea bags, and 
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so on. These were Ramadan gifts for around 500 needy families. The smaller 
bags were destined for families of not more then 4 children; while the big 
sacks were for the larger families. In order to keep order, not more then five 
clients at a time, mostly mothers, were permitted entry into the hall. All had 
to show their client cards to the Association’s president. The president com-
pared the personal data on those cards with those on the clients’ list. Some-
times he asked the client questions on matters like the number of people 
in her family. Then he told the female workers to hand over a bag or sack to 
the client in question. In some cases, two bags or sacks were given to one 
person. In those cases, one of them was destined for another family whose 
members were, for one reason or another, unable to attend the distribution. 
Clients volunteering to deliver food to other families were well known to the 
members of the association and trusted by them.
The interaction between the association’s members and its clients 
did not always run smoothly. Several mothers shouted, cried or begged the 
associations’ workers and members. The male workers usually responded in 
anger, protesting that “like you, there are dozens of other families in need 
here!” Indeed, on one occasion, the president himself bellowed at some 
women who came in: “Go away! You are not on the list!” The female workers, 
in contrast, were quieter, less aggressive, and more capable at calming the 
agitated women down.
Making more noise than most, one elderly woman protested that, as 
she was a poor widow and mother to many children, she was clearly entitled 
to one of the larger sacks. On the grounds that she had not been registered 
as particularly needy by the association, the president refused her request. 
The woman responded with a furious declaration of “shame on you!” before 
telling the president that he was not acting as a pious Muslim ought. Even-
tually, the female workers took her to the waiting room, imploring her to sit 
down and relax. Some time later, she returned and was given a small bag. She 
was still angry and told the president, albeit in a softer voice, that his treat-
ment of her was not right. The president came under siege from a number of 
directions that day; his reaction was to grow increasingly inflexible. Another 
woman, armed with medical papers confirming that she had one disabled 
and one sick child, also told the president that she was a widow in need of 
help. Since she was not registered as a client, however, the president refused 
to budge. Rather, he declined her plea on the grounds that there “is no time 
for study now!” (His meaning, of course, was that this was not the time to 
investigate her socio-economic situation). Likewise, a woman who showed 
a paper proving that she had a mentally distubed daughter was resolutely 
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turned away. Then there was the case of a young man who arrived with 
someone else’s client card. The president obviously did not trust him and 
was on the verge of tearing the card into pieces. When the man protested, 
the president told him angrily to leave and shouted “and you want to teach 
us manners! (tu‘alimuna al-’adab!)1
Historical Origins and Various Forms of Direct Aid
Financial and in-kind assistance to the needy by voluntary welfare 
associations in Jordan most often takes place on religious feast days. In the 
case of Muslim associations, distribution is particularly intense during Ram-
adan, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha. Several Muslim NGO workers expressed to me 
their belief that gifts during Ramadan bring greater spiritual reward. For the 
same reason, many Muslims choose Ramadan as the time in which to make 
their yearly zakah contribution to a charitable association. Christian NGOs, 
on the other hand, concentrate their activities of aid distribution around 
the times of Christmas and of Easter.2 While voluntary financial and in-kind 
assistance is sanctioned by religious traditions, it also originates from local 
patterns of social solidarity prevalent in traditional Middle Eastern commu-
nities such as tribes, clans, rural villages and urban neighborhoods.3
Voluntary welfare associations in Jordan, regardless of their religious, 
ethnic or socio-political background, engage in various forms of providing 
direct aid to the needy. Sometimes, this involves the giving of simple gifts 
of money, food, clothes, blankets, heaters and medicines for needy families, 
school bags and stationary for needy school pupils and wheelchairs and 
hearing aids for the handicapped. At other times, fees are waived, or a dis-
count or partial discount of expenses (of important services like education 
and health care) are granted. There is also the service of reparations free 
of charge of daily utensils or within houses of needy people. Apart from 
religious feast days, the timing of distribution of financial and in-kind assist-
ance differs from association to association. Larger and financially well-to-
do associations may give benefits to all of their clients on a monthly basis. 
Others give aid at irregular occasions only, aside from religious feast days of 
course. The aid practices of The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated associations 
will first be discussed; this will be followed by some mention of other Muslim 
associations.
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Islamist Associations
The Identification of Needy Recipients
In chapter 7, I observed that mainstream Muslim public opinion in 
Jordan – learned ‘ulama’ as well as laymen and women, state representatives 
as well as The Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Islamist movement – holds 
the view that according to Islamic ethics, help should be given to anybody 
and everybody in need. What, we now explore, are the criteria by which the 
genuineness of someone’s needs is ascertained?
This is a question that has preoccupied Muslim thinkers from the early 
stages of Islam. The early medieval Muslim ‘ulama’, including the founders of 
the four main legal Sunni schools of law, were engaged in lengthy debates 
on the definition of need. They did so in order to establish the boundaries 
of jurisprudence relating to the implementation of zakah and the mainte-
nance of the family.4 During later centuries, however, the definition of need 
and the concomitant criteria of eligibility for social assistance became less 
a matter of formal jurisprudence. Rather, the category of “needy” was estab-
lished subjectively within the local communities of the Muslim world. In the 
Ottoman period, for instance, eligibility – and therefore the fate of one’s 
family – depended largely on face-to-face relations and day-to-day knowl-
edge within the local community, and less on formal mechanisms of assess-
ing people’s need.5 Charitable aid on a regular basis was given by relatively 
wealthy members of certain social networks – often based upon family, 
tribe, neighborhood or profession – to the relatively needy ones. Also, reli-
gious scholars and students were usually included in the category of poor 
who deserved to receive social assistance. Those not belonging to such net-
works or religious status groups could only hope for occasional help from 
time to time.6
From the 19th century onwards, modern bureaucratic states came into 
being in the Middle East. Their rulers and bureaucratic institutions became 
increasingly concerned with the economic productivity of the population as 
a whole. This question of productivity was increasingly perceived as related 
to public health and welfare. At times, the latter issues became reflected in 
the discourses and the practices of state bureaucrats, philanthropic activ-
ists, intellectuals and journalists alike.7 In other words, need and poverty 
came to be regarded as public issues of society at large that warranted col-
lective action to tackle them. This also implied that need was increasingly 
assessed by official welfare institutions on the basis of formal and uniform 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   250 05-02-2008   11:13:41
criteria related to a person’s income, family-situation, health and ability to 
work.8 Present-day voluntary welfare associations in Jordan and elsewhere 
in the Middle East rely to a greater degree than ever on formal procedures in 
order to determine the eligibility of applicants to their services.
Needy people in present-day Jordan wishing to apply for aid from a 
voluntary welfare association usually have to visit the association’s office 
first, where s/he explains his or her exact conditions (of need). Such condi-
tions may have persisted for years, or have been brought about suddenly 
by, for example, the death of a main provider in the family. Regardless of the 
nature of their appeal, each applicant fills in a registration form during this 
first visit. The applicant may have come on his/her own initiative or have 
learnt about the association from a third party. Typically, this third party is a 
member of the association in question, a potential donor willing to support 
him or her through the association, a relative, a friend or a neighbor.9
The initial visit by the applicant is usually followed by a home visit 
by one or more workers of the association. During such visits, the social 
circumstances in which the applicant family lives are investigated: a tally is 
made of the number of persons in the family, sons of working age; elderly 
or sick family members; whether or not there are disabled children; the fam-
ily’s sources of income; its ongoing expenses (rent, electricity, water); and 
its general health situation. The necessary papers concerning these mat-
ters are collected. In the case of orphan- or fatherless families, relevant data 
about life and death of the father as the former breadwinner are gathered 
as well.10
At the ICCS centers for orphans and poor, the task of investigating the 
socio-economic circumstances of the applicants of aid is usually assigned to 
salaried employees or regular volunteers specialized in this field. Such social 
investigators have usually completed training courses run by the Ministry of 
Social Development or by the main office of the ICCS. Both deal with how to 
assess a situation of poverty and how to approach applicants for aid.11 The 
social investigator’s relationship with an applicant for aid is, in principle, one 
of (a modern and formalized version of ) control, since the latter’s situation of 
need must be established by the former on the basis of uniform criteria and 
empirical socio-economic facts: the presence or absence of income and/or 
assets; expenses on rent, electricity and water bills, medical and educational 
costs of the family in question et cetera. The investigator writes down the 
answers to all such questions on a standardized form. However, moral lan-
guage evoking the principle of self-sacrifice for the sake of God, and the need 
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for honesty and sincerity is also used within the framework of ICCS trainings 
of social investigators. One of the ICCS instructions to the social investiga-
tor regarding his attitude to applicants or clients is to “humble himself in 
front of them, have compassion and sympathy with them, care for them, 
not to boast to them, and work with his mind for charity which leads to their 
enrichment.”12 I was not permitted to attend one of these social investigation 
practices myself. Yet, in all likelihood, an attitude of formal control versus 
one of affective compassion toward clients differs from one social investiga-
tor to another, and according to the mode of personal interaction between 
an investigator and a client. As stated in the last chapter: compassion and 
control are not necessarily at odds with each other, and this is certainly not 
the case in the context of personalized patterns of authority, such as those 
prevalent in the Middle East.
People known by the center and living in the neighborhood of the 
family that has applied for aid, often help the social investigators in their 
work. Such people are known as manadib (delegates, single: mandub). They 
might be relatives, friends or acquaintances of the ICCS center’s workers. 
A very valuable kind of mandub is a mukhtar, the chief of a neighborhood 
who carries a great degree of social authority. A mukhtar is appointed by 
the municipality to solve problems and disputes among inhabitants (and 
sometimes within families) of a community by means of mediation and rec-
onciliation. Not surprisingly, the same figure often possesses a wealth of 
information on the socio-pyschological situation of families and the quality 
of family relationships applying for help to an ICCS center. In general, the 
mandub provides additional information about the social situation of the 
family, and may also be present during the home visits of the investigators. 
Both men and women may serve as manadib, although women’s activities 
in this regard are usually confined to dealing with aid applicants in their 
immediate vicinity, while males have greater freedom of movement in their 
aid activities.13
During his home-visit, the social investigator also checks whether 
the applicant family already receives aid from other sources, such as the 
National Aid Fund (a social welfare institution under the Ministry of Social 
Development), the local Zakah Committee (a charitable institution resorting 
under the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs), or other voluntary welfare 
association. Receiving aid from such institutions affects the decision of the 
ICCS center as to whether to give assistance or not, on the nature of the 
assistance and on the amount of money to be given.
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After the visit, the social investigator writes his report about the social 
situation of the applicant family on the form, making to sure to include his 
own recommendations, and presents this to the administrative committee of 
the ICCS center, of which he is usually also a member.14 The political scientist 
Janine Clark, who carried out field research on the ICCS, has observed that 
the voice of the individual social investigator is, in practice, the most impor-
tant factor in the administrative committee’s final decision as to whether a 
family merits aid.15
The administrative committee may also decide to send a second team, 
consisting of females, to the applying family in order to obtain additional 
information. These female investigators talk only to the women of the family 
and focus more on women’s issues. This often means that intimate psycho-
logical and emotional aspects – e.g. daily experience as mothers, woman’s 
role in public space and, possibly, health and sexual matters – figure highly 
in their contacts, whereas male investigators concentrate on the material 
and financial aspects of family problems.16
The officially stated policy of all licensed voluntary welfare associa-
tions in Jordan – including those under the control of the Islamists – is to 
admit clients solely on the basis of their socio-economic needs. Formal pro-
cedures to assess applicants’ eligibility for aid are, in some respects, similar to 
institutions belonging to the welfare state in Western countries – the latter 
also demanding all kinds of papers relating to socio-economic circumstanc-
es from their clients. This impersonal and bureaucratic approach – based on 
the principle of formal equality in regulations, rights and duties of clients 
– also characterises many of the internal regulations of the ICCS. One such 
regulation specifically states that a social investigator may not grant any 
privilege to (prospective) clients on the basis of friendship, acquaintance or 
family relationship.17 In practice, however, we see that the form of control 
and discipline exercised by an association like the ICCS over its (prospective) 
clients is much more likely to be connected to personal face-to-face rela-
tions in the local community, than would be the case in a European welfare 
state. This can be seen from the nature of the home visit and use of local 
social networks and contacts, such as the manadib, in establishing the valid-
ity of the application. ICCS centers are locally embedded institutions, their 
workers often live in the community in which they serve and thus make use 
of local social networks of trust in their selection of clients. As Clark notes: in 
practice, the views of social workers on the eligibility of clients are far more 
important then any set of formal criteria.18
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There are indications that such personal, face-to-face approaches 
involve also the issue of the “morality” of applicants. One of the volunteers of 
Al-‘Abura Center, who stresses the importance of informal personal contacts 
with clients on a day-to-day basis in his work, told me: “I am not helping fam-
ilies who engage in criminal activity like stealing or killing, acts of immoral-
ity or wasting their money on alcohol. Unless we feel that we can bring them 
back onto the right track again. And of course, our help prevents people 
from falling into the trap of crime and immorality.”19 In addition to the well-
being of the individuals involved, this volunteer clearly had the reputation 
of the center itself in mind when considering the nature of his work.
Islamic value rationality seems to play an important part in the selec-
tion of clients as well. According to Raif Nijm, an ICCS member and architect, 
who used to supervise the construction of the ICCS-run Islamic hospital, the 
ICCS centers aim to make “better Muslims” out of the needy clients. In con-
trast, they do not want to waste their money and efforts on people with a 
reputation for duplicity, or committing crimes, or even for neglecting their 
religious obligations.20 Again, we find stated a powerful inter-relatedness 
between the various Islamic ethical injunctions, as well as a denial of any 
distinction between ‘ibadat and mu‘amalat. In this case, this value rationality 
is applied to the selection of clients. The latter must be known to be hon-
est, sincere, good mannered, respectful and religiously observant Muslims, 
or at least display a serious willingness to improve themselves along these 
lines.21
Religious or moral considerations in the selection of clients are also 
related to the concern that beneficiaries will spend the financial aid they 
receive in an appropriate fashion. The ICCS as well as other, like minded asso-
ciations like to ascertain that clients spend the money in a way that is per-
ceived as good for them, as regards this life as well the hereafter. “Ignorance” 
on social as well as religious matters is considered by ICCS representatives 
as one of the characteristics most widespread among needy people, besides 
poverty and illness. Islamist associations are middle class-based, and middle 
class members often posses a sense of social and moral superiority toward 
the lower classes, on the basis of their higher level of formal education and 
“greater knowledge.” As a result, they often claim to know “what is best” for 
the lower classes, and may, rightly or wrongly, mistrust the capability of 
lower class members to judge what is best for themselves. Such a paternal-
istic approach takes, in the case of Islamist associations, the form of religion-
based and moralizing da‘wah discourse vis-à-vis lower class people. ICCS 
instructions to social investigators state that families applying for aid must 
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not have a reputation for habits of “waste in housing, clothes and food.”22 The 
president of the Al-’Ihsan Women’s Association in Zarqa observed that what 
renders the work of her association authentically Islamic:
is that [the] money and any other kinds of aid [that we provide] is truly satisfy-
ing the real needs of people…. [Thus, this] money may not be spent on things 
like smoking, drinking alcohol or other vain and even harmful matters. I talk 
about these matters with the clients and urge them to use the aid they receive 
in a good way, and not to waste it.23 
The last issue to be dealt with regarding the identification of needy 
recipients pertains to ethnic or tribal origin. In theory, Islamism forbids dis-
crimination between people on the basis of such criteria. The treasurer of 
the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association, for instance, regards the princi-
ple of equality in helping one’s fellow humans regardless of religion, sex and 
tribal, national or racial origin as intrinsic to the Islamic approach.24 In prac-
tice, however, we have seen that Islamist associations are, in an operational 
sense, part of local communities in which familial, friendship and neighbor-
hood ties and social networks of trust are indispensable to any kind of social 
activity. Not surprisingly, blood ties and ethnic identity happen to be very 
important factors in such networks. Hence, regardless of his egalitarian and 
pan-Islamic ideological convictions, the same treasurer told me that approx-
imately 90% of the clients of the Bani Hassan Association belong to the Bani 
Hassan tribe. And the remainder of the clients generally has a strong rela-
tionship with some of the tribe’s members, through marriage or other form 
of connection.25 In short, in Jordan, one’s tribal or ethnic origin continues to 
establish the degree of social trust necessary to receive aid from voluntary 
associations, including those with an Islamic background.
Approaches toward Distribution of Aid
As the account of the distribution of aid in-kind during Ramadan at 
the beginning of this chapter showed, the reality of assisting the poor may 
sometimes be far removed from the nominal Islamist ideals of closing the 
gap between rich and poor and enhancing social harmony. In practice, cir-
cumstances represent a state of friction and tension between, on the one 
hand, needy recipients who often struggle in an individual fashion for their 
survival and that of their families and, on the other, the association mem-
bers, whose main concern is to maintain the rules they have set for aid dis-
tribution, while simultaneously preserving order and discipline. In doing so, 
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the members try to safeguard their dominance and control over the multi-
tude of clients, and to prevent the latter’s demands from interfering in their 
own procedures. On the day of distribution (described at the beginning of 
the chapter), the members were clearly uncomfortable about the overall 
situation. This doubtless resulted from the overwhelming number of clients, 
their realization of the bitter plight of many of these, and the severe limita-
tions they faced in trying to do something about it. Such limitations have 
worsened due to the dwindling of donations from Jordan’s struggling mid-
dle classes, and the loss of financial support from charitable institutions in 
the Gulf Region. Its members attribute this loss of support to (post 9/11) US-
instigated, repressive policies against the latter from the state authorities in 
that region, as well as in Jordan. Indeed, since the year 2002, the association 
has hardly been able to engage in activities of aid distribution, apart from 
the time of Ramadan.26
During my time there, I also witnessed calmer days for aid distribution 
in Jordan. For instance, at the ICCS center Al-‘Abura on the 12th of February 
2003, one of the days of ‘Id al-Adha, sacks of mutton were distributed in 
an atmosphere of relative serenity to client families. The related registra-
tion process took place in a big hall where the mothers of dozens of client 
families were sitting quietly, in rows of chairs. The social investigator sat in 
front of them, behind a desk, with a list of beneficiaries in his hands. He 
called every family by name, and each time a mother came to the desk and 
printed her thumb with ink besides her last name on the list. Then the inves-
tigator wrote his signature besides the thumbprint. The mothers received 
small cards with numbers. After the registration, they went to the account-
ant’s office downstairs, where they showed their cards to the workers there, 
who, in turn, handed the sacks of mutton over to them. The overall atmos-
phere of silence was only disturbed when a few girls asking for mutton were 
angrily sent away by one of the workers. They were not considered eligible 
for receiving this kind of aid, possibly because they were not registered as 
clients.27
The Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association is dwarfed in size as well 
as in financial recourses by the ICCS. The latter has more financial and mate-
rial means at its disposal to institutionalize its relationship of patronage 
with its clients. This may account for the significantly greater degree of calm 
and routine during its activities of aid. Apart from the daily educational and 
counseling programs for orphans and their mothers, a subject that will be 
dealt with in subsequent chapters, it distributes financial benefits to its cli-
ents on a monthly basis. The amount of money distributed per family ranges 
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from 10 to 50 Jordanian Dinar (approximately 15 and 70 Euros respectively), 
depending on social data like the number of family members and whether 
there are any additional sources of income.28 According to the official ICCS 
guidelines, each sponsored orphan child below the age of 16 has the right to 
a monthly financial benefit of 20 JD.29 My own observations suggest that this 
rule is not always strictly adhered to. Each ICCS center for orphans and poor 
enjoys financial autonomy, and has its own financial sources and amount of 
funding. This affects, in turn, the amount of money distributed to orphans 
and poor clients. Besides this, the personal judgments of ICCS social workers 
on the situation of client families have a tremendous impact on the mat-
ter.30
ICCS centers usually do not transfer the financial benefits to their cli-
ents’ bank accounts, if the latter have any. Rather, they summon their clients 
on a monthly basis to their premises to receive their allowances in person. 
The distribution of these allowances takes place in a manner reminiscent 
of the distribution of mutton during the ‘Id al-Adha meeting described 
above. Thus, during the giving out of financial benefits, the client mothers 
also have to sit and wait in the hall. They must have their client cards with 
data about their families and the amount of money they are entitled to with 
them. Again, the social investigator calls them one by one, and each one 
has to sign with her fingerprint besides her family name on the list. At one 
distribution I attended, the social investigator and accountant were sitting 
silently behind the desk, working in a serious, even stern mood. Outside 
the hall, women were queuing up to take their places in the waiting room. 
Some, who felt that they had waited for too long, came in and complained. 
The center’s doorkeeper, whose role it was to maintain order, sent the com-
plainers out and forcefully told them to wait their turn. When the social 
investigator had to leave because of his professional duties as an Imam, the 
head of the center’s women’s department took over. Though wearing the 
full niqab, she immediately brought a change to the hall’s atmosphere by 
talking, telling jokes and laughing with the clients.31
Gender has a significant impact upon the way the needy are made to 
feel during these distribution meetings. At Muslim associations, the male 
workers often play the role of the hard taskmaster, enforcing discipline and 
turning people away who, according to the rules of the association, are ineli-
gible to receive aid. Relations between male workers and female clients in 
general are characterized by hierarchical distance and a more impersonal 
attitude – traditional habits and Islamic value rationality ensure that these 
males keep their distance from unrelated females. By contrast, woman-to-
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woman contact brings in an affective and personal element, even if the 
relationship is one between service provider and client. Emotional comfort 
plays a more central role in these contacts. The head of the Al-‘Abura Cent-
er’s women’s department was able to mix discipline with a more amicable 
approach toward her clients than that showed by her male colleagues.
The general pattern of aid distribution by Islamist associations seems 
to be characterized by a deliberate rationality of the enforcement of rules. 
The question concerning who is eligible to receive a certain amount of aid 
is determined beforehand through social investigation practices. The clients 
are carefully registered and listed in this regard. At the occasion of the distri-
bution itself, they are told to wait their turn and to receive their share without 
further discussion. At the distribution of financial benefits described above, 
clients sometimes asked questions or made remarks concerning their social 
situation to the social investigator. The latter gave brief answers or promised 
to look into the matters raised by them. The disciplinary approach prevail-
ing at distributions of aid by Islamist associations is possibly related also to 
Islamic values like purity of intention, honesty, and ensuring one’s deeds are 
transparently fair. Accordingly, the workers try to ensure that the limited 
resources are distributed fairly to every entitled person and do not want to 
tamper with this under pressure of the impatient or demanding clients.
Such an approach also reveals, however, the class-based inequality 
between, on the one hand, the associations’ workers and, on the other their 
beneficiaries (Islamist ideals pertaining to the basic equality of all believers 
and narrowing the gap between the rich and poor notwithstanding). Ulti-
mately, a pattern of patronage and dependency is reinforced through which 
middle class based NGOs unilaterally determine and enforce their rules per-
taining to client eligibility and the fair distribution of aid. Their lower class 
clients have no voice in the making of those rules.
Following-up on Aid
This relationship of discipline and control is an ongoing one, since one 
of its aims is to determine whether or not, or to what extent, circumstances 
initially judged to be sufficient reason for supporting clients still apply. Thus, 
social investigators of Jordanian voluntary welfare associations pay follow 
up visits to client families to determine whether, how and to what degree 
their situation has changed. The social investigator of Al-‘Abura Center pays 
annual follow-up visits to all the client families in order to determine whether 
any changes in the latter’s income, health, and housing situation and recur-
rent expenditures have taken place. The amount of money and the nature 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   258 05-02-2008   11:13:42
259
of other forms of aid the client receives may be changed by the administra-
tion of the center in accordance with these changes. Once more, we find 
that the association adopts a deliberate and rational approach toward the 
just provision of aid to clients – an approach that involves a (quasi welfare 
state) measure of control and discipline. At the same time, personalized pat-
terns of hierarchical relationships may play an important part in this proc-
ess as well. Al-‘Abura center’s social investigator himself is a volunteer. In 
his professional life, he works in a local mosque as a state-employed Imam. 
This function provides him with a wide social network and an authoritative 
status in Hussein Refugee Camp. He told me that it helps him to gain access 
to the families in question, because these people generally respect and trust 
him.32
There are other, more informal ways of following-up on the situation 
of clients. A client might drop in to the office of the director or president of 
a welfare association, Islamist or non-Islamist, and ask for help for an urgent 
need. This might range from difficulties with paying a hospital bill, water and 
or electricity rates, or the cost of mending a broken pair of glasses. The direc-
tor or president usually acts upon such requests.33 Apart from that, given 
the fact that a social worker of an association often lives in the same local 
area as the client, the former may informally meet the latter several times, in 
places such as the park, the sports center or the coffee house, where he or 
she might hear from the client about his or her situation. The social worker, 
in turn, may give advice or urge the client to do something or to change his 
or her behavior.34 In such a setting, the relationship between aid worker and 
client takes place in the context of the informal relationships in local public 
space, something far less common in the Western welfare state.
Occasional Forms of Aid Distribution
Unlike the distribution of financial benefits to needy clients by associ-
ations such as the ICCS, the distribution of in-kind assistance takes place on 
an ad-hoc basis and is less formally structured. It is strongly concentrated in 
the times of Ramadan, the ‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr. Outside these religious 
occasions, distributions usually take place at moments when the associa-
tion feels that enough items have been donated for the neediest families 
to receive their hand-outs. According to members of Al-‘Abura Center and 
the president of Al-’Ihsan Association, this form of aid distribution takes 
place on an almost daily basis during Ramadan while outside this it will only 
happen, on average, twice a month.35 Some associations only engage in the 
distribution of financial or in-kind assistance when certain families ask for 
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concrete things, whether these be food, clothes, medicines, medical treat-
ment or the costs of study.36
Does Financial and in-Kind Assistance Wholly Satisfy the People’s 
Needs?
In spite of the Islamist claim that, through implementing the princi-
ples of zakah and sadaqah, poverty and want will be eradicated from soci-
ety, the amount of help given by one individual association to a needy client 
falls far short of what s/he really needs in terms of food and clothing, let 
alone other requirements. The female director of the women’s section of 
the ICCS center for orphans in Al-Wihdat refugee-camp told me that she 
regularly had “sleepless nights,” because of the apparent impotence of her 
center to help families solve basic problems – such as not being able to pay 
rent or provide higher education for their children.37 The accountant of Al-
‘Abura Center was very candid about the lack of monthly financial help his 
center could provide:
they [the benefits] are by no means enough to cover all the needs of the clients. 
They may help them to buy a chicken, some rice, some clothes or whatever 
[once a month]. As far as other needs are concerned, poor and orphan families 
might have to be hungry for a day, or they might receive additional support 
from relatives, neighbors or the Ministry of Social Development.38 
Members of other ICCS centers also admitted to me that the financial 
and in-kind assistance they provide is far from adequate in terms of many of 
their clients’ basic needs for food and clothing.39 
To ensure that they can support deserving clients with limited resourc-
es, the centers are compelled to be very selective before admitting them. 
The ICCS center in a refugee camp to the north of Amman, for instance, dis-
tributes its monthly aid of 5 Dinar (approximately 8 Euros) per person to the 
300 orphan (or fatherless) families in the area, as well as to approximately 
200 other poor families. The latter are considered eligible because they do 
not have any other sources of income, due to circumstances like the physical 
or mental illness or retardation of the family’s head and/or absence of other 
income providers. They also confirmed that many of the client families get 
support from other sources, such as the Ministry of Social Development, the 
Zakah Committee,40 or other associations.41
In order to alleviate their plight, needy families in Jordan try to find 
support from all quarters, from individuals as well as from institutions, from 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   260 05-02-2008   11:13:42
261
governmental as well as from non-governmental sources and from religious 
as well as from secular organizations.42 Such practices lead at times to con-
cern at the ICCS centers. The latter wonder how “deserving” (potential) ben-
eficiaries are when they are already (relatively) well supported by several 
other donors, yet try to conceal this from the ICCS center in question. The 
ICCS branch in Zarqa is in the process of setting up a computerized database 
to coordinate the efforts of various associations and to document to whom 
exactly they provide assistance, in order to determine the eligibility of cli-
ents more efficiently.43
In practice, the strategies pursued by the ICCS to serve the middle as 
well as the lower classes are not wholly consistent with the Islamist ideal of 
serving as a religiously inspired model of social justice and narrowing the 
gap between rich and poor. Indeed, Clark notes that the level of assistance 
offered by the ICCS to the poor compares unfavorably with that offered by 
the state-run National Assistance Fund.44 More importantly, she observes 
that profits accrued by the Society’s commercial activities, such as those in 
the realms of education and healthcare, are invested directly back into the 
respective commercial activities and not toward the social welfare activities 
designed for the poor. The poor are financially unable to afford the services 
provided by those commercial ICCS institutions, like schools and the Islamic 
Hospital.45
Enabling Aid
This observation on the lack of institutionalization of principles of 
social justice within the ICCS as an overall organization is not to imply that 
its centers for orphans and poor are not serious in their attempts to improve 
the lot of their needy clients. Some forms of direct aid provision are not 
simply aimed at assisting them in their daily economic survival, but enable 
them to participate in certain activities that are essential to raise one’s status 
in Jordanian society.
One such activity is education. Like many other voluntary associa-
tions in Jordan – including those sponsored by members of the royal fam-
ily – ICCS centers distribute schoolbags and stationary to the orphans and 
poor children they sponsor at the beginning of each school year.46 Another 
example is the payment of tuition-fees to needy students. The Al-Urwa Al-
Wuthqa Association in Amman used to pay part of the tuition fees of orphan 
children who study at the university and provided them also with books, 
before being hit hard financially in the aftermath of the 11th of September 
2001 when it lost much of the support from Islamic welfare organizations 
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in the Gulf-region.47 Likewise, the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association 
supports needy school and university students by gifts of 40 JD to pay their 
fees.48 Associations also sometimes pay the expenses of vocational training 
courses of young needy clients if the association itself cannot train the lat-
ter. If Al-‘Abura Center does not succeed to persuade a vocational training 
institute to accept one of its orphan clients on a free of charge basis, it often 
pays the fees demanded by it.49
Another realm vital to people’s life chances is access to health care. 
ICCS centers enable the orphan families they sponsor to go to government 
hospitals and clinics by paying for 75% of the medical expenses concerning 
physical as well as psychological care.50 As far as care for the handicapped is 
concerned, Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa Association used to finance wheelchairs for 
the physically handicapped and to pay the fees that the latter owe for their 
education at state-run schools for the handicapped as well as for the special 
medical care they need.51
A special example of enabling aid is provided by Al-‘Afaf Welfare Soci-
ety. It helps to enable couples participating in its mass weddings to cope 
with the financial and material burdens of starting a family. The mass wed-
dings themselves are an expression of the Society’s concern that the high 
expenses related to weddings and starting a family in Jordan put financial 
obstacles in front of young people wishing to marry that are sometimes 
insurmountable.52 Interest-free loans are provided by one of the Society’s 
committees to the participating couples to help them start their married 
life.53 Different amounts of money are lent to different couples, according to 
their own needs and desires as well as the financial situation of the Society. 
A couple married at a mass wedding held in 2002 told me that they were 
given 500 Jordanian Dinar as a loan, which they paid back over a period 
of 11 months in installments of 42 JD. This couple could not be considered 
poor by Jordanian standards, since both worked as teachers, the husband 
in a high school and the wife in a university. Poorer couples may pay back 
lower amounts per month, and the poorest may receive the money a gift 
rather than loan.54
At the mass wedding itself, donated items such as clothes, utensils for 
kitchen and bathing room, furniture, as well as financial gifts were distrib-
uted to the couples at the wedding party in equal portions.55 Donations to 
Al-‘Afaf Society also enable the couples themselves as well as their visiting 
relatives, friends and acquaintances to enjoy cold drinks, sweets and other 
food at the wedding party. Furthermore, wedding dresses are lent to the 
brides free of charge and wedding costumes are offered to the grooms at a 
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discount rate of 40% of the customary price. Before the wedding party, the 
Society arranges for the prospective brides to make use of a hairdressing 
salon of their choice where they are charged cut rate prices, or on occasion 
given treatment for free.56
Waiving Fees and Offering Discounts
Another practical translation of the Islamic principle of closing the 
gap between rich and poor involves waiving fees or offering discounts to 
the needy on services that the Islamist NGOs themselves provide. We speak 
here mainly of services in the realms of education, training and health care. 
As far as ICCS centers for aiding orphans and poor are concerned, mention 
must be made of their arrangements with the (ICCS-run) Islamic hospital. 
These centers make sure that members of client families who receive treat-
ment there will also receive compensation from the hospital’s Fund for Poor 
Patients. On top of this, the center will contribute 20% towards the rest of 
the expenses of treatment.57 Like other associations, the ICCS organizes sev-
eral times a year a free medical day for needy clients with health problems. 
On this day, doctors and nurses volunteer to give medical aid for free.58
On the ground floor of the building of Al-‘Abura Center, there is a 
kindergarten belonging to the equally ICCS-run Dar al-Arqam school chain. 
Some of the children admitted to this kindergarten are orphans from client 
families of the center. These families are exempted from the payment of kin-
dergarten fees. Likewise, orphans participate in various religious, tutoring, 
vocational training and cultural courses and other activities organized by 
the ICCS centers on a free of charge basis.59
One final example of services offered for free by ICCS centers to their 
needy clients is the reparation and rehabilitation of the latter’s houses after 
fire or heavy rainfall (or in any other instance of natural damage).60
Ideological Manipulations of the Aid Relationship
Do Islamist welfare associations use their services of financial and in-
kind aid in order to indoctrinate their clients through a religious or even 
religio-political ideology? The ideological influencing of clients is suggested 
sometimes by the discourse of ICCS representatives. These emphasize the 
associations “comprehensive approach,” according to which the orphans 
and the poor are supported predominantly, if not solely, on the basis of (the 
associations’s understanding of ) Islamic faith and doctrine. In practice, this 
means that, in addition to financial and in-kind aid and other services of a 
socio-economic nature, the clients are invariably offered educational and 
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cultural programs strongly imbued with an Islamist moral discourse. The 
purported aim of this “comprehensive approach” is to realize The Muslim 
Brotherhood-propagated ideal of cultivation of a “healthy, balanced and 
complete” Islamic personality.61 The aspect of linking financial and in-kind 
assistance to orphan and poor children to educational and cultural pro-
grams is discussed below with ICCS center Al-‘Abura serving as an example.
On 16 June 2003, mothers of orphan families gathered in the office of 
the director of Al-‘Abura Center. The director himself was sitting behind his 
desk, and a male and a female social worker were also present. The moth-
ers had been summoned because the center’s tarbawiyyah (i.e. educational) 
department had discovered “problems” in their families. It turned out that 
these problems related to the failure of many of the children to show up at 
the department’s courses and counseling sessions. Indeed, 100 of the 230 
boys did not attend, as well as 60 of the 260 girls. The director admonished 
the mothers in a stern, paternalistic fashion, urging them to send their chil-
dren immediately to the educational programs. “This is in your own interest!” 
He emphasized.
The Center regards the courses as a vital investment in the future of 
especially orphan children. Arguments by some mothers that the center’s 
bus did not pick their children up on time were dismissed as false. One of 
the mothers had her son, aged between 11 and 13 years, with her. The direc-
tor asked him: “what is the matter with you, why don’t you come?” When 
the boy remained silent, the director said: “you will be here next Saturday, 
all right?” Once the mothers consented to send their children to the edu-
cational department, the director smiled again and became friendlier. Top-
ics of discussion between him and the mothers also included the Qur’anic 
courses organized by the Center, and matters pertaining to salah (prayer), 
paradise and hell.
The social investigator of the center told me afterward that the 
attendance of the orphans to the center’s educational programs was a com-
pulsory matter. He explained that each contract between a muhsin (donor) 
and the center states that part of the formers’ money goes to the educa-
tional and socio-cultural programs that the center provides to the orphan 
child. Much of the educational content disseminated in these programs is of 
a religious nature.62 ICCS instructions to social investigators state that 25% of 
the amount of a donation to an orphan-child goes to “administrative, educa-
tional, health and social expenses” (emphasis added) of the Center itself.63
Pushing client mothers to send their children to educational pro-
grams, and institutionalizing this practice by making the orphan’s participa-
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   264 05-02-2008   11:13:42
265
tion an integral part of every donation to him or her, confirms the idea of 
patronage by Islamists of a middle class background over “ignorant” lower 
class clients. Yet, according to the coordinator of the tarbawiyyah depart-
ment of Al-‘Abura Center, direct financial sanctions against families whose 
children fail to show up cannot be applied. The reason is that it is not the 
Center, but the donor of orphans that is the source of financial benefits. The 
donor financially adopts one or more orphan children from a family on an 
individual basis through the Center. The latter does not pool donations. In 
the end, the Center’s role in the financial aid relationship with orphans is 
merely one of distribution. The relationship itself is ultimately of a personal 
nature, between the individual donor and the orphan and his or her family. 
It is the donor who determines the fate of his or her donations.
However, the nature of relationships between donors and the social 
workers of the center is also often personal and close. Donors regularly visit 
the center and ask about the situation of the client family he or she is sup-
porting. Workers of the tarbawiyyah department regularly write reports 
about this situation, including the participation of an orphan child in the 
educational programs, the latter’s behavior, whether or not s/he attends and 
the extent to which s/he is motivated.64 ICCS instructions for social workers 
state that the “behavior, interaction and activities” of orphan children and 
their parents must be observed at the premises of the center itself, in their 
homes and in “society,” by which is meant public spaces like the street, the 
market and the play-ground.65 The reports on these matters are handed over 
to the social investigator who keeps in touch with the director as well as the 
donors. If a donor hears that the orphan child s/he supports does not go to 
school or to the center’s educational programs and prefers merely to loiter 
in the street, it is up to the donor to do something about this. In such a way, 
disciplinary measures against clients who do not satisfy the ICCS Center’s 
requirements depend on the personal interactions between donors and the 
workers of the center, which are of a relatively horizontal nature. The donor, 
in turn, may utilize the vertical patron-client nature of his or her relationship 
with the client family to take any measure he or she deems fit.66
Obviously, an educational and cultural program for needy clients that 
is strongly imbued with a clear Islamist discourse serves here as an instru-
ment to dominate and discipline in the framework of a relationship charac-
terized by patronage and dependency. This discourse reinforces the process 
of disciplining by stressing values like patience and gratitude toward what is 
accorded to them by God, and the concomitant condemnation of jealousy, 
envy and greed.67 A certain emphasis on work ethics and a moral condem-
f I n a n c I a l  a n d  I n - k I n d  a I d
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   265 05-02-2008   11:13:42
266
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
nation of idleness and “unjustified” begging also forms a part of the same 
discourse.68 Benefits offered by the ICCS centers to the clients are donated 
by others “for the sake of God.” This implies that they are ultimately to be 
regarded as gifts from God Himself. We see here that patterns of disciplining 
are grounded in a duty-based religious discourse. This discourse presumes 
that if people of all economic strata observe such duties toward God, peace 
and harmony will prevail in society.
The institutionalized dissemination of this discourse by ICCS centers 
may contribute to the relatively high degree of discipline taking place at its 
distributions of financial and in-kind assistance, besides their rational proce-
dures of aid distribution. However, the fact that not all families are as faithful 
in sending their children to the educational courses of Al-‘Abura Center also 
indicates the limits of this disciplinary approach. As will be illustrated in the 
chapter on childhood development development activities, this failure can 
in large measure be attributed to these families’ need to prioritize imme-
diate economic survival over the need to attend the Center’s educational 
programs.
Other Associations
The Identification of Needy Beneficiaries
In terms of formal and socio-economic criteria, the selection proc-
ess of needy clients among voluntary Associations not involved (or to a 
significantly lesser extent involved) in The Muslim Brotherhood-dominated 
network is not largely different. For, social workers of non-Islamist associa-
tions also pay home-visits to aid applicants, collect the necessary papers 
from them, make use of relations in the local community based upon social 
trust to help in the process of verification of need, and so on. What is differ-
ent is that, unlike those with connections to The Muslim Brotherhood, these 
associations are not established on the basis of a well-defined political and/
or religious ideology and doctrine; and thus, they are generally less prone 
to discriminate in the selection process of beneficiaries along religious or 
political lines. This is not to say, of course, that discrimination along differ-
ent lines – ethnicity, tribe or family – does not play a role. Voluntary associa-
tions of different backgrounds have different (but possibly also overlapping) 
social networks that will have different impacts on the selection process.
There is nothing uniquely Islamist about concern with the moral rep-
utation of aid applicants. Any association that is serious about reaching out 
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to the needy also cares about its own reputation and likes to be sure that 
any aid provided will truly satisfy needs. Conversely, no association likes the 
idea of inadvertently financing criminal or “immoral” practices in the local 
community. Moreover, not being Islamist or Muslim Brotherhood-oriented 
does not necessarily mean being less pious. Moral considerations regarding 
the selection of beneficiaries may very well play a part in a similar religious 
discourse as that engaged in by The Brotherhood-affiliated associations.
The Islamic Welfare Society of Salt, for instance, mainly focuses on 
activities relating to (largely religious) education and training. However, it 
also distributes aid to the needy on an occasional basis, in particular during 
Ramadan. The Society tries to implement the principle of “narrowing the 
gap between rich and poor” by selecting as beneficiaries the severest of 
cases from among the needy families in Salt. This includes orphan or father-
less families without children of working age, widows lacking support, poor 
families with a sick or disabled father, but also families in which the father is 
an alcoholic and/or (criminal) prisoner.69
Approaches toward Aid Distribution
Small associations usually do not have the means at their disposal to 
build up a structural relationship with needy clients in which disciplinary 
processes take place frequently and over a long period of time. However, 
patterns of dependency, inequality in power and status as well as discipline 
can also be observed at the events of aid distribution that such associations 
organize on an occasional basis.
I attended one distribution of in-kind assistance during Ramadan that 
was held by the Association of the Righteous in Jabal Luweibdeh – a rela-
tively old neighborhood in Amman inhabited by mainly middle class peo-
ple though also counting a number of needy families – where the social 
gap between the association’s members and the recipients was imme-
diately obvious. This women’s association consists of a kindergarten that 
charges relatively low fees, and of religious courses on subjects relating 
to the Qur’an and Hadith for adult women. When I arrived at the kinder-
garten, between one and two dozen shopping bags containing food items 
such as rice, yogurt, sugar and chicken were placed in the small schoolyard. 
Needy recipients, always mothers or children, came to take these bags. The 
association’s members took great care that everyone got the right portion 
and sometimes quizzed the beneficiaries on details regarding the family, to 
make sure that the correct amount of aid would go to the correct benefici-
aries. After the sound of the mu’adhdhin from the mosque, the festive part 
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of the event began in the form of the ’iftar meal, which breaks the fast after 
sunset. The meal was shared among the inner friendship circle of association 
members, who, if their rounds of laughter were anything to judge by, clearly 
enjoyed it. The poor beneficiaries were entirely absent from this occasion.70
The humanistic orientation of the more progressive Al-Faruq Society 
for Orphans in Irbid is also reflected in their ideas and practices related to 
aid distribution. In contrast to other such associations, the Society takes the 
perspective of the client family seriously. Thus the form distributed to all 
applicants includes a question on “The family’s view on how to solve their 
own state of (economic and social) vulnerability.”71 Such a question is not 
to be found on the social investigation forms of ICCS centres like Al-‘Abura. 
Seemingly, Al-Faruq Society gives greater room to the subjective experi-
ences and views of its clients, and does not try to marginalize these in the 
name of an “objective” duty-based religious discourse instructing them to 
be patient and thankful. The Society’s board members are also well aware of 
potential feelings of humiliation which being a needy client of charitable aid 
entails. To avoid such feelings in the distribution process as much as possi-
ble, they let the orphan-families open their own bank accounts and transfer 
the monthly financial benefits to the family in question. The Society does 
not object to personal visits by donors, who like to have a better idea about 
who they are supporting, to client-families. Al-Faruq Society itself arranges 
such visits, similar to the ICCS.72
The relatively humanistic and rights-oriented approach of Al-Faruq 
Society also translates itself in its policy regarding aid in kind. Clients are 
summoned to its premises only if there is a large amount of goods, such as 
food, clothes, blankets, mattresses or heaters, to distribute. This is especially 
the case during Ramadan, or when it concerns items for protection against 
the cold during the winter, such as blankets and stoves. Such central distri-
butions take place in the school building of the association in the Palestinian 
refugee camp of Irbid.
The Society tries to integrate such distributions into its vision of the 
empowerment and the human dignity of its recipients. It does so by involv-
ing mothers of client families in the distribution activity. In this way, it tries 
to strengthen the relationship between the association and the client pop-
ulation and to smooth communication between the two sides. One such 
mother told me that it gave her a good feeling to do something in return 
for the association. Volunteering in distribution activity also has a social 
dimension: the mother in question heard from other orphan mothers dur-
ing the distribution about their experiences and problems. When needed, 
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she referred them to the president of the association to discuss such matters 
with him.73
In the case of small amounts of goods for distribution, Al-Faruq Soci-
ety’s workers will prefer to bring them to the houses of the people them-
selves, since they regard it as “humiliating” and “shameful” for them, in the 
words of the president, to insist that they must always make the trip to the 
association to pick it up. There is also the practical consideration that there 
are client-families that live in faraway places, like villages. The association 
will always bring their share of aid-in kind to their houses.74
Practical considerations of distance also play a role in aid distribution 
practices of other associations, including Islamist ones. The members of the 
Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association in Zarqa and those of the Southern 
Society for Special Education in Ma‘an also bring aid to client-families who 
live in faraway villages.75 A very different form of aid-distribution from door 
to door is practiced by the Orthodox Welfare Association in Fuheis. Besides 
distributing financial gifts to a few dozen needy families at the time of 
Christmas and of Easter, it distributes Christmas presents to them at Christ-
mas time. Members of the association dressed as Father Christmas will go to 
their houses and hand over the presents.76
Satisfaction of Needs
If ICCS centers for orphans and poor – part of an extensive Islamist 
network capable of mustering vast resources of money, expertise and prof-
itable social relations – are not able to adequately satisfy the basic needs 
of their clients, it is not surprising that other NGOs lacking such networks 
cannot do so either.
Despite their limitations, services provided by these voluntary asso-
ciations often do make a significant difference to the lives of needy people. 
This is especially the case regarding the financially, organizationally and 
socially stronger associations. A single and divorced mother and her son 
who are clients of Al-Faruq Society, for instance, receive a monthly benefit 
of 20 Jordanian Dinar from this Society, on top of a monthly benefit of 50 
Jordanian Dinar from the Government-run National Aid Fund. This finan-
cial aid is several times a year supplemented by the Society in the form of 
in-kind assistance, such as food, clothes and medicines. Al-Faruq Society’s 
health center provides the mother with medicines free-of-charge for her 
psychological treatment. Meanwhile, at the beginning of each school year, 
her son receives a schoolbag from the Society with the necessary stationary 
for study. At the time of fieldwork, the Society even intended to enable them 
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to travel and and settle in Pakistan, where her father’s family lives, by paying 
for the airplane tickets.77 
Enabling Aid, Waiving Fees and Offering Discounts
No clear-cut difference in the practical translation of Islamic social 
ethics pertaining to the duty of the strong to help the weak, and the bridg-
ing of the gaps between rich and poor, can be detected between, on the one 
hand, Islamist associations like the ICCS and, on the other, non-Islamist ones, 
like Al-Faruq Society and its peers.
The Al-Faruq Society has made efforts to integrate principles of 
(Islamic) social solidarity in its institutional setup.78 It holds, for instance, a 
fund allocated to young orphan-boys and girls that excel academically so 
that they receive higher level vocational training or even university educa-
tion.79 Moreover, the educational center that the Society runs tries to imple-
ment the concept of social solidarity by allowing children from orphan 
families to enroll in its school-classes free-of-charge, and offers discounts 
to non-orphan children from poor families. This center consists of a primary 
school, a kindergarten and a nursery. Indeed, most children receiving an 
education there are not clients of the Society, but come from families of vari-
ous socio-economic backgrounds in the Palestinian refugee camp of Irbid 
and its vicinity. As is the case with the ICCS run schools, the preservation of 
educational quality requires sufficient income for the educational center. To 
a large extent, this income is provided by parents who are capable of paying 
the monthly tuition-fees of 12 JD for their children.80 Thus, the percentage 
of orphan children allowed to enroll free-of-charge does not exceed 20% in 
each school class. In the words of the Society’s president: “every four chil-
dren at the school have to subsidize one orphan-child.” True to the principle 
of serving the weakest first, orphans from the largest and poorest families 
– since these suffer most from school-expenses – are the first to be granted 
free entry. However, the Society claims that it can afford only one child per 
orphan family on a free-of-charge basis. The client families do receive sup-
port from the Society in meeting the costs related to education in schools in 
general, such as books, stationary and uniforms. Al-Faruq Society also admits 
a limited number of non-orphan poor children to its educational center on 
the basis of a discount of between 30 and 50% of the tuition fees.81
Al-Faruq Society’s medical center also endeavours to put the prin-
ciple of social solidarity into concrete practice. This center functions as a 
polyclinic offering services in fields like general medicine, gynecology, pedi-
atrics, dentistry and physiotherapy. All orphan children and their mothers 
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are admitted to it free-of-charge. Other patients pay according to their level 
of income. And many pay only half the amount the price that regular private 
clinics charge.82 Like ICCS centers, clients can participate on a free-of-charge 
basis in the social, cultural and vocational courses and trainings offered by 
Al-Faruq Society.83
There are also examples of associations that waive fees or offer dis-
counts to needy persons that are supported by other people or institutions 
with which the particular association enjoys a cooperative relationship. A 
case in point is the sewing course offered by the Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Wel-
fare Association in Amman. Any woman living in Wadi Sir, where the associa-
tion is located, can participate in this course, irrespective of socio-economic 
status. In principle, the fee for a participant is 5 JD. Some participants are 
poor, however, and thus exempted from paying. They are often mothers of 
orphans who live in an orphanage with which the association maintains a 
close relationship. In such cases, the orphanage pays the fees for the moth-
ers in question to the Anwar Al-Huda Association.84 To enable its own needy 
clients to obtain medical aid, this association makes use of its local social 
networks as well. Members of the association ask doctors or pharmacies in 
Wadi Sir with whom they are familiar to provide medicine free-of-charge to 
their clients. Such requests are often successful, as long as the treatments 
do not become long-term.85
As a final example of offering aid free-of-charge and implementing 
the Islamic principle of selfless caring for the weak, the role of associations 
running orphanage institutions should be mentioned. Accepting children 
who miss both, or one of their parents, and whose families are financially 
unable to take care of them, these institutions provide housing, nutrition, 
clothes, health care, upbringing, education and leisure activities to orphans 
for free. In exceptional cases, children whose parents are both alive but suf-
fer in conditions of extreme poverty are also accepted.86
The Question of Ideological Manipulation
Do non-Islamist associations, such as Al-Faruq Society, also manipu-
late the aid relationship they have with their clients? In the case of Al-Faruq 
Society, we find the same essential ingredients – a dependency based rela-
tionship between, on the one hand, a predominantly middle class group 
of service providers and, on the other, a group of economically, socially 
and often psychologically vulnerable clients – as exist between the Islam-
ist NGOs and their clients. Such a relationship also gives Al-Faruq Society a 
degree of (paternalistic) power over its clients’ lives and an ability to push 
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the latter to change in a direction that is considered best for them. In terms 
of influence, the fact that the Society’s president regards himself explicitly 
as a “father” figure for the orphans is telling.87 While donations to Al-Faruq 
Society’s orphan clients are not meant to finance a program of “obligatory 
schooling” for the latter, as is the case with the ICCS, it does offer its client 
families courses on topics like religion, hygiene and the upbringing of chil-
dren designed by organizations like UNICEF.88 A client family that needs the 
Society’s aid badly may, psychologically speaking, have difficulty with open-
ly resisting such offers, since it will prefer to satisfy rather than disturb the 
relationship with the Society’s members and workers.89 In other words, even 
if their means and discourse differ, Al Faruq Society, like the ICCS, utilizes its 
aid-relationship with its clients to promote its own vision of what is best for 
society as a whole. While “promoting” does not mean the same as “imposing,” 
by virtue of being the main provider of aid, Al-Faruq Society seems to be in a 
position of power to induce clients to do what it likes them to do.
Conclusion
Financial aid and aid in kind to needy people is by nature strongly 
dependency-reinforcing. We have spoken of simple and direct forms of aid 
helping the beneficiaries to survive and to enjoy certain essential daily serv-
ices (in particular, those services associated with health and education). The 
importance of such services to the lives and even the life chances of the 
needy should not be underestimated. Though underfunded and hence lim-
ited in their power to do good, they provide food, clothing, education and 
medical aid to people who would otherwise lack such essentials. However, 
the voluntary association determines the criteria of eligibility, the mode of 
distribution and the following-up on aid. The recipients, in turn, passively 
receive as far as the aid itself is concerned.
Being in the position of aid provider to dependent needy clients 
provides associations with a degree of disciplinary power over the former. 
This is especially true for larger associations that have enough resources 
to entertain an ongoing and structural aid relationship with clients. Since 
a relationship of socio-economic inequality and dependency between 
middle class based voluntary associations and needy recipients is a given, 
however, the question of the aim of using disciplinary power as well as its 
mode of using it is essential here. Discipline is not, by definition, humiliat-
ing or degrading to one’s sense of dignity. Even Michel Foucault, the most 
prominent critic of (the evils of ) modern disciplinary power structures has 
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observed that (disciplinary) power “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that 
says no…it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowl-
edge, produces discourse.” According to Foucault, it is for these reasons that 
people who are subjected to disciplinary power consent with and accept it.90 
I would like to add to this observation that, while discipline often serves to 
reinforce dependency, it may also be instrumental in empowering people, 
as is reflected in the NGOs’ financial support and their own services in the 
fields of education, health care, culture and (vocational) training.
Especially in the case of the Islamist NGOs, disciplinary practices are 
used to cultivate a dependency relationship between needy clients who are 
often deemed socially and religiously “ignorant,” and NGO members and 
workers who claim to “know better.” This dependency-based relationship 
is utilized to expose these clients to a religious discourse that emphasizes 
human dependency on God. The discourse claims to empower needy people 
to improve their chances in this life as well as in the hereafter by inculcating 
values – i.e. patience, thankfulness, learning and work ethics, good manners 
and love for others – that are derived from an equally dependent relation-
ship with the divine. The pious and balanced Islamic personality is empow-
ered to attain true happiness and success. The ICCS tries to contribute to this 
endeavor by utilizing the aid relationship with the needy clients to educate 
them in this vein and “make them progress” in religious consciousness, the 
quality of family life, the upbringing of children, school education, health 
and hygiene, moral behavior in public life, etc. This topic will be dealt with 
in greater detail in Chapters 13 and 14. It is the proclaimed knowledge gap 
between ICCS members and workers on the one hand and the clients on the 
other that serves as a justification for practices of discipline reinforcing a 
relationship of dependency.
The emphasis placed on discipline by small associations that provide 
aid on an occasional basis to needy clients is largely confined to procedural 
matters. Such matters pertain to a selection of deserving beneficiaries as 
well as to the distribution of, and following-up on, the aid itself. Even among 
them, however, religiously legitimized moral interference in the beneficiar-
ies’ lives on issues – an interest, for instance, in how money is spent, or in how 
family relationships are conducted – may occur, albeit in a less institutional-
ized form than within a large association like the ICCS. For the smaller asso-
ciations, it rather takes place through the admonishment towards certain 
ethical choices of clients on an individual basis (at the association’s office or 
through home visits), and not through group activities and courses.91
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The more secular and developmentalist discourse of Al-Faruq Society 
emphasizes the empowerment of the needy as a goal in itself. This goes 
hand in hand with attempts to minimize the humiliation that a relationship 
that is entirely dependent on financial and in-kind aid entails. In its view, 
empowering the poor must take place through methods emphasizing the 
clients’ rights and possibilities, instead of coercive means practiced by an 
ICCS center like Al-‘Abura that go hand in hand with a stronger discursive 
emphasis on duty.
As regards the modes of discipline involved in Jordanian aid distribu-
tion, we see that there exist patterns of legal-rational as well as traditional 
authority in Max Weber’s understanding of these terms.92 Legal rational 
authority can be observed in practices like the use of formally uniform cri-
teria and procedures in the identification of eligible beneficiaries, in the 
following-up on aid and the rational norms of fair distribution. Traditional 
authority, of a more personal nature, can be discerned in the usage of the 
personal social status of some of the association’s members or workers (a 
good example is the respected imam who also works as a social investigator 
for Al-‘Abura Center). It can also be discerned in contacts with authorita-
tive figures in the neighborhood in the process of verifying need. The same 
goes for the role of the Associations’ president or director as a dominant 
father (in the case of women’s associations mother) figure to whom clients 
are directly referred to discuss certain problems, requests and questions and 
the moral surveillance of clients by the association’s workers. The role of 
personal interaction between donors and association members in the proc-
ess of disciplining clients to let them participate in educational programs at 
ICCS center Al-‘Abura illustrates the same pattern of personal authority.
To summarize, the legal-rational form of the Muslim voluntary asso-
ciations’ practices in the realm of financial and in-kind assistance contains 
much traditional and personal authority in its daily substance. While the 
extent and form of disciplining differs from association to association, no 
clear difference can be established in the choice of Islamic concepts and ter-
minology. All of them share a common lexicon that speaks of giving to the 
needy fi sabil li-llah, of the value of harmony, patience, care (takaful), love 
(mahabbah) and mutual tolerance (tasamuh), as well as of the need to nar-
row the gap between rich and poor and of serving the weakest to achieve 
this. It is the contrasting ways in which such concepts relate to their aid 
practices as well as to their interaction, or the lack thereof, with non-Islamic 
development actors and approaches that differences between the various 
associations can be discerned.
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12.  Employment-Oriented 
Activities
 
Apart from direct aid, representatives of many voluntary associations 
also underline their efforts to enable their clients to become economically 
independent. In part, these efforts are motivated by the ethical conviction 
that self-reliance and the economic empowerment of the needy is prefer-
able to allowing them to remain in a state of dependency. This conviction 
is often supported by (and rationalized through) Islamic beliefs regarding 
human dignity. Murad al-Adeileh of the ICCS Social Care Council (the super-
visory body of all ICCS centers for orphans and poor in the Kingdom) argues, 
for instance, that remaining a passive recipient of aid is, in the long run, 
bad for one’s dignity. Those who are able to rely upon themselves to make 
a living must be encouraged to do so. He considers the hadith in which the 
Prophet Muhammad states that whoever meets a hungry person asking for 
help should give him an axe to earn his own bread, rather than a piece of 
bread to eat, an important religious basis for the idea of economic empow-
erment and self-reliance. Many members of other Islamic voluntary asso-
ciations agree.1 On another level, working for economic empowerment is 
also motivated by the associations’ desire to decrease the number of clients 
dependent on their financial and in kind aid, and thereby to save their own 
resources.2
Activities to find employment-opportunities for clients by associa-
tions might be divided into three different types: a) offering opportunities 
for vocational training; b) looking for jobs in the labor market; c) sponsoring 
income-generating projects. In this chapter, these three types of activities, 
undertaken by various associations, will be described. Limited empirical 
observations could be made regarding some of these projects. Information 
on others is drawn mainly from interviews. It should be born in mind that 
here is presented a record of these associations’ discourse on themselves, 
rather than an objective external assessment of their efficacy and/or suc-
cess.
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Vocational Training
Vocational training services provided by voluntary associations can-
not be put into perspective without mentioning the role of the state in 
this field. The state is actively concerned with providing young Jordanian 
jobseekers, men and women alike, with skills required by the country’s job 
market. The government-run Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) fulfills 
this function. Moreover, in addition to lectures on various social and health 
issues pertaining to youth, the elderly, children and/or the family in general, 
the Community Development Centers of the Ministry for Social Develop-
ment, distributed throughout the Kingdom, offer vocational training pro-
grams in a wide variety of areas, such as sewing, weaving, computer skills, 
mechanics, shoe-making and hairdressing. Another task of the Ministry is to 
assist voluntary associations with setting up such training programs.3 Here, 
vocational training programs offered by NGOs may be regarded as supple-
mentary to state policies and programs.
Remarkable in the case of the Muslim voluntary welfare associations 
dealt with in this study is the overwhelming number of courses designed for 
female trainees. All the associations who have set up such programs seem 
to provide courses, in fields like sewing, tricot, embroidery, hairdressing, 
food preparation, glass painting and typing, exclusively for women. Some of 
these associations are run entirely by women, others are generally male-run, 
but employ female staff.4 Apparently, Muslim Voluntary Associations attach 
a high priority to the development women’s vocational skills to enable them 
to play a useful role in contributing to the family income, even though these 
skills can often be regarded as traditionally female.5
Some of the vocational training courses by associations have only a 
certain category of women as their target, such as orphan girls or women 
from broken and poor families. Other associations emphasize that their 
courses are open to any interested woman living in the area the association 
is serving, regardless of socio-economic status. Muslim associations offer-
ing such programs also emphasise that their Islamic nature generally has 
a reassuring impact upon traditional Muslim families who may otherwise 
be reluctant to let their daughters go outdoors to participate in vocational 
training. This is the case because Islamic associations are expected to uphold 
certain moral values, such as gender separation and chastity.6 However, eco-
nomic need may in some cases bring lower class young Muslim women to 
follow training courses or to work in “non-Islamic” places as well. Some Mus-
lim women from Palestinian refugee camps, for instance, attend vocational 
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training courses provided by the Middle Eastern Council of Churches or even 
work in industrial companies that are largely Israeli-owned.7
Apart from skills considered gender-neutral, relating to computer 
usage for instance, Muslim associations obviously presume that only certain 
jobs and vocations befit men, while others naturally befit women. Attribut-
ing gender division and separation solely to the religious ideology of these 
associations would be misleading, however. Any association serving needy 
communities, whether it is religious or secular, foreign or local, has to take 
the cultural perceptions and sensitivities of its target group into considera-
tion.
The British development organization Questscope, for instance, which 
works for children from broken or socially weak families, also observes a 
clear-cut gender-based division regarding vocational training. It sends boys 
to the Vocational Training Corporation to train their technical skills, or helps 
them to establish small commercial ventures, while girls are trained in voca-
tions such as sewing, embroidery or cooking.8
The biggest project set up by an Islamic NGO in the area of vocational 
training is undoubtedly the Islamic Community College in Zarqa, run by the 
ICCS. This school for higher vocational education is open to female students 
only. There are around 1000 students and a wide variety of subjects, includ-
ing shari‘ah, social work, English, Arabic, Kindergarten teaching, pharmacy, 
sewing, accounting, computer-skills and management, are taught.9
Regarding ICCS centers for orphans and poor, most of their vocational 
training facilities are exclusively for girls and women, in particular orphans 
and widows. The Al-‘Abura Center has two vocational training workshops: 
one for sewing and tailoring and the other for the production of food, in 
particular pastries and sweets.10 Whether these workshops may be seen as 
part of a conscious endeavor to promote the economic empowerment of 
women is questionable: according to the head of the Center’s male depart-
ment, training in such fields is part of a teenage girl’s preparation for her 
future role as housewife. Food products as well as clothing produced at the 
center are marketed and sold. The women (mainly older orphan girls and 
their mothers) working there earn a modest salary.11 Some teachers at Al-
‘Abura’s vocational training center used to be orphan girls themselves and 
had initially been trained there, as the center’s male head of the educational 
department proudly mentioned.12 The food production instructor is a widow 
from the Al-Hussein refugee camp and a mother of orphans.13
Apart from its own vocational training programs, Al-‘Abura Center’s 
workers state that they arrange for places in government-run vocational 
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training centers for teenagers among the orphans, especially when they 
have difficulties with learning in a regular school. Orphans sent to exter-
nal training centers are almost always boys. Families of orphans are often 
reluctant to send their daughters to a center outside of the camp, due to 
traditional beliefs regarding gender roles.14
Other ICCS centers for orphans and the poor offer similar vocational 
training courses, in particular sewing and tricot.15 The center in Jabal al-
Zuhur, in southern Amman, also teaches hairdressing.16 Women and girls 
who follow training in sewing at the ICCS center in Al-Wihdat camp may 
receive a sewing machine in order to work at home to earn a living and 
become economically self-reliant, according to the director.17 In its brochure, 
the Social Care Council of the ICCS also mentions training courses preparing 
male orphans to work as carpenters, smith and electricians.18
So far, Al-Faruq Society in Irbid does not have workshop-facilities on 
its premises, although teenage orphan boys served by it may participate in 
training in certain technical skills, such as repair, carpentry and computer 
programming, at the Youth Center of Irbid Refugee Camp. Girls receive some 
training in sewing, cooking and assembling artificial flowers at the Society’s 
girls’ committee.19 Toward the end of my fieldwork period, at the beginning 
of 2004, the Society had plans to open a vocational training center for boys 
and girls, in fields such as computer program design and embroidery with 
the help of a state subsidy.20 The Al-Faruq Society, like the ICCS center Al-
‘Abura, reportedly looks for vocational training opportunities for orphan 
teenagers at external institutions, in particular for those who do not well in 
regular schools.21
Another special target group for vocational training by (Muslim) 
NGOs is the handicapped. The Young Women’s Muslim Association (YWMA), 
patronized by Princess Sarvath, has a vocational training program for men-
tally retarded youth who are educated in its special school. They are trained 
in skills such as weaving, gardening, ceramics and carpentry. During the first 
year, they receive introductory courses in all those vocations. Following that 
year it is decided, after consultation with the children and their parents, in 
which area they are going to specialize. Mentally retarded students earn 
the very modest amount of 15 JD a month with their work. In the case of 
piecework, they may earn up to 25 JD a month. Handicraft works produced 
by them are sold in bazaars.22
In some cases, associations working with deaf children also offer 
vocational training projects for the latter. At the medical center run by the 
Southern Society for Special Education in Ma‘an, a few young deaf women 
278
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   278 05-02-2008   11:13:43
are employed to produce hearing moulds, essential to the functioning of 
hearing aids, under the supervision of the centre’s staff.23 In 2003 and 4, the 
Al-’Aqsa Association in Madaba was planning to set up a new primary and 
secondary school for deaf girls in the town. For those of 15 years and older, 
a workshop for the making of hearing-moulds was to be built. Also a hair-
dressing saloon, a sewing workshop and a computer lab, each of them for 
training-purposes, were planned for these girls.24
Several other voluntary welfare associations offer vocational train-
ing courses to the general public, in particular women.25 The sewing course 
offered by the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association goes some way 
towards fulfilling the stated goal of “raising the status of women.” Accord-
ing to workers at the association, 50 women in total had obtained a certifi-
cate in its sewing course by 2001.26 The course is open to all women who 
are interested; the needy may participate for free. Repairing as well as tai-
loring clothes is taught to the participants, as the workers told me. This is 
meant to enable them to work and sell at home, a convenience for mothers 
and housewives. After obtaining the certificate, the women can turn to the 
Women’s Income Fund, a governmental institution, for a loan to buy a Tricot-
sewing machine for themselves.27 The-all male Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa associa-
tion in Amman reportedly finances the participation in sewing courses and 
the provision of sewing machines to young girls from needy families with 
the aim of providing them with a source of income.28 The Islamic Welfare 
Society in Salt offers computer courses to young men and women, in order 
to enhance their skills in programs such as Windows, Word, and Excell, and 
in navigating the Internet. The certificates participants obtain often helps 
them gain access to secretarial jobs in the public or the private sector.29
Looking for Jobs
Apart from training orphans, the poor and needy for the labor market, 
several NGOs make efforts to find jobs for clients through mediation and the 
utilizing of social networks. In particular, associations with an extensive net-
work including donors and others working in business or enjoying strong 
ties with employers are successful in this endeavor. Associations focusing 
on continuous care for and development of children and youth, in particu-
lar orphans, seem to be most active in finding jobs for them once the latter 
have reached adulthood. Smaller associations with a more limited donor 
network and/or a less intensive contact with client families seem to have 
less capability or incentive to carry out this task for the clients.30
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ICCS centers have an extensive network involving members, workers, 
donors, clients or relatives who are well placed at several types of businesses 
or other employing institutions. Orphan and poor children may find jobs 
there once they reach 15 years old. In Al-‘Abura Center, jobs may even be 
found for children of a younger age who do not do well in school, provided 
that the workplace is “trustworthy.” Requests from families of orphans to find 
a job mostly occurs in the case of boys, but sometimes also with girls.31 The 
supervisor of the female section of Al-‘Abura Center singles out two main 
responsibilities as: “finding job opportunities for those who would rather 
work than study, and teaching them a profession to work with.”32
The director of the ICCS center for poor and orphans in Al-Wihdat 
refugee camp claims that computer courses provided by his center enables 
many orphans, boys as well as girls, to work in places like printing shops, 
graphic design companies and as secretaries in offices. As he told me, upon 
graduating some orphans from its computer courses will be employed by 
the Center itself before later finding work elsewhere. Likewise, there are 
orphans who first find a job as a teacher in the center, and are later employed 
as a teacher in a school.33
Al-Faruq Society in Irbid also tries to find jobs for its orphan clients. 
It insists, however, that they must have completed their education or voca-
tional training first. Jobs are found in various fields: technical jobs mostly 
for orphan boys; factory work for boys as well as for girls (unlike Al-‘Abura 
Center); and jobs for both sexes in the educational and health sector.34 Find-
ing jobs for their clients is not always easy, according to the workers. It is 
particularly hard to find something for them in the public sector, because 
prevailing wastah practices put Palestinian job seekers at a distinct disad-
vantage. Al-Faruq Society is more successful in finding jobs for their orphan 
clients in the private sector, where it enjoys significantly stronger social 
connections.35 According to the president, two dozen orphan families have 
benefited from such mediation efforts by the Society.36 Like ICCS centers, 
Al-Faruq Society deals with children who have learning problems at regular 
schools and helps them to find a place in a vocational school or training 
center. Unlike the ICCS, however, letting children at school age drop out and 
work instead in certain places considered to be “trustworthy” is something 
the Al-Faruq Society rejects out of principle. For the sake of their future, 
children must learn and train first, the Society insists.37
Some voluntary associations point to the people they themselves 
employ as proof of their commitment to alleviating unemployment and 
poverty. Such employees may otherwise have been jobless and destitute. 
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The president of Al-Faruq Society points to the dozens of doctors, nurses, 
teachers and other personnel working in its health and educational cent-
ers.38 Likewise, the President of the Southern Society for Special Education in 
Ma‘an points to its 60 employees – including audiologists, physiotherapists, 
speech therapists, computer training teachers, school teachers, outreach 
workers, doctors, nurses and assisting staff – to show that his Society makes 
a valuable contribution in generating employment and providing income 
to families.39 Given the high rate of unemployment in Jordan, which stands 
officially at 15%, and the practices of wastah prevalent in the public sector, 
it is probable that some voluntary associations do provide jobs to skilled 
persons from the middle classes who otherwise would have great difficulty 
in finding employment suitable to their training or educational level.
Income-Generating Projects
More purposeful and deliberate in terms of economic empowerment 
and providing jobs to the needy are income-generating projects aimed to 
foster economic self-reliance and productivity among poor and/or unem-
ployed families. In such projects, a needy family receives capital in the 
form of a loan, a gift and possibly also equipment from a governmental or 
non-governmental institution in order to set up a business. Empowering 
the needy socio-economically is an aim advocated by the Jordanian state 
as well as by Jordan’s foreign donors and development partners. We may 
even speak of a state-promoted discursive trend in which traditional alms 
giving is regarded as a necessary evil at best, and as a negative dependency-
reinforcing practice at worst. According to this discourse, the ultimate aim 
of social care and support for the needy must be their socio-economic self-
reliance.40
This topic of discourse is translated into actual policies. In 2003, for 
instance, the National Aid Fund, a branch of the Ministry for Social Develop-
ment that provides monthly financial allowances to families deprived of any 
income out of work, embarked on a new policy according to which finan-
cial support for jobless families is conditioned upon the readiness of their 
able members to participate in vocational training or income-generating 
projects.41 The Ministry makes use of NGOs to carry out income-generating 
projects for needy families. Its Community Development Centers, present 
in various urban neighborhoods and rural areas, have the task of support-
ing NGOs financially and through their technical expertise and experience 
gained from establishing and running these projects.42
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During my last meeting with the accountant of the Islamic Bani Has-
san Welfare Association in Zarqa, he spoke enthusiastically about concrete 
plans to establish some 15 income-generating projects in cooperation with 
the Ministry of Social Development. It is, however, not only the state that 
tries to pursue policies of fostering socio-economic self-reliance. Already in 
the 1970s, debates on how to shift from a traditional welfare approach to 
a modern development approach had grown increasingly popular within 
Jordanian intellectual circles, the government, the media and the NGO sec-
tor alike (see Chapter 6). Ideas on modern social development and fostering 
self-reliance were put into practice on a large scale by the royal NGOs.
The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) 
has, since the end of the 1970s, focused on establishing income-generating 
projects with the general aim of strengthening the grip of needy families 
and communities on their own socio-economic situation. The Fund’s under-
lying philosophy is the promotion of democratic values of participation in 
social and political development. Its credit program provides loans, as well 
as advice and training, to jobless families in order to enable them to estab-
lish small businesses in the sphere of agriculture, food production, handi-
craft making, cattle-raising, sewing, repairing clothes and the like. The loans 
are provided either directly by the Fund or through smaller local NGOs.43 
Hundreds of such projects have been established. Especially women are 
targeted as potential micro-finance entrepreneurs. According to the Fund’s 
figures from 1997, 512 families benefited from its home-gardening project 
alone.44
Virtually all of the Muslim NGOs included in this study are, in one way 
or another, also affected by this debate. Several of them have been engaged 
in setting up income-generating projects for the needy. Thus, representa-
tives of NGOs, e.g. the ICCS, the Al-Faruq Society in Irbid, the Islamic Wel-
fare Society in Salt, and the Al-’Aqsa Association in Madaba are all able to 
mention implemented projects, such as the provision of sewing machines 
to needy clients, and providing credits or grants to needy families to set 
up businesses. Such businesses may be in the spheres of stock-breeding 
(cows, sheep or rabbits), or of agriculture (farming of thyme, lentils, barley 
or medicinal herbs as well as beekeeping). They may also consist of grocery 
stores or other kinds of shops or of workplaces, in fields like shoe-making, 
or photography.
The extent to which these projects succeed in bringing their benefici-
aries out of the cycle of poverty, improving their situation in terms of income 
and, most importantly, empowering them in terms of socio-economic capa-
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bilities and opportunities cannot be established with any degree of certainty 
on the basis of the findings of this research.45 Some NGOs are candid enough 
to admit that some projects are less successful than others, and that some of 
them fail outright. This was the case with agricultural projects set up under 
the supervision of Al-Faruq Society in Irbid, for instance.
Apart from the sheep-raising and bee-keeping projects, the agricul-
tural projects did not last. Families running them worked on land rented by 
the Society from landowners on the basis of a contract of 5 years. Their rev-
enues turned out not to be sufficiently profitable. Only the sheep-breeding 
and beekeeping farms have lasted until the present day, since the families in 
question have been able to buy the land on which they worked.46
Nawal Al-Fa‘uri of Al-’Aqsa Assocation in Madaba speaks about ten 
families, whose only or main breadwinners are women, that were helped 
by her association in setting up income-generating projects in the sphere 
of stockbreeding, gardening or agriculture, through the provision of micro-
credits, support and counsel. It also arranges for the training of the par-
ticipant women in fields like management and marketing with institutions 
like the Ministry of Planning or the General Federation of Jordanian Women. 
According to Al-Fa‘uri, the projects are, generally speaking, doing well, but 
she admits that success varies “depending on the possibilities and capabili-
ties of the families involved.”47
There is reason to believe that (lack of ) experience and knowledge 
from the side of NGOs themselves is another decisive factor in the (lack of ) 
success of income-generating projects. Strong will and motivation on the 
part of the NGO are by themselves insufficient guarantees for successful 
development efforts, after all. Walid Hammad mentions in his book on Jor-
danian women’s NGOs and sustainable development the constraints these 
NGOs are facing, such as lack of financial means, training, accounting skills 
and fund raising ability as hampering factors in such efforts, especially in the 
case of smaller associations.48
Interviews with such associations’ representatives make clear, how-
ever, that there is an active interest on their part in making a fundamental 
difference to the lives of needy beneficiaries. This they plan to do by helping 
them establish income-generating projects, and learning from past mistakes 
in order to make these more successful. By the time of fieldwork, Al-Faruq 
Society had decided to adopt a program of providing credits to the orphan 
families to set up their own business projects, instead of the grants it used 
to provide in the past. Its members had reached the conclusion that provid-
ing loans gives more of an incentive to those families to make their efforts, 
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since they will have to earn the money lent back to them. This will give these 
families the sense that the project is, in its entirety, the result of their own 
efforts – psychologically favorable in terms of building self-worth and dig-
nity and, therefore, of generating success.49 According to the Society’s rep-
resentatives, it was contacts with international humanitarian organizations 
that gave them the push to start anew with income-generating projects on 
the basis of micro-credit.50
Principled reflection on how to go about establishing such projects 
also takes place at a value rational level and may involve religious discourse. 
Al-Faruq Society clearly shows itself as a religiously inspired Muslim asso-
ciation when it voices objection to the fact that the GUVS credit program 
involves the taking of interest.51 After all, such an objection is motivated 
purely in terms of Islamic principles. During one of my visits, the president 
of the Society was arguing with one of the other staff members about tak-
ing credits from a bank and, more specifically, whether this had been done 
in the “Islamic way.”52 In the eyes of Al-Faruq Society’s members, however, 
religious rules in this instance do not simply apply for their own sake; rather, 
they argue that, for their poor beneficiaries, it is often difficult if not impossi-
ble to pay back the interest. In their view, such down-to earth considerations 
of social solidarity are intertwined with religious ethics.53
The same Islamic socio-ethical considerations regarding the issue 
of charging interest could be heard at the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Associa-
tion, working for teenage school-dropout girls in a working class area of 
the industrial city of Zarqa, as was mentioned already in Chapter 10. This 
association has a handicraft-workplace in which the girls as well as their 
mothers participate. Activities taking place there include embroidery, glass 
painting and other forms of popular art. The double aim of this project is to 
provide the participants with a source of income and to enhance their sense 
of dignity and self esteem. The associations’ members told me that the prod-
ucts of the handicraft program are sold at fairs in various institutions, such 
as schools with which the association members maintain personal contacts, 
the Zarqa department of the Ministry for Social Development and the Zakah 
Fund, which resorts under the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.54 Half of 
the profits are paid as wages to the participating girls and mothers, and the 
other half goes to the treasury of the Association.55 At the time of fieldwork, 
the association bought the raw materials for the girls and their mothers. In 
order to make the women in question more independent, the association 
hoped to be able to obtain funds for (riba’-free) credits to enable the women 
to buy the necessary materials and items by themselves.56 With the help of 
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British development association Questscope, it tried to obtain such funds 
from an international church-based NGO like CARITAS.
In the case of the Al-’Aqsa Association in Madaba too do we see the 
connection between cooperation with a variety of development actors, 
including governmental and foreign institutions, and a strong motivation 
to carry out projects of economic empowerment. The Association’s projects’ 
credits are financed by the Ministry of Social Development, the GUVS, the 
Jordanian Hashemite Fund and the Canadian Embassy.57 Al-Fa‘uri motivates 
her social development activities with the conviction that Islam means 
working for change for the better and a willingness to learn from the outside 
(including non-Muslim) world to that end.58
These examples of development-oriented Muslim NGOs, who all 
belong to the category of progressive NGOs dealt with in chapter 10, show 
that there is no inevitable contradiction between, on the one hand, a mod-
ern, empowerment-oriented development approach and cooperation with 
transnational development actors from inside as well as from without the 
Muslim world and, on the other hand, profound adherence to religious con-
victions and a pious lifestyle, in spite of widespread assumptions that reli-
gion induces one to charity rather than to development. Representatives 
of the Al-’Aqsa Association and of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association, 
for instance, refer to the Qur’anic exhortation “’Iqra’!” (“Read!”), which they 
interpret to mean development through learning and openness to the outer 
world and to new ideas and methods, as well as to Qur’anic verses related to 
respecting the dignity of the needy as a religious legitimation for develop-
ment.
As regards Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated NGOs, the ICCS is by far the 
largest of all Muslim NGOs in the Kingdom with an extensive resource-base 
in terms of money, training, skills and social networks. Some of the ICCS 
centers for orphans and poor sponsor income-generating projects for their 
client families through the provision of loans.59 Critics of the Islamist move-
ment are often skeptical regarding ICCS’ genuine interest (and success) in 
empowering needy families. In the words of a local social worker of the 
UNRWA working in Irbid-refugee-camp:
If they [ICCS representatives] talk about self-reliance and income-generating 
projects for the needy, it is only because this is regime policy and discourse, 
and they need to follow that. Their leaders are not really interested in a last-
ing improvement of the living circumstances of their clients. By the way, they 
themselves are privileged and living in expensive villas. 
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Janine Clark states that the ICCS “focuses predominantly on charity 
activities and not on development efforts per se.” 60 Asef Bayat, an expert on 
civil society and social movements in the Muslim world, maintains the same 
in the case of Islamist NGOs in Egypt.61
In the case of the Jordanian ICCS, this picture lacks nuance. As indi-
cated in this chapter, ICCS centers do have vocational training facilities and 
income-generating projects aimed at the economic empowerment of the 
needy. They also uphold a religious discourse that strongly emphasizes 
educational and work ethics and social and economic self-reliance as a 
way for the needy to regain their dignity and improve their prospects and 
circumstances in life. Examples of this discourse can be found in the ICCS 
newsletter Al-Kheir wal-‘Ata, as when it advertises the opening of new com-
puterlabs by ICCS-centers for orphans and the poor, for instance, or these 
centers’ scouting activities. They can also be found in interviews with ICCS 
workers and orphans benefiting from their services (see Chapter 14 below). 
This reflects, of itself, an orientation towards development. On the other 
hand, for a nationwide NGO of this size, the number of 41 income-generat-
ing projects mentioned by the ICCS Social Care Council in its brochure does 
not seem particularly impressive. Moreover, many more pages in Al-Kheir 
wal-‘Ata are devoted to the issue of selfless giving (for the sake of God) than 
to social development and economic empowerment.
The ICCS’ Islamist ideology of promoting and strengthening notions 
of religious identity and morality in the face of the perceived threats of 
materialism, Westernization and secularization in Jordanian society, with 
the accompanying moralizing and patronizing practices toward clients, 
might occur at the expense of a modernist development approach that 
entails receptivity to, and active cooperation with, foreign (in particular 
non-Muslim) development-actors, although this does not always seem to 
be the case.62 On the other hand, the findings of this research do not suggest 
that Islamist ideology has any intrinsic bias against notions of social devel-
opment and economic empowerment as such. This ideology propagates an 
“authentic” Islamic form of development as opposed to one that is depend-
ent on the outside world, in particular the West.
Conclusion
Besides offering direct aid, many Muslim voluntary welfare associa-
tions perceive the need to help beneficiaries to acquire employment as 
basic to their charitable mission, though this often formulated in religious 
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terms. Acquiring an independent income is regarded by many associations 
as necessary in order to enhance the sense of dignity among the needy, and 
to pave the road for their later full participation in society. This aim may be 
regarded as part of a more general trend in discourse and practice, within 
the state apparatus as well as the NGO sector, which regards practices that 
reinforce the dependency of the needy to direct aid as a negative traditional 
practice to be rid off so that the poor may help themselves.
Relatively traditional ways of helping the needy to obtain income out 
of work are the provision of vocational training that is relevant to the labor 
market and obtaining jobs for them by utilizing social connections. The 
mediation services of voluntary associations in the fields of jobs and train-
ing depend very much on their social connections with persons well-placed 
in businesses, employing institutions and vocational training centers. Large 
associations, like the ICCS and, to a lesser extent, Al-Faruq Society are much 
richer in social connections than smaller ones and seem, therefore, to be 
more successful in these endeavors.
Whether this type of mediation on behalf of clients on the basis of 
personal connections or wastah mechanisms always happens on an equita-
ble basis is questionable. The last chapter has shown how the ICCS center, 
Al-‘Abura Center, uses the aid relationship with its client families and the 
concomitant dependency to pressure clients to fulfil the center’s expecta-
tions in terms of proper (religious and moral) conduct and participation in 
educational programs. As a result, the Center’s relationship with those cli-
ents who fail to live up to these expectations may suffer. The idea that the 
quality of these (vertical) NGO-client relationships is also consequential for 
the readiness of NGO workers to mediate on their behalf for jobs or voca-
tional training places does not seem to be far-fetched, given the widespread 
culture of favoritism in Jordanian society. And this may apply to non-Islamist 
NGOs as well.
A more novel form of employment-provision allows clients to estab-
lish income-generating projects, which are often financed by micro-credits. 
The success of such newly established businesses depends on several fac-
tors, among these favorable market-conditions, guarantees against failure 
and, not least, the entrepreneurial skills of the beneficiaries themselves. This 
study demonstrates a high degree of motivation among many Muslim NGOs 
to engage in this highly empowering form of poverty alleviation. Religious 
faith and discourse does not seem to present a hindrance to such forms of 
economic empowerment. On the contrary, it can serve very well as a source 
of inspiration for them.
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What seems to be of decisive importance in programs of establish-
ing income-generating projects is the willingness and ability to cooperate 
closely with relevant outside institutions, such as state institutions promot-
ing social development, royal NGOs and/or foreign donors, including those 
who may not be Muslim. The isolationist discourse of an Islamist NGO – like 
that of the ICCS – focuses on the development of a more or less “pure” and 
“authentic” Muslim personality and society. This vision entails a rejection of 
any non-Muslim influence that may jeopardize this development and, as a 
consequence, could lead to a refusal to cooperate closely with (non-Islam-
ist/non-Muslim) outsiders. This may give the impression of a lack of interest 
in “true social development” to those outsiders. As the coming chapters will 
show, however, Islamist approaches to social issues, no matter how patron-
izing they appear, have their own developmental logic.
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13.  Cultural Approaches
Muslim voluntary welfare associations’ services to their clients are 
not limited to the material or socio-economic realm. In the views of their 
members and workers, material poverty is often intertwined with a whole 
set of other social problems, such as conflicts between family members or 
among the local community, domestic violence, psychological abuse, sexual 
“immorality,” alcoholism, drug addiction, (petty) theft, violent crime, dis-
honest behavior, pollution and illiteracy. Apart from the issue of poverty, 
such phenomena may be regarded by Muslim NGOs as social problems that 
require tackling in one way or another. Dealing with these problems takes 
place from cultural perspectives that are often strongly informed by reli-
gious values, as is the case with socio-economic forms of aid.
This chapter provides an overview of various responses to these 
problems by Muslim voluntary welfare associations. Central to the cultural 
approach underlying these activities is the value of social harmony. There-
fore, our overview begins with an analysis of this value within the general 
context of Arab societies and within the cultural and social activities of Jor-
danian Muslim voluntary welfare associations in particular. This analysis also 
points out the ramifications of views on social harmony in terms of depend-
ency, patronage and empowerment.
Social Harmony
The overriding priority of the value of social harmony and sound 
social relationships, within the family as well as within the wider community 
in the Muslim associations’ discourse, is largely informed by the predomi-
nance of collectivist values in traditional Arab societies like Jordan. In this 
regard, Barakat notes that:
a highly distinctive feature of Arab society is the continuing dominance of 
primary group relations. Entering into these relations means that individu-
als engage in unlimited commitments to the group. Instead of asserting their 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   291 05-02-2008   11:13:44
292
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
separateness and privacy as independent individuals, they behave as commit-
ted members of a group – hence the significance of family, tribe, neighbor-
hood, village, sect, and so forth … Solidarity with the group may require the 
individual to identify with other members by sharing their joys and sorrows, 
achievements and failures, victories and defeats. Members of the same group 
expect a great deal from one another.1 
The most basic and dominant of these group formations in the life of 
Arab individuals is the family, in a nuclear as well as in an extended sense. 
Alan al-Krenawi and John R. Graham, with valuable experience of social work 
practices in Arab societies, observe that (extended) family members “may be 
expected to be involved (in dealing with problems of other members) and 
may be consulted in times of crisis. When a family member experiences a 
problem, its restoration may be of concern to many other family members.2
Given these cultural values, it is not surprising that Muslim NGOs in 
Jordan generally attach the utmost importance to family cohesion and har-
mony. Islamist NGOs like the ICCS and Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society are outspo-
kenly zealous in defending the Muslim Arab family’s unity and cohesion in 
the face of the perceived threat of a Western-style individualism. The latter 
phenomenon is rejected for its disintegrating, atomizing and demoralizing 
impact on social life in general and on family life in particular. Murad al-
Adeileh, head of the ICCS Social Care Council, emphasizes with pride that his 
organization works for the welfare of families as a whole and not for individ-
uals in an isolated sense as, according to him, Western- or Western-oriented 
social workers are doing.3 In the vision of such associations, women, and 
mothers in the first place, have a pivotal role to play in the preservation 
of family unity and harmony. Therefore, feminist approaches that advocate 
a complete gender equality of (individually conceived) roles, liberties and 
rights are considered threatening to the social fabric of the family and, by 
extension, to Muslim society as a whole.
The traditional norm in Arab societies that the solution of individu-
als’ problems should take place “within the family” often goes hand in hand 
with a (partial or total) concealment of those problems from the outer world. 
According to Maleis and La Fever, who have written on American psychiatric 
practices in multi-cultural contexts, Muslim Arab peoples may “value pri-
vacy and guard it vehemently” vis-à-vis the world outside of the family unit. 
Within that unit, however, “their personal privacy is virtually non-existent.”4 
Exposure of private problems to the outer world, whether they relate to 
relationships within the family (such as cases of serious conflicts or abuse), 
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sexual behavior or even material poverty may make a family vulnerable to 
the loss of honor in the local community and to a -sometimes unbearable – 
sense of shame.
The concepts of honor and shame relate to social pressures to con-
form to the norms of the collective. Barakat writes that Arabs, in general, 
“are exposed to immense family and community pressures, and to constant 
interference in the most private aspects of their personal lives. Demands 
for conformity,” he continues, “undermine individuality, the formation of 
independent views and free self-expression.”5 This culture of conformity and 
shame has implications for the discussions taking place at events organ-
ized by Muslim voluntary welfare associations. According to women social 
workers of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society, attendants of the Society’s seminars and 
lectures on marriage and family issues are inclined to discuss marital prob-
lems in general terms or to ask general questions about them and remain 
reluctant to venture forth with examples of their own specific problems. 
Yet, at least one of them expressed her regret about this attitude of shame 
regarding one’s own difficulties and hoped that through the Society’s activi-
ties, a more open climate of (public) discussion regarding “private” family 
problems could be created.6
This same remark indicates that members in an association like Al-
‘Afaf Society can display reflexive attitudes and criticise aspects of tradi-
tional culture, such as the notion of shame arising from personal problems 
and/or failures. It possibly indicates tendencies toward empowerment and 
a greater autonomy for the individual, in this case. On the other hand, many 
social harmony-related values rooted in traditional (in particular peasant 
and village) culture, such as brotherhood, marriage, respect for parents and 
the elderly, patience, cooperation and neighborliness7 are highly cherished 
by the same Society, as by other Muslim associations.
Barakat writes: “even in the present transitional period, Arabs, wheth-
er rural or urban, continue to maintain intimate affiliations from which they 
derive a great deal of intrinsic satisfaction and a strong sense of belonging.”8 
Such affiliations naturally imply mutual dependency in social relationships. 
This raises the question of what, precisely, Muslim NGOs’ efforts to deal with 
social problems mean in terms of (individual or collective) empowerment 
versus the reinforcement of relationships of patronage and dependency.
The role of Islam is important in this regard, since religion is central in 
dealing with social problems in most Arab cultures and societies. Al-Krena-
wi and Graham have found that, unlike in the West, most Muslim clients of 
social work “constructed problems and their solution with a strong reference 
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to religion.”9 They emphasize the ways in which “religion provides individual 
catharsis and psychological relief, self-actualization, natural forms of social 
support, conflict resolution, familial and marital mediation, and group cohe-
sion and support.”10
Conflict Resolution
Working for sulha, or reconciliation, is regarded by Muslim NGOs as 
an important religious duty, one that is directly related to the goal of pre-
serving social harmony. Sulha is prescribed by Islamic law as a legally bind-
ing contract designed to “end conflict and hostility among believers,” and to 
promote Islamic norms of harmonious individual and community relations.11 
Apart from a formal contract, however, it is also a deeply rooted traditional 
practice, especially in Arab peasant and village life. In the latter, informal 
commitments have always prevailed over contractual commitments, and 
mediation and reconciliation as a way to resolve conflicts has always been 
preferred to formal legal action.12 Even in present-day modern and urban-
ized Jordan, there are attempts by the Ministry of Justice to revive these 
traditions of dispute resolution as a way to reduce demand on courts.13
Members and workers of Jordanian Muslim voluntary welfare asso-
ciations – often operating in urban settings that are, due to the rural back-
ground of its predominantly Palestinian or Transjordanian inhabitants, still 
greatly affected by the values of village life – attach great importance to the 
informal and personal resolution of conflict.
The chief volunteer of the Islamic Welfare Association in Salt, for 
instance, emphasized that he regularly goes on home visits to families in 
the local area to discuss their problems and offer advice.14 Female clients of 
the Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Association in Wadi Sir in Amman who face family 
problems or conflicts can either go to the associations’ premises to discuss 
them with the workers or to see its president, Madiha Kokh, personally in the 
Kindergarten she runs. Subsequently, volunteers of the association may visit 
these clients at home to try to deal with such problems. The president states 
that she does what she can to console such clients and look for solutions.
Her explanation of conflicts and relational problems among the poor 
client families is strongly colored by traditional role divisions and a hierarchi-
cal understanding of the relationship between husband and wife. According 
to this view, a husband is responsible for many problems if he neglects his 
role as breadwinner of the family, drinks alcohol, leaves his family to its fate 
and is unwilling to work. She asserts that some husbands are too lazy and 
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unmotivated to work and claims to know several cases of families that have 
disintegrated because the father was fed up with the wife and the many 
children in the house, abandoned them and found another woman.15 On 
the other hand, she stresses that wives/mothers from such families often 
face difficulties because they don’t know any other way of dealing with their 
children except by shouting and beating.16
The sulha or reconciliation the association’s members try to bring 
about is likewise based on these gender-based roles. Women, Kokh states, 
are taught to deal with more patience with their children as well as their 
husbands and communicate with them on the basis of attention and under-
standing. Men are first and foremost called upon to uphold their responsibil-
ities for their families, to look for a job and provide for the family’s income.17 
This approach toward dealing with conflicts within families takes for granted 
the traditional relationship of dependency between the husband as income-
provider and head of the family and the wife as patient mother and house-
wife. It “empowers” both of them to resolve those conflicts by stressing their 
respective duties and responsibilities on the basis of these traditional roles.
Something similar applies to the case of another Muslim women’s 
association, the Al-’Ihsan Welfare Association in Zarqa. The volunteers of 
this association tell mothers of client families to behave patiently, be polite 
in public life and dress themselves modestly. Husbands are called upon not 
to abuse and beat their wives. Parents in general are urged not to abuse 
their children. Leaving aside the question of gender, the Muslim associa-
tions’ approach toward resolving conflicts and problems in social relation-
ship stresses notions of social duty and responsibility toward others, rather 
than notions of asserting ones own individual rights. The act of mediation 
and resolution of conflicts itself is also regarded as such a social – and reli-
gious – responsibility. In the case of conflicts within families or between 
neighbors in the local community, workers and friends of Al-’Ihsan associa-
tion will speak to the persons involved, try to mediate and then help them 
find a solution. The Association’s president stresses the importance of not 
leaving people who behave offensively to their fate. Constructive commu-
nication must take place in order to convince them to change their behavior 
and to offer them the chance to reintegrate into the community.18The same 
principle was stressed to me by the chief volunteer of the Islamic Welfare 
Association of Salt. He mentioned the example of a father who had com-
plained to him about the quarrels he was having with his 17-year old son. 
The chief volunteer told him that he should not pressure his son too much, 
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but, rather, “treat him more like his brother” (i.e. listen to him more closely 
and take his feelings and demands more seriously).19
Blood Feuds 
In addition to run of the mill family or neighborhood problems and 
conflicts, some associations counter a more serious kind of dispute that con-
tinues to occur in the tribal sections of Jordanian society: the blood feud. Of 
this, the renowned American anthropologist Eickelman observes that:
conflict with other (tribal) groups, including a feud resulting from homicide 
and the theft of animals, can be defined as an attack on collective honor. In 
such a situation, members of the segmentary group are expected to support 
one another. An integral element of segmentation…is the high value placed 
upon the autonomy and honor of groups, and a balanced opposition of honor 
bearing persons and groups.20 
Al-Krenawi and Graham write that the blood feud “provides a sys-
tem of justice in the absence of formal apparatuses, the legal specialists or 
the police forces.”21 It must be emphasized in this regard that, during the 
last century or so, Muslim Arab societies have, generally speaking, become 
increasingly familiar with formal apparatuses, legal specialists and police 
forces. Moreover, they have become increasingly urbanized. This must have 
made the phenomenon increasingly less acceptable in the eyes of not only 
Arab state authorities, but of those of (urbanized) Arab populations at large 
as well. Such developments have reinforced Islamic discourses on the need 
to prevent and overcome vengeance and blood feuds for the sake of social 
harmony.22
This confluence between the reconciliatory aspects of the Islamic faith 
and the emergence of modern Arab states and societies comes to the fore in 
the discourse and practice of the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association in 
Zarqa. The members of this association publicly condemn the blood feud as 
un-Islamic at the meetings they organize. For, they stress that, according to 
Islam, only the individual perpetrator is responsible for his or her misdeed. 
The latter’s relatives may never be threatened or assaulted. According to the 
association’s accountant, the perpetrators’ family may only get involved in 
a case of killing when it comes to the shari‘ah-stipulated payment of diyah 
(blood money) to the victim’s family.23
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The Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association has occasionally been 
involved in mediation efforts. Its members have been alarmed by the fact 
that families of the perpetrators of murder or manslaughter in the local com-
munity often feel themselves compelled to move to a different village or 
city, from fear of revenge by the victims’ families. Alongside other associa-
tion members, the association’s founder and first president, Bassam Umush, 
a moderate Islamist politician and former minister and ambassador, went to 
a small locality to visit the family of the victim of a murder. He encouraged 
them to view the situation calmly, and attempted to convince the various 
parties that seeking revenge would only worsen the overall situation.
Care for the Elderly
Respect and care for the elderly has already been mentioned as 
one of the core values of social cohesion prevalent in traditional, but also 
modern Arab culture, as well as in the (Muslim NGOs’) religious discourse. 
Apparently, there is a concern among socially involved Muslim and Christian 
citizens and NGOs in the Kingdom that modernising (and individualizing) 
socio-economic developments will lead to the undermining of this value 
and to the social marginalization of the elderly. According to members of 
the Orthodox Welfare Association of the Christian town of Fuheis, Jordan’s 
elderly – while more respected than those living in Western societies and, 
in many cases, still looked after by their families – at present often spend 
their days in relative isolation. They further state that their children do not 
have sufficient time for the elderly since the former are busy with their jobs 
and are sometimes far away from home.24 Nawal Al Fa‘uri stresses that her 
Al-’Aqsa Association wants to transmit the Islamic message to the elderly, as 
well as to the community at large, that old people need to be taken care of, 
and that the society can only benefit from them as well as from their experi-
ence. The elderly, she asserts, should not live in special homes, but with their 
families, since the family is the foundation of society.25
The Orthodox Association’s president visited clubs for the elderly dur-
ing his travels to the United Kingdom and the United States. This inspired 
him to establish something similar in his hometown of Fuheis. At the time 
of my fieldwork, a new building was erected by the association for a club 
where the elderly can socialize, drink coffee and entertain themselves with 
games like billiard, basketball and keep-fit exercises.26The Al-’Aqsa Associa-
tion had already established such a club at the time. True to Al-Fa‘uri’s mod-
ernist Islamist emphasis on education and enlightenment, this club organ-
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izes lectures for the elderly about religious and health topics of interest as 
well as providing TV programs and televised lectures. There is also space 
for informal socializing over a cup of coffee and during outings with picnics 
and at the yearly celebration of the International Day of the Elderly.27 In the 
case of both associations, we may speak here of modern and institutional 
ways of socializing a special segment of the local community. This process 
is occuring in response to modern developments that threaten to lead to 
the marginalization and isolation of Jordan’s elderly population. The same 
process is derived from the traditional as well as religious value of respect 
of, and care for, the elderly.
Sporting, Festive and Recreational Activities
We arrive at another important aspect of working for social cohe-
sion. Specifically, I refer to the basic need for the kind of social harmony and 
bonding that arrives when people go to parties, and/or play sports together. 
Many voluntary welfare associations, Muslim as well as Christian, organize 
such activities.
Sports and physical exercise is important for social bonding, but is also 
related to health concerns. The fitness center for women at the Islamic Bani 
Hassan Welfare Association that opened in 2002 is a case in point. According 
to the Association’s treasurer, a number of female students asked the asso-
ciation to establish the facility because of the increasing problem of obesity 
among women of all ages.28 Such an initiative is not unique to this relatively 
small association. ICCS centers for orphans and the poor, for instance, offer 
women possibilities for increased fitness as well.29 In a Muslim Arab society 
like Jordan, fitness exercises are not to be carried out in a gender-mixed set-
ting, so are usually provided for males only. In turn, voluntary associations 
respond to a demand for fitness-facilities for women only.
Regarding festive activities, it must be noted that several Jordanian 
voluntary associations – religion based as well as secular ones – join the 
Jordanian government in endeavouring to raise awareness on the dangers 
of the traditional and celebratory practice of shooting in the air, which often 
takes place during wedding parties or on other festive occasions. Among the 
associations included in this study, the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Associa-
tion and the Islamic Welfare Society in Salt actively warn the public against 
this practice on the grounds that accidents are thus regularly caused. They 
do so in the name of Islam, which calls upon the believers to safeguard life, 
health and security.30
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On the other hand, several times a year, religion also provides the 
occasion for such associations to organize their own festivities. Ramadan 
is always an opportunity to organize festive ’iftar meals. At the ’iftar dinner 
of Al-Faruq Society, held on 18 November 2003 in a huge rented hall on the 
edge of the city of Irbid, a group of orphan-boys, dressed in uniforms with 
green shirts, sang several songs accompanied by drum beating. The topic 
of one of them was the “liberation of Jerusalem,” the holy city whose Arab 
character had to be preserved.31 Associations may also organize ’iftar meals 
specifically for orphans and/or their mothers, as ICCS centers as well as the 
Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association are doing.32
Apart from religious holidays, the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Associa-
tion organizes feasts for young tribe members who graduated from the uni-
versity. It is an occasion of tribal bonding between graduates, but also one in 
which tribal and national identities are linked and loyalty to the Hashemite 
monarchy is expressed. The Jordanian prince Faisal has patronized one of 
the celebrations for university graduates organized by the Islamic Bani Has-
san Welfare Association. The Association also organizes other celebrations at 
certain national events, for instance birthdays of members of the royal fam-
ily and Independence Day.33 The Welfare Association for the Care of Orphans 
in Wadi Sir in Amman organizes similar feasts at national and Hashemite 
holidays, along with religious holidays, for the orphan children living in its 
orphanage.34 
Christian NGOs are no different in this regard. The Orthodox Asso-
ciation of Fuheis organizes feasts for the town’s inhabitants at the times 
of Christmas, Eastern, New Year’s Eve as well as Hashemite occasions like 
the King’s birthday. The association’s scouting club, which consists of a few 
dozens of men, performs theatrical acts at these occasions, often on top-
ics related to the daily life of the town. This club also functions as a music 
band. Through such activities, the association apparently contributes to the 
process of bonding of the inhabitants of this town dominated by members 
of Jordan’s Christian minority.35 All these festive activities strengthen proc-
esses of social bonding and a sense of social belonging to the (religious, 
tribal or local) community as well as to Jordan as a nation-state (and thus 
promote unquestioning loyalty to the monarchy). Such festivities, and in 
particular those in which the Hashemite hegemony is confirmed, reinforce 
patterns of patronage. At the same time, the strengthening of social ties 
and networks taking place there can also foster a sense of empowerment 
among the participants, since social relations of mutual support are central 
in Arab societies, like Jordan’s, to all kinds of social, economic and political 
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opportunities (in fields like employment, education and political leadership) 
– possibly even more so than in the liberal-individualist cultures of the West-
ern world.
Recreational outings organized by voluntary associations have a 
function in social bonding and empowerment similar to that provided by 
feasts. Some associations claim that the reason for organizing them is to 
provide opportunities for deprived people like the needy, women or wid-
ows – to break their daily routines and to learn more about their environ-
ment and country. The Islamic Anwar al-Huda Women’s Association used to 
organize trips with picnics to pretty places in Jordan for many women in 
the area, including elderly women who live in relative isolation. According 
to Mrs Kokh, this helped “to bring these women out of their daily routine, 
stresses and concerns.”36
Combating Illiteracy
A more direct way by Muslim voluntary welfare associations to 
empower the underprivileged involves the combating of illiteracy. Sev-
eral associations provide literacy courses to illiterate adults, often on the 
ethical basis of the Islamic imperative of “’Iqra!’” (“Read!”), with its implica-
tions for individual as well as societal development. The Al-’Aqsa Associa-
tion gives such courses mainly to illiterate elderly women. After completing 
the course in almost one year, the participants receive a certificate from the 
Ministry of Education.37 The Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association and the 
Islamic Educational Welfare Association, both in Zarqa, provide such courses 
for adult men and women alike, against nominal fees. The former associa-
tion organizes three-month courses on different levels that are taught by a 
female association member. According to the Association’s treasurer, after 
completion of thhe courses, participants should be able to read simple 
newspaper articles.38
Public Meetings, Lectures and Campaigns
Muslim voluntary welfare associations regularly organize informative 
meetings, workshops and lectures for the public in the local community. 
They set out to attract members of the local community to such events by 
advertising in local media, by putting up posters, and by spreading word of 
mouth through the local social networks of association members.
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Such events can deal with a variety of topics. Those related to child 
development and gender relations will be dealt with specifically in the next 
two chapters. Others aim to empower the public to deal with environmen-
tal issues. The Al-’Aqsa Association in Madaba, for instance, regularly invites 
representatives of the Jordan Environment Society as well as those from 
the Ministry of Environment to give lectures on environmental issues to the 
local public in Madaba.39 Topics dealt with relate to the town’s rural environ-
ment; hence the speakers discuss how to save on daily water usage and 
the damage caused by chemical pesticides in agriculture and in gardening, 
before offering tips on environmentally friendly agriculture. Needless to say, 
the importance of keeping air and water clean is particularly emphasized. 
Other recommendations made at such lectures to the audience are in the 
sphere of vaccinations against possible health hazards and keeping children 
as well as the locations of new houses away from polluted places and pol-
luted water. At the time of fieldwork, the Al-’Aqsa Association was planning 
to establish a biological agriculture project where natural instead of chemi-
cal fertilizers would be used.40
Since the end of 2002, the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association has 
been involved in a public awareness raising campaign regarding pollution 
by industry and cars. This particularly concerns the effects of oil refineries 
and petro-chemical industry near the city of Zarqa on the health of those 
living in nearby working class neighborhoods (diseases like asthma or even 
cancer are cited as possible consequences). 41
Lectures on rituals, holy places, religious and other events are used 
as occasions for Muslim voluntary associations to convey certain social or 
political messages. In the case of the Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Welfare Associa-
tion, for instance, a lecture on the ritual of washing corpses in Islamic funeral 
ceremonies was used as an occasion to condemn widespread practices of 
corruption, cheating and illegal self-enrichment. The message was that the 
corpse is wrapped in nothing but a plain kafan (linen wrap), signifying that 
he or she takes nothing to the grave. Corruption, cheating and exploita-
tion are of no use to any believer because eventually, we all enter the grave 
empty handed.42 Likewise, the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association uses 
Ramadan as an occasion to stress the social values of love, kindness, honesty 
and social solidarity with people in need, especially within the context of 
family, friendship and neighborhood relationships.
 In not dissimilar fashion, the commemoration of (religious) events 
related to Jerusalem,43or of the military conflicts between followers of the 
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Prophet and Jewish tribes, as well as the UN-sponsored Human Rights Day, 
are used to highlight the “crimes” of Zionism. On the Day of Combating 
Illiteracy, a lecture was held by the Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa Association on the 
importance of learning and science as a Qur’anic value. Mention is made 
of the fact that the Prophet Muhammad himself was reportedly illiterate, 
and that the angel Jibril first conveyed to him God’s message through the 
imperative “’Iqra’!”44 A political scientist speaking at the Islamic Bani Hassan 
Welfare Association dwelt upon the issue of the rights of women to political 
participation and equal access to positions of leadership.45 The topics of such 
lectures must not prove too controversial to Jordanian state authorities. 
Indeed, they may even agree with official regime objectives and policies. 
Al-Fa‘uri’s Al-’Aqsa Association has even participated in the implementation 
of a state-sponsored civic education program on democracy, rule of law and 
human rights.46
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14.  One Islamic Association’s 
Approach to Education
Many of the examples mentioned in the last chapter highlight the 
central place of religious faith and discourse in many awareness-raising 
activities undertaken by Muslim voluntary welfare associations. Religious 
education, in one form or another, plays a very dominant role in the socio-
cultural activities of Muslim NGOs through which they hope to tackle social 
problems or to affect change for the better within families and the commu-
nity. In this chapter, the approach of an Islamic voluntary association that 
specializes in religious education will be described and analyzed. First, the 
way in which the association’s members perceive the – actual as well as ideal 
– status of religion and religious doctrine will be pointed out. Subsequently, 
its vision and discourse on social relationships and social harmony that flow 
from this perception will be dealt with. This will be followed by some obser-
vations on the role of discipline and agency in the association’s educational 
approach. The chapter will conclude by mentioning some theoretical impli-
cations for the civil society concept of the preceding material.
View on the State of Religion in Modern Jordan
The Islamic Welfare Society’s office in Salt is housed in a modern build-
ing on the top floor, perched over a number of small stores in the middle of 
the oldest existing town of (what now comprises) the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan. Situated on the slope of a hill, in one of Salt’s many narrow streets, 
I paid regular visits to the place. The Society’s general manager, Muham-
mad Shawmali, was always eager to talk about various religious and social 
issues that occupied his mind. Being the grandson of a prominent ‘alim in 
Salt, one of the Society’s original founders as well as its president, Shaw-
mali is well versed in the Qur’an and Hadith, including reports of the rightly 
guided caliphs, as well as Islamic mystical traditions. When I first called him 
to ask whether we could meet, he appeared happy to receive me; and, when 
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I arrived in his office for the first time, he welcomed me in with a broad smile. 
He was a man in his early thirties, tidily dressed in a regular modern office 
suit and with a neatly trimmed black beard. During my various conversa-
tions with him, he regularly used religious expressions, particularly those 
enunciating reverences to the Prophet Muhammad, for instance when he 
wanted to show his amazement. Other people, most often Abdul Latif, the 
Society’s chief volunteer, joined the conversations at times. The latter was 
teaching Islamic ethics at the Islamic Welfare Society to children and young-
sters from the city. Adbul Latif ’s appearance was slightly different from that 
of Shawmali: the former was modestly dressed in jeans and sweater and had 
a long, though neatly trimmed beard. The impression he conveyed was that 
of a highly motivated, energetic and active fieldworker, impassioned and 
enthusiastic about effecting change. He wanted there to be religious devel-
opment in the life of the individual, the community and Jordanian society 
as a whole.
 Neither the general manager nor the chief volunteer agreed with 
the assumption held by Jordanian citizens of more secular orientation, as 
well as many local and foreign observers. According to this assumption, the 
role of religion in Jordanian society has grown increasingly strong over the 
past decades. Shamali and Abdul Latif, by contrast, perceive the dominant 
socio-cultural trend in the Hashemite Kingdom to be one of secularization 
amidst the gradual disappearance of religious morals and values from peo-
ple’s daily lives. As manifestations of this trend, they mentioned phenomena 
like extra-marital sex, usage of (and addiction to) drugs and alcohol and the 
seductions of consumerism and materialism. They explicitly linked the cur-
rent spread of such phenomena to the impact of globalization and Westerni-
zation, felt most through channels like the internet, the educational system 
and (global) business life. They acknowledged, however, that such “vices” 
have indigenous roots as well. They also stressed the interrelated nature of 
Jordanian society’s various ills. Shawmali reasoned, for instance, that pov-
erty and despair give rise to addiction to alcohol and drugs, which, in turn, 
contributes to sexual immorality and violence. All these threats to the integ-
rity and moral fabric of Muslim society necessitate, according to this view, 
educational efforts to remind young and old alike of Islam’s basic truth of 
tawhid, the oneness of God, as well as that of His almightiness and absolute 
moral authority. Abdul Latif phrased this message accordingly:
God has created every human being in the way he is, each one with his own 
characteristics. Blond hair, brown hair, happiness and anger, all of these char-
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acteristics come from God. The good things in life emanate from God, but the 
same goes for the bad things. If we do not recognize that, it amounts to disbelief 
(kufr). Because if certain things in reality are not created by God, who else cre-
ated them? The human being himself? That would imply that the human being 
is also a god, while the truth is that God is the only creator. Some people believe 
that there exists no god, which is kufr as well. Truth is also that He cannot be 
identified with anything He created. He is not similar to the human being, to an 
animal or to anything else in the universe. He is highly elevated above all of this. 
Human beings have to serve Him. Performing good deeds and working for the 
common good is only accepted by God if it is done for His Sake. 
At first glance, Abdul Latif ’s emphasis on God’s omnipotence and His 
role as creator of both good and evil might seem like a call for passive resig-
nation to one’s fate. However, the end of his statement points clearly in a dif-
ferent direction: human beings are obliged to serve God, which implies the 
active performance of good deeds and working for the common good for 
His Sake. This demands from the believer a high degree of engagement and 
moral agency in changing their own lives and conditions as well as that of 
the community at large. As pointed out in an earlier chapter, in the Society’s 
discourse serving God equates to a selfless attitude via which the common 
good is promoted. It is a matter of al-amr bil ma‘ruf wal-nahy ‘an al- munkar, 
to ordain good and to prohibit evil, in private as well as in public life. In other 
words, it is precisely because God demands that human beings (actively) 
apply what is good and discard what is evil that He has created both forces. 
A precondition is that human beings learn the difference between good 
and evil and, to this end, God has delivered His prophets. “For Muslims,” he 
stressed, “the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad are their guide-
lines in (a virtuous) life. He has indicated why and how immoral acts, such as 
lying, stealing and fornication, should be avoided.”1
In the view of the members of the Society in Salt, spirituality is close-
ly related to all aspects of life in society, in its public as well as its private 
aspects. In this regard, Abdul Latif stresses the rational nature of the call 
of the Islamic message to humankind. His approach is a “modern” one in 
Talal Asad’s sense, in that he regards it as highly important that any believer 
obtains explicit and profound knowledge about the basic truth of Islam, 
uses his or her own rational faculties to that end and does not blindly follow 
what others tell him or her to do.2 He stressed repeatedly that “action should 
be preceded by knowledge.” In order to function and work properly and 
actively in society, people must have knowledge and insight into what they 
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are doing regarding aims, results and consequences.3 Secularly educated as 
an accountant and having worked as a general manager at the office of the 
General Union of Voluntary Societies in Salt (an institution with close interac-
tions with international development agencies and profound engagement 
with global development discourse), Abdul Latif appreciates the legacy of 
Western rationalism. “The West owes all of its (political, economic, social and 
medical) successes to the wise and purposeful application of its knowledge,” 
he states. He regards this rational attitude as a sine qua non for the success 
and well-being of Muslims and Muslim society at large. As GUVS representa-
tive, for instance, he promotes the idea that the needy should get rid of their 
dependency on alms. They should learn to use their own rational faculties to 
change their situation through projects like vocational training and micro-
credit schemes.4 Likewise, he promotes the idea that women should have 
the opportunity to participate in society through education, and/or to earn 
their salaries through professional or manual work.5
However, his admiration for the West’s rationalist tradition obviously 
does not amount to secular and relativistic liberalism. His vision of the com-
mon good is not so much based upon the ideal of the supremacy of per-
sonal autonomy and value pluralism, but upon one of a virtuous society in 
which all members strive to live in accordance with Islam’s laws, morals and 
values.6 That is to say, rational knowledge seeking for him is not merely a 
question of political and socio-economic development and modernization, 
although he obviously considers this an important part of it. Neither is he 
content with the kind of liberalism that simply leaves the formation of the 
normatively oriented socio-cultural lifeworld to the individual preferences 
of citizens, within the bounds of (procedural and secular) law. For Abdul 
Latif, the desire to seek knowledge is rooted in the Islamic revelation and 
pertains to all aspects of life, not least of them social and family life. While 
not denying the right of the individual to choose between several options in 
life, his assumption is that the morals, values and laws of the Islamic revela-
tion determine the confines, and are at the same time constitutive of these 
options. The malaise that he perceives in Jordanian society is of a moral and 
ethical nature, undermining the social fabric and Muslim society’s capabil-
ity to resist challenges and overcome problems. Therefore, the society is in 
urgent need of proper knowledge about the ethical guidelines laid down by 
God and conveyed by His messenger, the Prophet Muhammad, to human-
kind.
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Social Relationships and Harmony
True religion, according to the voluntary teacher and the other mem-
bers of the Islamic Welfare Society, is not simply or even mainly a state of 
mind, in the way Talal Asad characterizes modern approaches toward reli-
gion.7 Religious life depends crucially on one’s actual behavior and activities 
in this world. Active observance of the ethical guidelines is at the core of, 
and not merely secondary to, the Islamic faith. The Society’s members refer 
regularly to the afterlife and emphasize that one’s actual behavior, for bet-
ter or for worse, determines one’s prospects of reward or punishment in the 
next life. But, in their view, there is more at stake than simply the relationship 
between individual believer and God. Rather, at stake is the moral quality of 
relationships between Muslims as well as the ethical standards, well-being 
and social cohesion of Muslim society as a whole. In educating adults, youth 
and children about religious guidelines, the rationalization of these guide-
lines is considered important for their comprehension. This rationalization 
is often presented in terms of social well being, harmony and health and 
overcoming social problems. On the basis of this kind of value rationality, 
they criticize the literalist Salafis for merely sticking to the supposedly outer 
appearances of piety and dry religious rules as a way to salvation, and for 
not adopting a more rational approach toward problems of society.8 While 
the voluntary teachers of the Islamic Welfare Society – two men (Abdul Latif 
being one of these) and one woman – regard the disciplining of individual’s 
believers’ relationship with God in terms of doctrine (iman) and ritual (fiqh) 
as very important, the true test of sincere piety, from their point of view, 
resides in one’s social behavior. This realm is divided by the Society’s chief 
voluntary teacher into two more or less distinct areas: mu‘amalat, or the 
more positively formulated principles and rules pertaining to social dealings 
and relationships, and akhlaq, which are more negatively defined in terms of 
abstaining from sinful acts.9
When he was still a student of accountancy in a community college, 
Abdul Latif already identified sexual temptation between the sexes as a 
main problem capable of leading young people to sinful behavior. While 
stopping short of pleading for strict spatial gender separation, he now urges 
the young to avoid situations that might be morally compromising in this 
regard, for instance by physically and visually restraining oneself during 
interaction with unrelated persons from the other sex, observing an appro-
priate distance from the latter, and not to remain alone in the same room 
with an unrelated person of the other sex. In other words, he focuses more 
on individual moral self-discipline than on collectively imposed practices of 
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separating the sexes.10 Practices of (preventative) disciplining against (ille-
gitimate) sexuality as well as against other behaviors considered sinful or 
harmful, like the usage of alcohol, drugs, cigarettes and violence in public 
as well as in one’s private life, are dealt with at the Society by verbal warn-
ings using concrete examples of where this behaviour may lead. The impor-
tance of listening to the “knowledgeable and the experienced,” and not to 
the jahilin (ignorant) and those lacking intelligence or “proper” knowledge 
in health, social, ethical or religious matters is particularly stressed.11
While still a student, Abdul Latif identified the problems of envy, 
aggression, and strife in human relationships. Such things, he claimed, 
invariably lead to violence. According to him as well as to other members 
of the Society, gossip also destroys good relationships between people.12 
Underpinning all this is the belief that the community of believers must be 
preserved as a whole, and all of its members must be considered as vital 
parts of the whole. Anybody transgressing ethical norms should not be 
rejected as a person, as happens in the practice of gossip; rather s/he needs 
to be talked to and persuaded to improve his or her behavior, so that s/he 
may be reintegrated into the moral community of believers.13
This practice of moral correction toward fellow believers in horizontal 
relational settings is prevalent among Islamic piety and da‘wah movements 
in other Muslim countries as well. It results at least partially from a relatively 
modern approach toward da‘wah in which every believer, and not just the 
elite of formally trained religious scholars (as used to be the case until the 
twentieth century), is entrusted to call one’s fellow-believers to join the right 
path.14
Gossiping about gossipers is something equally forbidden in Islam, 
the Society’s members stress. One can either ignore gossiping about oneself 
or, if one feels confident enough in his or her relationship with the gossiper, 
approach the latter to discuss his/her undesirable behavior. Besides, Abdul 
Latif advocates discussion of the issue of gossip and warning people against 
its harmful and sinful implications as part of religious educational efforts. 
People must be called upon to adjust their behavior in the direction of a 
more harmonious and unified Islamic society.15
The idea that strengthening social ties and cohesion within the 
’ummah is serving God is reflected in the Society’s calls to the local com-
munity to change mutual dealings or mu‘amalat in a positive direction. 
Abdul Latif stresses, for instance, that morality and strong social ties are 
far superior in value to financial and material wealth. “Even if one has a lot 
of money”, he stated, “without the right knowledge and the right (ethical) 
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attitude, one can easily lose what one possesses.”16 In the chapter on Politi-
cally Unaffiliated Conservative Muslim NGOs, the way in which the Society’s 
general manager values the principle of ’ithar or self-sacrifice and selfless 
aid and support toward one’s fellow-believers and fellowmen in general has 
been addressed. To mention a similar instance from Jordan, Richard Antoun 
has analyzed a sermon of a mosque preacher in a Jordanian rural village on 
the religious concept of rahmah, which stand’s for the womb in a woman’s 
body as well as for compassion. According to Antoun, the sermon conveyed 
the message that: “since birth has severed man from his source of physi-
ological compassion, the womb, man must now seek God through ethical 
compassion (service to his fellowman, his kinsman and co-religionist … 
Man’s individual salvation is [thus] strongly linked with his group’s destiny.”17 
The last chapter pointed out the importance of the cultural value of social 
solidarity – a value expressed through notions of brotherhood, cooperation, 
neighborliness, respect for parents and for the elderly – in Arab peasant and 
village life. Since the Islamic Welfare Society in Salt was established by mem-
bers of rurally based tribes and communities in the Jordanian governorate 
of Balqa, of which Salt is the capital, it may well be argued that Islam pro-
vides a means for them to preserve and promote such traditional values in a 
more modern and urban environment. Their educational efforts are focused 
on religiously inspired reform that accord with such values.
For the sake of a socially more cohesive, stronger and easier to live in 
’ummah, the Society’s members promote modes of behavioral reform that 
extend into the tiniest details. They want to encourage people to be kind 
and friendly to one another and to express this attitude through civilized 
pleasant body (and verbal) language – wearing a smile on their faces, for 
instance. An atmosphere and (embodied) attitude of stress, annoyance and 
chagrin that can be witnessed on peoples’ faces in the Jordanian street, and 
which several Jordanians attribute to the tough daily economic struggle for 
survival and making ends meet, must be countered and transformed into 
something more positive.18 Observing (religiously construed) standards of 
hygiene is equally linked to reform of social behavior. Washing oneself regu-
larly ensures that one has a pleasant odor. Likewise, decency in dress and 
table manners contributes to an amenable social atmosphere.19 While such 
ethical exhortations may sound banal to a reader of a secular liberal mind-
set, this is not the case from the religio-ethical code of discipline to which 
the members of the Islamic Welfare Society adhere. That view has roots in 
an Aristotelian worldview according to which ethical behavior and inward 
ethical dispositions do not simply emanate from one’s “natural” and sponta-
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neous individual self, but must be consciously and actively developed and 
cultivated through continuous training and practice pertaining to even the 
tiniest details of one’s daily life.20
Values of honesty, probity and transparency, as opposed to practices 
of fraud, deceit and corruption, are stressed in the realm of economic deal-
ings. The Society’s members mention a hadith stipulating that, in financial 
transactions, prices must be agreed upon in a candid and transparent man-
ner that binds seller as well as buyer. In the case of the relationship between 
landlord and tenant, for instance, the former is not allowed to raise the rent 
in violation of his or her agreement with the latter.21 Abdul Latif translates 
the Islamic concept of ’amanah (faithfulness) into the economic realm as 
respect for one another’s property. One needs to ask the owner of a certain 
property for permission to use it, to do that with care after permission has 
been granted and to avoid any damage. As a concrete example, he men-
tioned the workers in the printing house he used to own, whom he urged to 
make careful use of the material and instruments they were working with.22 
We may speak here of a (petty) bourgeois ethic regarding the sanctity of 
private property and economic probity and transparency in an Islamic form 
that is not devoid of self-interest. However, the meaning of ’amanah as used 
by the Society’s members is much wider then that. It stands for social deal-
ings on the basis of mutual respect and care, and the avoidance of insult 
and injury.
The Society’s members give expression to this ethical value by men-
tioning examples from the Hadith that stresses the need to be consider-
ate toward and take care of one’s neighbors and their (material as well as 
psychological) needs.23 Another religious concept stressed by the Society’s 
members is sabr (patience). Sabr has multiple meanings and is often inter-
preted by pious Muslims as (individual) perseverance and fortitude in the 
face of adversity. Members and workers of Muslim voluntary welfare associ-
ations, however, often utilise this concept in the context of their social work 
activities. They also translate it as an attitude of kindness and forgiveness in 
social interactions. Abdul Latif gives meaning to the concept in the context 
of vertical social relationships as well, such as those of teachers toward their 
pupils, doctors toward their patients and engineers toward their clients. He 
tries to spread the message that people with an advanced level of educa-
tion, knowledge and understanding must not arrogate themselves toward 
those whose level is less in these regards. They must adapt their mode of 
communication to the latter’s level of understanding and be accommodat-
ing and friendly during interactions with them.24
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Piety, Discipline and Agency
All these elements of a discourse of piety are geared toward the build-
ing of pious individual characters that must result in the construction of 
a pious and harmonious community of believers. “Serving God” here is an 
ongoing project pertaining to all aspects of life. It is the notion of selfless-
ness meant to be developed and internalized in the Muslim individual in 
ritual as well as in social, private as well as in public life. In the view of this 
Society’s members, what one does or says in private has ramifications for 
the whole of one’s personality and all of one’s activities, including those of 
a public nature. Uttering phrases like bismillah (in the name of God) and 
al-hamdulillah (thanks be to God) before and after the meal and after sneez-
ing has implications assumed to go beyond one’s maintenance of his or her 
individual relationship with God. Such actions are part of the process of 
cultivating one’s personality and mentality in accordance with standards 
of piety, devoutness, gratitude and selflessness that is supposed to have 
a bearing on one’s behavior in social and public realms as well. Notions of 
order, discipline and conscious, rational efforts to improve one’s own actions 
in life, which implies taking one’s responsibility toward one’s fellowmen and 
the society at large as well, are highly prevalent in the Society’s members’ 
discourse.25
Sabah Mahmood analyzes discipline in the case of the women’s mosque 
movement in Egypt as an embodied process of internalization of beliefs and 
values through conscious practices like ritual, dress, physical comportment 
in daily life and way of speech.26 Several of these aspects of embodiment can 
be recognized in the discourse of piety expressed by the members of the 
Islamic Welfare Society in Salt. My own opportunity in observing embodied 
practices at this society has been limited. In terms of educational methodol-
ogy, the chief voluntary teacher emphasized the importance of entertaining 
activities like listening to CDs with songs about Islamic beliefs and morality 
accompanied by the sound of drums, singing these songs after listening 
and group activities in the realm of sports, games and outings to natural 
areas as (embodied) means of inculcating Islamic values into the young and 
the children, besides the more “serious” means of lectures and discussions, 
which have their own implications in terms of embodiment.27 Such activities 
of pleasure and relaxation are, in fact, seen as part of the process of disciplin-
ing the body against the temptations of sin and vice, since they are meant to 
constitute an alternative to the latter.28 However, the (embodied) activities of 
the Society’s voluntary teachers are not limited to the visiting children and 
youngsters themselves. They also consider keeping in touch with the latter’s 
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parents and families, visiting them at their homes and offering them advice 
and counsel as an important part of their work.29
Implications for the Civil Society Concept
Obviously, educational activities undertaken by the Islamic Welfare 
Society of Salt are based on a conscious drive to reform individuals and the 
local community along religious lines and, moreover, to turn the latter them-
selves into conscious agents of reform and change. This conscious nature 
is underlined by the fact that the Society’s members see their activities in 
terms of combating jahl (ignorance) in matters of religious doctrine as well 
as of social practice. It is also consciously regarded as a way of protecting and 
strengthening the local Islamic socio-cultural lifeworld against the threat of 
an increasingly hegemonic Western-dominated global culture, even though 
state policy and legislation preclude them from publicly expressing any 
political statement in this regard. The Society is doubtlessly engaged in a 
form of working on peoples’ reflexivity which, in turn, is basic to the latter’s 
social, and in the end to their political agency. In chapter 1, I described such 
reflexivity and agency as a fundamental basis of any civil society. That this 
reflexivity is based on a religious doctrine of which the fundamental premis-
es are not to be questioned is not relevant in this regard. Something similar 
could be stated about the doctrine of liberalism that is based on the sanctity 
of individual autonomy and freedom. Liberalisms’ claim to represent human 
nature cannot be considered more universally valid and neutral than that of 
social or political Islam. In the words of Talal Asad:
The assumption is surely mistaken that modern liberal politics precludes any 
direct commitment to particular moral norms, or any space for ideologically 
based criticism. To the extent that modern politics employs the language of 
rights (individual and collective), ideological principles are central to it. Civil 
rights and human rights … are not merely neutral legal facts, they are pro-
foundly moralistic values constantly invoked to guide and criticize modern 
politics.30
In the following two chapters, the (religiously informed) reflexive dis-
course of various Muslim voluntary welfare associations in Jordan that are 
related to their activities in the realm of, respectively, the development of 
children and gender will be dealt with. Questions regarding the relationship 
between discourse derived from Islamic revelation on the one hand and glo-
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bal rights discourse informed by the ideology and values of liberalism and 
enlightenment on the other will receive attention in this regard.
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15.  Various Muslim 
Approaches toward 
Education and Child 
Development
This chapter highlights different approaches toward religious edu-
cation as an answer to social ills that are basic to educational activities of 
Muslim voluntary welfare associations. In the chapter’s first section, theo-
retical observations on religious education in Muslim Arab settings will be 
presented. Subsequently, a closer look will be taken at the interrelationship 
between religious education and indoctrination. The remainder of the chap-
ter analyzes discourses related to various Muslim voluntary welfare asso-
ciations’ educational activities in the realm of the development of children. 
The central question involves how notions of disciplining, empowerment, 
dependency and agency play a role in these discourses and practices, and 
what the possible implications of these notions are in terms of the shaping 
of reflexive (future) adult individuals and citizens. The chapter concludes 
by putting this question in the framework of modernizing developments in 
Jordanian society at large.
Approaches toward Religious Education
Historical Background of Religious Education in the Muslim Arab 
World
Religious education as a means to deal with contemporary social 
issues and ills is necessarily aimed at understanding and interpreting the 
meaning and the current social, cultural and political relevance of religious 
texts. Such a stress on explicit meaning is not a self-evident matter from a 
more traditional Islamic point of view on religious education. At least until 
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the nineteenth century, educational methods in the madrasah or mosque 
college throughout the Muslim world largely focused on repetitive meth-
ods, like memorization, recitation, and grammar, as well as on ritual purity 
practices. Explanation and interpretation of the meaning of the Qur’an was 
considered a specialized science accessible only to those with years of reli-
gious study behind them.1 These formal forms of religious disciplining did 
not, of themselves, disappear with the advent of modernity. They are still 
an important part of religious education taking place in mosques and in 
movements of piety. What has gradually disappeared in the modern age, 
however, has been the monopoly of specialized religious scholars regarding 
the explanation and the interpretation of the Islamic textual sources. Such 
knowledge and education became accessible to the wider public, under the 
impact of developments like the spread of mass literacy and mass media.2 
At present, states as well as religious social movements in the Muslim world 
make use of this public access by advocating their own “correct” interpreta-
tions of Islam and by promoting “Islamic” solutions to the problems of the 
individual, the family and the society at large. These solutions have become 
part of rational public debates in which the question of what it means to be 
a good Muslim, and to live in a truly Islamic society and state – and thereby 
the concept of authentic identity – are central.
The Islamist Approach
Concerns with identity became increasingly urgent under the impact 
of Western colonial as well as post-colonial dominance, as Chapter 2 pointed 
out. According to Islamists affiliated to movements like The Muslim Brother-
hood, an authentic identity that is free from corrupting non-Islamic influ-
ences can only be developed through a pious lifestyle. In The Muslim Broth-
erhood’s view, such a lifestyle must be acquired through all kinds of discipli-
nary practices. Among the most important of these is included (collective) 
prayer, fasting, engaging in sadaqah toward the poor, reciting the Qur’an 
and cultivating one’s own moral self so that it is characterized by an attitude 
of honesty, trustworthiness and modesty in one’s dealings with others. Such 
an attitude should, ideally speaking, be reflected in one’s daily speech and 
behavior. In this way, Muslim Brothers are expected to shake off the “cor-
rupting” influences from the existing “ignorant” society and create a new 
society of fraternity and love between believers for the sake of God.3 These 
“corrupting influences” are to an important extent attributed to a Western 
cultural assault spreading materialism and immorality. In the words of ICCS 
general manager Lafi Qaba’a:
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Western civilization is materialist. Everything there is oriented toward mate-
rial and financial gain, and that destroys morality and social life. We want the 
people here to trust God, to follow His will, to find peace in Him. Then they can 
grow into balanced personalities. Our educative efforts are necessary, because 
some people are in danger of being seduced by the Western materialist view of 
life of wanting to posses more and more… and they are going to follow it.4
“Finding peace” in God is not only an individual but also a social affair, 
and it is supposed to lead to a more peaceful and harmonious Islamic soci-
ety. As Ahmad Mousalli notes in his analysis of Islamist social ideology: 
Before world peace can be realized [according to the Islamists’ vision], peace 
must first be found in the individual, family and society. The peace of the indi-
vidual, which is the real seed of positive peace, gives the supreme power to the 
spiritual part of the human being to discipline desires and purify the soul. As 
such desires are balanced and controlled by spiritual yearnings, an equilibrium 
between the spiritual and material is made.5 
Islamists identify the family as the fundamental site for cultivating the 
values essential to build a peaceful Islamic order. In the words of Mousalli: 
“This peace extends to the family and becomes the focal point of love, mercy 
and tranquility. In turn, the peace of the family constitutes a building block 
for a peaceful society.”6 As already stated, Islamist NGOs try to translate this 
vision into practice in their approach toward family issues. In the words of 
ICCS Social Care Council head Murad al-Adeileh:
Orphan and poor families are educated (by our workers) in good behavior, the 
values of mutual respect, good family relationships as well as relations with 
others in the community. They must learn to love their own community and 
society. Lapsing into alcohol usage, drugs, crime and bad behavior must be 
prevented.7 
Charles Hirschkind and Sabah Mahmood have analyzed in the case of 
Egypt how this religious morality with the concomitant disciplinary endeav-
ors has become a more general socio-cultural trend permeating public as 
well as private spheres – a trend in which believers exhort, persuade and 
deliberate with one another on various behavioral matters pertaining to 
a pious way of life.8 As the coming two chapters highlight, Islamist NGOs 
engage in such practices of moral exhortation and persuasion through lec-
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tures, workshops, educational meetings with children and adults as well as 
informal contacts. From a liberal point of view, religious and moral disci-
plining may be regarded as authoritarian and oppressive toward the free-
dom and self-realization of the individual. However, within Islamic da’wah 
and piety movements as well as NGOs, such disciplining is considered – 
and functions – as a different form of agency and capacity building for the 
individual.9As Mahmood points out, engaging in various kinds of ritual and 
social practices in a disciplined fashion is conceived of within piety move-
ments as developing one’s personality in the desired, that is to say pious, 
direction. It internalizes values that are assumed to bring a believer closer 
to God and to contribute simultaneously to a pious and harmonious Islamic 
society. It is through this emphasis on moral duties, rather than a contrast-
ing and liberal emphasis on personal autonomy and choice in normative 
matters, that the individual is supposed to realize him- or herself.10
In her work on the Islamic piety movement in Egypt, Mahmood dis-
tinguishes two different trends within the Islamist current: one is focused 
on the cultivation of Islamic virtues in one’s personal lifestyle as a Muslim; 
while the other is more concerned with the outward expression of Islamic 
identity as a way to publicly promote the Islamic ’ummah as an authentic 
civilization and culture, and to change society and polity in accordance with 
Islamist notions of freedom and justice.11 The orientation of the former could 
be described as one of acting upon the individual self in order to achieve 
greater levels of piety; the latter’s orientation, meanwhile, may be described 
as one of acting the (Islamic) self out upon society and (national and inter-
national) politics in order to achieve the desired changes on a larger scale. In 
the case of Islamist NGOs, these two approaches complement one another.12 
Moreover, both have prominent roots in The Muslim Brotherhood move-
ment, whose founder and leader, Hasan al-Banna, regarded Islam as an all-
encompassing project for moral reform on individual, familial, societal as 
well as political levels.13
When the emphasis in religious education is on the formation of a col-
lective Islamic identity and solidarity and the promotion of a truly authentic 
’ummah in the face of hostile forces from the outside, such as Zionism and 
Western imperialism, Islamists, including Islamist NGOs, often make use of 
parallels with earlier historical periods when, as is also true today, Muslims 
were under attack and had to fight back. Examples are the medieval cru-
sades or the time of the Prophet Muhammad himself and the early Muslim 
community. Through such parallels, Islamists try to promote their own legiti-
macy, influence and power as a socio-political movement. Antoun has called 
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such usage of historical parallels, by Islamists or by others, “assaults on his-
toricity.” He observes in this regard: “In terms of persuasion, the paradoxical 
result of this assault on the historicity of events is to make them alike, in 
some sense scripturally anticipated, and to enhance feelings of unity and 
solidarity of the audience not only with their historic past but also with one 
another in the living present.”14
The Humanist-Modernist Approach
There exists also a fundamentally different approach to Islamic edu-
cation. This does not take the protection and development of a supposedly 
pure and authentic Islamic ’ummah, in the face of external (and internal) 
threats as its (main) point of departure. Rather, it focuses on the reinter-
pretation of the Islamic message in line with global human, women’s and 
children’s rights discourses and approaches, as these are enshrined in inter-
national documents and UN-conventions and translated into practice by 
various international development actors.
A non-Islamist NGO dealt with in this study, Al-Faruq Society for 
Orphans, tries to implement the approach of UNICEF toward child devel-
opment. This approach is reflected in a manual by UNICEF-Jordan that was 
originally written for Muslim preachers in order to help them espouse a 
modern Islamic vision on child development in their sermons in line with 
the Universal Declaration on the Rights of the Child issued by the UN in 
1959. Jordanian pedagogues, social scientists, jurists as well as religious 
scholars have contributed to it. A copy of this manual was given to me by 
the president of the Al-Faruq Society, who told me that it serves the Society’s 
awareness-raising program on child development
Instead of emphasizing conformity to a pious lifestyle, this manual, as 
well as other UNICEF material used by the Society espouses individualizing 
principles such as: “respect for individual differences between children;” the 
importance of developing the “internal motivation of the child that leads it 
to undertake self-directed activities” for the sake of his or her own person-
ality building;15 offering children “chances to bear responsibility and make 
choices;” “stimulating the child’s own originality;” “enticing the child to reg-
ulate itself to guarantee and ensure its personal freedom and responsible 
behavior;” and “the importance of developing the children’s (own) ideas and 
opinions and their expression thereof.”16 
Such principles are a clear departure from more traditional Arab 
approaches toward the parent-child relationship. In traditional Arab fami-
lies, children have, in Barakat’s words, often “been socialized into depend-
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ence and escapism.” There, the “principle technique of child-rearing… is 
shaming, while the learning process emphasizes physical punishment and 
talqin [rote-learning] rather than persuasion and reward.” Such strategies, 
according to Barakat, result in “dependency, inequality, and the downplay-
ing of challenges and difficulties.” In such traditional parent-child relation-
ships, “downward communication may be accompanied by anger and pun-
ishment” and “upward communication may be accompanied by crying, self-
censorship, obfuscation and deception.”17
The UNICEF manual for Muslim preachers interprets injunctions 
expressed in Qur’anic ’ayat and hadiths in a fairly liberal spirit in order to 
make them correspond with modern principles and insights regarding chil-
dren’s rights and child development. A prophetic injunction like “honor 
your children and improve their manners” is cited as a legitimization of the 
UNICEF approach toward the upbringing of children described above, for 
instance.18 As an example, consider the way in which the guide interprets the 
following Qur’anic ’ayah: “And your Lord has decreed that you worship none 
but Him. And that you be dutiful to your parents. If one of them or both of 
them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of disrespect, nor 
shout at them but address them in terms of honor” (Al-Isra’: 233).19 On this, 
the manual comments:
The disobedience of children toward their parents in their arrogance can be 
[used as] a precedent for the disobedience of parents toward their children. 
Here we can mention the story of Umar bin al-Khattab and the man who came 
to complain to him about the disobedience of his son. When Umar brought the 
son to reprehend him for his disobedience toward his father, the latter com-
plained to Umar about the disobedience of his father toward him. 
This story, according to the manual, is meant to warn parents against 
“malicious punishments of [i.e. abusive measures against] their children and 
against disregarding the latter’s rights.”20
The UNICEF manual also espouses the idea of gender equality. It 
states that “equality and justice” between boys and girls is legally enjoined 
(by Islam) and that the transgression of this principle is haram (sinful/forbid-
den). The guide calls for equally distributing rights, duties and responsibili-
ties over all members of the family regardless of gender, and condemns hab-
its according to which “girls are given all the housework tasks while the boys 
are playing or doing their homework for school.” Any discrimination between 
boys and girls, the guide stresses, deviates from the Islamic shari‘ah and acts 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   320 05-02-2008   11:13:46
321
to the detriment of positive and mutually supportive relations within the 
family. In this vein, it condemns those fathers who only take their sons out 
to places like the mosque or the market and deprive girls of the opportunity 
to enjoy such “different social and life experiences.”21
UNICEF in Jordan also tries to encourage fathers to take up their own 
role in the upbringing of their children, something relatively new to the cul-
ture. It recommends fathers to participate in all different aspects of their 
children’s development, such as taking care of their health, showing them 
affection by hugging and kissing them, singing with them and telling them 
stories, showing trust in them and respecting their feelings and emotions, 
stimulating their interest in their environment, giving them opportunities 
to choose between different options and take their own decisions.22 Revo-
lutionary ideas indeed when compared to the traditional role of the Arab 
father as depicted by Halim Barakat and others. According to that, the father 
is to have limited presence in his children’s life and to limit his role to that 
of exercising of punishment. Moreover, a child’s difficulties and challenges 
are to be downplayed and the expression of a child’s individuality is to be 
restrained.23
The above depiction of two different approaches within Islamic edu-
cation, the Islamist and the humanist-modernist one, is not meant to sug-
gest that the two are necessarily always at odds in terms of the content of 
their messages on, for instance, the upbringing of children or gender rela-
tions. The basic difference between the two is that the Islamist approach is 
aimed at Islamization, that is to say, the development and fortification of a 
supposedly “pure” and “authentic” Islamic identity and way of life, on indi-
vidual as well as on collective levels, in the face of everything considered to 
be non- or even anti-Islamic.
However, given the fact that Islamists want their Islamic message to 
be relevant in (and to) modern society, we also find among them a critique of 
certain traditional Arab practices and habits; in particular, this occurs in the 
realms of child development and gender relations. This critique can make 
the Islamists’ discourse sound very similar at times to that of the humanist-
modernist approach and may even lead to the explicit adoption of modern 
rights-based principles.
The more progressive Islamists are more outspoken in this tendency 
than the more conservative ones. Head of the Al-’Aqsa Association and ex-
Muslim Brotherhood member Nawal al-Fa‘uri, for instance, emphasizes the 
importance of educating women, not only to make them good mothers and 
housewives but also to enable them to participate in the social, economic 
v a r I o u s  m u s l I m  a p p r o a c h e s  t o w a r d  e d u c a t I o n  a n d  c h I l d  d e v e l o p m e n t
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   321 05-02-2008   11:13:46
and political life of their (Islamic) societies on an equal footing with men. 
Regarding the reproductive role of women in “developing countries,” she 
writes:
Assuming this role well requires education, enlightenment and much study 
about the affairs of life to enable her to offer her sons and daughters anything. 
However, the [societal] focus is only on being married or not, delivering children 
and [questions like]: why didn’t she deliver a child yet? Why did she postpone 
her marriage? How many boys and girls will there be once she has got children? 
In this pattern of diminishing the capabilities of the woman, her education and 
aspirations, there is complete frustration for half of the society in participating 
in its development in an exemplary way.24 
Even some ICCS centers have adopted a more modernist approach 
in their educational activities and their educational discourse. ICCS Center 
Abu Dhur started to cooperate with UNICEF already in 1997, out of a con-
cern with promoting sustainable development and the whish to get rid of 
the trap of providing dependency-reinforcing charitable aid only. Interviews 
conducted by Marie Juul Petersen with UNICEF-trained woman workers of 
this center reveal how much notions of rights and of the empowerment of 
women and children are part of their (Islamic) educational approach. Accord-
ing to the Center’s director, the plan of the new ICCS-administration is that 
within two years from 2007, 25% of the ICCS centers for orphans and poor 
all over Jordan will have adopted the UNICEF approach.25
Religious Education, Dependency-Relationships and 
Indoctrination
In Chapter 8 we noted that opponents of the Islamists accuse the lat-
ter of religiously indoctrinating the clients who depend on their services. 
Being a dependent client implies vulnerability in terms of one’s socio-eco-
nomic status and often psychological vulnerability as well. That is to say cli-
ents are entwined in a patronage relationship that renders them unusually 
sensitive to what the patron has to say on any given matter. Being a child 
usually makes one even more sensitive in this regard. And if these patrons 
are firm adherents of a dogmatic religious ideology, indoctrination seems to 
be all the more likely. Accordingly, even well-educated adults – vulnerable 
in the socio-economic, political, cultural and psychological context in which 
they live – are targeted. What specifically does indoctrination involve in the 
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present context, however, and how does it work? Before moving on, some 
scientific insights on the phenomenon of indoctrination will be presented.
Indoctrination on an Individual Level
The Muslim Brotherhood Movement as a whole, including Sayyid Qutb and his 
writings, advocate Islamization from the bottom up! One cannot even impose 
Islam from the top down. Islam can only be implemented by people and by a 
society who voluntarily and sincerely embraces it! 
This point was made by Murad al-Adeileh, director of the ICCS Social 
Care Council. He had grown agitated because I had reminded him of the 
famous Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood thinker Sayyid Qutb who had pro-
moted the idea of a religiously purified Islamic vanguard to take over power 
by force, and to push through the Islamization of the entire society from the 
top down.26 However one likes to interpret Sayyid Qutb’s thought – which 
can be done in various ways27 – the point I would like to make here is the 
truth contained in the idea that religion, or any conviction for that matter, 
cannot simply be imposed from the top down.
Both indoctrination and brainwashing refer to practices of coercive 
persuasion and mind control. Through such practices certain beliefs and 
ideas are imposed upon people to the exclusion of other beliefs and ideas. 
The emphasis in the concept of brainwashing is on the prevention of rational 
and critical thinking about beliefs presented as absolute “truths.”28 Indoctri-
nation as a concept denotes teaching people to be exclusivist in their think-
ing, in other words to believe unconditionally in a dogmatically given “truth” 
and to reject anything that deviates from that.29
Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins, who have written on the topic 
of conversion and brainwashing in new religious movements, suggest clear 
limits to the power of practices of mind control. No matter how sophisticat-
ed a brainwashing technique is, it can only be successful with those who are 
already receptive to the message in play. On the basis of data derived from 
research on conversion to “new” religious movements in the United States 
such as the Moon Sect, the Jesus Movement, Baghwan and Hare Krishna, as 
well as on the experiences of American prisoners of the Korea war who have 
been exposed to intensive indoctrination efforts in Maoist China, they refute 
the thesis of the proponents of the “Brainwashing Model.” Theories starting 
from that model have an “extrinsic” view on brainwashing. They assume that 
in its process:
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 [a] presumptively passive convert is overwhelmed by dynamic overpowering 
stimuli and converted to ideas and to a self-conception which would previ-
ously have been highly distasteful to the convert…the subject is assumed to 
be passive, without choice or freedom of will to escape his or her brain being 
laundered.30 
According to Anthony and Robbins, the findings of the above-men-
tioned research have demonstrated that ideas, beliefs and self-conceptions 
cannot be imposed upon people who are unwilling to embrace them. Even 
in the extreme case of prisoners of war, who were also physically incarcer-
ated and subject to physical duress and threats, indoctrination efforts posi-
tively affected the inner beliefs and convictions of only a few among them. 
They attribute the receptivity of these exceptional few to their “pre-conver-
sion personalities, past history, emotional strains and identity-problems.”31 
In other words, indoctrination practices must have an appeal to certain pre-
existing personality-traits, emotions, values, beliefs and ideas of its subjects 
in order to succeed.
Here again, Foucault’s statement that power and discipline are not 
only negative in their functioning but must have positive features and pro-
duce “pleasure, forms of knowledge and discourse” in order to operate effec-
tively comes to mind. 25 years ago, Anthony identified such positive aspects 
in the case of converts to alternative religious movements. He mentions the 
rehabilitation of drug users, rewarding interpersonal relationships, renewed 
vocational commitment, suicide prevention and relief from depression and 
anxiety.32 He and Robbins stress that research findings on converts to such 
movements suggest that there is a clear connection between aspects of 
the converts’ pre-conversion selves and their receptivity to the discourse of 
those movements.
The “new self” that results from a conversion experience is not an ego-
alien one. Phrased differently, those who are successfully “indoctrinated” or 
“brainwashed” by a religious movement feel that they have a psychological, 
social and possibly also an economic or even political interest in getting 
“indoctrinated.” This feeling emanates from their previously existing selves 
with all their psychological, social and cultural aspects. The high rate of 
defection of previous converts from such movements, once they come to 
feel that the latter did not meet these interests, only confirms this thesis. The 
authors conclude: “there is generally some ‘elective affinity’ [a term derived 
from Max Weber] between the group and the recruit, which commences a 
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process of interaction in which certain types of individuals and certain types 
of groups jointly create a religious milieu.”33 
Indoctrination on a Collective Level
The concept of “elective affinity” is not only applicable to individual 
psychological cases. Its relevance also extends to more collective levels of 
being. On the level of societies and nation states, there are several examples 
showing that systematic attempts to ideologically mold a population into a 
belief system it does not genuinely accept does not work in terms of control-
ling inner convictions and beliefs, even if it has a powerful impact in terms 
of outward behavior and expressions by the people living in those societies. 
The ultimate fate of Communist one-party states in the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe are a case in point, as well as the massive protests and 
calls for democratization and liberalization of well-educated Iranians – in 
particular from the younger generation – in opposition to the ideological 
strictures of the Shiite clerical regime in Iran. Islamists in Jordan and else-
where have always understood that their message has to resonate with the 
ideas, sentiments and feelings that predominate in the society they operate 
in if they are to have a chance of expanding their movements’ social and 
political influence.
Indeed, any voluntarily and sincerely embraced belief system cannot 
simply be imposed from the top down. In past centuries, Christian mission-
ary organisations as well as Muslim Sufi orders had to adapt their religious 
discourse to the worldviews and the cosmologies of native peoples in newly 
“discovered” lands in order to make their message appealing to the latter. 
Something similar applies to activities of religious education carried out by 
present day Muslim NGOs. If the messages conveyed by these educational 
activities are to be successfully transmitted, they have to resonate with the 
experiences, ideas, interests and values of their local target groups. In other 
words, they have to be geared toward the socio-cultural lifeworld of the 
latter, even if they aim to transform this lifeworld in certain respects. This 
insight has to be kept in mind when evaluating the activities of religious 
education of Muslim NGOs. Such education may even have aspects of foster-
ing individual empowerment.
Al-‘Abura Center’s Approach
On 16 June 2003, a meeting took place between Al-‘Abura Center’s 
staff and mothers of client families. Problems related to the daily lives and 
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the behavior of some of these mothers’ teenage sons were discussed. One 
mother complained about her 12-year old son who wouldn’t listen to her, 
did not go to school and was spending his time hanging around in the 
street. Another woman said that her 14-year old son couldn’t go to school 
since he was forced to take up various temporary manual jobs, in factories or 
in farms, to contribute to the family’s economic survival. Yet another mother, 
tired and sorrowful, talked about her 17-year old son who failed to obey 
her, behaving aggressively and smoking all the time, abusing her and his 
younger siblings verbally as well as physically.
In most of these cases, the director responded to the various com-
plaints by telling the male social worker present at the meeting whose task 
it was to deal with the boys among the orphan clients, to visit the families in 
question in order to find out more about reasons and circumstances under-
lying behavioral problems and to find ways of tackling them. In the case of 
the aggressive teenager, the male social worker mentioned to me that refer-
ral to a psychologist could be one option. In the case of the boy who was 
engaged in paid labor to the detriment of his school education, the director 
suggested raising the monthly financial benefit to the family in question so 
as to enable the boy to go to school again. The mothers in question were 
invited to the meeting to discuss problems that were noted by the center’s 
workers in their daily interactions with the orphans.34
Problems of Orphans – The Workers’ Perception and Discourse
The kind of behavioral problems among orphan boys raised and dis-
cussed at this meeting, such as failure to go to school, disobedience, hang-
ing around in the street without clear purpose, addiction to cigarettes and 
aggressive and abusive behavior is regarded by workers of Al-‘Abura Center 
as resulting from the general condition of poverty and want in the refu-
gee camp. Apart from a lack of income, this entails the crowded and often 
unhealthy living conditions there. Related psychological stresses and frus-
trations may lead to escapism among the orphan boys in the form of addic-
tion and to aggressive behavior within the family or outdoors. Apart from 
poverty, the absence of the father in orphan families is often identified by 
Al-‘Abura Center’s workers as a cause for behavioral problems among espe-
cially orphan boys. This absence is often equated with the absence of control 
and discipline, which they regard as indispensable to the orphan’s mental 
development and future prospects. To borrow the words of the supervisor 
of Al-‘Abura’s women’s center: “boys are usually unmotivated because they 
have no fathers and the mothers cannot control them.”35 According to the 
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same supervisor, the absence of the father as “teacher and supervisor in 
life” creates “mental problems as well as pain and suffering, not to mention 
health problems due to the lack of nutrition because of their poor economic 
status.”36 The workers point to the situation of needy mothers or widows who 
have to bear the double burden of bringing her children up and ensuring 
the family’s economic survival which leads to mental stresses and anxieties 
among them.37
A third cause for the problems in the upbringing and the development 
of orphan children identified by workers and representatives of the ICCS is 
ignorance (jahl) on the part of the mothers of orphans. Murat al-Adeileh, 
the ICCS director who is in charge of these centers all over Jordan, points to 
mothers who discipline their children in a rude, insulting and abusive way. 
He stresses the need for teaching the mothers a more patient, refined and 
friendly approach toward their children.38
The sequence in which such orphan children end up in trouble is 
explained by the center’s (male) supervisor of the orphan boys as follows: 
children – and boys in particular – who lack motivation get in trouble with 
their teachers and may eventually drop out of school.39 Many of them even-
tually find poorly paid jobs in shops or workplaces. They may be subject to 
verbal or physical abuse by the owners or adult workers there before even-
tually being dismissed without remuneration. Once they spend their day-
time in the street, they may engage in (sexually) “immoral,” addictive and 
petty criminal behavior, like stealing.40
Religious Education
In the view of ICCS workers, it is necessary to provide the orphan 
families with moral guidance, education, training and purposeful Islamic 
socialization in order to give them a sense of moral and social direction. 
The director of the ICCS center in Al-Wihdat refugee camp in Amman, for 
instance, considers “keeping the orphans from the street, far from people 
with criminal or immoral intentions and bringing them into an atmosphere 
of moral motivation with a sense of (common) purpose” its central mission.41 
Workers of Al-‘Abura Center stress the importance in their work of “rais-
ing new generations that respect religion and moral values” and “helping 
human beings with their energies, emotions, souls and morals.” The women’s 
section supervisor goes so far as to say that “a person without religion is a 
person without being.”42
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The moral disciplining of Al-‘Abura clients takes a persuasive form 
similar to attempts described by Hirschkind in Egypt. In the words of one of 
the male workers:
When we try to solve social problems or conflicts between people, we do our 
best to convince them that a certain behavior is not desirable. But this often 
happens naturally, because we have personal contacts with clients in the camp 
(such as in places of sports or recreation). So it is often easy and natural to 
speak to people (also) on moral and religious issues.43 
Female workers speak about home visits to client mothers, which 
they describe as taking place in a spirit of “good neighborliness”, “friendship” 
and “sisterhood.” They stress the importance of “listening to the mothers and 
their daughters and letting them know that we feel and care for them.”
The ICCS centers’ educational program for orphans as well as their 
mothers is explicitly presented by ICCS representatives as an alternative to 
the “evil temptations” and “corrupting influences” of materialism and con-
sumerism, as well as an antidote to the negative behavioral inclinations of 
aggression, bitterness and envy toward those who are better off. It is sup-
posed to shape a more pious, harmonious and “balanced” personality out of 
the needy beneficiary, who should learn to be patient, grateful toward God 
and sincerely strive to obtain the divine reward in the afterlife.44
The head of Al-‘Abura Center’s educational department for orphan 
boys speaks about its educational activities as a way to instill a “quieter” 
and more disciplined attitude into the boys. Part of that program involves 
warning orphans, sometimes in the presence of their mothers, against the 
adverse consequences of “harmful” behaviour like not going to school, 
smoking, drinking alcohol, theft, lying and giving in to “evil” temptations 
such as the loose sexual conduct one finds in films or on the internet. The 
workers urge the orphans to completely avoid interaction with other poorly 
behaved youngsters. The disciplinary approach against all of these tempta-
tions is based upon religious values of faith in God, inner peace, patience 
and perseverance in following His way.45
Every week, the orphans receive Qur’anic lessons in ICCS centers. 
These are a vehicle for religious disciplining in the form of instruction in the 
memorization and recitation of the Qur’an and of the performance of ritual 
obligations, such as salah. Concomitantly the duty to attend the weekly 
khutbah (sermon) in the mosque is also much emphasised. They also involve 
instruction in social values derived from the Qur’anic text, like respect for 
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the elderly, honesty, faithfulness and prohibition of gossip. Such values are 
often discussed in reference to the orphan’s concrete experiences and daily 
lives.46 Discussions with orphan girls at Al-‘Abura Center of between 10 and 
12 years of age indicate something of the effects of such religious disciplin-
ing. They spoke, for instance, about seeing sick and miserable people, among 
them alcohol addicts, during a visit to a hospital, which they regarded as a 
lesson about the vital importance of good health and gratitude toward God 
regarding one’s own health. Their response to seeing a man there whose 
arm had been amputated was simply: “thank God that I still have my arm.” 
Another message of gratitude, spiritual contentment and patient endurance 
was expressed while discussing a father who died a martyr in Palestine. This 
was not to be regarded as a cause for sorrow since the children would meet 
him later in Paradise.47
Harmony in Family and Society
To prevent the sort of behavior among children that might lead to 
the disintegration of families, the workers of Al-‘Abura Center encourage 
orphans belonging to the same family to stick together and support one 
another. In concrete terms, according to the Center’s supervisor of orphan 
boys, this means that older brothers should be encouraged to take care of 
the younger ones. The oldest brother, who takes the place of the father in an 
orphan family, is taught to use his position responsibly. He must pay close 
attention to the situation of his younger siblings, make sure that they go to 
school, as well as listen to what they have to say about their problems. The 
younger brothers are, in turn, taught to obey the oldest one in the house as 
well as in matters pertaining to life outdoors.48
Such discourse reflects a straightforward orientation towards the ful-
fillment of one’s duties and responsibilities. It is congruent with traditional 
Arab family values, in which self-denial of each member for the sake of the 
well being as well as the moral integrity and reputation of the family as a 
whole is the norm.49 It also reflects traditional patterns of hierarchy within 
the family.50
However, statements of Al-‘Abura Center’s workers as well as those 
of ICCS representatives such as Murad al-Adeileh (mentioned above) seem 
also to indicate a desire toward reform of the parent-child relationship. Such 
reform polishes down the severer aspects of this hierarchical relationship 
and places a greater stress on empathic care by the older children toward 
the younger ones, whose human dignity should be respected. This vision is 
reflected, for instance, in game activities taking place in the women’s sec-
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tion of Al-‘Abura Center. The participating girls, ranging from 5 to 18 years of 
age, are divided into three age-based groups. Girls from the oldest group are 
obliged to make regular visits to a group of younger children, play games 
with them and help preserve the order in the group, under the supervision 
of a female worker.51 
Pious Discipline as a Vehicle of Empowerment
The Islamist reliance on religious and moral disciplining as a form of 
agency in the building of the individual became most apparent during a 
discussion with Al-‘Abura Center’s orphan girls. They understood the impor-
tance of the Centre’s activities in terms of religious notions of responsibil-
ity, dignity and the strengthening of one’s own capability for doing good. 
Likewise, they stressed the new experiences they underwent at the center 
and the new things they were able to learn there, for instance, computer 
training, and first aid. They were also positive about the visits they had made 
to historical and religious places, including ‘umrah (the lesser pilgrimage) to 
Mecca, and how they had learnt to recite and interpret the Qur’an and the 
Hadith in a way that rendered these texts instructive for their daily behav-
ior.
 The same feelings of empowerment through learning and education 
were also expressed when the girls spoke about the importance of knowl-
edge-seeking in general, the pride they expressed regarding the school 
achievements of their brothers and sisters, and the boys who cause trou-
ble to their mothers by dropping out of school. During religious counsel 
received by the girls, much importance is placed on the development of 
’adab (good manners) as a way to cultivate good relationships with others. 
This includes proper eating habits, modest outward appearance – includ-
ing the eventual donning of the hijab – and polite and civilized behavior 
and speech during daily social interactions.52 Mothers of orphans receive 
religious instruction at the Center’s women’s department as well, amongst 
others on their duty to become “good Islamic mothers.”53
Collective Identity Formation
Besides the cultivation in ICCS centers of virtue in one’s personal life, 
the expression and cultivation of a collective Islamic socio-political identity 
has an important place in the educational programs for the orphans. A lan-
guage class that took place at Al-‘Abura Center provides a clear example of 
the construction of a collective Islamic political identity in the face of “alien” 
hostile powers. The voluntary teacher of this class was a man in his thir-
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ties whose professional life was spent as a teacher of Islam in a government 
school.
On one particular occasion, he was sitting together with a small 
group of seven or eight orphan boys of between 8 and 12 years old around a 
table. The first part of the language class was devoted to exercises in ruq‘ah 
writing. Once the boys had completed them under the supervision of the 
teacher, who approached them in a didactic, calm and encouraging manner, 
they received a homework assignment in the form of a text entitled rabb al-
‘alamin (Lord of the two Worlds) which they were told to write in ruq‘ah. Next 
came a poetry session, in which all the boys were told to read aloud a poem 
on the Prophet Muhammad, after the teacher himself had done so. Some 
of them recited the poem in a melodious voice. Once everybody was done, 
the teacher asked the pupils about the poem’s meaning. When no verbal 
response was forthcoming, he started to emphasize that understanding the 
meaning of the text was essential. Then he highlighted several themes in the 
poem: praise to the Prophet Muhammad who is the best of God’s creatures 
and a light in darkness and oppression; the Prophet’s own orphanhood; the 
jahilin of Mecca who mocked the Prophet, accusing him of being a liar and 
attacking him physically; and the necessity for the Prophet and his follow-
ers to fight their enemies in order to emerge victorious from their weak and 
vulnerable position. The teacher stressed that, in order to live as good Mus-
lims, the Prophet and his followers needed to become strong and to acquire 
political power themselves.
Subsequently, he drew a parallel with the present time, in which 
Arabs and Muslims once again live in a state of weakness and vulnerabil-
ity. His argument was that, due to the fact that the Arabs and Muslims are 
divided and fragmented, they are oppressed by the West in general and the 
United States in particular. In a rhetorical fashion, he asked the boys: “would 
the Americans have been able to invade Iraq if the Muslims were strong 
and united? Would the Jews have been able to take Palestine if the Muslims 
were united?” The teacher concluded his comments by saying that all Mus-
lim countries could be invaded by the Americans, including Jordan.54
The class speaks volumes about the educational approach of ICCS 
centers for orphans and the poor. First of all, we see the centrality of reli-
gious topics and material when teaching linguistic skills like handwriting and 
poetry. Second, we see, as with the Islamic Welfare Society of Salt described 
in the previous chapter, that the approach to religious knowledge is a mod-
ern one in the sense that its content is expected to be comprehended in an 
explicit and rational manner. Furthermore, it was obvious that the teacher 
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of this language class attached great importance to fostering a sense of col-
lective Muslim consciousness and identity among the orphan boys as a way 
of relating to the outside world.
From the teacher’s point of view, the boys must understand that the 
(political as well as social) problems and weaknesses Arabs and Muslims cur-
rently face, and which greatly affect the boys’ own lives as (often orphaned) 
children of Palestinian refugees, are caused by the lack of a solid (political) 
Islamic identity. Likewise, the teacher had no doubts that the way to over-
come these problems and for Muslims to regain their dignity is for all true 
believers to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad and his early 
Companions. Thus, they are unconditionally to adhere to a commonly held 
Islamic faith, to practice mutual solidarity and to stand united in the face of 
the enemy of the modern ’ummah (the forces of [US] imperialism and Zion-
ism). In this spirit, Muslims will regain their power and dignity. The usage of 
the Prophet Muhammad as a model of (collective) empowerment for the 
orphan boys was apparent from the teacher’s emphasis on the Prophet’s 
own orphanhood.
Similar political messages were conveyed at the women’s department 
of Al-‘Abura Center as preparations were made for a celebration to mark 
the end of the summer. Part of these was the rehearsal of a theatre play 
performed by orphan girls under the supervision of women teachers. This 
play dealt in a satirical vein with the politically hot topics of Palestine and 
Iraq. One of the girls played the role of a minister of an unnamed Arab coun-
try. She was “interviewed” by another girl who played the role of a journal-
ist. The “minister” tried to soothe and placate the audience with reassuring 
words. When the “interviewer” asked her about the American occupation of 
another Arab country, the “minister” answered that the Americans should 
be considered friends and reasonable people, with whom everything can 
be discussed and arranged in a fair spirit. When the issue of Palestine was 
raised, her response was that the Jews are victims deserving of pity, and 
that maintaining good relations with them was of the utmost importance. 
Needless to say, the play was intended to elicit ridicule and mockery from 
the audience and, presumably, it succeeded in doing just this.
After the rehearsal, singing exercises began. The first song dealt with 
the life of an orphan family suffering from poverty and unable to afford the 
kind of food and clothing that other people enjoy during the time of ‘Id al-
Fitr. The second song dealt with the exile of Palestinian refugees who miss 
their country and family and long for a return to their homeland. That song 
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was accompanied by traditional Palestinian dabka dance. At the end, a song 
about the Prophet Muhammad was sung.55
The activities taking place at this event also illustrate how the pur-
portedly Islamic educational message at Al-‘Abura Center is colored by the 
experiences and multiple identities of the inhabitants of a Palestinian refu-
gee camp in Jordan. The play cannot be explained other than as a thinly 
veiled protest against the type of government they live under as Arab citi-
zens who, moreover, carry the status of Palestinian refugees who often feel 
excluded and discriminated against. Its message was that this government 
cares more about its relationship with the “enemies” of the Arab nation then 
about the well being and rights of the bulk of the members of this nation 
itself, and in particular the Palestinian people.
The first song dwelled upon the experiences of orphanhood, poverty 
and socio-economic inequality. It gives expression to experiences common 
to needy single-parent families living in the Al-Hussein refugee camp. Their 
situation was contrasted with that of people who can afford an abundance 
of food and clothing during the feast of ‘Id al-Fitr. To a certain degree, the 
issue of social class came to the fore here. Apparently, the song reflects a 
form of protest against the lack of solidarity on the part of the wealthier 
classes with the underprivileged. This lack of solidarity is most painfully 
felt during a religious feast like ‘Id al-Fitr, which must be experienced as a 
betrayal of the feasts’ true religious and ethical meaning, which calls for the 
inclusion of the poor and orphans.
The second song, on the fate of Palestinians exiled from their home-
land, gave direct expression to the Palestinian experience and identity. This 
was underlined by the accompanying dabka dance, a cultural symbol of Pal-
estinian identity. The last song, about the Prophet Muhammad, was specifi-
cally related to the Islamic message.
Piety and Social Mobility
ICCS representatives and workers often stress the need to work for 
upward social mobility of the orphan clients, mainly through education and 
training. Apart from interviews with them, this is reflected in their publica-
tions, where values like self-reliance, building one’s own personal character, 
obtaining success and progress are emphasized in reports on activities like 
scouting, computer training or employment provision to needy clients.56 
Their religious view on this matter apparently is that while only God knows 
and determines how successful one will be in life, it is the duty and respon-
sibility of every needy believer to exert all efforts to overcome their situa-
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tion of need and the duty of every wealthier believer to assist and support 
the former in this regard.57 This spirit of social betterment and advancement 
through education is reflected in the following statement a worker of Al-
‘Abura Center’s food production unit, who is a widow and used to be a needy 
recipient herself, about what she tells her own children: “I do everything I 
can for you and work from early in the morning until the evening. I do not 
allow myself to be tired, but please, do your utmost at school and get high 
marks. When I walk in the streets, I am proud of you.”58
Working on Social Mobility and Economic Prospects
ICCS centers’ program of supporting orphans in their (future) socio-
economic development and/or mobility consists first of all of tutoring les-
sons for children in any school subject they have difficulties in coping with. 
The center’s educational workers may pay visits to schools where the client 
children are enrolled, talk to the teacher about the latter’s learning results 
and problems and subsequently draw up a plan for tutoring them, and 
assisting them in their home-work assignments at the center.59 If a child’s 
learning problems are related to an unstable family situation at home, a 
female worker, possibly accompanied by a male worker, may visit the family 
in question to look for ways of improvement. They may encourage the moth-
er to be more positive and rewarding toward her children, and the child to 
be more disciplined and obedient toward his mother and to do his or her 
best at school.60
As already mentioned in Chapter 12, children who “do not fit” within 
the regular school system may be send to vocational training centers, or may 
even find employment opportunities in places like garages, groceries, car-
pentry workshops or construction sites that are considered “trustworthy” by 
the Center’s workers.61 On the other hand, orphan boys considered talented 
enough may, with the help of Al-‘Abura Center, get places in institutions of 
higher education, such as those for advanced IT-learning. Like in other ICCS 
centers, there is in Al-‘Abura Center itself a small computer lab where orphan 
boys as well as girls receive elementary computer training in order to sup-
port them in their school education.62
Al-‘Abura Center also organizes lectures and discussions for boys as 
well as girls on social issues that are of relevance to their lives. These may be 
led by the Center’s workers themselves or by experts such as medical doc-
tors, formally trained social workers or pedagogues invited by the Center. 
They are sometimes open to the public in the local community, and not con-
fined to the clients alone. Topics raised and discussed at these events range 
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from health issues, such as the effects of sexual diseases, smoking and the 
drinking of alcohol, to proper social conduct and the children’s prospects in 
terms of their future education and work. Advice, counsel and warning are 
given at these events.63 According to the Center’s female workers, orphan 
girls can bring in any subject relevant to their own lives in these sessions and 
receive counsel. The Center’s educational teachers regularly organize a quiz 
on issues discussed with the orphans. Those who win receive a price.64
Gender Separation and Role Differentiation
Orphan boys and girls participate separately in educational activities 
at ICCS centers. From Saturday till Thursday, the boys are supposed to come 
to Al-‘Abura Center between 4 and 5 pm., and to stay there until the begin-
ning of the evening. They number 120 at most. The attending boys usually 
divide themselves into three age-based groups; these roughly correspond 
to the ages of kindergarten, primary and secondary school age. Each group 
will work in a different room and is supervised by one of the three male edu-
cational workers employed by the center, or by a male volunteer.65
The girls arrive in the morning at the Center and stay until early or 
mid-afternoon with the Center’s women workers. They are similarly divided 
into the three age-based groups. At separate times, boys as well as girls 
make use of the same rooms and facilities, such as the computer lab, the 
library and the video recorder.
There are, however, obvious differences in the nature of educational 
activities for boys and for girls. On Friday, for instance, the male workers 
take the orphan boys to Al-Hussain Club, Al Hussain Refugee Camp’s youth 
center, where they engage in sports and in cultural activities like theatre, 
singing, story writing and poetry.66 Moreover, several times of the year, 
the bus of the Center brings the boys and their guides to a forested place 
south of Amman, where they camp for three days. There they engage in 
various marching exercises (equipped with solid wooden sticks), as well as 
in other scouting activities.67 Girls, while also engaged in similar cultural – 
though not the same kind of sportive – pastimes, spend less time outside 
the premises of the Center; rather, they spend a considerable amount of 
time being prepared for future roles as mothers and housewives, learning 
to cook and clean well.68
This does not a priori mean that, from an Islamist point of view, girls 
cannot engage in activities similar to those of boys; merely that these have 
to take place on a gender-separate basis. The male director of the ICCS cent-
er in Al-Wihdat refugee camp in Amman, for instance, talked about plans to 
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establish a scouting club for the orphan girls, parallel to the already exist-
ing one for boys.69 The women’s department of Al-‘Abura Center regularly 
organizes outings and picnics to natural areas and places of (historical and 
religious) interest for the orphan girls and their mothers, as well as excur-
sions to various social institutions.70
In terms of gender, we may conclude that Islamist social welfare cent-
ers situated in culturally conservative communities like Palestinian refugee 
camps are not that conservative, let alone reactionary, when compared with 
prevailing traditional culture. While they reproduce traditional gender roles 
and divisions, they offer certain opportunities in terms of education, voca-
tional training, social awareness and activities to underprivileged girls and 
their mothers that may otherwise not have been available to the latter. In 
other words, they try to work through their own (religiously inspired and 
gender-separated) ways on the latter’s social, psychological and educational 
agency and empowerment.
Al-Faruq Society for Orphans in Comparison with ICCS 
Center Al-‘Abura
In terms of function, activities and target group, Al-Faruq Society for 
Orphans in Irbid, which is mainly active in the Palestinian refugee camp of 
that city, is similar to ICCS centers for orphans and poor in Jordan. Both work 
with children from orphan families who face the same problems and risks, 
such as lowly educated or even illiterate mothers who face severe difficulties 
in providing for their basic needs and helping them with their school educa-
tion, dropping out from school and ending up in child labor or in practices 
like petty theft, alcohol abuse and (homo-)sexual experiments.71
Both also use methods like home visits 72 and offering the orphan chil-
dren educational, cultural and recreational activities intended to keep them 
from spending too long on the streets, where the dangers of crime, addic-
tion and “immorality” lurk, and on giving them new perspectives.73
Al-Faruq Society versus the ICCS: Two Different Discourses
Having said this, generally speaking, Al-Faruq Society is run by people 
with more secular or liberal religious orientations than those working in the 
ICCS centers. Moreover, Al Faruq Society does not insist that its client families 
make use of its educational and cultural services, unlike an ICCS center like 
Al-‘Abura. At the time of fieldwork, the latter stipulated that any donations 
paid to an orphan family also meant the obligatory usage of such services 
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by the recipients. Only 45 orphan girls participate in Al-Faruq Society’s Girls 
Committee, for instance, while it serves in total approximately 700 families 
with an estimated 3,500 individuals. The Committee’s head explained this 
relatively low number with a simple remark: “everybody is free to register or 
not.”74 Likewise, the President affirmed that nobody could be forced or even 
pressured to participate.
This difference can be attributed to a vision specific to the place of 
religion in individual, social as well as political life, as well as to the way in 
which this vision translates itself into (varying) approaches to social work. 
An ICCS center like Al-‘Abura works on the premise that following the Islamic 
revelation with its injunctions and admonitions to act “for the sake of God” 
must be the ultimate and only real aim in the lives of the believers. Their 
representatives mention with pride that these injunctions and admoni-
tions pertain to “all” aspects of life, including the tiniest and most intimate 
details, like going to the toilet or the sexual behaviour between a husband 
and wife.75 From this follows the idea that there exists no correct form of 
social work outside of the Islamic doctrine as they understand it. This also 
means, in practice, that those who benefit from ICCS centers’ services must 
be willing, “for their own good,” to be guided in the direction of a religious 
worldview and to become part of a collective effort of religious reform, with 
its implications in terms of personal piety as well as socio-political identity. 
This worldview and effort is the one espoused by Jordan’s major Islamist 
movement.
Al-Faruq Society, on the other hand, does not have the Islamization of 
society in general and of clients in particular as its aim. Central to their dis-
course is the idea that clients must be enabled to empower themselves, to 
be made aware of their own rights and opportunities and to learn to grasp 
the latter in accordance with their own preferences and desires as well as in 
harmony with their social environment. The practical results of this approach 
may not be totally unlike those of the one applied by ICCS centers. The lat-
ter’s vision of the “truly pious” Islamic personality includes notions of taking 
one’s own responsibility to grasp one’s (religiously legitimate) opportunities 
to improving one’s own (spiritual as well as socio-economic) conditions in 
life, in harmony with duties toward one’s own family and community. Moreo-
ver, Islamic faith has a prominent presence in Al-Faruq Society’s discourse as 
well. It does not, however, take the promotion of piety and a collective Islam-
ic identity that is defined in opposition to non-Islamic (for instance secular 
or Western) identities as its starting point in social work. Besides the Islamic 
revelation, it pays equal attention to global human, women’s and children’s 
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rights discourses that are enshrined in international treaties. The latter indi-
cate the direction in which change in the lives of the Society’s beneficiaries 
as well as in the wider community should take place. Such discourses are 
based upon a relatively liberal notion of individual rights, wherein the indi-
vidual must have the freedom to acquire the self-esteem to express him- or 
herself in the attainment of self-directed goals. This includes the choice as to 
whether or not to engage in a certain (religious) lifestyle or not. 76
Al-Faruq Society’s Educational Approach toward Orphans
In Al-Faruq Society’s discourse, Islam as a revelation offering values 
and injunctions for a better life accords well with a liberal and humanist 
developmental vision, also when it comes to child development issues. The 
remarks of a father of a school child who is enrolled in the elementary school 
run by Al-Faruq Society may here serve as an illustration. According to the 
head of the school, a middle-aged woman, its teachers always use examples 
derived from the daily social lives of the children in order to illustrate reli-
gious values. As important examples of those values, she mentioned sidq 
(honesty) and ’amanah (reliability and faithfulness). The visiting father in 
question spontaneously explained these concepts in terms encouraging the 
child to express his or her true feelings and opinions in an atmosphere of 
freedom. Only in such an atmosphere, he stressed, can lying and hypocrisy, 
the opposite of those values, be countered.77
Interviews with Al Faruq Society’s workers about their own activities 
related to child development indicate as well a greater stress on individual 
choice, learning and creativity, and a lesser focus on values of obedience 
and (sacred) duties toward the family and the accompanying conceptions 
of values like sabr (patience) and gratitude. This is reflected in the words of 
the Society’s President who said:
for sure, the orphan children must learn to memorize the Qur’an, but it is as 
important for them to learn computer skills, for instance, to engage in sports or 
to have fun … for us, religion is just one element in our overall program, while 
at the ICCS, religion dominates everything.78 
Accordingly, the Society’s members argue that they want to give boys 
and girls the opportunity to make their own choices, “and this could mean 
working with computers, with something in the area of religion, in the medi-
cal realm or whatever.”79
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The question remains to what extent such different ideological out-
looks really translate themselves into different practical approaches. ICCS 
centers too present their orphan clients with different possibilities in terms 
of vocational training or orientation. This seems to indicate that social work-
ers employed by ideologically different NGOs apply much the same meth-
ods of education and empowerment in practice, even though the accompa-
nying socio-cultural discourses may significantly differ. This is also reflected 
in the activities Al-Faruq Society organizes for its orphan boys and girls.
The Society offers much the same types of socio-cultural activities 
and vocational training to its orphan clients as ICCS centers do. They receive 
aid and support in their school education and their homework assignments, 
for instance. Apparently different is that Al-Faruq Society insists that every 
child must follow a certain type of modern education or training, whether 
this is academic or vocational. Its president strongly rejects one practice that 
I found at Al-‘Abura Center. Specifically, I refer to the tradition that children 
who do not learn well at school may prefer to work in a “trustworthy” place, 
with an uncle for instance, instead of going to school.80 Apparently, when 
it comes to the enhancement of children’s own socio-economic prospects, 
Al-Faruq Society’s approach is more disciplinary, whereas Al-‘Abura cent-
ers’ disciplinary approach placed, at least at the time of fieldwork, a heavier 
emphasis on religion and piety.
Like ICCS centers, Al-Faruq Society enables boys to follow vocational 
training in various areas like repairing engines or electrical devices, carpen-
try or even more advanced techniques like computer programming at the 
youth center of the refugee camp.81 Primary school age girls are trained at 
the Society itself in the production of ceramics, artificial flower making and 
embroidery. The chairwoman of the Society’s girls committee presents the 
aim of the latter activity as offering the participating girls (aged between 6 
and 13) the opportunity to be engaged in a productive and creative vein. 
She emphasises that there are few possibilities at home for activities of a 
creative and enjoyable nature. The girls also receive the necessary materi-
als and tools from the committee to carry out these activities in their own 
houses.82 The products that are the fruit of such manual activities are pub-
licly displayed at exhibitions at times, and may be sold. If that happens, 
the proceeds are used for the benefit of the committee and its programs.83 
With the same aim of developing their own creative skills, the girls are also 
encouraged by the committee to give presentations on topics in which they 
are interested. Many other activities, like helping the participating girls 
with their school assignments, watching educational films on subjects like 
v a r I o u s  m u s l I m  a p p r o a c h e s  t o w a r d  e d u c a t I o n  a n d  c h I l d  d e v e l o p m e n t
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   339 05-02-2008   11:13:47
340
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
health, animals or history, excursions to places like hospitals, centers for the 
handicapped, religious institutions and natural areas, staging theatre plays 
on subjects like daily behavior, religious or historical themes and computer 
training, seem to be similar to those of ICCS centers.84
In spite of all these similarities, however, the emphasis on creative 
self-expression in the discourse of the committee members, rather than of 
living and acting “in the way of God,” points to a difference in (sub-) cultures. 
What may be indicative as well of the Society’s own approach is the desire 
expressed by its president to acquire more useful toys and devices for the 
children to play, including musical instruments. When asked whether play-
ing music conflicted with Islam’s teachings, an opinion held by Islamic fig-
ures of stricter interpretations, he replied: “we are not fanatical about such 
(faith-related) issues.”85
The discourse of individual creativity and empowerment can also be 
heard at the primary school the Society is running. The staff of this school 
prides itself on its strict adherence to the legal stipulation prohibiting any 
form of corporal punishment of children – something that cannot be said 
of a significant number of other schools in Jordan – and in its application 
of methods of playful and creative learning, which they contrast with other 
school’s more traditional methods of rote-learning.86 Encouraging children 
in a rewarding and positive spirit, instead of humiliating them and empha-
sizing their mistakes, is explained as the correct approach.87 They told me 
that they try to promote this approach toward the parents of schoolchildren 
as well.88
Individual Development in a Social Context: Activities toward 
Parents
Similar messages are transmitted to parents – client mothers as well as 
others – who attend the Society’s public lectures or courses on the upbring-
ing of children. These are usually taught by UNICEF’s affiliated experts, and 
include themes like health, hygiene, sexuality, children’s right to protection 
against abuse and positive and rewarding ways of communicating with, and 
encouraging children that is conducive to the development of their individ-
ual selves.89 According to the Society’s president, these lectures or courses 
are often well attended, due to the social relevance of the topic. One of the 
Society’s client mothers, a divorced mother with a teenage son, stressed 
the benefits she received from such a course. It taught her how to defuse 
conflicts with her often defiant son, how to listen to his concerns, engage in 
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constructive discussions and to find workable solutions that are acceptable 
to both of them, instead of reacting aggressively and merely shouting.90
Apart from referring client mothers to courses, problems in the 
upbringing of their children are also discussed in personal contacts with the 
Society’s social workers. The head of the Society’s girls’ committee reminded 
me of the suffering of the orphan girls: daughters of needy widows who 
were living in overcrowded housing conditions and facing financial prob-
lems. Such situations invariably give rise to an atmosphere of tension and 
conflict within the home; often the arguments will stem from money-based 
concerns. Poorly educated (or completely uneducated) mothers, she states, 
are often unable to understand their daughters’ needs, such as the need to 
play; instead, they tend to overburden their children with all kinds of house-
hold duties. Needless to say, this often occurs at the expense of the relation-
ship between mothers and daughters. The members of the committee try 
to overcome this by talking to these mothers, advising them to pay more 
attention to their daughter’s situation, needs and feelings and to promote a 
more open form of communication between them, in which desires, prob-
lems and difficulties can be mutually expressed.91
It is obvious, then, that the idea of empowerment of the individual 
means at the same time working on the social, on improving patterns of 
communication and strengthening social relationships. Al-Faruq Society’s 
president explicates this in the following words:
The Society attaches great value to the preservation of good relations in the 
family… if there are conflicts, for instance the oldest son is frustrated because 
things are not going well with him, he cannot find a job, he expresses himself 
in an aggressive manner and abuses his younger brothers and sisters and we 
hear about this, I will intecede together with the social investigator. We will do 
our best to convince him that there is a way out, and we want to restore these 
(family) relationships.92
Islamic Concepts of Social Cohesion
It is in the realms of familial as well as wider social cohesion that Islam-
ic concepts come most clearly and directly to the fore in Al-Faruq Society’s 
workers discourse. While the Qur’anic language may primarily be regarded 
as a language of duty and obedience, something that is most clearly present 
in ICCS discourse, Al-Faruq Society’s workers connect this with the modern 
language of rights by interpreting religious duties as a call for people to 
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respect one another’s rights. This happens out of the awareness that each 
individual is dependent on others in the family as well as in the local com-
munity to realize those rights. In terms of the parent-child relationship, 
for instance, the workers understand the children’s right to a healthy indi-
vidual development as well as the parent’s rights to be respected through 
the Islamic notions of rahmah (care and compassion) and ’ihtiram (respect 
and honoring). The former quality ought to be displayed by parents toward 
their children; while the latter should inform the attitude of a child towards 
his/her parents. Concomitantly, when dealing with neighbors and others in 
the wider community, the workers try to instill in the orphans the value of 
respect for everyone else’s dignity by emphasizing the religious concepts 
of tasamuh (mutual tolerance and forgiveness) and sabr. The message con-
veyed to the orphans is that life can be made easier if one is considerate and 
patient with others. The right to be taken care of, to be applied in particular 
to the weak and vulnerable, is also part of the same message. And the same 
goes for the value of respect for one another’s property, from which admoni-
tions – such as not taking or using someone else’s possessions without the 
latter’s permission, or peeping at another’s schoolwork – are derived.93
Last but not least, the Qur’anic and legal concept of taharah (puri-
ty) is invoked when it comes to emphasizing children’s right to grow up in 
healthy and hygienic circumstances. Parents are made aware of the religious 
importance for children to take a shower or to bathe regularly. The same 
concept is also used to warn orphan children against engaging in sexual 
experiments, stealing or drug abuse, all of which are classified as “impure” 
forms of behaviour. Qur’anic visions of divine reward and punishment may 
be used to underline such ethical messages pertaining to health and social 
well being.94 To confirm messages from secular experts on issues like child-
parent relations or hygiene, a relevant ’ayah from the Qur’an or a relevant 
hadith is often included because, in the words of the Society’s president, “in 
the culture of the people here, religion relates to all aspects of life.”95
Role Differentiation and Gender Separation versus the Ideal of 
Gender Equality
The Society’s approach of working for social development in harmony 
with the socio-cultural fabric of the local community means, in practice, that 
traditional perceptions of gender relations are also reflected in the activities 
it organizes for orphan children. According to its president, “given the tradi-
tions prevalent within the community,” gender separation is needed when it 
comes to discussing with orphans topics like sexuality, the physiological and 
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psychological changes taking place during puberty, and relationships with-
in the family. He is of the opinion that “girls need a specialized and careful 
approach” in discussing such matters, one that is “implemented by female 
teachers.” Boys are assumed to talk in a different way about these topics, one 
that is unsuitable for girls.96 When asked about differences in approaches 
toward orphan boys and girls respectively, the head of the girls’ committee 
stressed that girls are not allowed to spend hours outside of the house and 
wander in the streets in the way boys are doing. A girl may go to certain safe 
places like the school, the hairdresser or to a (girl)friend’s house. Islam, she 
stresses, does not allow her to be adventurous and wander around without 
a clear and legitimate purpose. That is not good for her honor and dignity.97
While especially the latter view appears to convey an image of con-
servatism in terms of gender issues, the question remains as to whether 
Al-Faruq Society’s members and workers regard practices of gender separa-
tion and traditional role divisions as immutable and sacred, or whether they 
consider these merely as necessary concessions to traditional and prevalent 
social mores. Involved in the abovementioned conversation with the head 
of the girls’ committee, the president expressed a desire to go beyond such 
traditional attitudes. He claimed that once a child, a boy or a girl, reaches 
puberty, he or she should “discover his or her own way in life,” regardless of 
ascribed gender roles.98
Theoretically, the president and other members of the Society are 
ready to go to great lengths in allowing for the possibilities of change, also 
in terms of gender relations. On this level, they are influenced by global 
rights discourses pertaining to gender equality. Practically however, they still 
seem to be largely bound by the local mores of the community in which they 
themselves are part.99 Traditional gender-based differences are reflected as 
well in the different types of activities, courses and trainings for boys and 
girls respectively mentioned above. In some activities, however, like excur-
sions to companies, the university or other social institutions, intermingling 
between boys and girls is not considered a problem since such activities are 
of a gender-neutral nature.100
In terms of ideals, an emancipatory vision of children’s rights and gen-
der equality is present among Al-Faruq Society’s members and workers. A 
vision in which injunctions derived from the Qur’an and the Hadith are inter-
preted as conditions for the (equal) rights human beings, including women 
and children, should enjoy.101 At the same time, discussions with its members 
revealed that the Society follows a cautious approach in this regard, out of 
fear of offending people’s traditional convictions and of generating suspi-
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cions that “alien, immoral and inauthentic ideas” originating from outside 
are being introduced. Moreover, most members and workers of the Society 
come from the same community as their target group. They have, generally 
speaking, a close cultural affinity with the latter and have been socialized in 
much the same traditional values. My discussions with them suggest, how-
ever, that they also engage in reflection on certain traditional patterns in 
ways I did not find in Al-‘Abura ICCS center. Take, for instance, the way in 
which the Society’s president discussed the case of a (hypothetical) daugh-
ter who lives with her parents, works outdoors, possibly even at night, and 
earns more money than her father. He explained the traditional view on this 
by observing that such a practice would undermine:
the balance in the family and the authority of the father – and that is really a 
problem, in the light of the reputation of the family in the community. In this 
society, the man is expected to be the head of the family, since it is a male-
dominated society. A daughter may contribute to the family income, but there 
are limits [even] to that.102 
The very fact that the president used the term “male-dominated” 
points to a certain reflexivity, an awareness of different patterns of (and 
different views on) gender relations, as well as an interaction with (global) 
discourses that express those views. And he knew how to explicate such 
differences to me on my own terms, in a way that Al-‘Abura Center’s work-
ers did not. The latter, by contrast, seemed to take traditional gender roles 
wholly for granted. Thus, my questions needed to be particularly explicit 
to obtain any kind of clarification on these matters. Further, when they did 
arrive, these clarifications presented the Center’s own approach to gender 
separation as if it were entirely natural. They were not reflective of gender 
based role divisions as something that could be problematized, let alone 
changed. My observations at Al-‘Abura Center suggest a significant degree 
of isolationism vis-à-vis global secular discourses. At Al-Faruq Society, in 
contrast, I experienced a much more active and conscious interaction with 
the latter.
Child Development Education in Other Associations
In spite of differences in philosophy and (religious) ideology, a com-
mon desire for reform and change in the upbringing of children can be 
noted in the discourse of the various Muslim NGOs included in this study. 
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This reform and change is based on the idea that the preservation of happi-
ness, harmony and cohesion in the family and the wider society requires that 
children’s individuality, their own thoughts, feelings, desires and creativity 
must be taken more seriously by adults, and in particular by their parents, 
than has been – and continues to be – traditionally the case. Suppression 
of the child’s individuality, in particular in the form of (verbal, physical as 
well as sexual) abuse, is something to be warned against, countered and 
combated. This idea comes also clearly to the fore in associations focusing 
on other target groups then orphan families.
Islamist women’s and children’s rights activist and head of the Al-
’Aqsa Association Nawal al-Fa‘uri for instance, identifies as a problem of child 
development in traditional communities the parents’ lack of recognition of 
their children’s independent natures and needs, and their tendency to resort 
to corporal punishment as a way of disciplining. Her association tries to 
encourage mothers to stimulate their children by giving compliments and 
rewards for positive behavior, to play with them and take them, and in par-
ticular their daughters, to outside places like shops and recreational places 
as a way of acquainting them with the wider world. As she informed me, her 
association sometimes organizes discussions on childhood issues, in which 
children are invited to talk about problems pertaining to their relations with 
others at school, at home or elsewhere. At these meetings, parents, teachers 
and pedagogic experts are invited to give them counsel in return.103
According to Mufid Sarhan, the general manager of the Islamist Al-
‘Afaf Welfare Association, parents have to learn to listen better to the needs 
and the views of their children, especially when they reach puberty. “Even 
though parents have more life experience, this does not mean that they 
know things always better then their children,” he stated to me. “A child 
might have an idea or a desire which is different from that of their parents, 
but which is still a good one. In this society, there is the widespread mis-
conception that being older always means that one knows better.”104 This 
association organizes courses for prospective brides and grooms who are 
going to participate in one of its yearly mass weddings, as well as courses 
for parents from the general public, on the issue of bringing up children. 
Two women who had participated in such courses stressed to me independ-
ently from one another the importance of a patient, positive, rewarding and 
stimulating approach toward children and the abjectness of corporal and 
humiliating punishments as important eye-openers conveyed to them. 
Underlying this idea of a more patient approach toward children is also the 
v a r I o u s  m u s l I m  a p p r o a c h e s  t o w a r d  e d u c a t I o n  a n d  c h I l d  d e v e l o p m e n t
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   345 05-02-2008   11:13:47
346
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
Islamic insight that children are still morally and socially “ignorant” or “inno-
cent” and in the process of building their personalities.105
At the same time, Al-‘Afaf Society stresses that encouraging children’s 
development as individuals should be combined with the instilling of a sense 
of civility, decency and respect in them. Such values are promoted at work-
shops organized by the Society for school children. According to Sarhan, 
children there learn the habit of respectful dialogue and of how to prevent 
the deterioration of mutual differences into mutual aggression and fights. 
The traditional Islamic theme of respect for the elderly in general and one’s 
parents in particular is put across by Al-‘Afaf Society in the framework of the 
same conception of civility. Children, Sarhan argues, have a legitimate right 
to express their wishes, needs and opinions to the elderly, but must learn to 
do so in a polite manner.106
Some Muslim associations make use of Islamic discourse in order to 
counter traditional forms of shame that present an obstacle to a healthy 
development of certain categories of children in modern society. An exam-
ple is mentally or physically disabled children. They are often kept from 
public view in traditional Arab families because their presence is consid-
ered as a disgrace. The Southern Society for Special Education in Ma‘an tries 
to convince parents of disabled children to cherish their children as wor-
thy members of family and community, since their disabilities are given by 
God. Accordingly, their parents are encouraged to do everything possible to 
develop the talents their children do have and enable them to participate 
more fully in society. It offers such families medical diagnosis and treatment, 
various forms of therapy, counsel as well as special education for their disa-
bled children.107
School Dropouts as a Target Group
The Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association serves school dropout girls 
from needy and socially weak families, as well as their mothers in the out-
lying Hashemiya quarter near Zarqa city, with the support and training it 
has received from the British development organization Questscope. These 
girls usually come from the many broken families there, or else from families 
where the father is an alcoholic or suffers from illness, is unemployed or does 
not earn a sufficient income. These families’ financial difficulties (making it 
difficult to cover the costs of school fees, books and stationary), in com-
bination with the girls’ learning and behavioral problems and the deeply-
ingrained traditional habit of favoring boys over girls in terms of educational 
opportunities, often causes the girls to abandon school.108
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This is especially true as the girls reach puberty; for, at this time, the 
parents themselves often withdraw them from school. Indeed, many con-
sider their teenage daughter’s school attendance a threat to her morality 
and, by extension, to the honor of the family. Notwithstanding the fact that 
secondary government schools in Jordan are mostly gender-segregated, 
the girls can easily meet boys on their ways to and from the school – and 
thus, in their families’ eyes, run the risk of being morally compromised. Like-
wise, in the school itself, the girls are free to talk with their classmates about 
(contact with) boys. And sexual harassment and assaults in the streets are 
real risks faced by these school-going girls.109 Once they have left school, in 
contrast, they are usually compelled by their mothers to carry out all kinds 
of household tasks and to take care of their younger siblings. In so doing, 
the girls rarely enjoy the opportunity to leave their homes; they are isolated 
both from boys and from their wider society.110
At times, the girls as well as their mothers are victims of abuse by their 
fathers or husbands. According to the Association’s president, Ahlam, the 
girls often suffer from neglect as well, because their mothers are economi-
cally compelled to work outside for long hours, as cleaning ladies with other 
families, for instance, or as street sellers. Nor do the fathers take sufficient 
care of their children. While boys from these families often wander around in 
the area and may express their frustrations by aggressive behavior at school 
or in the street, girls are more likely to turn inward, resulting in feelings of 
shame and low self-esteem. They are ashamed, for instance, that their moth-
ers have to go outdoors to work as cleaning ladies, something that must be 
concealed from the wider community in order to avoid stigmatization. The 
mothers themselves often vent their own frustrations and suffering by ver-
bally and physically abusing their children in turn.111
Working on Dignity and Empowerment
The Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association opens from 9 am to around 1-2 
pm. Its educational program, sponsored by Questscope, consists of literacy 
lessons, a handicraft program, counseling sessions and recreative outings. 
This program is a substitute for a regular school education and is recognized 
by the Jordanian Ministry of Education as such.112 (Indeed, during my visit to 
the association, I was shown a room where some of the girls were complet-
ing their writing exercises.113)
However, in the vision of the workers of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar 
Association, development cannot be restricted to cognitive learning alone, 
particularly not among the target group in question. Given the latter’s situ-
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ation of poverty and economic marginalization, bolstering their dignity by 
means of engaging them in productive activity is considered essential in 
terms of offering a source of income as well as a sense of self-worth.114 At 
the time of my fieldwork, this productive activity took mainly the form of a 
handicraft project where works of embroidery and painting are produced.115 
The association’s workers emphasize the interrelationship between socio-
economic productivity and the issue of tackling socio-psychological prob-
lems. In their view, the fostering of karamah (dignity) can never take place in 
the mind alone. It has to be based upon an (embodied) activity, like a handi-
craft project. Becoming productive and self-reliant in such a way is expected 
to enhance karamah. The workers emphasize the social aspect of this proc-
ess as well. The girls and their mothers must be offered a place where they 
can escape and at times even “forget” the difficulties of their home situation. 
This is equally supposed to be a place where they can gain confidence in 
their own capabilities in a creative and co-operative atmosphere, and where 
they can share their personal problems and experiences.116
The Association’s president leads the counseling sessions in her capac-
ity as wa‘izzah (religious teacher) and social worker, with the assistance of 
a psychologist and a medical worker. These sessions may take place on a 
collective or on an individual basis with the girls or their mothers. All discus-
sions are meant to be confidential, since the association wants to encourage 
girls and their mothers to deal frankly with the problems and challenges 
they face, including personal matters, family-problems, economic difficul-
ties, life in the community, religious questions and so forth.117 In the coun-
seling room of the association, I was shown puppets meant for the girls to 
play with in order to express their experiences with issues that are discussed 
in these sessions.118
While, as a male, I was not been able to observe these counseling ses-
sions, interviews with the association’s workers made clear that a religiously 
inspired vision of greater gender equality informs their approach toward 
child development. The president outspokenly condemned several exam-
ples of gender discrimination in the upbringing of children as jahl. Accord-
ing to her, still prevalent customs – such as receiving the news of a male 
birth with great joy, while that of a girl merits merely shrugs of indifference, 
boys being placed in cradles, while girls are put on the floor, boys being fed 
better food than girls, and young women being denied the right to choose 
a marriage partner – are in no way valid Islamically. Rather, Islam’s endorse-
ment of gender equality in all such fields is stressed by the president as cen-
tral in the awareness raising efforts taking place at the counseling sessions.
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Another theme stressed by the president is overcoming the shame 
the girls and their mothers suffer from in their daily lives, in order to “turn 
negative feelings and attitudes into positive ones.” Participating girls are 
told, for instance, that their mothers’ engagement in work like cleaning 
other people’s houses is not shameful because it is done so that she can 
take care of her family and to feed and clothe her children. In this way, the 
Association tries to legitimize this practice in terms of the traditional – as 
well as religiously conceived – role of the mother.119
Moreover, the Association’s workers stress the importance of encour-
aging the mothers to listen more attentively to their daughters, to be more 
empathetic toward the latter’s feelings and needs, to give them the oppor-
tunity to express these and to discuss them openly and honestly. This stress 
on individual dignity and expression notwithstanding, the association 
members also emphasise that such emancipation must take place within 
the realm of the family unit. Rather than (absolute) individual independ-
ence, social interdependence within the family unit is therefore emphasized 
as a divinely ordained given that is basic to the attainment of dignity and 
true self-esteem. The workers want to prevent situations in which children 
are tempted to run away from home and leave their parents. They start from 
the premise that a unified and harmonious family life is fundamental to the 
healthy development of the individual and, by extension, of the society at 
large.
Sabr as a Path towards Empowerment and Social Reform
Improving the family environment implies that, in the Khawla’ Bint Al-
Azwar Association workers vision, fathers and husbands also have to change 
their attitudes and behaviors. Men must be made aware of the fact that Islam 
grants them no right to physically or verbally abuse their wives. Nor do they 
have a right to carry on affairs with other women. Islam orders them to treat 
their wives with respect, kindness and fidelity, as much as mothers have to 
learn to treat their own children on a basis of love, kindness and respect.120 
From the Association workers’ view, such improvements in family relations 
must be brought about by the instilling of sabr in the girls and their moth-
ers. Patience here has an active rather than a passive meaning. It stands for 
steady perseverance combined with the realization that their problems will 
not disappear overnight, but will be gradually ameliorated if one persists 
along the path of dignity. The girls and their mothers are told that their own 
will and efforts are a sine qua non for the prospects of improving their situ-
ation.121
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The workers’ assumption is that, by providing training, work and coun-
sel for the girls and their mothers, relations between mothers and daughters 
will be improved in the direction of greater mutual, as well as self-respect. 
This, in turn, is expected positively to influence the father/husband’s atti-
tude in the family. In this regard, it should be mentioned that cultural con-
ventions in the local community do not allow the workers of the association, 
who are all women, to approach the fathers or husbands of their clients in 
order to confront them with the need to change their own attitudes. They 
hope to achieve such change indirectly and over time, by enabling moth-
ers and daughters to discover the value of their dignity in a safe women’s 
environment first.122
In her work on the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, Sabah Mah-
mood has contrasted the view espoused by some of its protagonists on 
sabr (as a value that should be practiced by every believer in the path of 
God) with that of more secular or liberal Egyptians who place a much higher 
emphasis on the value of self-esteem as the primary means to attain self-
directed goals.123
Trying to fit the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association into one of these 
two categories is not simple. On the one hand, members and workers of this 
association and in particular its president, who wears a niqab, present them-
selves as advocates of a duty-oriented discourse of piety. For instance, she 
mentioned the duty of husbands to treat their wives with respect and kind-
ness in one breath with the duty of all believers to observe ritual obligations 
“because people who do not act in accordance with God’s Will shall be pun-
ished by Him.” Her stress on the need to restore an authentic Islamic lifestyle 
that Muslims in Jordan have often forgotten under the impact of Western 
hegemony, materialism and consumerism points in the same direction.124 As 
we have seen, sabr as an attitude of perseverance under all circumstances 
plays an important role in the Association’s discourse as well.
However, a discourse of self-esteem and (restoring one’s) dignity as a 
way of empowerment to attain self-directed goals is equally observable here. 
This can be discerned from the way in which they emphasise the importance 
for mothers and daughters to take one another’s individual views, feelings 
and desires seriously, and to discover their capabilities and creativity in pro-
ductive work, as well as in plans to turn them into self-sufficient small-busi-
ness women through the provision of micro-credits.
The Association’s president and her workers obviously put sabr in the 
context of a mission of social change and development – a mission that is, 
moreover, strongly affected by the empowerment discourse of an interna-
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tional development organization. In its framework, they try to tackle the 
particular problems of a particular target group and to alleviate its suffering. 
In the context of this project, sabr is meant to serve the attainment of a cer-
tain social goal that is, in turn, determined by the value of self-esteem that 
plays such an important role in global development discourse. In the dis-
course of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association, pious action means work-
ing on self-esteem. The experience of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association 
and its cooperation with Questscope suggests that the two orientations, the 
pious and the secular, can find common ground when there exist certain 
conditions inducing people in both camps to work for the same goals of 
social reform.
Conclusion
Two themes can be distinguished – though not separated from one 
another – in the discourse of all these Muslim voluntary welfare associations 
regarding child development: the need to socialize children behaviorally 
into harmonious familial as well as wider social settings, and the need to 
work on empowerment and agency-building among these children on an 
individual level as well as among parents, whose capability in bringing up 
their own children in modern Jordanian society must be enhanced.
Socialization for the sake of collective harmony and stability often 
entails a duty-oriented discourse. Duties and responsibilities are related here 
to the behavior of the individual toward other individuals, within the family 
or within other social settings, with their various – often age and/or gender-
based – roles and statuses. This orientation on duty is central to efforts of 
socialization into a pious lifestyle, an endeavor in which some of these NGOs 
are engaging. The language of the Islamic sources – primarily the Qur’an and 
the Hadith – corresponds closely with such an orientation. Notions of duty 
and responsibility are most prominently present at ICCS centers.
Such notions, however, are not necessarily dependency-reinforcing 
alone. They have empowering aspects as well, which could be observed at 
Al-‘Abura Center. There orphans were stimulated to study, to work and to 
engage in common activities in which new skills are learned. Associations 
more clearly inspired by a (global) rights discourse, like Al-Faruq Society, rec-
oncile duty-based Islamic (and, in particular, Qur’anic) language with such a 
discourse by attributing to social injunctions derived from Qur’an or Hadith 
the role of sanctioning modernly formulated human – including children’s – 
rights. Their liberal orientation toward childhood development emphasizes 
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individual self-expression and is not so focused on the promotion of con-
formity to religious ideals.
The processes of modernization that have taken place (and are contin-
uing to take place) in Jordanian society – such as urbanization, the spread of 
mass-education (which itself is gradually undergoing a modernization proc-
ess away from traditional methods of memorization and rote-learning and 
toward individual creativity and experiential learning), and the spread of the 
mass media – have upset traditional relations of authority and dependency 
between parents and children. It is thus becoming less and less possible 
for Jordanian parents to instruct their children to follow in their own (tradi-
tional) footsteps. The latter have often been too exposed to multiple forms 
of information, knowledge and socio-cultural influences that arrive as part 
of an increasingly globalized, as well as individualized, society to want to 
preserve such patterns.
This development is reflected in the Muslim associations’ activities 
and discourses in the field of child development. While these associations 
strongly oppose forms of hyper-individualism that put the very value of com-
munity, family ties or of marriage at risk (and which they associate with the 
West), most of the same associations do acknowledge the necessity to take 
the needs and perspectives of the individual child more seriously in order 
to preserve and enhance the strength of family ties. The result, it is believed, 
will be a stronger and more harmonious society. This kind of empowerment 
of the individual child within family and community possibly points in the 
direction of a (potential) change in the nature of parent-child relationship. 
This change should bring greater equality and reciprocal communication 
between parent and child and, thus, prevent the continuation of traditional 
forms of corporal punishment.
In the cases of some target groups, like the disabled or school drop-
outs, traditional shame is explicitly condemned by such associations as an 
obstacle to the children’s empowerment and social integration. In such 
cases, religious discourse often serves to justify and promote empowering 
changes. This discourse reflects the values of an urbanized, well-educated 
and modern middle class. Values that stand for a different kind of authority 
that is, more than ever before, based upon persuasion, reward and recipro-
cal communication.
By promoting such changes in the name of Islam, these associations 
seek to construct their own, authentic or indigenous form of modernity and 
modernization in the realm of family and child development. Finding a bal-
ance between tradition and modernity, authenticity and globalization and 
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individual and collective consciousness is a major concern for these asso-
ciations in the realm of gender and marital relations as well. This concern 
provides the focus for the next chapter.
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16.  Discourse and Activity 
Regarding Marriage 
and Gender Relations
This chapter deals with the discourse of Jordanian Muslim NGOs on 
gender relations among adults, in connection with their activities in this 
realm. As in the previous chapter, the topic will be approached from the 
question of the NGOs’ relationship toward local traditions; we will also con-
sider its notions of autonomous agency and openness toward change, and 
the degree and manner of reflexivity it shows in this regard. More concretely, 
the question of whether, and to what extent, Muslim NGOs see the role of 
the woman as limited to the family sphere and as subjugated to her hus-
band, or as an autonomous and equal being (with a rightful space for herself 
and an independent role to play in private as well as in public spaces) will 
here be dealt with.
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad distinguishes the conservative Islamic 
approaches of various traditionalist ‘ulama’ (corresponding largely with the 
first view) from more progressive Islamist approaches (that tend to embrace 
the second).1 This chapter tries to assess the manner in which this distinction 
applies to the discourses and related practices of Jordanian Muslim NGOs. 
It will start, however, with a description of one of Al-‘Afaf Society’s annual 
mass weddings,2 and with an analysis of the Society’s discourse (as well as 
that of other like-minded associations) on marriage as an overriding priority 
in Islam. This will be followed by an analysis of their discourse on a closely 
interrelated issue: honor and honor crimes. Subsequently, Muslim NGOs’ dis-
course and (discursive) activities related to different aspects of the marital 
relationship itself will be dealt with. Finally, attention will be paid to these 
NGO’s attitudes toward the question of women’s participation in public life.
355
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   355 05-02-2008   11:13:48
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
The Wedding Ritual
Since its establishment in 1993, the Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society has staged 
a yearly mass wedding in order to translate its vision of marriage – as the 
linchpin of a harmonious, cooperative and virtuous Islamic society – into 
practice. On the 25th of July 2003, the Society held its tenth mass wedding 
party; 52 couples participated. The party was held in the affluent Al-Rashid 
quarter in NorthWestern Amman, at one of the Dar Al-Arqam schools that 
belong to the Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS). When I arrived there, the 
street next to the school was filled with cars, vans, buses and invited families. 
Some of the vehicles were decorated with flowers. Banners with welcoming 
phrases were hung in the street. Some policemen were present, but the bulk 
of the task of maintaining order at this mass event was shouldered by men 
in green uniforms of the Jerusalem Scouting Association, another Muslim 
Brotherhood-affiliated institution.
The celebration took place on a gender-separate basis. The males were 
celebrating the event in the schoolyard, while the females did so within the 
school building. An enormous tent with an open entrance covered part of 
the schoolyard. The yard’s floor, inside as well as outside of the tent, was cov-
ered with many rows of chairs. They were facing a platform on which a sign 
was erected with the names and the logos of the Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society and 
of the ICCS Dar Al-Arqam school chain. The Jerusalem Scouting Association 
men supervised the multitude of visitors and gave them directions in order 
to prevent disorder and accidents. During the event, they also distributed 
glasses with the halal Mecca Cola beverage to the attendants. The crowd 
consisted of males of a wide range of ages, from little boys to elderly men.
After taking the microphone and welcoming all the visitors, a repre-
sentative of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society thanked God for enabling all present 
to attend the party and made sure to thank everybody who had made this 
great “Islamic wedding” possible through their donations. He specifically 
mentioned some prominent donors, such as the Islamic Bank of Jordan, for 
having contributed 100 Jordanian Dinar (around 150 euros) to each newly 
wed couple, and the (ICCS-run) Islamic Hospital, which had offered each 
couple the opportunity to deliver their first baby free of charge in the hos-
pital’s maternal unit. He then presented the program of the wedding party 
and announced the beginning of “a joyful time.” Subsequently, another per-
son started to recite Qur’anic verses relating to the theme of marriage. Then 
the earlier spokesman took the microphone again. He greeted the visitors 
for the second time and spoke about the benign values of marriage, sharing, 
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cooperation, solidarity and love. He expressed the wish that “our fatherland 
be a land of love and well-being for everyone.”
After the opening, The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated male singing 
group Yarmuk started to sing about the marriage, the bride and the bride-
groom. Their voices were loud and solemn at the same time, and the songs 
were rhythmic. The only musical instruments used were powerful drums. 
Men started to clap and a group of young men started to dance, carrying a 
few other young men on their shoulders. Subsequently, the 52 bridegrooms 
were led into the schoolyard by members of a dance troupe dressed in tra-
ditional robes and wearing white kuffiyat (traditional Arab male head cov-
ers). The grooms themselves were dressed in dark-blue costumes. In the 
meantime, other male choirs made their own rhythmic performances, sing-
ing about Allah and the living of a pious life. Once the grooms entered the 
schoolyard, white foam was poured over them. A circle was created within 
which the grooms started to dance. Some jostling and pushing among the 
crowd of visitors occurred. The Jerusalem Scouting Association men imme-
diately intervened and urged the people to sit down. Their orders were fol-
lowed without question or argument.
Once the singing and dancing was over, Al-‘Afaf Society president 
Abdul Latif Arabiyyat took the microphone. With a broad smile, he empha-
sized that the Society’s message of love, togetherness and unity was 
addressed to all people in the fatherland, and that everybody, “in the north, 
south, west and east” of the country was invited. He described the celebra-
tion as a “popular feast,” and stressed that the Society’s work was open to 
people from all classes and layers of Jordanian society. He spoke about the 
success of the association and its wedding parties, and thanked all donors 
who had contributed to this. He underlined the Society’s overriding aim of 
promoting a harmonious marital life that corresponds with Islamic values as 
well as with “modern life.”
Subsequently, the spokesman who had opened the event began his 
concluding speech. He mentioned all donors by name. The first one was a 
Christian Orthodox businessman, who was followed in his list by a whole 
range of individuals, men as well as women, and companies like the Jordan 
Islamic Bank and Mecca Cola (a firm that produces and sells its own Islamic 
brand of cola drink and donates part of its profits to charitable causes in the 
Palestinian territories).
The dancing troupe, who had led the grooms into the schoolyard in 
the middle of the event, started to perform a dabka accompanied by the 
sound of drums. One of the dancers led the performance by swinging his 
d I s c o u r s e  a n d  a c t I v I t y  r e g a r d I n g  m a r r I a g e  a n d  g e n d e r  r e l a t I o n s
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   357 05-02-2008   11:13:48
358
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
stick. At the end, the dancers bared their fists and sang about “liberating the 
homeland from the Zionist enemy.” Subsequently, each bridegroom received 
on the platform a present with a card in an envelope. Then the feast was over 
and everybody left. Local and foreign media were present throughout the 
event for coverage.3 
As a male researcher, I was not able to observe what went on inside 
the school building, where the females were celebrating. The information 
that I have on the female section of the wedding party was provided to 
me later by two women working for the women’s and children’s commit-
tee of Al-‘Afaf Society. According to these, the women volunteers first wel-
comed the brides into the hall, offering them a seat and something to drink. 
They also engaged them in informal conversations and paid attention to 
their needs. If anyone expressed dissatisfaction with her appearance or her 
bridal dress, for instance, the volunteers tried to solve it. They also did their 
utmost to prepare the brides for their wedding ceremony, mentally as well 
as physically. The female relatives and friends were seated in another part of 
the hall. All of the attendants were offered food (sweets) and drinks (water 
and juices) throughout the party. They also engaged in singing and danc-
ing. One section of the hall was left vacant for the reception of the bride-
grooms. Once they arrived, their brides joined them at their side. Flowers 
were thrown over the couples, traditional Arab wedding songs were sung 
and balloons released into the air. At this ceremonial occasion, the brides 
were fully veiled, including their faces. At the end, the couples then received 
their gifts, contributed by the donors of the wedding party, in the form of 
furniture, household utensils, clothes, and so on.4
Preparations for the Wedding
Any couple wishing to hold their wedding at Al-‘Afaf Society’s collec-
tive wedding party can visit the Society for a conversation with the general 
manager, or perhaps another functionary.5 The couple must show their mar-
riage contract. It is customary in Jordan that the signing of this contract pre-
cedes an actual wedding party by months or even years, due to all the prep-
arations and expenses involved in the latter. However, according to workers 
and beneficiaries of the Society, custom as well as Islamic beliefs require that 
the couple will only consummate their marriage and start to live together 
after their wedding party. The rationale behind this is the importance of 
making it known to all the neighbors, friends and acquaintances that the 
man and the woman in question are married. During the intake at the Soci-
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ety, the prospective married couple is informed about the procedural as well 
as the normative and religious aspects of the mass wedding. The intake is 
followed by the choice of wedding dress by the bride and the reception of 
the wedding costume by the bridegroom. Shortly before the ceremony, the 
prospective couple, and in particular the bride, undergo their beautification 
in a beauty saloon free of charge that is arranged for by the Society. About 
one week in advance of the mass wedding, however, they have to attend a 
workshop on marital life organized by Al-‘Afaf Society.
Teachers at this workshop are usually medical doctors and Islamic 
scholars specialized in family law. Prospective brides and bridegrooms par-
ticipate in it on a gender-separated basis. Since both husband and wife are 
presupposed to assume different and complimentary roles within the fam-
ily, both receive different messages in their own workshops.
The prospective bride receives information on healthy behavior dur-
ing pregnancy and childrearing, as well as on the psychological aspects of 
raising children. She is taught about her role as a mother who is patient 
toward her children, and as a wife who is patient toward her husband. The 
husband is encouraged at the course to assume his masculine role as the 
“solid pillar” of the family. Accordingly, he is to place his financial and materi-
al responsibility for his family above everything else. The wife does not have 
a similar duty, even though she has the option to work, earn money and 
contribute to the family income provided that her husband agrees to this. 
One husband who had participated in an earlier mass wedding considered 
the Islamic value of kindness and respect in the marital relationship and the 
prohibition on abusing one’s wife as an important lesson of the workshop.6
Besides a workshop for the prospective brides and bridegrooms, 
another one is organized for their mothers. The aim of the latter is to tell 
the mothers how they can contribute to a happy marital life of their sons or 
daughters. Respect for the privacy of their married children and abstaining 
from interfering in their private lives is reportedly central to the message 
conveyed at that particular workshop.7
Timely and Accessible Marriage as a Religious and Social 
Priority
Of the couples who participate in the mass-weddings organized by 
Al-‘Afaf Society Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki observe the fol-
lowing:
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Participants are usually more financially strained than deeply religious, but 
members of the organization hope those who enjoy the benefits of the col-
lective wedding will be inclined to practice their faith more diligently and pass 
Islamic values on to their children.8 
The Society’s president, Arabiyyat states that while many participat-
ing couples are from needy backgrounds, there are also others, educated 
middle-class people, who underwrite the Society’s message and partake in 
the wedding merely out of principle.9
One such couple, who married at Al-‘Afaf Society in 2002, had origi-
nally met when students at Jordan University. As the wife told me, she heard 
about the possibility of participating in a mass wedding organized by the 
Society while listening to a radio interview with its representatives. She then 
suggested to her fiancé that they make use of this opportunity. The financial 
advantage of holding a cheap wedding party was not the motive, accord-
ing to the couple. The wife’s parents had a joint monthly income of 5000 
JD (approximately 7000 Euros), so organizing and financing a regular wed-
ding party would not have been a problem for her family. The couple stated 
their motive in terms of their aversion against the extravagant and luxuri-
ous nature of “customary” weddings, with their display of expensive jewelry 
and clothing. Older sisters of the wife had wed in such a style. She and her 
husband were of the opinion that such customary weddings are about pro-
fane and idle things, like outer appearance and the display of wealth and 
prestige, rather than about the true values of marriage, like mutual love, 
harmony and cooperation. In the words of the husband: “we do not care 
about this world (dunyah). We want to live for God (fi sabil li-llah),” whereby 
“this world” stands for materialism and worldly prestige and living fi sabil li-
llah stands, amongst other things, for mutual affection, attention and care. 
The couple decided to register with the Society for the mass wedding, even 
before they notified their own families. “After all”, the wife said, “the aim of 
Islam is to facilitate essential things for the human being, like marriage, not 
to make them more difficult.”10
Financial and Material Obstacles to Marriage
According to scholars like Hoodfar and Singerman, the most pressing 
socio-economic problem for families in the Middle East is the rising cost of 
marriage.11 On the same matter, Wiktorowicz and Taji Farouki write:
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Because marriage is central for expanding family ties, enhancing social net-
works and providing social security, its rising cost directly undermines the 
reproduction of the family unit… As in many countries, the cost associated 
with marriage in Jordan has become exorbitant and prohibitive. Social pres-
sures to ‘keep up with the Jones’ have led to extravagant weddings in luxury 
hotels, which are often well beyond the financial resources of the couple and 
their families, even as they devastate the household economy and channel 
resources away from other necessities. Lavish wedding feasts, hotel parties and 
expensive wedding dresses are culturally expected.12
It is exactly this state of affairs which is so vehemently criticized by 
the members of Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society. As Sarhan notes disapprovingly:
The average monthly income in Jordan is 130 Dinar, but the expenses involved 
in wedding parties are often in the thousands of dinars. People want to have 
an expensive wedding party, where golden jewels and expensive clothes are 
worn, and where women want to have a haircut by a distinguished hairdresser. 
Furthermore, they want to rent an expensive car for the wedding feast.13 
Added to this criticism, informed by a religious anti-materialist and 
anti-consumerist ideology, is sometimes criticism of the attitude of the 
wealthy classes vis-à-vis the poor. Al-‘Afaf Society president Arabiyyat, for 
instance, speaks about wealthy people who spend many thousands of 
dinars for extravagant and ostentatious wedding parties, while the poor do 
not have the money for the simplest of weddings.14
 As far as the bride’s mahr (dowry) – the responsibility of the bride-
groom’s family – is concerned, Sarhan stresses its symbolic value, as an 
expression of the care and attention the wife deserves from her husband. 
Yet, Islam also stipulates, he asserts:
that the mahr, and the costs related to marriage in general, should be modest. 
In Islam, marriage is considered as a priority (and should therefore be easily 
accessible). Unfortunately, many people in Jordan developed ideas that devi-
ate from what Islam stipulates. 
As far as other expenses related to marriage are concerned, he 
states:
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They [many Jordanians] think: first I have to find a job and acquire a good 
income, then a beautiful house, then a beautiful car and only then am I going 
to marry. But Al-‘Afaf says, on the basis of Islam, that marriage life and marital 
love are a fundamental requirement for the well-being of the human being … 
material expectations have to be lowered, and a higher priority has to be put 
on the warmth and the love of marriage …There is too much of a mentality in 
which people with modest incomes are taking the life-style of the rich as an 
example.”
Thus, in addition to Arabiyyat’s criticism of the wealthier classes, 
Sarhan criticizes the consumerism and materialism among the lower income 
groups. 15 
Prolonged Bachelor/Spinsterhood
The obstacles to young people marrying have led to a rise in the aver-
age age of marriage and, in some cases, to prolonged bachelor- or spin-
sterhood. As Islamists in general do, Al-‘Afaf Society’s members and workers 
stress that this phenomenon brings the risk of a spread in sexual immorality 
and a list of negative feelings, among which are included anxiety, loneliness, 
lack of self-confidence and simmering frustration. In the end, they argue, 
this combination may even contribute to the disintegration of the fabric 
of Muslim society.16 Basing themselves on the Qur’an, Islamists attribute to 
marriage and family a fundamentally protective function for every Muslim 
individual and, by extension, for Muslim society at large. If this function is 
undermined, the happiness and well being of Muslims as well as the integ-
rity of Muslim society is placed in jeopardy.17 
This view was clearly reflected in the discourse expressed at a semi-
nar organized by Al-‘Afaf Society on 26 April 1999. At this event, speakers 
stressed that Islam provides for social coherence and that marriage is a con-
structive path for healthy relations between man and woman.18 Apart from 
the psychological consequences, they emphasized that prolonged bach-
elor/spinsterhood leads to macro-economic problems, such as the increase 
in state expenses involved in tackling the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases, the decrease of production due to the psychological problems of 
lonely unmarried people and the birth of a higher number of handicapped 
children delivered by women who marry at a late age.19 Obviously, prolonged 
bachelor/spinsterhood represents for the members of this Society and their 
(Islamist) sympathizers a sense of moral and social malaise that reflects the 
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impotence and incapability of Muslim society to solve its problems and sat-
isfy its needs on its own terms.
Foreign and Indigenous “Hindrances”
It is clear from their discourse that “Western influence” is a major, if not 
the major, culprit responsible for prolonged bacherlor/spinsterhood. Arabi-
yyat speaks about the “ancient Greek and Roman roots” of modern Western 
civilization that used to portray the woman as a commodity. He believes that 
these roots are responsible for the current Western practice of “excluding” 
the woman from the family circle and “encouraging bachelor/spinsterhood 
and individualism” so characteristic of the materialist and capitalist systems. 
He contrasts this with Islam, which has paid special attention to the building 
of human communities on solid bases and has made the family the primary 
element of these communities.20
Therefore, the Society states in one of its publications:
Let us sow the seeds of goodness in a good society … let us set up the pillars 
of the Muslim home without over-spending and extravagance, in order to shut 
the society’s doors in the face of the winds of the foreign … corruption … 
which is drowning the youth in its mud … to open the path of happiness for all 
couples … and let our slogan be ‘afaf (chastity, virtue, purity).21
Accordingly, Arabiyyat laments the “absence [in Jordanian society] of 
authentic values which govern individual and collective social conduct and 
customs … in a framework of projects for Westernisation which are backed 
by wealth, experience, and deadly means.” This absence, he stresses, leads to 
“social illnesses and an epidemic of (Westernized) customs, ways of behav-
ing and values that threaten our edifice from its foundations.”22
Apart from materialism and consumerism, lecturers at workshops and 
seminars organized by the Society also blame several other habits and cus-
toms for the phenomenon of prolonged bachelor/ spinsterhood. Some of 
these may be attributed, in whole or in part, to the impact of globalizing 
Western and secular culture on Jordanian society. Examples are “deviation 
of social conduct (i.e. extra-marital sexual activity) as a result of (unneces-
sary) mixture between the sexes,” “feeble awareness of the importance of 
marriage (as an institution regulating sexuality as well as a social bond of 
harmony and love) due to lacking religious awareness”23 and, possibly, unre-
alistic and idealized expectations about the personal character of the future 
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marital partner, be it husband or wife, a phenomenon for which contempo-
rary media culture is largely blamed.24
Other customary hindrances to early marriage mentioned are obvi-
ously more indigenous in origin, like marrying only with spouses from one’s 
own environment, such as the extended family or the village, and the habit 
among some families stipulating that a younger daughter cannot marry as 
long as an older one has not.25 Both of these customs limit the range of pos-
sible marriage partners. The same goes for the tendency among males to 
choose females who are younger then them and less in education and socio-
economic status, and for the opposite tendency among females.26
In this regard, it is interesting to note that, of the two families of the 
couple married at Al-‘Afaf Society’s mass wedding, that of the bride was 
clearly the better off. The father of the wife used to work as an accountant 
in a government department and her mother used to work as a teacher. The 
husband’s father, in contrast, used to be a truck driver and his mother was 
housewife. Further, while both partners had originally met each as students 
at university, the wife was, at the time of the interview, teaching chemistry 
at a university; the husband, on the other hand, taught the same subject at 
a high school. That is to say, his socio-economic position was certainly the 
more modest of the two. Neither did they belong to the same extended fam-
ily, and were ethnically different: the husband was Palestinian in origin, and 
the wife Transjordanian.27
This case illustrates that there are anti-traditionalist elements within 
Al-‘Afaf Society’s discourse that are rooted in real life experiences and atti-
tudes of many of its members, workers, and beneficiaries. They are people 
who are often from an urbanized, upwardly mobile and well-educated mid-
dle class background. These people usually do not want to turn the clock 
back to pre-modern times. They try to locate (social, economic, cultural and 
psychological) stability in a modern society in accordance with their read-
ing of the Islamic revelation. In this endeavor, they may experience aspects 
of Western-dominated globalizing culture as disruptive and disturbing, but 
the same applies to certain local traditions and customs.
Being modern does not necessarily entail being “liberal” however – 
and certainly not in the contemporary Western sense of the word. In Al-‘Afaf 
Society’s discourse, heterosexual marriage and the begetting of children (if 
biologically possible) is regarded as a religious duty of every Muslim, and 
as the only kind of adult lifestyle that corresponds to the human being’s 
true nature. There is absolutely no room in this discourse for lifestyles that 
deviate from that pattern. Illiberal restrictions are reflected in the “religious 
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measures” to facilitate marriage endorsed by shari‘ah expert Ali Sawwa, one 
of the speakers in the Society’s seminar on bachelor/spinsterhood. They are 
the following: 1) fighting adultery and “deviant” (homo) sexual relations and 
punishing these in accordance with the shari‘ah; 2) prevention of “unneces-
sary” mixture between the sexes and respecting “moral norms” (of chastity) 
when such mixture cannot be avoided; 3) prevention of the spread of immo-
rality by censuring films, TV shows and “bad pictures” enticing its viewers to 
such immorality.28
Within this shari‘ah-bound framework, however, the Society pro-
motes a certain liberalization or facilitation of access to marriage, as well as 
the choice of partners. It emphasises, in the name of Islam, that consent or 
rejection of each other by both prospective marriage partners is essential 
for any decision on whether or not to marry. It also speaks about facilitating 
meetings (albeit in a protected and familial environment) between those 
who “wish to marry for God,” sees engagement as a step to know one anoth-
er and stress that different ways of communicating and signaling between 
candidates are possible in Islam, either directly or indirectly through a go-
between person, “depending on each situation.”29 While the Society regards 
pre-marital sex as a significant sin that must be prevented at all costs, it 
does not view traditional Arab customs of enforced pre-arranged marriages 
(in which the two partners may not even know one another beforehand) 
favorably either.
The Question of Honor
As the previous section has shown, a central aspect of Al-‘Afaf Society’s 
rationalization of prioritizing (early) marriage as a religious and social duty 
is the extremely dishonorable nature of pre- or extra-marital sexual activ-
ity. The Society organized a seminar on the issue of honor in 2001. At this, 
prominent Muslim Brotherhood figure and former Minister of Awqaf and 
Islamic affairs Dr. Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani argued that Western society’s toler-
ance of pre- or extra-marital sexual relations has devastating consequences 
for the structure of the family as well as for the individual personality. It 
leads, he announced, to the spread of diseases, nervous breakdowns and a 
proclivity for crime among children born out of wedlock.30 Society president 
Arabiyyat remarked at the same occasion that nations and peoples differ in 
their intellectual and value systems; and that “honor is … highly important 
in our life and social system.” He added that today the Islamic ’ummah faces 
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an unfair campaign that targets its social system in its entirety, in order to 
replace it with an alien one.31
The Traditional Conception of Sexual Honor
The traditional Arab conception of sexual honor can be described as 
the need for men to maintain the chastity and virginity of their female family 
members by monitoring their behavior and their movements in outer space, 
so as to prevent them from any activity that may put their chastity and vir-
ginity at risk. After all, a man’s masculine status and reputation depends in 
traditional Arab communities on his ability to control the female members 
of his family and to preserve their chastity and virginity. If anyone of the lat-
ter compromises or destroys this reputation by any kind of behavior that is 
interpreted in the local community as sexually immoral or as suspect in this 
regard, the only way for the man to restore his masculine reputation might 
be to kill her.32 What position, we now ask, do Jordanian Muslim NGOs, and 
in particular Islamist ones like Al-‘Afaf Society, take on this issue?
Defending Honor against Westernization and Zionism
In many ways, Islamists present themselves as spokespersons of a 
religious version of Arab nationalism. For them, the message of the Islamic 
revelation stands for the “truly authentic” cultural heritage and values of 
the Arab nation. They attempt to construct an “authentic”, that is to say 
Islamized, version of modern Arab life that must be defended against the 
assault of Westernization and global consumer culture.
Regarding the issue of honor crimes, this defensive attitude takes in 
the case of Al-‘Afaf Society often the form of downplaying the phenomenon 
in the face of (real or perceived) demonizations of the Muslim orient. Sarhan 
speaks about the issue of honor crimes as something that is blown out of 
proportion by Western voices as part of an anti-Arab and anti-Muslim cam-
paign. He claims that statistics presented in one of the Society’s publications 
prove that the problem is very limited. Al-‘Afaf Society, he states, sees it as 
its main task to prevent such negative phenomena by focusing on the posi-
tive values of Islam regarding compassion, love and harmony between the 
marital partners and in the family.33
Jordanian Islamists, as well as tribalists, regard the struggle for wom-
en’s rights and against honor crimes undertaken by local liberal or feminist 
circles as a cover for promoting sexual immorality, an aim they attribute to 
imperialist powers. In Arabiyyat’s words, this is the “work of the Zionists to 
devalue our society.”34 Sarhan describes the use the West makes of its osten-
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sibly lofty principles of women’s and human rights and democracy as a form 
of abuse – implemented so as “to promote its own interests and hegemo-
ny” in Arab and Muslim societies. “Islam is against every kind of murder, for 
sure,” he stated emphatically, “but the West uses the honor crime issue in an 
aggressive campaign against Islam and Arab society.”35
Islamic Honor versus Traditional Honor
The Islamists – including Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society – are not entirely 
in favor of traditional cultural notions of sexual honor. According to such 
notions, the mere suspicion of dishonorable sexual activity by a woman 
may prove sufficient reason for male relatives to kill her in order to preserve 
their (masculine) reputation within the local community. These Islamists 
acknowledge that the shari‘ah does not allow any believer to carry out a 
punishment that is unauthorized by Islamic law. The pre-meditated execu-
tion of an honor crime, therefore, is not justifiable in their eyes; while a spon-
taneous defense by a male of his honor, by contrast, is.36 Such a spontaneous 
defense may only occur in reaction to what he really observes – as occurs in 
the true crime passionelle, but not on the basis of rumors and guess work. 
That is why Al-‘Afaf Society president Arabiyyat limits the definition of honor 
crimes to the killing of “innocent” women and girls that take place on the 
basis of unproven allegations.37 This point of view was expressed as well at 
the Society’s seminar on “The Question of Honor,” where it was stated that 
Islam disapproves of honor killings based on accusations and rumors.38
Criticism of the phenomenon of honor crimes is directly linked to crit-
icism of at least two more general kinds of custom: resorting to self-justice 
and gossip. To illustrate how much Islam disapproves of judging people on 
the basis of gossip or non-solid evidence in matters of honor, the general 
manager of the Islamic Welfare Society in Salt emphasised that, according 
to Islamic law, four men should have witnessed the act of adulterous sexual 
intercourse in order for it to lead to punishment:
If I saw a man and a woman practicing zina (adultery) alone, all I could do is 
reprimand them for their sinful act. I cannot use what I have seen as an affidavit 
in a legal procedure against them. I cannot even talk about what I have seen to 
other people, because then I would deserve punishment myself. I would have 
to be whipped with eighty lashes, since this is considered in the shari‘ah as 
slandering others.39 
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Likewise, his grandfather and founder of the Society in Salt, Muham-
mad Amin Zaid al-Kilani notes in connection with the issue of self-justice that 
individual acts of murder – which he considers as remnants of pre-Islamic 
tribal customs – are also condemned by Islam. Indeed, al-Kilani concludes by 
arguing that Islam does not recognise the right of self-justice as a substitute 
for resorting to a legal judgment.40
In other words, Islamist and like-minded Muslim NGOs preserve the 
notion of sexual honor and chastity in their discourse, but give it a different 
basis. The basis for judging matters of this order should not, ideally speaking, 
consist of mere suspicion, gossip and considerations of personal (masculine) 
reputation in the local community; rather they should consist of careful and 
objective legal judgments rooted in the rules of the shari‘ah as well as in the 
cultivation of a moral conscience strong enough to prevent believers from 
engaging in illicit sex practices. It implies a certain individualization of the 
concepts of morality and honor, and a move away from the traditional cul-
ture of “shame,” toward a more modern culture of (individual) responsibility 
and guilt.
Therefore, the solution promoted by Islamists and their NGOs for the 
twin issues of illicit sexual behavior and honor crimes is the following: there 
should be strict application of shari‘ah, including moral education and prac-
ticing gender separation where needed, as well as the hudud punishments, 
which form the proper alternative for the – illegitimate and un-Islamic – 
practice of honor killings. At Al-‘Afaf Society’s seminar on the issue of honor, 
Dr. Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani asserted that people resort to “jahili practices of 
honor crimes” because secular law is applied in the country. Likewise, sheikh 
Muhammad Amin Zaid al-Kilani of the Islamic Welfare Society in Salt blames 
Westernized legislation in Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world for the 
phenomenon of honor crimes, since it fails to punish adulterers and forces 
people to take the law into their own hands.41
Noticeable is the fact that Islamist and conservative Muslim NGOs do 
not tackle the aspect of gender discrimination, or the fact that it is always 
women who are the victim and that men usually get away with “violations” of 
sexual honor. When I confronted Sarhan, Al-‘Afaf Society’s Executive Director 
with this idea, he answered, with a sense of anger and indignity: “there exists 
a lot of ignorance about Islam in this (i.e. Jordanian) society. Islam does not 
discriminate between men and women in such matters. Men and women in 
Islam have the same punishments, and enjoy the same rights!”42
In theory, representatives of such NGOs do endorse the Islamic princi-
ple of “equality in punishment for equal crimes,” regardless of gender. At the 
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same time, many of these NGOs seem to stick, to a greater or lesser degree, 
to – traditional but religiously justified – patriarchal notions of the “ration-
ally superior male” as the guardian of family honor.43 In their eyes, males con-
tinue to enjoy a privilege over their female spouses and relatives so that the 
religious morality and honor in the family may be preserved. It shows the 
continuation of traditional gendered patterns in their thought about sexual 
honor that are expressed in the name of religious faith, shari‘ah and the 
restoration of a morally clean Islamic society, rather than so as to preserve 
one’s own masculine reputation in the local community. Al-‘Afaf Society’s 
representative Sarhan, for instance, told me that he saw the monitoring of a 
girl’s movements by her family as something positive, since the purpose was 
“to protect her, and not to oppress her.”44
Jordanian anti-honor crime activists disagree with their Islamist as 
well as tribalist opponents especially on the aspect of gender discrimina-
tion in honor issues, apart from the inhumane nature of honor crimes as 
such. Inconsistency, from the point of view of gender equality, between the 
“equality in punishment” principle and that of male guardianship over the 
honorable conduct of female family members in Islamist discourse cannot 
be denied. In this regard, the legal scholar Abu-Odeh states: “the fundamen-
talist agenda itself is not devoid of its own ambiguities. An important ques-
tion for the Arab world today is: what is the meaning of gender when the 
traditional, nationalist and fundamentalist texts intersect?”45
The Marriage Relationship
During an interview, two workers of Al-‘Afaf Society’s women’s com-
mittee spoke to me about the duty of a husband and wife to “respect each 
other’s rights.” They regarded this message as central in the lectures and 
workshops they were organizing. When asked what these rights entailed, 
one of them, the head of the women’s committee, stated: “if the wife obeys 
her husband, she obeys God.”
I asked them how the principle of a wife’s obedience toward her 
husband could be compatible with the principle of an equal relationship 
between both, something Al-‘Afaf Society purports to advocate as well. The 
other woman worker, who performed a coordinating function in the same 
committee, responded:
Obedience in the shari‘ah does not mean that the husband can simply give 
orders to his wife, lock her up and prevent her from going out of the house and 
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so on. No, the wife has her own life, is free to do what she wants and to have 
contacts and activities outside of the home. I studied shari‘ah science at the 
Jordan University, so I know what I am talking about. The duty of obedience 
relates to very fundamental issues that are basic to the well being of the family 
as a whole. Issues in which the woman cannot act against her husband’s will. 
For example, once I raised with my husband the idea of working outside of 
the house. He said: ‘if you are going to work outdoors fulltime, what about the 
household tasks and the care of the children?’ I had to consent to his objection, 
but decided to work as a volunteer for Al-‘Afaf Society. My husband under-
stands very well that I need to do something outside of the home. He even 
supports me, and tells me: don’t sit all the time at home, you will get sick of 
boredom …my parents grew up with much more traditional ideas. My mother 
always had to follow my father’s orders; there was not much room for her own 
desires and demands. Really, I wouldn’t be able to live like that!46 
Apparently, in the Islamized educated middle class atmosphere to 
which this Al-‘Afaf Society woman belongs, women do not slavishly dote on 
their husbands, awaiting their every order. Rather, there is room for mutual 
consultation, reasoning and the exchange of ideas in arriving at decisions. 
In other words, there is room for negotiated compromise between husband 
and wife, even though it is still the husband who has the last say. His edu-
cated wife certainly has means at her disposal to influence and persuade 
him in his decision-making, though.
This middle class-based Islamist subculture also allows for the pos-
sibility of men to take their share in the family’s household duties. Accord-
ing to Sarhan, the idea that assigning housework exclusively to women is 
Islamic is wrong. He asserts that Islam defines the marital relationship as 
one between two partners, in which the husband must assist his wife in her 
household tasks.47 The coordinator of Al-‘Afaf Society’s women’s committee 
is also of the opinion that the husband should assist his wife in her house-
work in order to relieve her from part of her burden. She mentioned to me a 
hadith stating that the Prophet Muhammad cleaned the carpets of his house 
as part of his household tasks.48
During discussions at the lectures and workshops organized by Al-
‘Afaf it became clear that one of the main problems among Jordanian married 
couples relates to money. In particular, husbands are traditionally reluctant 
to give wives a share of their income, or to delegate to her any responsibility 
that requires her to spend money. According to the workers, the husband 
has to be urged to share his money so that his wife has enough to satisfy her 
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needs around the house, not to mention her movements and activities out-
side of it. They base their insistence that husbands do co-operate financially 
with their spouses on the Islamic principle that a husband must provide for 
the needs of both his wife and family.49
A Complimentary Division of Roles
The abovementioned statements of Al-‘Afaf Society’s women workers 
show that it is impossible to classify the discourse of Islamist voluntary asso-
ciations as either conservative or progressive within the Jordanian context. 
Progressive elements can be detected when people speak about the right 
of the woman to run her own life independent of her husband, about the 
need for there to be reasonable consultation between husband and wife 
based upon an exchange of arguments, and about the duty of husbands and 
sons to assist their wives or mothers in her household tasks. The discourse 
sounds much more conservative when the topic is that of complementary 
role divisions as the basis of a harmonious and happy family life. Then, to a 
large extent, it corresponds with the views of conservative ‘ulama’ who want 
to limit the woman’s sphere of activity as much as possible to that of home 
and family, in subservience to her husband.50
Underlying this discourse of complementariness is a view on family 
and community that emphasizes the duty and responsibility of each person 
to satisfy, in accordance with age and gender, the rights of others. In the 
words of the husband who had married in one of Al-‘Afaf Society’s mass 
weddings:
Everybody in Islam has his or her responsibility in the community. The husband 
is responsible for his mother as well as for his wife, but the responsibility for his 
mother enjoys overriding priority. The wife, on the other hand, is first responsi-
ble for her husband, but she will also gain the responsibility of her son. This is 
written in a hadith. In this way, everyone gets what one is entitled to.51 
The discourse of Al-‘Afaf Society and other Islamist and conservative 
Muslim associations, like the Islamic Welfare Society of Salt or the Islamic 
Anwar Al-Huda Welfare Association, stresses, first of all, the husband’s role 
of satisfying the family’s needs financially and materially. At Al-‘Afaf Society’s 
seminar on marital love and harmony, administrative legal expert Abd al-
Qadir Al-Sheikhali spoke in his presentation of the husband’s duty to satisfy 
all the basic needs of his family and the house, such as nutrition, clothing, 
furniture and medical care.52 According to Sarhan, this responsibility of the 
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husband sets the priority in spending the money he earned, over which his 
wife and children enjoy the first right. Only after meeting these needs can 
the husband spend money on anything outside of the family sphere.53Other 
duties of the husband mentioned in Al-‘Afaf Society’s discourse is to “edu-
cate wife and children on affairs concerning life and the world,” since he is 
usually “older in age and richer in experience,”54 providing his bride with the 
mahr55 and kindly treatment.56
Woman participants in the Society’s discourse promote the latter duty 
of the husband with a great passion. Haifa’ Kamal, for instance, in the Al-‘Afaf 
Guidebook, states that in a proper Islamic marriage a husband should treat 
her wife as follows:
Console her emotionally when she is tired and don’t hesitate in (satisfying) her 
right to a sign of your attention. 
Bring her a present now and then. 
Speak to her about your admiration of her, consider her circumstances and 
forgive her. 
Don’t demand from her the impossible. 
Help in the household duties has a positive impact on her soul. 
Don’t neglect her and she will be protected, don’t underestimate her mental 
capabilities and she will understand you, don’t be nasty to her and she will be 
dignified. 
Don’t treat her from a view of inferiority because the woman is the full sister 
of the man. 
Beware of humiliating your wife in front of others. 57 
Such discourse puts the husband’s duty to consider his wife’s feelings, 
circumstances as well as rational capabilities in the framework of the tra-
ditional and complimentary role division between the husband as income 
provider and the wife as mother and housewife. In this sense, it is of a rather 
conservative nature.
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This conservatism comes even more clearly to the fore in the Socie-
ty’s discourse on the wife’s duties. Al-Sheikhali mentioned at the seminar on 
marital harmony the wife’s duty of decent and “timid” or modest behavior. 
Within this, he directed women to watch their language and outer appear-
ance. She should also provide good and healthy cooking for the family (no 
fast-food), ensure that she looks after herself in terms of hygiene and cleanli-
ness, attend to the clothes of family and all parts of her house, and abstain 
from controlling her husband. “Some wives,” he states, “believe that the way 
to marital happiness is realized by possessing the husband as an individual 
property and subsequently controlling him.” This attitude disturbs the mar-
riage relationship.58 In addition, Haifa’ Kamal emphasizes the psychological 
and emotional aspect of the wife’s duties by mentioning stipulations like: 
“let your husband share with you his feelings, his sentiments, his aspirations 
and his sorrow,” “thank him for his wonderful actions,” “beware of an abun-
dance of grumbling and complaints and choose the right moment to put 
forward your complaint,” “make yourself beautiful for him and receive him 
with a smile and with delightfulness,” “let him feel your love and respect and 
show him your admiration for his strength and capability,” and “don’t leave 
his house without his permission.”59
In this discourse, the right of the one is always satisfied and respected 
through the other’s fulfillment of his or her duty. The rights of the husband, 
for instance, are mainly phrased by the Society at large in terms of his wife’s 
obedience. Al-Sheikhali stated in the above-mentioned seminar, in line with 
conservative ‘ulama’, that the husband has the right to be obeyed by his 
wife, provided that he behaves piously and morally; “there is no obedience 
to a madman or an adulterer.”60 Shari‘ah expert al-Qara’in concurs, and states 
that the husband’s duty as family provider gives him the right to exercise 
control and guidance over the affairs of the house and the upbringing of the 
children. If any member of the family deviates from “the order and the rules 
[with] which the shari‘ah has determined the Islamic family and its security,” 
it is the husband’s right to exercise his authority and control. In so doing, he 
guarantees the “solidarity and unity of the family.” This, however, does not 
imply that he may “inflict damage on his wife by beating and abusing her, 
which is considered by the shari‘ah as legal ground for the wife to leave the 
house of her husband without losing her rights.”61
Regarding the rights of the wife, Sarhan likes to emphasise the “spe-
cial place” which the Muslim woman enjoys in the family and wider Islamic 
community. Islam, he stresses, guarantees the woman her right to choose a 
husband, use her own property as she sees fit and to spend her income or 
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money in the way she likes. Unlike her husband, she is under no obligation 
to spend any money she might possess or earn to the family household, 
although Islam does not prohibit her from doing so either. “She can even 
make a request to her husband to hire a housemaid (to assume her burden 
of household duties) if she wants to work,” he stated.62 A more conserva-
tive explanation of the rights of the wife is put forward by Al-Sheikhali. He 
stresses, amongst others, the wife’s right to care for the interior of the house. 
“The house,” according to Al-Sheikhali, “is a paradise for the wife.” The wife is 
“the expert of the affairs of the house. She is the one who knows its needs 
and she is capable of organizing it in accordance with her own insights.”63
Gender, the West and Traditional Culture
The ideal complimentary relationship between husband and wife 
in Islam is often contrasted with the economic and sexual “exploitation” of 
women in Western societies. Abu Hisan, a judge working at the Jordanian 
High Court of Justice who wrote a booklet for Al-‘Afaf Society entitled Al-
Mar’ah baina al-Islam wal-Nizam al-Gharbi (The Woman between Islam and 
the Western Order), states: “while the woman is, in Western theories, a being 
with complete equality to man in terms of rights, duties and competences of 
work, she is, in reality, still regarded in the West as merely a body that is use-
ful solely for pleasure.”64 The Western woman, Abu Hisan argues, becomes 
degraded through what he calls her “instrumental” equality. This happens 
when she is socially and economically pressured to work as a secretary, a 
waitress, a mannequin or any other job in which she has to show her physi-
cal beauty. This causes her to lose her humanity for the sake of financial gain. 
Paid work by women, the author stresses, should be regarded as a means to 
her own well being and, especially, that of her family and not as an end in 
itself. The best situation for a woman is that she can make herself free to take 
care of her home and her family.65
Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society’s president Arabiyyat considers the introduc-
tion of “certain Western values” in Arab and Muslim societies as a part of a 
grand plan to expand the military, political, economic and social invasion of 
the Arab and Muslim worlds and reinforce the “Western-Zionist hegemony” 
over them.66 Likewise, Sheikh Muhammad Amin Zaid al-Kilani, founding 
father of the Islamic Welfare Society of Salt, sees it as his task to warn Mus-
lims against the “cultural, social and political offensive” of the West and the 
Zionists. He states that since the family is basic to the “Islamic system,” Islam’s 
enemies have targeted it. They do so, he argues, by using the oppressive and 
cruel character of some tribal and “backward” values as a pretext in order to 
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defame Islam. They try to abolish the authority of the Muslim husband and 
deprive Muslim women of their purity, give them unlimited freedom and 
encourage them to destroy the solid and eternal (family) law of Islam.67
Such perceived socio-cultural threats emanating from the West are 
used by Islamist NGOs to urge Muslim women to follow the “right Islamic 
way” and resist these alien influences. According to Haddad, “for the Islam-
ists, women are maintainers of tradition and are relegated to the task of 
being the last bastion against foreign penetration.” That such a fear-based 
defensive and reactive discourse easily assumes a conservative character is 
not surprising. Haddad writes: “Given the perception of the collapse of West-
ern society, it is clear that traditional family values in the Arab world will be 
propagated strongly for fear of loss of social cohesion.”68
As we have already seen in the case of Al-‘Afaf Society’s women work-
ers, when the emphasis is put on the oppressive and un-Islamic character 
of indigenous habits and customs, Islamist discourse becomes significant-
ly more progressive in tone. Instead of focusing on the defense of tradi-
tional values and relationships in the face of perceived external threats, the 
emphasis is put on what needs to be changed internally in order to improve 
one’s own socio-cultural lifeworld. Nawal al-Fa‘uri’s Al-’Aqsa Assocation, also 
Islamist in terms of sociopolitical ideals, is an outspoken advocate of such 
change. Not once in her writings nor during my interviews with her did al-
Fa‘uri resort to the kind of conspiracy theories and phobia for what is alien 
(and in particular Western) as many of the representatives of the associa-
tions quoted above are so prone to do. Al-Fa‘uri mainly attributes problems 
in contemporary Arab marriage relationships to the centuries of corruption 
of the Islamic message. On the issue of “human rights and the present situ-
ation of Arab and Islamic societies,” she writes: “All these rights which Islam 
established for the human being are applicable … to men, women, boys, 
girls and the elderly, as it is spelled out in detail in the noble Qur’an and 
the sunnah of the immaculate prophet.” The Muslims, however, forgot about 
them in subsequent centuries, so as to follow:
traditions that have strengthened with the passage of time and that have noth-
ing to do with Islam… These deviations and loss led to ignorance regarding the 
rights of the woman and the rights of the society and to the delay of human 
development in Arab and Islamic societies, in addition to the presentation of 
wrong models of the social roles of man and woman in Islam toward other 
countries of the world.69 
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In terms of the marriage relationship, Al-Fa‘uri sticks to the husband’s 
status as provider and (albeit democratic and consulting) head of the family 
and wife’s status as deliverer of children and the family’s nurturer. On the 
other hand, she takes modernizing developments and change into consid-
eration when she writes:
change in the (distribution of ) tasks between husband and wife is in the inter-
est of both and in the interest of society, if both of them make themselves avail-
able for duties that suit them and which the creator prepared for them, if the 
circumstances of family or society require change in tasks or the assumption 
of additional tasks, and if this affair is discussed in an objective spirit within the 
family and the decisions reached are subsequently built upon.70 
Interviews with her clarify that what she means here is flexibility in 
gender roles, including women’s possibilities to work outside of her home 
for an income and to assume public responsibilities. Likewise, she places 
the onus on men to take their share in household tasks and to bring up the 
children.
Al-Fa‘uri told me that for a women’s association in a conservative 
provincial town in Jordan, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to approach 
men directly in order to try to change their convictions and attitudes toward 
women. Prevalent cultural notions of male superiority as well as gender 
separation prevent traditional men from engaging with women’s views.71 
Interviews with the head of another women’s association, the Khawla’ Bint 
Al-Azwar Association in Zarqa, working for school dropout teenage girls and 
their mothers, clarify the extent to which such cultural notions limit Muslim 
women’s associations in their work for change. When asked what her asso-
ciation could do when abusive husbands victimized some of its woman ben-
eficiaries, she explained that she and the other association’s workers would 
give these women advice to avoid or avert confrontation with the latter. 
These women are told, for instance, to be at home when the husband arrives 
and to make sure that the food is ready by then, or to withdraw to another 
room when he is moody and angry.72 If the husband demands money from 
her, she is advised to give it to him in order to avoid further trouble. If the 
situation really becomes unbearable, the woman in question is advised to 
leave her house for good and return to her own family. However, this solu-
tion has its price: she will have to leave her children with her husband.73
The association tries to compensate for its impotence vis-à-vis abu-
sive husbands through the psychological, social and economic empower-
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ment of the dropout girls and their mothers, especially through its income-
generating handicraft project. Indeed, such empowerment is expected to 
have a positive impact on the behavior of their fathers and husbands in the 
long run. The association assumes that it would motivate the latter to look 
for work and become more responsible toward their families.74 They also 
expect that it would make the husband respect her more and stop beating 
and abusing her.75 In other words: the association hopes to improve the sta-
tus of women, inside as well as outside of her family, precisely by invoking 
traditional gender-based role divisions: the wife as mother and nurturer of 
her family, of which her work outdoors is an extension, and the husband as 
the main breadwinner.
The idea that the economic empowerment of women will enhance 
their husbands’ respect seems to contrast not only with the observations 
of Al-‘Afaf Society’s workers, but also with those of the president of the 
non-Islamist Al-Faruq Society for Orphans in Irbid. The workers stress that 
situations in which both husband and wife work, or wherein the wife is the 
only breadwinner, often give rise to much tension between both spouses 
because they are quite simply unacceptable in the culture. Al-Faruq Soci-
ety’s president Hassan Harb gives the example of a husband coming home 
from his job while his wife had gone off to her own job without having had 
sufficient time to do the housework. In a culture where male dominance and 
traditional role divisions are taken for granted, such a situation often leads 
to anger and may even result in the wife’s physical abuse.
In the name of the Islamic concept of rahmah, Al-Faruq Society tries 
to counter such patterns of women’s oppression and abuse through its pub-
lic religious courses for men and women alike. These courses advocate an 
attitude of empathy and dialogue between both spouses instead of verbal 
and physical violence. Both of them should listen to one another’s needs 
and desires in order to realize a better coordination of familial tasks and 
reach satisfactory solutions.76
The Spirit of Rahmah and Good Communication
Harmony and good communication as goals characteristic of a good 
marriage relationship are also shared by an Islamist association like Al-‘Afaf 
Society. According to the couple married at one of the Society’s mass wed-
dings that was mentioned in the section on the wedding ritual, a married life 
truly dedicated toward God is characterized by mutual attention, care and 
cooperation. Material demands and luxury are of minor or no importance. 
“We do not own a car,” the husband said, “and we live just in a small apart-
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ment. But one doesn’t need to start one’s family life in a villa.”77 At the Socie-
ty’s seminar on marital harmony – and very much in the spirit of The Muslim 
Brotherhood – Al-Sheikhali positively contrasted the value of rahmah with a 
materialistic lifestyle when he said: “the feelings of compassion vary greatly 
according to the ideal people are imagining. If this ideal is built upon the 
force of materialism, then rahmah gets fragmented. If it is built upon the 
force of spiritualism, rahmah becomes firmer and greater, and rahmah only 
turns into true love when the human being counts himself as the brother of 
every human being.” Compassion, he stresses, is one of the attributes of God 
who calls, through the Qur’anic message as well as through sayings of the 
Prophet, for compassion between spouses and other family members.78
When the Society speaks – orally or in writing – about the values of 
harmony, rahmah and good communication within the marital relation-
ship, its discourse adopts a more egalitarian tone. Apart from role divi-
sion between husband and wife, the Society also recognizes the common 
rights and duties of both. Among these are mutual respect, tolerance (of 
one another’s differences in background and character), forgiveness (of one 
another’s mistakes), goodwill, kindness and friendliness (including laughter, 
humor, smiles, greetings, kind gestures and the keeping of common secrets), 
understanding (for one another’s thoughts and feelings, in order to allow for 
positive behavioral adjustment aimed at greater harmony),79 honesty, trust 
and empathy.80 Examples from the Hadith and reports about the Prophet’s 
wife Aishah and his companions are used to religiously substantiate these 
marital values.
Questions of sexuality are also part of Al-‘Afaf Society’s discourse on 
the harmonious and compassionate marital relationship. When Al-Sheikhali 
states that the wife has “no right to reject the husband’s call” to have inter-
course with him, except when she is sick, tired or menstruating, he seems 
to confirm once again traditional claims of male dominance and gender 
inequality on the basis of the Hadith. He mitigates such claims, however, 
by emphasizing that the woman is a “combination of feelings, sentiments 
and emotions” that the husband should respect, and that the husband does 
not have a right to reject his wife’s desire for sex either.81 Again, ambiguous 
discourse is expressed, possibly to simultaneously accommodate more tra-
ditional and more modern views on the marriage relationship.
He also emphasizes the husband’s and wife’s “mutual right to jeal-
ousy” (or fear and revulsion against extra-marital affairs or romantic contacts 
with persons from the other sex by the marital partner) and the mutual duty 
of chastity. These are, he states, expressions of honor feelings that are condi-
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tional for a strong, mutually involved and harmonious marital relationship.82 
Significantly, his emphasis on mutual jealousy and chastity between hus-
band and wife – while potentially imposing on both of them serious restric-
tions in social interaction with unrelated persons from the opposite sex by 
prohibiting activities like dancing or meetings in private settings83 – departs 
from traditional Arab culture in which only the woman’s chastity and the 
man’s jealousy is of importance.
The values of marital love, harmony and compassion in Al-‘Afaf Soci-
ety’s discourse are also approached from a rational point of view as nec-
essary for the smooth running of family life. Cooperation, compassion and 
harmony enable the married couple to organise their energies, financial and 
human resources and time, to solve family problems, plan their future, take 
thoughtful decisions in order to avoid a negative impact on the family, reach 
goals and deal with financial difficulties. Here, the stress is on the couple’s 
responsibility to engage in this planning and decision making endeavor, and 
not just to limit this to the husband, which possibly suggests a more demo-
cratic and egalitarian style of negotiation, discussion and counsel between 
the genders.84 According to this discourse, rationality, in turn, contributes to 
happiness.
All of the discourse expressed by representatives of Al-‘Afaf Society 
is presented in the frame of its official goal: “searching for a new vision con-
cerning the values of marriage and the formation of the family by means of 
disseminating good customs based upon the teachings of our true religion 
and our original Arab values.” Put mildly differently, the discourse aims “to 
offer a practical model in order to strengthen the positive values regarding 
marriage.”85 The Society endeavors to carry out this mission by speaking to 
the media, organizing public lectures as well as expert seminars and pub-
lishing leaflets and booklets, and by organizing its yearly mass weddings. 
Three of its committees are directly involved in these activities. To be spe-
cific, these include the Culture and Media Committee, The Social and Public 
Relations Committee, and the Women’s Committee.86 
Several times a year, the Society’s women’s committee organizes pub-
lic meetings and lectures on the socio-cultural and psychological aspects 
of the marriage relationship. Most of these are for women only, but some 
have married couples among the audience.87 Meetings for women only are 
meant to discuss marital and family issues relating to, for instance, financial 
matters, daily social dealings with the husband and family in-law and the 
upbringing of children. Problems discussed may be reviewed afterward by 
experts, for instance psychologists or social workers belonging to the Socie-
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ty’s network. Subsequently, a follow-up workshop might take place in which 
these experts discuss possible solutions or approaches of dealing with them 
with the women-attendants. In mixed meetings for married couples, marital 
issues are discussed in a more general fashion. According to the women 
workers, couples that participated in one of the Society’s collective wed-
dings are most likely to attend.88
Domestic Violence
When asked to mention valuable lessons from the workshop on mari-
tal life they had to attend as participants in Al-‘Afaf Society’s mass wedding, 
the husband of the couple referred to above answered: “I learned that abus-
ing and (harshly) beating your wife is prohibited by Islam. In popular culture, 
it is acceptable, but Islam teaches you to treat your wife with respect and 
dignity. You may not treat her like an animal.”89 His own mother, he told me, 
had been abused by his father in the past, and had suffered medical reper-
cussions from this treatment.
According to a survey conducted by, among others, Jordan’s Ministry 
of Health in the summer of 2006, 53 percent of young unmarried women in 
the country believe a husband is justified in hitting his wife if she insults him. 
Remarkably, only 40% of their male counterparts share this opinion. Wom-
en’s Rights activist Iman Nimri of the Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development made the following comment on these figures: “Although 
one would assume that the younger generation would tolerate abuse less, 
young girls see their mothers accepting it.”90
As is the case with the issue of sexual honor, however, criticism of 
an indigenous traditional habit like domestic violence is easily sacrificed in 
Islamist efforts to defend Muslim society and identity against – real or per-
ceived – orientalist attacks and recriminations by pointing the finger back to 
the West. “It is not we who are irrational but the West, [for] we do not deny 
our women a human existence but Western society does so with its women,” 
“our culture does not encourage violence but Western society does.” When 
I asked Sarhan of Al-‘Afaf Society whether physical abuse of the wife is an 
issue the Society is dealing with, he rushed to answer: “we do, but this prob-
lem is by no means as serious in our society as it is in the West.”91 According 
to shaikh Muhammad Amin Zaid al-Kilani of the Islamic Welfare Society in 
Salt, men in the West beat their wives unjustly and unnecessarily under the 
influence of alcohol, to point where they injure and kill them, while the just, 
moderate and alcohol-free system of Islam prevents men from committing 
such horrifying acts.92
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When Al-‘Afaf Society members, beneficiaries and workers say that 
beating (daraba) of the wife by the husband is not justified, it is question-
able whether they mean to rule out all kinds of beating. Al-Sheikhali main-
tains that Islam prohibits the husband to beat his wife harshly, even in the 
case of disobedience, because that shows cruelty and is a form of domestic 
violence. At the same time, however, he stresses that the husband has a right 
to “discipline” his wife when she disobeys. This may entail the refusal to have 
sex with her; though, in the case of persistent disobedience, a (light) beating 
is also permissible, so as to convey the message of anger to her. He refers to 
Qur’an 4:34 to prove his point.93
In other words: Islamist and conservative Muslim NGOs make a dis-
tinction between severe abusive beating, which is to be condemned under 
any circumstance, and non-abusive light beating, which is approved of 
when a wife overtly and persistently defies the will and/or honor of her hus-
band. Madiha Kokh, president of the Islamic Anwar Al-Huda Association, for 
instance, asserts that the beating, when it has to take place, should be car-
ried out in a manner that is not really physically hurting, but should teach 
the wife a “psychological lesson.”94 Amin Zaid al-Kilani of the Islamic Wel-
fare Association in Salt speaks about “moderate beating” that husbands can 
exercise against wives who commit sins like meeting other men without 
the husband’s consent or behaving malevolently toward him.95 Again, tra-
ditional patriarchal structures are reproduced in these NGO’s discourse. In 
comparison with the past, however, when husbands felt free to abuse their 
wives as they saw fit, it is also true to say that these structures have been 
significantly refined.
The Privacy of the Nuclear Family
The transition from the extended to the nuclear family in Jordanian 
society is another topic dealt with by especially Al-‘Afaf Society. High up the 
list of ‘adat (traditional habits) regarded by the workers of the Society as a 
hindrance to modern Islamic family life is interference by the husband’s rela-
tives in the life of the couple – and, in particular, their tendency to dominate 
and control the wife and demand from her all kinds of services in the sphere 
of household tasks. “This is not good,” according to the coordinator of the 
Society’s Women’s Committee:
because the wife gets overburdened in this way. The wife’s duties pertain to her 
own house and her own husband, and not those of others. She needs to have 
her privacy and her own space in her own house. And it isn’t good, anyway, 
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if the wife moves into the house of his husband’s family. Husband and wife 
should have their own family life in their own house. These things are changing 
in Jordan, fortunately, but especially in rural environments, these habits are still 
widespread. 
In addition to this, the Women’s Committee’s head added the wrong 
practice of “marriage partners who discuss their mutual problems with their 
own families instead of with each other.” This only worsens their problems, 
she asserts: “because their families will interfere, which creates a very com-
plicated and escalating situation. Both (marital) partners must learn to solve 
their problems among themselves and should listen to each other, without 
the interference of others.”96
The same discourse was also expressed at Al-‘Afaf Society’s public 
seminar on the married couples’ relationship with the mother in law. This 
event reflected an attempt to cope with the transition from the traditional 
extended to the modern nuclear family. On the one hand, it emphasized the 
need for more privacy for the nuclear family; and, on the other, it focused 
on the need to preserve harmony within that family as well as in the rela-
tionship with the extended family, and in particular with the mother-in-law. 
Islamic law and ethics were in general regarded as the appropriate frame of 
reference for providing solutions.97 Such solutions arise in an urbanized, edu-
cated and middle class environment that is increasingly emancipating itself 
from old tribal and rural patterns. At the same time, concern was expressed 
about the cohesion of the (nuclear as well as extended family) and a turn to 
religion as a source of renewed stability in modern society was advocated.
The Question of Divorce
What most emanates from Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society’s discursive stress 
on marital harmony and familial unity and solidarity is its strong dislike of 
the practice of talaq (divorce). In a seminar organized by the Society on 
the issue, sociologist Muhammad al-Diqs stressed that although, in the 
case of necessity, Islam permits talaq, it has a powerful aversion towards 
it and, therefore, imposes restrictions so as to ensure it only occurs when 
matters between both spouses can only worsen if they remain together.98 
As adverse consequences of divorce, al-Diqs mentions the damage it does 
to the divorced couple’s children. These, he notes, must live separated 
from one of their parents, adapt to live with a step-parent, and endure the 
struggle between biological parents over the rights to raise them. He also 
mentioned the “material, social and psychological problems and conflicts” 
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between the divorced husband and wife themselves and the damage it does 
to the society by causing social problems and contributing to the society’s 
“fragmentation.”99
Among the causes for the magnitude of the problem of talaq in 
present day Jordanian society, al-Diqs singles out for blame the lack of reli-
gious and moral awareness that makes couples seek divorce too easily, illit-
eracy among women (because he ascribes to educated women a greater 
capability of solving family problems), and “the woman who goes out to 
work.” In particular, going out to work strengthens a woman’s sentiments of 
“individualism and independence in an economic sense,” making it easier for 
her to divorce.100 The solutions he suggests include awareness raising and 
providing counsel for couples on a healthy and harmonious marital life and 
the prevention of divorce, as well as the “development of a family law… that 
accords with the Islamic shari‘ah.”101
Limitations to the woman’s autonomy in favor of her husband are 
again noticeable in Al-‘Afaf Society’s discourse when considering its opposi-
tion against the (temporarily enacted) khul‘ law in the Kingdom. This law 
allows a wife to divorce her husband without his permission on condition 
that she returns the mahr and forfeits all financial rights. The Society’s mem-
bers are of the opinion that, before a woman can divorce her husband, a 
qadi should intervene to determine whether the woman has suffered real 
damage in her marriage. Sarhan thinks that since the husband bears heavy 
responsibilities in providing and caring for his family, he is entitled to a cer-
tain privilege in divorce matters. Moreover, “women are (in general) more 
emotional, impulsive and capricious in the decisions they make and there-
fore, putting the final say in divorce matters into her hands alone would not 
be responsible.” The Society organized a meeting on this law as well.102 The 
same opinion of the khul‘ law was expressed to me by Muhammad Shaw-
mali, general manager of the Islamic Welfare Society in Salt.103
President of the Al-’Aqsa Association, Nawal al-Fa‘uri seems to have 
a more liberal conception of women’s right to divorce. She argues that, 
according to the shari‘ah, women have the “full right to demand the power 
of divorce in their marriage contract” and that a woman is entitled to initiate 
the dissolution of her marriage through the judicial court when she “fails to 
fulfill her marital duties and obligations toward her husband as a result of 
hatred or due to their lack of understanding.”104
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Women’s Participation in the Society
Jordanian women’s movements, such as the Jordanian Women’s 
Union and the women’s organizations sponsored by Princess Basma, have 
for many years been involved in a struggle to change policies and legislation 
in the direction of equal rights for women in the wider society, in political, 
social and economic respects. Yet, the issue of gender equality in the public 
realm is virtually absent in the discourse of an Islamist group like Al-‘Afaf 
Welfare Society. The reason for this omission can be attributed to the Socie-
ty’s Islamist ideology according to which the woman can participate in pub-
lic life, work and earn money only after fulfilling her primary responsibilities 
towards her house, husband and children.105 In other words: the woman’s 
status in public space is not regarded by the Society’s members as a priority 
issue, since her primary role lies elsewhere. In this respect, its discourse is 
predominantly conservative.
In a practical sense, however, Islamist organizations such as Al-‘Afaf 
Society do offer women channels to be active, within their organizational 
structures, in the public realm. The Society also counts a great number of 
educated women among its sympathizers and beneficiaries who often work 
outside of the home. Its ideology does not disapprove of working or pub-
licly active women, provided that their work or activity outdoors does not 
impede upon their role as housewives and mothers and occurs in an “honor-
able” manner. This means that certain jobs in the realm of heavily physical 
or “unsafe” work are considered off-limits to these women, since they are 
deemed undignified.106 The general manager of the Islamic Welfare Society 
in Salt, who shares this view, had the following to say about the ideal of total 
gender equality in economic life:
 Obviously, there is no way. Women have their own rights and men have their 
own rights, and that needs to be developed, but there are jobs that are not suit-
able for women, for instance in the construction sector, or as cab or bus driver. 
Just imagine! Women can very well have other kinds of jobs, such as school 
teacher, doctor or architect, like my own sister.107 
There are other ways in which it seems perfectly clear that, while Mus-
lim NGOs approve of the woman’s movement and her general participation 
in modernized and modernizing Jordanian society, their consent depends 
upon women adopting jobs that are morally acceptable, especially to its 
male members. This moral acceptability invariably includes a modest outer 
appearance and dress, including the headscarf.
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Generally speaking, the norm of moral acceptability does not require 
absolute gender segregation in public spaces, since even in many Islamist 
institutions, including the ICCS-run Islamic hospital, Al-‘Afaf Society and the 
Islamic Action Front Party, many men and women do collaborate in work 
situations as “brothers” and “sisters,” as they themselves like to describe it.108 
Instead, it implies precautionary measures preventing mixing between men 
and women from turning into sexual temptation and seduction. Besides 
modest behavior and dress for women (including the headscarf ) and early 
marriage, the general manager of the Islamic Welfare Society in Salt men-
tions as an example of such measures the implementation of the hudud for 
illicit sexual activity that the Islamic state should, ideally speaking, enforce. 
He emphasizes the deterrent nature of these punishments against engaging 
in adultery by men and women alike. Its execution requires four men testify-
ing that they had witnessed the act, and those who genuinely repent may 
be pardoned, as the prophet commanded.109
Some women Islamists and Muslim NGOs are more outspoken, explic-
itly advocating the rights of women in the public domain, including the 
Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association and Nawal Al-Fa‘uri’s Al-’Aqsa Association. 
Their argument centers on women’s need to use her skills and education to 
contribute to Jordanian and Muslim society at large, and not just her own 
home and family.110
Al-Fa‘uri insists on women’s equal civil and political rights and her 
right to engage in economic transactions independently of men. In support, 
she draws from Qur’anic verses and the practice of politically and economi-
cally active women in the earliest Muslim community as examples.111 To illus-
trate the woman’s “right to express her opinion and protest,” she mentions 
the example of Umm Salma, who successfully advised the Prophet against 
the conditions of a peace treaty. Furthermore, she mentions Caliph Umar Ibn 
Al-Khattab, who was reprimanded for wanting “to limit the dowries.” Accord-
ing to this report, the woman stopped and asked Umar: “how can you do 
this while the Noble Qur’an says: ‘(if ) you have given one of them (wives) 
a qintar (an amount of gold equal to the dowry) take not the least bit of 
it back’”? (4:20). Apparently, Umar was chastened, admitted his culpability 
and reversed his decision on the matter of dowries.112 As pointed out earlier 
in this chapter (as well as in chapters 10 and 13), Al-Fa‘uri heavily criticizes 
certain local mores and customs limiting women’s role in society. On the 
one hand, her position, as an ex-member of The Muslim Brotherhood, agrees 
with the latter’s tradition of emphasizing the woman’s role as a motherly 
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“educator of the next generation.” On the other hand, she puts a greater 
stress than would most male Muslim Brothers on enhancing women’s role 
in society and in developing her potential in a way that transcends mother-
hood and housewivery.113 In Al-‘Afaf Society as well, I found women workers 
most outspoken and explicit in their condemnation of customs and tradi-
tions that were seen as detrimental to the woman’s status. The males in the 
Society’s leadership tend to put greater stress on external threats to the 
Muslim family, such as those emanating from globalization and imperial-
ism, which leads to a more conservative discourse.
Al Fa‘uri’s Al-’Aqsa Association tries to put its vision of developing 
women’s potential and enhancing her role in the wider society into practice 
through its Committee for Families – a body that helps the mothers of poor 
and marginalized families. She describes these mothers as “living in a state 
of isolation, who sit passively at home, lack education, have a limited social 
and cultural horizon and face problems in bringing up their children.” The 
Committee members, including Al-Fa‘uri herself, try to raise these women’s 
awareness on various issues, like child raising (see previous chapter), hygiene, 
healthy food preparation, gardening as well as various societal and religious 
issues and developments.114 These activities take the form of conversations 
and guidance during home visits, or invitations to informative meetings 
at the association’s premises. The mothers can participate there in literacy 
courses, listen to experts lecturing them on topics (such as the bringing up 
children, or the rights of women) and watch TV programs on various societal 
topics and developments, including programs from international stations.115 
As discussed in the chapter on employment-oriented activities, the associa-
tion also works with micro-credit programs to enable such families to set up 
agricultural projects as a means to economic empowerment.
According to Al-Fa‘uri, “these women need to learn to invest their 
time well, because the more their capabilities improve, the more they can 
contribute to their society.” They need, furthermore, “to be taken out of their 
isolation and learn to communicate with others in the society by obtaining 
more knowledge about the world around them.” “Islam,” she stresses:
teaches you to open your mind to new developments, knowledge and infor-
mation, no matter where these comes from. We teach these women to ask 
questions about things that are important, because the reality of Islam is that 
this religion has an answer to each question. They must learn to follow this 
message, and not blindly imitate the traditions, norms and habits which they 
inherited from their parents and ancestors. 
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Al-’Aqsa Association’s president admitted, however, that these aware-
ness-raising efforts were neither smooth nor easy affairs. Promoting change 
among these women is fraught with difficulties, she said, “because they 
often don’t care much about these things. Change proceeds with difficulty. 
It takes time.”116
Conclusion
None of the Muslim associations dealt with in this chapter, or in this 
dissertation for that matter, openly and radically defies the traditional patri-
archal family structure, which ties the woman first and foremost to her home 
as mother and housewife. A structure in which males in general and the 
husband in particular are traditionally regarded as superior to the woman in 
terms of rational decision making abilities, and rights to control the family’s 
affairs. Such superiority entitles him to have a dominant position and leader-
ship role, in the name of guarding the family’s integrity, unity, honor and the 
well-being of all of its members. Especially in the discourse of Al-‘Afaf Society 
and like-minded associations, the leadership role cannot be left to females 
alone, since they are understood to be rationally less stable and more emo-
tional. The underlying assumption is that, if they were given an entirely free 
hand, chaos and decay would reign. In this vein, such associations continue 
to give expression, albeit in a subtle and modified form, to a religious ideol-
ogy that, in Barakat’s words, “considers women to be a source of evil, anarchy 
and fitnah (social disorder), and kaid (trickery or deception).”117
It must be acknowledged, however, that the associations would 
themselves never conceive of their message on gender relations in such 
crude terms. Emphasising the equal spiritual and moral value of the sexes 
as well as the values of mutual consultation in decision making, and the 
need to take account of one another’s needs, their discourse is much more 
ambiguous than that. To begin with, they redefine patriarchy in terms of the 
democratic or consultative leadership that the husband should exercise. In 
the words of the website of the Muslim Sisters, the women’s section of the 
transnational Muslim Brotherhood movement:
Every type of group including the family must have a leader to guide it with-
in the limits of what Allah has ordained… This role is not one of repression, 
hegemony or tyranny, but one of kindness, love and gentleness. It directs to the 
right path of wisdom in wisdom and benevolence. It is fundamentally based 
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on consultations…There is also a specific order for consultations in the affairs 
of marriage.118 
Many women are involved in the work of these associations. They are 
often well educated and aware of all kinds of social, psychological and politi-
cal issues. Both their male and female members face, on the one hand, the 
pressures of certain traditions and, on the other, those of modernization 
within their family lives. For, as regards role expectations in the relationship 
between husband and wife, there is little doubt that modernization brings 
considerable potential for disruption. These women try to get across their 
own needs and desires – for the respect and attention from their husbands, 
for the opportunity to work (whether paid or unpaid) and for the husband’s 
assistance in household duties – within the framework of moral sanction 
and acceptability that religious discourse provides. In more general terms, 
this religious discourse seems here to serve as a framework for the negotia-
tion and balancing of, on the one hand, traditional and patriarchal values 
and, on the other, the influences of modernization and globalization. By 
claiming that, as long as we uphold our natural and religiously endorsed 
duties, everyone’s rights will be respected, the same discourse offers both 
the family and the wider society the prospect of a harmonious life.
The power of religious discourse to act as a legitimizing framework 
for gender relations is noted by the American political scientist Laurie A. 
Brand. Writing on Jordan’s general women’s movement, she observes that:
the vast majority of Jordanian women are concerned that issues related to 
women’s rights and their role in society be addressed within a framework that 
upholds Islam and societal traditions. The percentage of women who feel com-
fortable with trying to move beyond that framework remains small. Activists 
who go to villages or refugee camps stress the need to base any discussion with 
women on Islamic principles; otherwise, women assume that what is being 
proposed contradicts religion, and will likely reject the ideas presented.119 
In the Jordanian context, this legitimizing framework for social (and 
potentially political) action reproduces deeply embedded structures of 
patriarchy and (gender) inequality. Inequalities pertaining to gender rela-
tions may be morally justified by such an ideological framework in terms of 
“natural differences” between the sexes and of the need for the weaker sex 
to be protected by the stronger, exactly as we have seen in the discourse of 
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several of the Jordanian Muslim NGOs. In other words, it may reinforce male 
patronage over females. 120
This chapter has equally shown, however, that an ideological frame-
work for discourse and action aimed at moral understanding could also be 
utilized to modify, change or even overturn existing structures, possibly 
in the direction of greater equality. On the one hand, some of the Islamist 
and more conservative Muslim associations show themselves to be strongly 
defensive of patriarchy when it comes to legal-social issues, such as honor 
crimes and divorce. On the other hand, modern education and an enhanced 
participation of women in labor market and public life have led several 
Muslim associations to criticize certain traditional forms of patriarchy and 
to advocate greater equality and (a consultative version of ) democracy into 
the marital relationship. Islamic discourse is also used for a critical reflection 
on dilemma’s pertaining to gender in modern Jordanian society. In particu-
lar, certain women’s associations now insist that the role of the woman is 
wider then only the family sphere and try to enhance women’s rights in the 
wider society and the public domain.
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conclusion:
 Muslim Social Activism 
as a Phenomenon 
of Civil Society: 
empowerment or 
patronage?
In the first chapter, civil society was defined as the realm in which 
citizens associated on a voluntary basis to serve common goals (interests, 
values, norms, morals, and ideals) and whose decisions and practices in this 
regard are relatively autonomous from state policies as well as from eco-
nomic objectives. In doing so, a civil society gives an organized, conscious 
and reflexive expression to social relationships, solidarities and cultural val-
ues in the socio-cultural lifeworld of its citizens.
In chapter 3, two different angles from which the existence of such 
a civil society in the Muslim Arab world is problematized were dealt with. 
First, some scholars, most notably Sami Zubaida, have maintained that most 
of the associations established by citizens in those societies serve mainly 
to continue traditional patterns of patronage and hierarchy. According to 
these scholars, the associations are based upon primordial ties of tribe, 
family, ethnicity or religion, rather than representing the kind of reflexive, 
voluntary, inclusive and egalitarian institutions a “modern” civil society is 
supposed to consist of. Second, such associations have been described as 
in the grip of state control and policy to the point that they cannot func-
tion as autonomous citizens’ initiatives. This concluding chapter aims to deal 
with this problematic. Here, I assess the degree to which Muslim voluntary 
welfare associations in Jordan foster the empowerment and autonomy of 
citizens as opposed to reinforcing patterns of patronage and dependency.
These conclusions draw especially from the contrasting observations 
of two scholars in particular, Sami Zubaida and Janine Clark, regarding the 
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vertical versus the horizontal aspects of especially Islamist voluntary associ-
ations – a discussion dealt with in chapter 3. Subsequently, a closer look will 
be taken at these associations’ socio-ethical discourse in order to establish 
how it reflects patterns of empowerment and/or patronage. The next part of 
the conclusions deals with the wider political context in which these associ-
ations find themselves and focuses especially on their relationship with the 
state. Finally, an attempt is made to formulate an answer to the problematic 
of these associations’ nature as civil society institutions.
Islamist NGOs: Horizontal Networks or Vertical Patronage?
Janine Clark’s analysis of the sociopolitical role of Islamist NGOs 
focuses primarily on their nature as the embodiment of more or less hori-
zontal middle class-based networks in religious form. On the other hand, 
Sami Zubaida points to a more vertical pattern of moral patronization (or 
“colonization”) targeting beneficiaries that characterizes the approach of 
such NGOs.
My own observations suggest that both of them reveal part of the 
truth, while overlooking certain other important aspects of it. Clark’s obser-
vation that these NGOs strengthen horizontal ties among the (relatively 
underprivileged) well-educated middle class – ties with empowering impli-
cations for its members in terms of the social, economic and even politi-
cal opportunities they offer – may serve as a useful correction to Zubaida’s 
description of Islamic voluntary associations as “neo-traditional formations.” 
After all, for Zubaida, these associations merely continue patterns of author-
itarianism, paternalism and ascribed membership inherited from the pre-
modern mujtama‘ ahli. And it is true that traces of this traditional culture 
can be found in contemporary (Islamic) voluntary associations, such as a 
strong emphasis on the (exclusive) personal role of leadership exercised by 
the NGOs’ presidents, often at the expense of a more democratic institu-
tional structure,1 and the role that sectarian, familial or tribal ties may still 
play in the founding of and the ongoing membership within NGOs.2 Yet, I 
agree with Clark when she states that, with the emergence of a modern 
educated middle class in the Middle East, new patterns of associational life 
came into being. Generally speaking, members of contemporary voluntary 
associations, including the Islamic and the tribal ones, do not simply join 
them because they belong to certain familial or tribal formations. Even if 
religion or tribe is the basis for the existence of certain NGOs, many of their 
members have acquired educational levels and been exposed to modern 
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forms of media that enable them to make their own individual and rationally 
informed choices to join the association in question.3 Of course, beneficial 
social ties and a sense of social duty remain important in this process; but 
these are usually of a horizontal nature and based upon mutual interde-
pendence of needs, resources and skills. Besides, there are also many Muslim 
voluntary welfare associations in Jordan that are of an inter-familial, inter-
tribal or even inter-ethnic nature. Associations affiliated with The Muslim 
Brotherhood have an ideological basis transcending such forms of identity; 
and this is often reflected in their membership. Clark succinctly describes 
how Islamist associations in countries like Yemen, Egypt and Jordan have 
the potential to expand their networks, and to reach out and recruit other 
members of the middle class previously not involved in Islamist networks.4
In terms of religion, tribal affiliation and ethnicity, the neighborhoods 
of modern cities in an Arab country like Jordan have become increasingly 
mixed. This fact is also reflected in the existence of a mixed associational life 
that bridges traditional forms of identity. Family and tribe remain important 
factors in the formation of social capital, but are by no means as exclusive or 
dominant in terms of personal identity, protection and socio-economic sur-
vival as they used to be in the past. Consequently, in terms of membership, 
social capital and discursive processes, the contemporary associations often 
have something distinctly modern about them. They are based on a rela-
tively conscious and voluntary membership and generally possess reflexive 
and critical attitudes toward prevailing modern, as well as traditional pat-
terns in wider society. This pertains to issues as diverse as consumerism, the 
environment, gender relations, upbringing of children or habits like gossip 
and tribal and familial feuds. Such attitudes often play a critical role in the 
self-definition of Islamic identity.
What Clark seems to overlook, or at least downplay, however, is that 
Islamic NGOs also make serious efforts to influence and “educate” their needy 
recipients in the name of Islamic da‘wah. As discussed in chapters 13-16, 
these attempts take place through activities like counseling, guidance, lec-
tures and courses on reading and memorizing the Qur’an, performing Islam-
ic rituals, and responding to various familial and social problems. Religious 
values are also expressed to the recipients in connection with activities such 
as tutoring school students, vocational training, mediation in finding jobs, 
income-generating projects and recreational and cultural activities. Through 
such programs, Islamist associations in particular endeavour to instill a sense 
of piety, dignity and responsibility in the recipients. A serious willingness 
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among members and participants of various Islamist as well as other Muslim 
NGOs to raise the educational, cultural, socio-economic and “moral” level of 
their beneficiaries can be found. The latter may even be pressured by such 
NGOs in question to participate in such educational programs, as we saw in 
the case of ICCS centers for orphans and poor in Amman.5
It is difficult to ascertain the impact of such activities on the attitudes 
and mindset of recipients. That there is something of an impact, in particular 
among the children and the youth among them, is indicated by the inter-
views and discussions by a local female research assistant of mine at the 
women’s section of an ICCS center for orphans and poor in a Palestinian 
refugee camp in Amman, and by other activities in which political messages 
were also transmitted. These were described primarily in chapter 15. Several 
other Muslim associations in Jordan working for the poor, the needy and/or 
the orphans give similar kinds of guidance and make similar kinds of edu-
cational efforts toward their clients. Such associations are, in fact, actively 
engaged with the values of the lifeworld emanating from their social envi-
ronment – be this an urban neighborhood, a Palestinian refugee camp or a 
rural village – often on a religious basis. This pertains not only to the level 
of motivation of the NGO workers themselves, but also to their communica-
tion with their needy clients. And in the interactions with the latter, various 
degrees of reflexivity toward their lifeworld and its social problems are dis-
played.
As far as class differences and the concomitant social gaps between 
NGO workers and their needy clients are concerned, it must be pointed out 
that, in many cases, these are mitigated by familial, tribal, ethnic and/or 
neighborly ties between the workers and clients. Some educators of ICCS 
centers, for instance, were once needy recipients of those centers them-
selves.6 And it must be borne in mind that members and workers in such vol-
untary associations, even if they now belong to the educated middle class, 
may have experienced poverty during their youth. This is the case with many 
Palestinian NGO workers who initially arrived as refugees in Jordan, but it 
also applies to many East Bank Jordanians with a tribal background. Over 
the last half century, Jordan has known a significant measure of social mobil-
ity, due to the spread of mass education. The point to be made here is that 
the concept of class, while an important and useful tool of analysis, should 
not be reified too much. In many cases, NGO workers have a great deal of 
affinity with the lifeworld of their needy clients and their social problems, 
for reasons mentioned above.
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Various scholars, notably Bayat and Clark, have pointed out that 
Islamic NGOs have established commercially beneficial projects in the 
realms of education and health care that mainly serve the middle class. 
However, there are also efforts made for members of the lower classes that 
aim to develop the latter socio-economically, educationally, religiously and 
morally. In some cases, such services may offer opportunities for the recipi-
ents and their families to enter the educated middle class. No matter how 
scarce the resources (in comparison to commercially based projects), and 
how many obstacles they face in reality, these efforts may not be dismissed. 
In the frame of such activities, ties between NGO workers and (at least some 
of ) their needy recipients may at times be strong, and contribute substan-
tially to the lives of the latter. They are, however, of a different nature in com-
parison to the ties among NGO members, workers, donors and clients who 
are all from the middle class. They are, indeed, much more characterized by 
vertical relationships, patronage and one-way dependency.
This brings me to a point on which I agree with Sami Zubaida when he 
speaks of efforts undertaken by Islamist NGOs to Islamize the population in 
terms of religious observance and ethical conduct. In paternalistic fashion, 
this process places a heavy emphasis on the family (and, I would add, public) 
morality of their recipients. This aspect of Islamization may well contribute 
to the ideological influence or even hold of Islamist movements over large 
sections of the population, including the lower classes. The latter may also 
be politically important as voters and participants in demonstrations. It also 
emphasises, however, the patronizing nature of such relationships. Even if 
certain forms of support for the poor and needy may be empowering in 
educational and socio-economic respects on an individual level, the latter 
remain in the role of recipients of aid and other services, and do not par-
ticipate in decision-making regarding the NGO and its activities. Moreover, 
the lower classes are not politically organized by Islamic NGOs in order to 
fight for their own rights. Islamists do not bring class relations in the society 
into question on a structural level. Rather, they assume that social justice 
will be attained by changing and Islamizing the “mentality” of all members 
of Muslim society, from the unemployed and destitute to the richest busi-
nessmen and the heads of government and state, and by urging the state 
to promote such a religiously informed mentality through the implemen-
tation of the shari‘ah. On the level of NGO-client relations, this moralism 
translates itself in a patronizing attitude. The NGO-workers always assume 
that they know “what’s best” for their clients. In this sense, such NGOs may 
indeed be the inheritors of the authoritarian and paternalist mentality of 
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the historical mujtama‘ ahli. Islamists, however, do not hold a monopoly on 
this attitude. Patronization is inherent in any relationship between NGOs 
run by middle class members who have a significant amount of social capi-
tal, financial resources and organizational know how at their disposal, and 
needy clients.
Political and Socio-economic Empowerment
Social scientist Bayat’s observation that Islamist associations in the 
Arab world do not politically mobilize the poor on a class basis applies to all 
other legally registered voluntary welfare associations in Jordan, whether 
Islamist or not, since state policy and law strictly forbids them from doing 
so. Efforts of ICCS centers to patronize their clients ideologically and to build 
their identity and moral personality on a religious basis seem to imply, how-
ever, an approach to socio-economic empowerment on an individual and 
familial basis, making use of much the same kind of activities and projects 
which the other – including non-Islamist – voluntary welfare associations are 
using. Examples are vocational training, mediating for jobs in the labor mar-
ket and income-generating projects. In other words, patronizing and pater-
nalistic leadership does not seem to rule out every kind of empowerment 
for the clients. Religion- or ideology-based forms of paternalism in 19th and 
20th century Europe, accompanied by significant social pressure as well as 
encouragement, were reasonably successful in galvanizing people into tak-
ing different forms of political, social, cultural and economic action – which 
may now be considered as forms of empowerment.7 Likewise, in present day 
Jordan, such an (empowering) approach is supposed to be realized through 
the dependency of the individual on his or her social environment and its 
patrons, rather than by making him or her independent from these.
Through such dependency-relationships, practices of wastah (favorit-
ism) take place as well. Allegations that ICCS centers give preferential treat-
ment to beneficiaries from their own Islamist network in the provision of 
development opportunities were mentioned in chapters 8 and 11. Again, 
there is no reason to assume that the ICCS significantly differs in this regard 
from other, including non-Islamist, NGOs.
This is not to say that the prevailing pattern of paternalism within 
voluntary associations does not affect and limit the results of their work in 
terms of empowerment. Vulnerable people with limited resources do not 
have a sufficient base to empower themselves on their own account, and 
have no negotiating power vis-à-vis service-providing NGOs. If, in practice, 
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   398 05-02-2008   11:13:51
399
these NGOs themselves are structured along lines of paternalism and per-
sonal authority, and if the association’s workers are largely dependent on 
the will or the judgment of its head, as is usually the case, one cannot expect 
them to empower their beneficiaries to participate in the decision-making 
processes of the organization.8 The NGOs’ head has to ensure the conformity 
of his or her organization and its workers with government-policies and leg-
islation and ensure its obedience to the state, at least outwardly. The asso-
ciation, in turn, ensures that the beneficiaries behave in conformity with the 
associations’ rules, in which they themselves have no say. Such associations 
may have projects for economic empowerment, but whether they also turn 
their beneficiaries into autonomous and vocal citizens who can fully partici-
pate in the public sphere appears doubtful.
Empowerment and Gender
There is one more aspect of empowerment in the Muslim associations’ 
work – especially as it pertains to the socio-economic levels of the actors – 
that must be mentioned: gender. On the issue of gender and economic par-
ticipation in the Arab world, the Arab Human Development Report of 2002 
observes that:
Women’s economic participation remains unacceptably low, even though their 
capabilities have grown significantly (while still far less than is desirable). Their 
opportunities both to contribute to and to gain from such participation remain 
circumscribed by convention and legal restrictions… the feminization of unem-
ployment can be reversed by removing gender bias in labor markets, including 
gender-based occupational segregation and unequal returns on education.9 
In the chapter on employment-oriented activities of Muslim NGOs, I 
observed that while many of the vocational training programs run by these 
associations have women as their target, apart from computer skills, the 
nature of the vocations in which they are trained – sewing, embroidery, food 
preparation and glass painting – are traditionally associated with females. 
Instead of reversing them, they would seem, therefore, to reinforce gender-
based occupational segregation and possibly, by consequence, unequal 
returns on education as well. This is to be attributed largely to gender-based 
cultural biases in the local community rather than to religious ideology as 
such, since even the secular UK-based development organization Quest-
scope finds itself compelled to provide separate and different training activ-
ities to boys and girls respectively. It is obvious then that reversing trends of 
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occupational segregation is easier said than done in impoverished and cul-
turally conservative communities in the Arab world. In such socio-economic 
and cultural environments, reversing the feminization of unemployment 
as such, even if the employment offered is of a traditionally female nature, 
seems to be the only attainable form of economic empowerment of women, 
and many Muslim NGOs contribute to this. Indeed, religiously inspired Mus-
lim NGOs are capable of attracting women from traditionally low-income 
families to their vocational training programs (as well as to other educa-
tional activities) precisely because of their reputation of upholding pious 
norms of gender-based virtue and segregation.
An Islamist ideology that explicitly identifies woman’s primary tasks 
as mother and housewife may constitute a hindrance to reversing the femi-
nization of unemployment and gender-based occupational segregation. 
However, women who sympathise with, actively support or participate in 
the Islamist movement in Jordan do work outdoors to make a living, often in 
gender-mixed settings, sometimes as highly educated professionals. A few 
of them are represented in the elected shurah council of the Islamic Action 
Front Party and one is a parliamentarian for this party. As Nancy Ammer-
man, a specialist on American Christian fundamentalism argues, to judge 
the impact of a religious movement, one shouldn’t listen to its (patriarchal) 
rhetoric only. Actual practice in the movements’ members’ lives may differ 
significantly and have a decisive impact on the movements’ practice.10 Lisa 
Taraki points out that Islamist discourse and ideology on gender in Jordan 
have been significantly modified, adjusted and renegotiated due to trends 
of attaining higher educational levels by women and their entrance into the 
labor market and the public sphere.11 Moreover, Islamist Welfare NGOs them-
selves offer Muslim women venues to work and be active outdoors, either in 
a paid or in an unpaid fashion. Some of them are entirely run by women. This 
is certainly not to say that Islamist institutions have ceased to be patriarchal 
in nature. However, in terms of gender-based possibilities and constraints 
in socio-economic empowerment, no obvious practical difference can be 
discerned between the activities of Islamist and non-Islamist NGOs.
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A Discourse of Social Ethics
Ethics of Duty, Obedience and Harmony
Attitudes of paternalism prevailing among Muslim NGOs toward their 
beneficiaries are, especially among conservative and Islamist NGOs, related 
to a religious ethical discourse that is focused on duty. Such a discourse, 
especially in its Islamist form, does not empower certain groups within the 
society to stand up for their own rights so much as call upon them to fulfill 
their duties toward others as well as toward God. The underlying premise is 
that rights and empowerment can never be primarily based on the assertive 
autonomy of individuals, social groups or classes. They can be realized only 
in an environment of social harmony and solidarity in Muslim society as a 
whole. This implies that rights and empowerment of individuals or groups 
are necessarily embedded in social relationships of dependency. Each one’s 
duty fulfills the other ones’ rights.
Instead of calling upon their needy beneficiaries to organize them-
selves on a class basis and fight for their own rights, for instance, Islamist 
NGOs call upon Muslims from the wealthier strata of society to give selflessly 
and generously, fi sabil li-llah, to the poor and orphans. By fulfilling this duty, 
the living circumstances of the needy are supposed to improve and their 
socio-economic prospects to become brighter. The wealthy donors them-
selves get rid of their own egoism and greed and their chances for divine 
reward in the afterlife are enhanced. The needy beneficiaries are told to 
counter their own greed as well as their jealousy vis-à-vis the wealthier stra-
ta, be patient and thankful to God for what He has made available to them, 
equally with an eye on their chances in the afterlife. Both the wealthy and 
the poor are taught about the viciousness of materialism and called upon 
to be pious, honest and helpful in their religious and social dealings. Such a 
spiritual attitude, Islamists reason, will lead to true social harmony and eco-
nomic prosperity, implying that the blind pursuance of self-interest as well 
as one’s “own rights” by any separate individual, group or class will lead to 
the undermining of Muslim society and, ultimately, its disintegration.
In a similar vein, children are not called upon to assert their own will 
against that of their parents, older brothers and/or sisters, but rather to 
respect and obey their parents and the elderly in general. Parents and older 
brothers and sisters, in turn, are told to take good care of their children or 
younger siblings, listen to their needs and legitimate desires and give them 
proper and positive guidance. Women, finally, are called upon not to rebel 
against their husbands. The wife must obey her husband as head and pro-
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vider of the family, provided that he himself deals with her on an Islamic 
basis, does not abuse and/or humiliate her physically or verbally, respects 
her dignity and is attentive toward her needs, feelings and opinions.
A specific kind of conservatism cannot be denied in this type of social 
worldview. It implies a confirmation and legitimation of existing social hier-
archies and dependency relationships along the lines of class, age and gen-
der, even though the “stronger” are called upon to exercise their power with 
good care and consideration for the “weaker.” It is this combination of power 
and care that creates relationships of paternalism and patronage. What such 
dependency relationships can imply in practice is made painfully clear by 
the president of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar Association, who explained to me 
that she and the other association’s members cannot or will not advise cli-
ent mothers to openly resist the abusive behavior of their husbands. Islam-
ist and other, like-minded, NGOs,12 start from the belief that true dignity 
has to be obtained through enhancing ones’ level of religiosity and piety, 
with its ritual as well as its social aspects.13 With connotations of endurance, 
active perseverance as well as tolerance in social behavior, the notion of 
sabr (patience) is central to this understanding of how people can achieve 
greater dignity. This includes, in such associations’ discourse, learning and 
work ethics to improve one’s prospects in life. It may also include influenc-
ing persons in relatively powerful positions in a subtle and polite manner. It 
does not include, however, directly confronting class, age, and/or gender-
based power relationships in society and in the public sphere. The authority 
of the wealthy, the elderly or men is not, therefore, to be challenged.
Moreover, such conceptions of dignity and empowerment may be 
questionable from the liberal point of view of respect for individual freedom 
and choice. This becomes clear when dependent clients are pressured by an 
ICCS center to participate in religiously and ideologically shaped cultural 
programs, for instance, or when (early) marriage is promoted by Al-‘Afaf 
Society as the overriding duty for each and every believer.
Rights and Duties
A focus on duty and social harmony in religious discourse does not 
a priori exclude, however, the inclusion of a rights-based discourse among 
Muslim NGOs. Al-Faruq Society, for instance, combines the religious lan-
guage of ethical duty of respect for one another’s dignity with a discourse on 
human, women’s and children’s rights. The latter is unquestionably inspired 
by global institutions and documents like international rights conventions, 
UNICEF and foreign – including Western – development agencies. In this dis-
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course, the integrity of the individual with his or her own qualities, thoughts, 
feelings and rights (rather than the conformity to strictly conceived religious 
injunctions as the basis of a harmonious community life) is central. A form 
of hybridization between duty-oriented religious ethics and rights-oriented 
secular ethics takes place in the discourse of Al-Faruq Society. It appeals 
to the Qur’anic principle of protection of the woman and concepts, such 
as rahmah (compassion), tasamuh (forgiveness and tolerance) and sabr, 
in raising awareness against domestic violence and oppression of women 
and children within the family, and to redirect communication within cli-
ent families in the direction of mutual empathy, understanding, respect and 
greater democracy in daily relationships. This also implies a greater stress on 
the egalitarian aspects of Islamic social ethics, rather than on the virtues of 
hierarchy and obedience.
In the case of Al-Faruq Society, religious discourse is merely the inspi-
rational element of an effort that is aimed at the social and economic devel-
opment and empowerment of the orphan families in the local community, 
and not a part of an overall Islamization effort. It does not start from the 
assumption of a pure and monolithic Islamic identity to be defended and 
fortified in the face of an equally monolithic and hostile Western materialist 
culture and civilization. It pays equal attention to globally formulated rights 
discourses and modern development approaches as authoritative sources 
in social work and developmental activities, and interprets the Islamic mes-
sage accordingly.
However, even among several associations with a more orthodox 
Muslim or Islamist background, we see a readiness to embrace modern 
rights discourses and to cooperate with international, including non-Islam-
ic, development actors. The Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar association, led by a 
woman mosque teacher with orthodox religious convictions and wearing 
orthodox dress, and the Al-’Aqsa Association, led by Islamist and ex-Brother-
hood member Nawal Al-Fa‘uri, are cases in point. Both condemn traditional 
practices that discriminate against women in terms of social and educa-
tional opportunities in the name of Islam, as well as from the perspective 
of human, children’s and women’s rights. Both also cooperate with secular 
and/or foreign development actors. Such examples show that authenticity 
is never a straightforward or uncontested affair in local settings. In the name 
of Islamic authenticity, people can link up with global rights discourses and 
even build alliances with foreign and non-Muslim institutions to battle what 
they regard as distorted forms of traditional cultural identity. As more recent 
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research has demonstrated, even some ICCS centers are affected by this 
trend.14
Criticism of traditional popular practices deemed to be detrimental to 
the rights and the well being of people and, in particular, of women and chil-
dren can also be heard in Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated associations. Work-
ers and beneficiaries of Al-‘Afaf Society criticize the verbal and/or physical 
abuse of one’s wife, any lack of consideration of her (financial as well as emo-
tional) needs, opinions and views, the interference of the extended family, in 
particular the husband’s mother, into the affairs of the married couple and 
the denial to any women of a place in the labor market or the public realm.
Such anti-traditionalist elements in Islamist discourse are not surpris-
ing if we take the basically modern nature of such movements into account. 
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby define religious fundamentalism, on 
the one hand, as an effort to fortify religious identity by providing it with a 
firm and dogmatic basis that is – albeit selectively – derived from a tradition, 
in other words, from the past. On the other hand, religious fundamentalism 
wants to be relevant in modern society since it tries to respond to modern 
needs, dilemmas and predicaments.15 This means that at least in practice, 
fundamentalists, including Islamists, do engage in reinterpretations of their 
faith, since they want religion to have meaningful solutions to offer people 
– themselves included – who are part of a modern society. In the case of a 
modern Arab society like Jordan’s, modernization processes, such as urbani-
zation, mass education, globalization of economy and mass media and the 
increased participation of (educated) women in the public sphere and labor 
market has led to serious dislocations. Concomitantly, traditional patterns, 
such as the extended family, patriarchal authority, the tribe and the small 
scale local community have suffered some degree of erosion. Islamists, 
including workers of Al-‘Afaf Society among other associations, try to trans-
late the truth of Islam (that is conceived of as eternal and absolute) into 
answers that take such real life conditions of modern society into account 
and that may be critical, therefore, of certain traditional practices.
This approach could be characterized as a form of adaptive conserva-
tism. That is to say, a form of conservativism that is adaptable to modern 
conditions and circumstances. Their overriding aim is the attainment of 
socially stable, harmonious and secure conditions that provide Muslims 
with a sense of moral direction, certainty, dignity and possibly even power. 
The result is a kind of social ethics that could be characterized as a hybrid, 
in the sense of a combination of traditional and modern elements – all its 
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claims of representing “pure and divinely inspired truth and authenticity” 
notwithstanding.
It must be noted in this regard that a rigid distinction between “fun-
damentalist” and “modernist” approaches to social ethics cannot be made. 
Not only Islamists, but also members and workers of a more liberal NGO like 
Al-Faruq Society regard Islam as a vital component of their authentic selves 
and are wary of the political, socio-economic as well as cultural impacts of 
Western-dominated globalization. This applies to most of Jordan’s citizens, 
including the more liberal and secular among them. The latter differ from the 
Islamists mainly in terms of a less rigid sense of Islamic authenticity as well 
as a significantly lesser degree of predominance and centrality of religious 
doctrine as an “absolute yardstick” in their overall socio-ethical vision.
The Political Significance of Muslim NGOs
Constraints imposed by the State
The context in which Muslim NGOs operate in local communities with 
their social activities and their (religiously informed) socio-ethical discourse 
is significantly shaped by the politics of the Jordanian nation-state. The state 
allows them room to maneuver as long as they serve the policy-objectives 
of the regime and pose no challenge to the country’s political and social 
stability. As chapters 3, 4 and 6 made clear, repressive government policy 
and vaguely formulated legal restrictions prohibiting welfare associations 
from serving any “political” or even “religious objective”16 successfully dis-
empower these associations by preventing them from expressing criticism, 
let alone opposition in the public sphere – an essential characteristic for any 
civil society to function freely and autonomously. As I noticed consistently 
during my field research, this legislation and policy generates among mem-
bers of Muslim NGOs, and, in particular, their leading personalities, a great 
deal of anxiety. This tended to be manifested when sensitive political issues, 
ranging from Islamist political activism to the US invasion of Iraq were raised 
in my (a foreign researcher’s) presence. The fear of government measures, 
such as arrests, detentions or even closure, against the association in ques-
tion became obvious as soon as any kind of “political activity” came under 
discussion.
At the time of fieldwork, such anxieties were compounded by the tur-
bulent political circumstances in the Middle East Region: the US-led “war 
on terrorism,” the US/UK-invasion of Iraq and the bloody cycle of Israeli 
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repression and Palestinian resistance in the occupied Palestinian territories. 
Among many Jordanians, this state of affairs contributed to a sense of being 
under siege by hostile foreign powers. Representatives of several associa-
tions, among these the Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa Association, the Al-Faruq Society 
and the Islamic Bani Hassan Association, complained about the loss of funds 
from abroad for their programs of financial sponsorship of orphan clients, 
a form of aid that used to be arranged for by transnational Islamic NGOs.17 
This loss was always attributed to the repressive measures taken by authori-
ties in the Gulf States or in Jordan itself, under pressure of the United States, 
against transnational Islamic aid in the wake of the terrorist attacks of the 
11th of September 2001.
Whether for internal or external reasons, the Jordanian state seems 
deliberately to create apprehension and anxiety among members and work-
ers of voluntary welfare associations as regards potentially “illegal political 
activity.” In the words of Wiktorowicz, this allows it to “control organizational 
space and prevent the emergence of an organized opposition through civil 
society.”18 The vagueness surrounding the definition of “political” or even 
“religious” objectives appears to keep voluntary associations in a perpetual 
state of uncertainty about what can or cannot be said or done within the 
framework of associational work. After all, as the president of the Jordanian 
Writers Union once remarked: “any cultural activity will one way or another 
include politics in it.”19
Relationship of Mistrust
The presence of restrictive legislation and government policies to 
monitor and politically control the voluntary welfare sector does not neces-
sarily mean that government institutions exercise full control of everything 
voluntary associations are actually doing. According to the Jordanian anthro-
pologist Muhammad Tarawneh, who is in close contact with (top) officials 
of the Ministry of Social Development, the prevailing climate between such 
NGOs and the state is often one of mistrust and mutual unease. He observes 
that the relationship between both sides is not yet institutionalized, because 
the high proliferation of such voluntary associations all over Jordan is still 
relatively recent. State officials often feel that they do not really have a grip 
on what is going on among these associations. To compensate for this impo-
tence, these officials may behave in ways that seem to NGO members as 
authoritarian, interfering and oppressive. Such behavior is certainly not con-
ducive to the latter’s own transparency toward the state authorities, which, 
in turn, reinforces the mistrust of state officials toward the former.20
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The Ministry of Social Development’s director of Supervision of the 
Voluntary Associations himself spoke to me about “associations abusing 
their activities for improper commercial, religious or political purposes.”21 
Scholars as well as civil society representatives speak about “hidden” agen-
das prevalent among many NGOs, which are often related to the instru-
mentalization of NGO work for the sake of the “private” interests of the NGO 
founders and members. This can be social prestige in the local community, 
the usage of income-generating projects for the sake of profit (which may 
be seen as an illegal entanglement between charitable purposes and com-
mercial interests),22 outright financial fraud and embezzlement, increasing 
one’s chances of getting elected as a candidate to municipality or parlia-
ment and patronizing power over one’s own local community, kin or tribe.23
Serving State Interests
State-imposed restrictions and tensions in State-NGO-relationships 
notwithstanding, the Jordanian state’s withdrawal from the domain of social 
welfare and employment provision, especially in the form of cutting subsi-
dies of essential food and fuel items and of shrinking employment oppor-
tunities in the public sector, has created space for citizens (usually of a well-
educated middle class background) to organize themselves into voluntary 
associations and to deliver services to their local communities, and in partic-
ular the needy there. By delivering these services, a measure of contributing 
to social cohesion and harmony, and prevention of social unrest, disintegra-
tion and crime is achieved by these associations. In this sense, the activities 
of these NGOs, along with the accompanying (religiously informed) social 
values correspond with the interests of the state. In concrete terms, they 
help to take away a significant part of the burden of social care and (indi-
rectly) contributing to public order and security from the state. Activities of 
economic, social and psychological empowerment on an individual level, 
especially in the case of women and children, also accord very well with 
development policies of the regime. The latter feels the need to modernize 
in the direction of a more individualized citizens’ society based more con-
cretely upon a competitive knowledge-based economy. State institutions 
on a governorate and district level are actively engaged in coordinating the 
delivery of social services with the NGO sector and try to steer the latter in 
the desired direction.24
m u s l I m  s o c I a l  a c t I v I s m  a s  a  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  c I v I l  s o c I e t y
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   407 05-02-2008   11:13:51
408
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
Serving Community Interests
This is only one side of the coin, however. The other side is that these 
associations are initiated, established and developed by citizens who want 
to promote their own interests, beliefs, norms and values. Putting the pater-
nalistic nature of decision making in many of such associations to one side, 
all their activities around the provision of services reinforce cooperative ties 
between citizens – members, employees, donors and even some clients of 
the association – of a reciprocal and relatively horizontal nature. One exam-
ple of this strengthening of ties is the festive, recreational and mutual sup-
port activities undertaken by the members of the Islamic Anwar Al-Huda 
Association with the women in the neighborhood who support it. Another 
one is the ways in which the ICCS keeps its relationship with its donors warm, 
by letting their children enroll in ICCS schools against reduced fees, letting 
their family members undergo relatively cheap treatment in the Islamic Hos-
pital or by giving them, males and females alike, jobs in its institutions.25 As 
has been stated in this chapter’s first section, the strengthening of such ties 
has empowering potential in terms of providing socio-economic opportuni-
ties as well as in a psychological sense.
Islamic beliefs and values, mostly related to conceptions of social har-
mony, well being and justice, happen to play a central role in the discourse 
taking place within these social networks. The underlying cause for this cen-
trality of religious discourse within Muslim Arab lifeworlds and civil societies 
can be attributed to the protective role of religion in situations character-
ized by chronic distress, deprivation and vulnerability. Such situations are 
often prevalent in authoritarian and socio-economically frustrated Arab and 
other Muslim societies. In these conditions, religion provides identity, a sys-
tem of justice, hope and communal solidarity as well as a sense of security.26 
In other words, it appears as the appropriate vehicle for psychological, social 
and possibly political empowerment. Members of Muslim voluntary welfare 
associations in Jordan, as well as Jordanian citizens in general, are often con-
vinced that ethics are greatly lacking in the state apparatus. State authori-
ties are often seen as inefficient, incompetent, motivated more to satisfy 
their superiors than to serve the public, self-serving, nepotistic and corrupt. 
In contrast, religiously inspired voluntary welfare associations describe 
their own approach to social services as fi sabil li-llah, and thus based upon 
selflessness, honesty and on discarding expectations of worldly gain. A dis-
course that is very appealing to wide sections of the Jordanian public.
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Religion and Politics Intertwined
In such a context, religion has a potentially subversive tendency, since 
it is one of the few outlets (if not the only one) through which protest against 
the existing societal order of things may be expressed, no matter how covert 
or indirectly this needs to be. Religion tends to get politicized, either in favor 
of, or in opposition to, the regime or state policy. Fear of opposition explains 
why Jordanian state authorities are so keen to control or even to prohibit the 
usage of religion by civil society institutions like voluntary welfare NGOs.
Observations of activities for orphans at an ICCS center like Al-‘Abura 
reveal that religiously inspired political protest does play a part in its educa-
tional activities. The message told to orphan boys in a language class about 
Muslims having to unite in order to defeat Zionism and US imperialism, a 
theatre play staged by orphan girls ridiculing Arab rulers who collaborate 
with the Americans and the Israelis and a song on ‘Id al-Fitr highlighting 
prevalent socio-economic inequality in the society are telling enough. Such 
political messages are transmitted there in an Islamist ideological frame-
work, although they are not unique to such a framework. Even the lessons 
given at the center as well as at other Islamist associations on how to be a 
good Muslim, in a ritual as well as a social sense, have political importance 
in terms of resistance against a secular, materialist and hedonist culture that 
is disseminated by Western-dominated globalization.
This could be ground for accusing such associations of ideological 
indoctrination, in particular those who work with children such as ICCS cent-
ers for orphans and the poor. And, due to the obvious vulnerability of their 
status, children and needy recipients of aid are in all likelihood more suscep-
tible than others to efforts of indoctrination. These efforts can only succeed, 
however, if the messages are connected to their personal selves as well as 
the collective lifeworld in which they live. Themes like resistance to Zionist 
occupation and colonization, US imperialism, state oppression, poverty and 
social inequality are by no means alien to the inhabitants of the Palestin-
ian refugee camp from which the orphan clients of Al-‘Abura Center come. 
The same goes for this kind of Islamic religious discourse. If these center’s 
workers use such familiar themes in order to indoctrinate their clients in a 
coherent and dogmatic religious ideology, they may be successful in this 
endeavor, especially given the fact that these workers often share in their 
beneficiaries’ experience as refugee camp dwellers. However, given the fact 
that the success of an indoctrination programme depends on the suscepti-
bility of its objects, the ability of the ICCS centres to shape the minds of their 
beneficiaries is not without its limits, especially when one remembers that 
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the first concern of needy people is socio-economic survival and not bulked 
up ideology.
This study provides indications that the public sympathy Islamists 
try to generate through social welfare activities, along with the religious 
and political discourse Islamist association members and workers try to 
disseminate in the local community, is most utilized during election time. 
This should not be surprising: in non-Islamist settings (tribal, rural as well as 
urban) election candidates also utilize their reputation and the social net-
works generated through activities of serving the local community as a way 
to garner votes and possibly other forms of political support.27
Local Political Sentiments in Muslim Voluntary Associations
It can be argued that the social and cultural activities of the associa-
tions dealt with in this study, such as those related to (Islamic) social eth-
ics, marriage, gender and family have a strong political dimension and are 
always part of some kind of politics. This could be the politics of Islamization 
as a defense against Westernization and globalization, of social develop-
ment and progress as opposed to “non-modern” or “oppressive” traditional 
local customs (a discourse which is often inspired by the politics of tran-
snational development agencies), or of both at the same time. Moreover, 
provision of services to underprivileged groups cannot be separated from 
the realm of socio-cultural values expressed in views on the individual, the 
family and the society that are part of certain (implicitly or explicitly held) 
political visions.
If such associations are close to the local community in which they are 
based and/or which they are serving, political sentiments prevalent there 
will affect, one way or another, activities and discussions of the voluntary 
associations’ members and workers. They may even be part of the reason 
for the associations’ original foundation. The treasurer of the Islamic Bani 
Hassan Association, for instance, gives a very political explanation for the 
establishment of this association. The original intention, he told me, was to 
establish a so-called rabitah, a lobby or interest group that would formally 
represent the whole Banni Hassan tribe. Fearful of the grassroots pressure 
such an association could mobilize, the state authorities, however, refused to 
accept this. In the final event, they settled for the establishment of a welfare 
association, which resorts under the supervision of the Ministry of Social 
Development. The associations’ main founder was Bassam Umush, a moder-
ate Islamist politician.28 It is obvious, then, that the association represents an 
overlap between tribal and Islamist sociopolitical spheres in Jordan.
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The Council of Islamic Organizations and Associations in Jordan, of 
which, amongst others, the Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa Association and the Islamic 
Welfare Association in Salt are members, regularly sends letters to govern-
ment figures raising various issues, ranging from protest against events 
related to “Zionism” and “imperialism” to corruption to religious social moral-
ity in order to urge these figures to take action upon them.29
Members of Palestinian-dominated Al-Faruq Society in Irbid complain 
about anti-Palestinian discrimination by government institutions affecting 
the socio-economic chances of their clients from Irbid refugee camp, and 
also affecting the Society’s general work. Officials at the Ministry of Social 
Development, usually of an East Bank tribal background, are often, in the 
view of its president, ignorant people expert only in creating obstacles. He 
had to face their distrust on several occasions. They questioned him, for 
instance, as to how and where he got a certain paper, and demanded all 
kinds of unnecessary proofs.30
To illustrate how interference by regime representatives in social 
aid may invoke oppositional thought and emotions among the members 
of a voluntary association, the following episode should prove informa-
tive. When I arrived one morning in the president’s office, there were two 
employees who were clearly upset also waiting there. The president had 
to receive some members of parliament, who had unexpectedly arrived in 
Irbid refugee camp with some donations for the Society’s families, including 
nineteen heating stoves for the winter. The Society’s staff saw this as a prob-
lem: to whom should they give these stoves when the Society had hundreds 
of families to support? The president was indignant later about this under-
taking of regime-loyal parliament members, reportedly filmed by the state 
media. He described it as a mere publicity show by the government, aiming 
to generate goodwill because politically important events were taking place 
– such as the parliament’s vote of confidence in the government and the 
launching of a Jordanian supported Middle East Peace Initiative in Geneva 
including representatives of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Zionist 
left. “Compared to the aid we distributed during Ramadan, this is nothing,” 
the president stated. “And anyhow,” he continued, “some days ago this same 
government announced an increase in the prices of fuel and electricity, from 
which the poor are suffering heavily!”31
This example shows how such associations, as citizen’s initiatives cre-
ating bonds of social solidarity in local communities, contribute indirect-
ly to a public sphere in which political opinions, ideas and emotions are 
exchanged. Jordan’s semi-authoritarian state, with its professional security 
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and intelligence apparatus, is obviously aware of this phenomenon and tries 
to contain it by prohibiting such associations from making explicit political 
statements in the public sphere. In this way, the state effectively frustrates 
them in terms of an essential function of civil society, of contributing to 
a lively and inclusive public sphere in which criticism and opposition can 
be voiced, even collectively organized from the bottom up. Voluntary wel-
fare associations suffer from this policy to a significantly greater extent than 
other civil society actors, like professional associations, trade unions or polit-
ical parties, even though the latter are facing state repression as well. This 
may be attributed to the state authorities’ fear of the mobilizing potential of 
middle class-based voluntary associations working for the most underprivi-
leged, deprived and disaffected sections of Jordanian society.
It may be one of the reasons for the weak role most of these associa-
tions play in the Jordanian public sphere, especially on the level of mass 
media, besides lack of financial resources or of connections with prominent 
people. Most (Muslim) voluntary welfare associations rely mainly on per-
sonal, face-to-face connections and social networks as far as activity in the 
public sphere is concerned. Besides, they may distribute some folders and 
brochures, visit schools and organize small-scale public events.32 Social ties 
along the lines of religion, political conviction, tribe, family or locality are 
important in such networks, even though not all of them are always deci-
sive.
Muslim Associations as Civil Society Players
Reasons to establish or join voluntary welfare associations can be 
multifarious, but it is obvious that they are often related to a certain reflex-
ive awareness regarding certain issues in modern society. Examples of such 
issues are (real or perceived) social problems: the growing gaps between 
rich and poor, threats of social disintegration, lack of opportunity to marry, 
lack of religious awareness, pollution, addiction, crime, domestic violence, 
(blood) feuds, illiteracy, and the denial of fair opportunity to groups like 
women, girls, school dropouts and/or the handicapped. This awareness and 
reflexivity is shaped by factors like local knowledge, personal experiences 
with political and socio-ecomic developments (for instance the arrival to 
Jordan of Palestinian refugees or urbanization), the relatively high levels of 
modern education members and workers of such associations have enjoyed, 
political involvement, contacts with other development actors (governmen-
tal or non-governmental, local or foreign) and, last but not least, discourses 
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and debates on social and developmental issues taking place in the public 
sphere, in particular the mass media.
What we see in Jordanian society in general and among the Muslim 
associations in particular is the centrality of religious faith in discourse on 
various social and developmental issues. This faith can be dealt with and 
interpreted in a dogmatic and exclusive fashion, as is the case with various 
Muslim-Brotherhood affiliated associations, or in line with global rights-ori-
ented development discourses, as takes place within the more progressive 
NGOs. What both approaches have in common, however, is that unlike in 
much of the premodern period, such issues are usually seen as problems 
of society and attributed to structural injustices and wrongs rather than as 
God-given facts. These injustices and wrongs are often attributed to the 
Western-dominated world system as well as to indigenous habits considered 
un-Islamic and oppressive. Islam serves then as a discourse of independent 
and authentic empowerment vis-à-vis these injustices and wrongs, and as a 
spiritual source providing norms and ideals for a better life and society.
Having said this, people rarely behave fully in accordance with the 
norms and ideals they profess, no matter if these are religious or secular 
in nature. Expressing an Islamic discourse of selflessness, compassion and 
solidarity can – to varying degrees – go hand-in-hand with self-interested, 
or even selfish behavior. Examples include the general manager of a pious 
Muslim association who expressed his eagerness to engage in financial 
speculation through a pyramid fund, or the way in which some heads of 
associations liked to promote their personal status and/or exaggerate their 
“good works.” Perhaps more importantly, observation of aid practices high-
lights the unequal dependency relationships that put NGO members in a 
position of power toward their recipients. The warm religious language of 
compassion and harmony often conceals the bitter and harsh aspects of 
such relations. Exercise of power may take the form of strict disciplining of 
clients waiting to receive aid, the rude manner of turning away clients who 
were considered ineligible and the paternalistic language used at an ICCS 
center to remind clients of their duty to attend educational programs “for 
their own good.”
Educative programs offered by Muslim voluntary welfare associations 
to especially needy and dependent beneficiaries may be considered a form 
of discursive patronage of the latter by the former, since the association’s 
members often presume to know what is “best” for their clients. Especially 
Islamist associations often work on the premise of the “only true religious” 
doctrine whose injunctions and stipulations are considered “best” for the 
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believers in general and for the beneficiaries in particular. Conveying such a 
doctrine can take the form of indoctrination, in the sense of imposing a cer-
tain world view on clients to the exclusion of other worldviews. As empha-
sized here, however, such indoctrination can only succeed if the message 
sufficiently accords with the life experiences of the recipients and if the lat-
ter have the feeling that they benefit from the education offered. Such edu-
cation may provide a sense of togetherness, dignity and moral purpose. Yet, 
it should be added that not only the needy but also many Jordanian Muslims 
of the middle class are inclined to voluntarily embrace an Islamist moralist 
discourse of piety and duty, as the attendance of workshops and lectures by 
Al-‘Afaf Society and of other associations also shows. Whether one should 
call this indoctrination depends on the degree of exclusivity of the discourse 
and the forcefulness with which it is conveyed.
Education offered by a more liberal NGO like Al-Faruq Society is based 
mainly on the UNICEF approach. This approach tries to empower clients to 
deal with their own problems and to improve their own living circumstances 
as empowerment-oriented goals in themselves. In the Society’s implemen-
tation of this approach, religious discourse plays a powerful role as well, 
since it is an integral part of the lifeworld of the beneficiaries. The stress of 
UNICEF on self-reliance and individual choice seems to be less paternalis-
tic and doctrinaire as compared to the Islamist approach. One should real-
ize, however, that a concept like indoctrination is a highly loaded term that 
is generally used in a subjective vein to label the educational activities of 
opponents.
Voluntary membership and reflexivity as a basis for civil society activ-
ism does not rule out patterns of hierarchy in voluntary associations’ prac-
tical functioning. Nor are Jordanian Muslim voluntary welfare associations 
insulated from the authoritarianism and patrimonialism of the regime that 
pervades Jordanian society, no matter how mild this might be in comparison 
to the situation in other Arab states. Indeed, such authoritarianism seems to 
be mirrored in the associations’ internal patterns of decision making, which 
is often highly concentrated in the hands of a dominant leading personal-
ity. In their relations toward the clientele, these associations often seem to 
reproduce the dependency relationship which is inherent to welfare states. 
Moreover, the Jordanian regime pushes voluntary welfare associations into 
the role of dutiful partners in a state-led effort of “national progress and mod-
ernization.” The associations’ practices of patronage as well as their patron-
izing socio-ethical discourse, in which an attitude of generosity, care and 
benevolence is expected from the stronger in their relationship towards the 
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weaker, seems to be reminiscent of the way in which the Jordanian monarch 
is presented by state-dominated media as a father figure, and the Jordanian 
queen and princesses as mother figures. Such figures are understood to be 
benevolent and considerate of Jordanian citizen’s wellbeing, progress and 
needs, but may also be seen to dominate them through this very attitude.
At the same time, such voluntary associations embody in their activi-
ties the social relationships, solidarities, socio-cultural and political values 
prevalent in their local communities as well as in the wider society. Through 
the social networks these associations are reinforcing, they help to maintain 
and strengthen socio-cultural spheres that are relatively autonomous from 
the state and through which more or less independent political opinions 
and messages are expressed. As such, they can contribute indirectly to a 
public opinion that the state authorities have, in one way or another, to take 
into account. These associations represent, therefore, a highly imperfect and 
frustrated, but nevertheless real, motivated and changing civil society.
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Though eventually leaving Egypt, he remained a member of The Muslim Brotherhood 
and, after settling in Jordan as an internist in 1963, he became one of the founders of 
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 32 Steve Feierman as quoted by Benthall in Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan eds., p. 21. 
 33 Benthall in Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan eds., p. 21. 
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 35 The yearly ICCS newsletter Risala al-Khair wal-‘Ata’ (The Message of Charity and 
Giving), as well as brochures from other Muslim NGOs, frequently touch on this 
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 40 Interview in Amman on 15 January 2002.
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 55 Interview in Amman on 20 February 2002. 
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 61 Interview with political scientist Abu Ruman of the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center 
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 62 Interview in Amman on 27 January 2002. 
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 66 Putnam, Bowling Alone. On these two different kinds of social capital, see Putnam’s 
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 67 Interview in Amman on 18 February 2002.
 68 Interviews with Mr. Khatoum, GUVS functionary at the main office of the union, on 10 
January 2002 in Amman and with Dr. Khalil Na‘imat, GUVS functionary and at the time 
of the interview adviser on voluntary welfare associations at the Ministry of Social 
Development on 8 June 2003. 
 69 Interview at the premises of GUVS in Amman on 30 July 2003. 
 70 Interview in Amman on 23 June 2003. 
 71 Interview in Amman on 21 June 2003. 
 72 Ibid. on 22 June 2003. 
 73 Interview in Amman on 22 July 2003. 
 74 Conversation in Amman on 22 May 2003. See also Shteiwi ed., p. 32. 
 75 Interview in Amman on 12 June 2003. 
 76 Interview in Amman on 25 June 2003. 
 77 Interview on 28 January 2002. 
 78 Interview on 22 December 2003. 
 79 Conversation on 12 December 2003. 
 80 Conversation on 8 January 2004. 
 81 Conversation on 13 January 2004. 
 82 Conversation on 8 January 2004. 
 83 Conversation on 13 January 2004. 
 84 Conversation on 13 January 2004.
 85 Conversation on 13 January 2004. 
 86 Joseph Al-Agha, Hizbullah’s Gradual Integration in the Lebanese Public Spere in 
Sharqiyyât, 13 (1): 2001: p. 51. 
 87 ICG, Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate 
Target?, ICG Middle East Report No. 13, Amman/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2 
April 2003, p. 15.
 88 ICG, p. 21. 
 89 ICCS president Kandil Shakir seems never to tire of emphasising that the social 
services of his Society “are not related to politics in any way.” In fact, he said exactly 
as much to me in a letter dated 17 September 2003. Editor-in-chief Atef Julani of the 
weekly Islamist magazine, Al-Sabeel, acknowledges that the Islamist NGOs services 
contribute to the popularity of the Islamist Movement, but also stresses that they 
should not be regarded as instruments to gain political support and power. During an 
interview on 30 June 2003, the magazine’s general manager (and prominent Muslim 
Brotherhood and IAF member) Abu Mahfuz expressed his sense of frustration to me 
through allegations that Islamist NGOs have become nothing more than political 
instruments: 
 — Really, I can’t lie as a Muslim. In the beginning, when the jam‘iyyat (associations) were 
still new, their activities might have contributed to much of the popularity of the 
Islamist movement, but now you see almost the opposite: a significant part of public 
opinion judges us on the basis of the performance of the jam‘iyyat. When something 
goes wrong there, we as Muslim Brothers get the blame. I am sometimes so fed up 
with this that I am almost inclined to see the jam‘iyyat as only a stumbling block to 
our cause. 
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 93 See page 194 and ns. 604-05 in the present work. 
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 37 Interview on 19 February 2003. 
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 14 Interview with the supervisor of the male Tarbawiyyah Department on 4 June 2003. 
 15 Interviews at the ICCS center in Al-Baqa‘a refugee camp on 31 August 2003, at the ICCS 
centers in Jabal al-Zuhur and in Al-Wihdat refugee-camp in Amman on 1 September 
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 59 Badraneh and Sarhan eds., Dalil Al-‘Afaf, pp. 43–44. 
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 61 Badraneh and Sarhan eds., Dalil Al-‘Afaf, pp. 55–56. 
 62 Interview on 27 May 2003. 
 63 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 74–75. 
 64 Muhammad Abu Hisan, Al-’Usrah baina al-Islam wal-Nizam al-Gharbi, Amman, Al-‘Afaf 
Welfare Society, 1993, p. 117. 
 65 Abu Hisan, pp. 115–116. 
 66 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 11–12. 
 67 Zaid Al-Kilani, pp. 15–19. 
 68 Haddad in Haddad and Esposito eds., pp. 21–22. 
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 69 Al-Fa‘uri, pp. 21- 22. 
 70 Al-Fau‘ri, pp. 33–34. 
 71 Interview on 15 December 2003. 
 72 Interview on 2 October 2003. 
 73 Interviews on 12 and 19 October 2003. 
 74 Meeting with the Associations’ members and workers on 6 October 2003. 
 75 Interview on 2 October 2003. 
 76 Various conversations with members of the Society. 
 77 Interview on 5 August 2005. 
 78 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 29–31. 
 79 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 40–60. 
 80 Badran and Sarhan eds., Dalil Al-‘Afaf, pp. 44–45. 
 81 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 42–44. 
 82 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 45–49 and 
pp. 50–52. 
 83 Such prohibitions are derived from conversations and interviews with members of this, 
as well as various other Islamist and conservative Muslim NGOs. 
 84 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, pp. 81–103. 
 85 Badran and Sarhan eds., Dalil Al- ‘Afaf, p. 15. 
 86 Badran and Sarhan eds., Dalil Al- ‘Afaf, pp. 17–19.
 87 Interview on 23 December 2003. 
 88 Interview on 23 December 2003, and interview with general manager on 27 May 2003. 
 89 Interview on 5 August 2003. 
 90 Victoria Macchi, “Over half of young women believe wife beating is justified – survey,” 
Jordan Times of 31 May 2006 (home news – digital version). 
 91 Interview on 27 May 2003 in Amman. 
 92 Al-Kilani, p. 65. 
 93 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Sakinah wal-Muwaddah wal-Rahmah, p. 62. 
 94 Interview in Amman on 19 February 2003. 
 95 Zaid Al-Kilani, pp. 58–60. 
 96 Interview on 23 December 2003. The general manager, Mufid Sarhan, also expressed 
the opinion that, for the well-being of a married couple, it is best for them to share a 
separate household from the wider family. 
 97 The proceedings of this seminar were published in the Society’s booklet Nahu ‘Alaqat 
’Usriyyah Rashidah, al-‘Alaqah ma’ al-Hamah, edited by Faruq Badran and Mufid 
Sarhan, Amman, 2000. 
 98 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Talaq, Ab‘adihi al-Shari‘iyyah wal-Ijtima‘iyyah, Amman, 
Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society, 2001, pp. 69–70. 
 99 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Talaq, Ab‘adihi al-Shari‘iyyah wal-Ijtima‘iyyah, pp. 83–86. 
 100 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Talaq, Ab‘adihi al-Shari‘iyyah wal-Ijtima‘iyyah, pp. 75–82. 
 101 Badran and Sarhan eds., Al-Talaq, Ab‘adihi al-Shari‘iyyah wal-Ijtima‘iyyah, pp. 86–89. 
 102 Conversation on 23 December 2003 in Amman. 
 103 Conversations on 23 September 2003 in Sal and 23 December in Amman. 
 104 Al-Fa‘uri, An Overview of Women’s Human Rights in Shari‘ah Stipulations and CEDAW 
Articles, Amman, UNIFEM WARO, unpublished at the time of fieldwork, p. 36. 
 105 Interview with general manager on 27 May 2003 and with women workers on 23 
December 2003. 
 106 Interview on 15 January 2002.
 107 Conversation in Salt on 16 December 2003. 
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 108 Lisa Taraki, Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women: Between Discourse and 
Practice, Middle Eastern Studies, 32 (1): 1996: pp. 153–154. 
 109 Conversation on 28 October 2003 in Salt. 
 110 Al-Fa‘uri, Al-Nahu al-Ijtima‘i min Manzur Islami, p. 24. 
 111 Al-Fa‘uri, Al-Nahu al-Ijtima‘i min Manzur Islami, pp. 23–24. 
 112 Al-Fa‘uri, Al-Nahu al-Ijtima‘i min Manzur Islami, p. 25.
 113 On latent gender-based tensions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, see Roald, 
pp. 150–156; and Boulby, pp. 110–113. 
 114 Interview in Madaba on 15 December 2003. 
 115 Telephone Interview on 7 January 2004, conversation during the Conference on Islam 
and Democracy in Amman on 20 January 2004 and the 1998 annual report of the 
Al-‘Aqsa Welfare Association, Taqrir ‘am ‘an Nashatat Jam‘iyyat Al-’Aqsa al-Khairiyyah/
Madaba, Ta’asasat bi-Tarikh, 29/5/1991, pp. 1–3. 
 116 Conversation on 20 January 2004. 
 117 Barakat, p. 102. 
 118 “The Role of Women by Ikhwan,” http://www.jannah.org/sisters/ikhwom.html, p. 5. 
 119 Brand, Women, the State and Political Liberalization, p. 173. 
 120 As Dale F. Eickelman points out, inequalities of control over persons and resources 
within lineage groups of Egyptian Bedouin tribes are often morally justified in terms 
of “protection and dependency.” The same happens in the gender discourse of Muslim 
associations. See Eickelman, pp. 251–252.
Notes Conclusions
 1 See, for instance, Hammad, Jordanian Women’s Organisations and Sustainable 
Development, p. 58, and Hammad, Islamists and Charitable Work in Jordan in Al-Urdun 
Al-Jadid Research Center’s publication Islamic Movements in Jordan, p. 170; and 
Hermann, pp. 106–107. My own field experiences confirm their observations of 
a high concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the Association’s 
head. Despite the formal presence of democratic structures, the head’s role is as 
gatekeeper, entirely responsible for contacts with outsiders and there is next to no 
delegation of responsibility that does not pass through him. 
 2 See for instance Antoun, Civil Society, Tribal Process and Change in Jordan, 
pp. 458–459; Hammad, Jordanian Women’s Organisations and Sustainable 
Development, p. 86; and Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center and Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Directory of Civil Society Organizations in Jordan, p. 29. The last authority 
concludes that voluntary associations with a tribal character in Jordan “have risen as 
an extension of the clan or headship of the traditional village.”
 3 The Islamic Bani Hassan Society in Zarqa, for instance, is largely made up of educated 
and relatively young members of their tribe who share a common concern with 
socio-economic, environmental as well as ethical problems in their community, and 
a desire to do something about them. On the basis of their understanding of Islam, 
they are critical of modern secular culture as well as of certain traditional habits, as 
pointed out in Chapter 13. The same goes for most of the other associations with a 
tribal or religious basis that I visited. 
 4 Clark, pp. 106–107 and pp. 131–142.
 5 Visit to this center on 16 June 2003. 
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 6 Interview on 2 August 2003. 
 7 In this regard, one could point to various movements: Social Democracy, Communism, 
Fascism and Nazism, as well as various forms of church-based activism. Indeed, in its 
struggle against Communist hegemony in the country, perhaps the Polish Solidarity 
Movement of the 1980s (with a strong base of support in the Polish Roman Catholic 
Church) is perhaps the most remarkable example of all. 
 8 See also Hermann, pp. 110–111. 
 9 Arab Human Development Report 2002, p. 11. 
 10 Nancy T. Ammerman, “The Challenge of Fundamentalism as a Public Phenomenon: 
Definitions and Issues,” an unpublished keynote address presented at the conference 
Fundamentalism and Ethics in Huissen, The Netherlands, on 28 August 2006. 
 11 Lisa Taraki, Islam is the Solution, British Journal of Sociology, 46 (4): 1995: pp. 643-661; 
and Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women, Middle Eastern Studies, 32 (1): 
1996: pp. 140-158. 
 12 To repeat: I distinguish Islamist NGOs from others on the basis of the (non-) existence 
of links with political Islam. 
 13 A view that is also central to the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, see Mahmood. 
 14 This research was carried out by Marie Juul Petersen in the spring of 2007. 
 15 Karen Armstrong, De Strijd om God, Een Geschiedenis van het Fundamentalisme, original 
title: The Battle for God, translated into Dutch by Carola Kloos, Albert Witteveen and 
Shirah Lachmann, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 2001, pp. 8–9. 
 16 When raised with the treasurer of the Islamic Bani Hassan Welfare Association the 
issue of religious education, the latter responded: “this is, as a matter of fact, a 
transgression of the law.” He then showed me the Association’s form of registration 
with the Ministry of Social Development. It includes the stipulation that “no activities 
with a political, tribal or sectarian purpose” are permitted. “In terms of religion, we are 
seriously constrained in our acticities by the state,” he further remarked. 
 17 Examples are the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization, the United 
Arab Emirates-based Human Appeal International and the Sudan-based Islamic Relief 
Agency. 
 18 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, p. 29. 
 19 Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, p. 32. 
 20 Interview on 15 January 2004. 
 21 Interview on 19 February 2002. 
 22 In Chapter 10, I described how the later founders of the Khawla’ Bint Al-Azwar 
Association broke away from the Islamic Bir Al-Sab‘a Association due to 
disagreements about how to use the revenues of an income-generating project. 
 23 Interviews and conversations with representatives of the Islamic Welfare Society in 
Salt, the Al-Faruq Welfare Society for Orphans in Irbid and the Islamic Bani Hassan 
Welfare Association in Zarqa , in addition to interviews with Ghada Abu Dur, Program 
Coordinator of Questscope in Amman, that took place on 30 September and 15 
October 2003 in Amman. 
 24 As noted in interviews at the Al-’Ihsan Welfare Association and the Al-Faruq Society and 
with officials of the Ministry of Social Development. Clark also pays attention to this 
pattern in Islam, Charity and Activism, p. 110.
 25 This is what the ex-head of the ICCS diwan in Zarqa and treasurer of the Islamic Bani 
Hassan Association told me on 23 July 2003. 
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 26 As mentioned by Rami G. Khouri, columnist of the Lebanese Daily Star newspaper, in 
his article “Muslim faith and Muslim anger,” Jordan Times of 22-23 September 2006, 
Opinion Section (Digital Edition). 
 
 27 As various Jordanian experts and civil society activists often told me. 
 28 Interview on 23 July 2003. 
 29 Council of Islamic Organizations and Societies in Jordan, Al-Taqrir al-Idari li-Majlis 
al-Munazamat wal-Jam‘iyyat al-Islamiyyah fil-Urdun, administrative report of this 
council, pp. 6–12. 
 30 Conversations on 8 and 13 January 2004. 
 31 Conversations on 1 and 4 December 2003. 
 32 Hermann, p. 109.
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 List of Abbreviations 
AWF Arab Women’s Federation
FTUJ Federation of Trade Unions in Jordan
GFJW General Federation of Jordanian Women
GUVS General Union of Voluntary Societies
IAF Islamic Action Front Party
ICCS Islamic Center Charity Society
ICG International Crisis Group 
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISI Islamic Social Institution
JOHUD Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development
JWU Jordanian Women’s Union
NCC National Consultative Council
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSP National Socialist Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 
TNC Trans-Jordanian National Congress
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Work Agency 
for Palestine Refugees
WEF World Economic Forum
WFJ Women’s Federation of Jordan
YWMA Young Women’s Muslim Association
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 Glossary of Arabic Words 
Adab Good manners or refined and civilized behavior.
‘Adat Habits or traditional customs.
‘Afaf Chastity, virtue, purity.
Ahadit Plural of hadith (English plural, hadiths, often used 
in text).
Ajr The divine reward one receives in the afterlife after 
having lived a virtuous and pious life on earth.
Akhlaq Morals or ethics.
Al-Amr bil-ma‘ruf  
wal-nahy ‘an al-munkar To ordain the good and to prohibit the evil. (General 
Islamic guideline for proper Muslim behavior and 
action in all aspects of life).
‘Alim Islamic religious scholar. Plural: ‘ulama’.
Al-Nahda Awakening, rebirth or renaissance. It is also the 
name of the main Tunisian Islamist party led by Abd 
al-Rashid al-Ghanuchi.
Al-Takfir wal-Hijrah “Excommunication and Emigration.” This is the name 
of an extremist Islamist group established in Egypt. 
The group condemned those deviating from its 
views as infidels (“excommunication”); it withdrew 
itself from Egyptian society (“emigration”) because 
it considered it un-Islamic, and therefore open to 
attack.Though the group has ceased to exist in a 
concrete, political sense, takfiri ideology continues 
in certain circles. It is renounced by most Muslims.
Amanah Faithfulness or reliability.
‘Aqidah Religious doctrine of Islam.
Awqaf  Plural of waqf.
Ayah Qur’anic verse. Plural: ayat.
Bani Adam “Children of Adam,” i.e. humankind.
Da‘wah The call or invitation to Islam. In terms of action, it is 
comparable to the Christian concept of mission.
Dhikr The practice of repeatedly remembering God 
in order to cultivate one’s piety, for instance by 
uttering his name continuously, praising him 
frequently on a daily basis or, as some Sufi orders 
are practicing, by performing certain ritual dances.
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Diyah Money which the family of a perpetrator of 
bloodshed, murder or manslaughter pays to the 
family of the victim in order to avoid prolonged 
(bloody) conflict. Islamic concept and practice.
Dunyah World.
Emir Prince (Arabic: Amir)
Fatwah Religious edict or legal opinion issued by a mufti on 
any possible matter in life.
Fitnah Chaos, strife and anarchy.
Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence
Fi sabil li-llah (Acting) For the sake of God.
Fuqaha’: Islamic jurists.
Gharar Any element of uncertainty in a contract, which is 
forbidden by the Shari‘ah.
Hadith The reports on the sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Plural: Ahadith/hadiths.
Halal Anything that is religiously approved in Islam.
Haram Anything that is religiously forbidden in Islam.
Hijab Islamic headscarf.
Hizb al-Tahrir Liberation Party. Islamist party calling for the 
overthrow of all existing regimes in the (Muslim) 
world so as to replace them with a final Islamic 
Caliphate.
Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami Islamic Center Party. Moderate Islamist party. 
Originally tablished in Egypt in 1994. Later, in 2001, 
a similar party with the same name was established 
in Jordan.
Hudud Punishments stipulated in the Qur’an for a number 
of crimes. These crimes are llicit sex engaged in by 
unmarried persons (lashing), adultery by married 
persons (stoning to death), drinking wine (lashing), 
theft (amputation of hand or foot), robbery with 
murder (execution) and falsely accusing someone 
of illicit sex or adultery (lashing). While these 
penalties are severe, rules of evidence are also strict 
and repentance by those convicted can lead to 
commutation of the penalty.
‘Ibadat One’s obligations toward God as a Muslim. 
Traditionally conceived of mainly in terms of ritual 
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behavior. Many Islamists, however, insist that 
social behavior in accordance with the Shari‘ah is 
equally an obligation toward God and that no real 
distinction exists, therefore, between ‘ibadat and 
mu‘amalat.
‘Id Feast or celebration.
‘Id al-adha The Islamic feast of sacrifice, commemorating the 
near-sacrifice of Isma’il by his father, the prophet 
Ibrahim (Abraham), as a symbol of dedication to 
God’s will.
‘Id al-fitr The feast that concludes the holy month of 
Ramadan.
Iftar The fast-breaking meal that is consumed during 
Ramadan, often immediately after sunset.
Ihsan Charity and goodwill (religious concept).
Ijma‘ Consensus or unanimous decision. One of the bases 
of Islamic jurisprudence, besides the Qur’an, the 
Hadith and analogous reasoning.
Ijtihad Independent religious reasoning or (re-)
interpretation.
Iqra’ Read! or Recite! The command given by the angel 
Jibril to the Prophet during the first Revelation. 
Most of the chapters in the Qur’an begin with this 
exclamation.
Islah Reform
Ithar Islamic religious concept denoting mutual love, 
affection, sharing and sacrifice. 
Jahili Ignorant (adjective) or an ignorant person. In 
Islamic discourse, it is often used to signify 
any attitude or behavior that is considered as 
un-Islamic, or as remnants of the habits of pre-
Islamic times.
Jahilin The ignorant. Islamic reference to the Arabs living 
in the time before the vent of Islam. At present it is 
also often used to label all people of the past, the 
present or the future who are seen as unaware of 
(the proper meaning of ) Islamic injunctions and 
values in their daily lives.
Jahl Ignorance.
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Jihad Holy struggle for the sake of God. This implies 
military fight against those considered as enemies 
of Islam as well as a spiritual battle against any 
human disposition or tendency considered as 
running counter to the will of God. 
Jizyah Poll tax which Christian and Jewish subjects of 
the pre-modern Muslim empires had to pay their 
to Muslim rulers for their protection, security and 
rights as a religious community. Muslims justified 
this special tax by the fact that Christians and 
Jews, unlike Muslims, were exempted from military 
service and didn’t have to pay the Zakah.
Kafir Infidel or non-believer.
Kaid Deception or misleading behavior.
Karamah Dignity.
Khula‘ Divorce initiated by a woman without resorting to a 
verdict of the qadi, in return for forfeiting her rights 
to alimony and any other form of support from her 
(ex-)husband. It is derived from the Hadith and has 
been made legal in a number of Arab countries, 
including Jordan, because possibilities to obtain 
the talaq through a Shari‘ah court are much more 
limited for women then for men. Khula‘ laws are 
heavily criticized by Islamists and conservatives, 
however, who fear the consequences of the 
widened possibilities for women to divorce their 
husbands.
Khutbbah Sermon in a mosque.
Kuffar Plural of kafir.
Kufr Unbelief.
Mahabbah Love, affection.
Mahr Dowry which the bridegroom pays to the bride in 
the form of money, gold or jewelry.
Majlis al-Shurah Consultative Council. The elected bodies of Islamist 
institutions like The Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Islamic Action Front Party are named as such.
Mandub Delegate. In the context of Jordanian voluntary 
welfare associations, the mandub is a go-between 
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between the association and (prospective) clients 
since he or she is familiar with both. Plural: manadib
Maslahah General interest or common good. Islamic legal 
concept.
Mu’adhdhin The announcer of prayer on the minaret of a 
Mosque.
Mu‘amalat The realm of social dealings or relations. In 
partnership with the ‘ibadat, this is the central 
domain of fiqh. 
Mufti Islamic religious expert with the authority of issuing 
legal opinions (fatawa)
Mujahidin Jihad fighters.
Mujtama‘ ahli Peoples’ society. The term denotes the realm of 
popular (i.e. non-state) civic institutions that used to 
organize social life in pre-modern Muslim societies.
Mujtama‘ madani (Modern) civil society.
Mukhabarat Intelligence agency or secret police.
Mukhtar Chief of an Arab village or neighborhood.
Nifaq: Hypocrisy or paying lip service (religious term).
Niqab Face veil that is often worn by very orthodox female 
Muslims.
Niyyah Intention (religious term).
Qadi Islamic judge.
Qur’an The holy book of the Islamic faith.
Rahmah Womb, but also “compassion.”
Ramadan The Islamic holy month of fasting.
Riba’ Charging interest, or usury.
Riddah Apostasy. The Riddah wars were fought shortly 
after the Prophet Muhammad’s death by the early 
Muslim community, under the leadership of caliph 
Abu Bakr, against newly converted tribes who 
defied his authority. It has often been assumed that  
these tribes were about to leave the Islamic faith, 
even though several other factors may have played 
a role in their opposition to Abu Bakr.
Ruq‘ah The most prevalent form of Arabic handwriting.
Sabr Patience, fortitude or perseverance in the face of 
adversity. In the field of social relations, it has also 
connotations of tolerance and kindness.
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Sadaqah Voluntary and informal forms of aid to anyone 
in need. It is an Islamic concept and practice but 
unlike the zakah, there are no stipulations in terms 
of form or amount. Nonetheless, many Muslims 
consider it a general moral duty for every believer.
Salah Prayer, which every Muslim is supposed to perform 
at least five times a day.
Shari‘ah Literally: path. Islamic law, which is based on the 
values, morals and injunctions derived from the 
Qur’an and the Hadith. It includes many guidelines 
for one’s daily behavior as a Muslim besides 
legislation pertaining to society as a whole.
Sharif A descendent of the prophet Muhammad.
Shaikh A wise (and often elderly) person. The concept 
refers in particular to tribal chiefs and to 
authoritative religious experts.
Shurah Consultation in decision-making.
Sidq Honesty or truthfulness.
Sulha Reconciliation, conflict resolution or peace-making.
Sunnah Tradition; in particular the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad and the first generation of Muslims. 
This is in Sunni Islam considered as the authoritative 
model of behavior for all Muslims.
Surah A chapter of the Qur’an.
Tabi‘un Followers. In Islamic theological terms: the 
generation of Muslims after the prophet 
Muhammad and his companions.
Taharah Ritual purity, hygiene, cleanliness as well as (moral) 
purity.
Takaful (Mutual) social care and solidarity.
Talaq Divorce obtained at an Islamic court through a 
verdict of the qadi.
Taqwah An attitude of fear of God, or piety.
Tarbawi Educational.
Tarbiyyah Education or training.
Tasamuh Tolerance or forgiveness.
Tawhid The absolute oneness of God.
Turath (Ancestral) heritage.
‘Ulama’ Plural of ‘alim.
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Umma Community of believers (Islamic term). Alternate 
meaning “nation.”
Usrah Family. In The Muslim Brotherhood, members 
are called upon to consider themselves and their 
fellow members as a family. The basic unit of the 
organization, consisting of a small number of 
members, is therefore called ’usrah.
Wa‘izzah A female religious teacher in a mosque.
Waqf Income or property dedicated by the owner to 
religiously and socially beneficial undertakings (for 
instance mosques, charity for the needy, hospitals 
or education). Plural: Awqaf.
Wastah Practices of favoritism or nepotism.
Zakah Wealth tax stipulated by the Qur’an. Any Muslim 
with property has to pay it for the benefit of the 
poor, the needy, the administrators of this tax, 
recent converts, manumitted slaves, debtors, the 
fighters of the jihad and the wayfarers.
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 English Summary 
In this dissertation, the religious discourse and the social work prac-
tices of Muslim voluntary welfare associations in Jordan are analyzed on the 
basis of civil society theory. It begins, therefore, with a close look at the civil 
society concept and the ways in which this relates to Islam, Islamist move-
ments and Islamist NGOs.
Civil society is understood here as the realm wherein citizens associ-
ate together on a voluntary basis in order to serve their common interests, 
ethical values, ideals and opinions, whatever these may be. Some academics, 
such as Ahmed Mousalli, Giles Kepel, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, John L. Esposito 
and Sami Zubaida, recognize the possibility of Islamically-inspired civil soci-
ety forces. Others believe that Islam and civil society are forces incompatible 
with each other; or, the opposite assumption, that only Islam can be the basis 
of an authentic civil society in the Arab World. In general, this work identifies 
with the views of the first group of scholars (i.e. Mousalli, et al). The historical 
trajectory of civil society in the Arab Muslim world significantly differs, how-
ever, from the one in the West. Several civil society forces in the powerful 
and wealthy Western world have criticized or attacked aspects of traditional 
life, including marriage, family and religion itself. Civil society forces in the 
Arab Muslim world, however, developed in the context of the need to react 
to Western political, economic as well as cultural hegemony. This defensive 
attitude gave rise to the increasing preponderance of relatively dogmatic 
and fundamentalist Islamic currents, such as The Muslim Brotherhood, in 
Muslim/Arab civil society.
One important way in which such currents have influenced civil 
society is through the establishment of voluntary welfare associations. A 
scholar like Sami Zubaida stresses that voluntary associations established by 
Islamists are engaged in efforts of religious and moral colonization of their 
beneficiaries. Janine A. Clark and Asef Bayat, on the other hand, emphasize 
the nature of Islamic NGOs as middle-class based institutions that mainly 
strengthen middle-class based social ties. While both approaches reveal part 
of the truth, it must also be said that the actual nature of these associations 
is heavily affected by repressive state legislation and policy. This limits them 
in their attempts to politically mobilize needy beneficiaries and prevents 
them from playing an oppositional role in the public sphere. Nevertheless, 
these associations succeed in giving expression to a set of socio-cultural 
values, derived from Islamic sources, so as to offer an alternative to the coun-
try’s prevalent political, economic and socio-cultural state of affairs.
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To put the religious discourse and social work practices of these asso-
ciations into a wider perspective, the nature of relations between state and 
society in Jordan and efforts by the regime to patronize and control the Jor-
danian people is dealt with in this dissertation’s second part. To the present 
day, the Hashemite dynasty plays the role of final arbiter between Jordan’s 
state and society by implementing a framework of authoritarian pluralism. 
This role is upheld through an ideologically flexible and pluralist discourse 
embracing Islam, secularism, tribal heritage, modernizing progress, democ-
racy, civil society, as well as unquestionable loyalty to the Hashemite patri-
mony. Actual practices of cooptation have resulted in the domination of the 
state apparatus by Jordan’s indigenous tribes, and in a preponderance of 
Palestinians dominating the country’s professional and educational spheres. 
Moreover, state policies protect ethnic and religious minorities as well as 
political and cultural Islam. While institutions of parliamentary democracy 
and a measure of democratic rights and freedoms exist in the Kingdom, 
they are limited by repressive legislation and state policies. As a result, the 
regime continues to maintain its hegemony over Jordanian society by skill-
fully employing policies of cooptation and repression.
On the one hand, these policies allow the existence of civil society 
forces like political parties, professional associations, employers’ organiza-
tions, trade unions and the Islamist movement, to channel oppositional sen-
timents in ways that are often acceptable to the regime itself. On the other 
hand, the regime will never let skip the political reins and, therefore, consist-
ently makes efforts to contain the influence of opposition forces. Since the 
1980s, such forces have been dominated by Islamist movements; and the 
state takes repressive measures against these movements when it deems 
such measures necessary.
From the establishment of the Hashemite polity in the beginning of 
the 20th century, non-governmental organizations trying to serve and pro-
mote societal interests outside of the realms of state and economy have 
been steadily growing in number and importance. Some of these asso-
ciations focus on charity and/or social development. Others are advocacy 
groupings that aim to influence legislation and policy in areas like human 
rights, gender equality, the environment or democracy. The focus of this 
dissertation is on the former category of associations. In particular, it analy-
ses the way in which religious faith and discourse affect their social work 
approach. Therefore, its third part takes a closer look at this discourse, in 
terms of motivations and ideals among Muslim NGOs.
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These motivations and ideals are rooted in an age-old religious social 
tradition in which the institutions of zakah (weath-tax aimed at support-
ing the needy), sadaqah (voluntary social aid) and the notion that serving 
the needy is serving God are central elements. The idea that helping the 
poor must be done for the sake of God rather than for one’s self-interest is 
dominant in the motivational discourse of Islamist NGOs. This Islamic value-
rational discourse may also go hand in hand with affective motivations of 
compassion toward the poor. It is also tied to visions of a moral and just 
Islamic society based on the “right” moral attitude of all of its members. As 
local critics point out, the aid given by these NGOs does contribute to the 
Islamist movement’s political and social influence. They could not have been 
so successful in this regard, however, had their members and workers not 
been driven by genuinely social as well as religious motives.
There are also Muslim NGOs with a very similar religious approach to 
those affiliated with The Muslim Brotherhood, but who do not have clear ties 
with this, or any other political movement. Then there are more progressive 
NGOs whose main aim is the economic, social and psychological empower-
ment of the needy and who cooperate with non-Islamic, including Western, 
development actors. They promote generally modernist and liberal inter-
pretations of the Islamic message rather than the fundamentalist defence 
against the perceived onslaught of (Western-originated) materialism and 
immorality often so prevalent in the discourse of Islamist and conservative 
Muslim NGOs.
The aim of the dissertation’s fourth part is to establish the relation-
ship between the Muslim associations’ religious discourse and the socio-
economic aid they provide. Islamist and non-Islamist NGOs engage in very 
much the same kind of provision of financial and in-kind aid. In the case of 
the Muslim-Brotherhood based Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS), how-
ever, the aid-relationship is also used to pressure their clients from single-
single parent “orphan” families (lacking regular breadwinners) to participate 
in educational programs that are strongly colored by an Islamist religious 
ideology. Muslim associations also engage in employment-oriented activi-
ties for their clients in the field of vocational training, finding jobs and 
income-generating projects.
In the fifth part, the dissertation deals with these NGOs’ educational 
and cultural activities and the role Islamic discourse plays in them. In the 
case of Islamist and conservative Muslim NGOs, this discourse is focused 
on enhancing levels of piety. Conformity to norms of pious behavior, in a 
ritual as well as a social sense, is regarded as not only the path to salva-
e n g l I s h  s u m m a r y
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tion in the next life, but also as the proper way towards the realization of 
social harmony and family contentment in the present one. In Islamist ide-
ology, the social integrity of Muslim society must be defended against the 
onslaught of Western-dominated globalization, materialism, consumerism 
and hedonism. A more progressive Muslim NGO, such as Al-Faruq Society, 
however, is inspired by UNICEF. Thus, it emphasizes the importance of devel-
oping one’s individual personality and the creativity of one’s children, rather 
than conformity to strictly conceived religious norms. The Islamic message 
is interpreted by Al-Faruq Society in accordance with modern rights princi-
ples. However, even some ICCS centers have modernized, or are modern-
izing their educational approach along these lines.
In their educational and cultural activities, Muslim NGOs express criti-
cism (usually in the name of Islam) of the impacts of Western-dominated 
globalizing culture in their society. They are also critical of some traditional 
habits which they perceive as hindrances to the development of Muslim 
society in modern times. Both forms of criticism come clearly to the fore in 
their discourse on gender relations. The Islamist Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society tries 
to promote its vision of a better Islamic society, characterized by chastity, 
modesty and justice, by organizing annual mass weddings untarnished by 
the customary traditional displays of luxury and ostentation. In the eyes of 
its members, materialism, consumerism and even deliberate Western plots 
undermine the Muslim family as the basis of Islamic society. Al-‘Afaf Welfare 
Society also promotes its vision of the harmonious Islamic marriage and fam-
ily through the organizing of lectures, workshops and courses. Especially the 
women who are active in this (as well as in other voluntary welfare associa-
tions) emphasize the un-Islamic nature of traditional habits discriminating 
against women in their educational and social opportunities. Other tradi-
tional habits condemned by Muslim NGOs in the name of Islam are tribal 
feuds, social isolation of the disabled and festive firing.
The findings presented in this dissertation affirm the middle class 
nature of Islamist NGOs, but acknowledge at the same time their efforts to 
educate their needy beneficiaries toward greater levels of piety and to work 
at their moral reform in a paternalistic fashion. In many cases, Islamist NGO 
workers live in the same neighborhood as their clients, are personally famil-
iar with their plight and have ethnic, even family ties with them. This enables 
them to exercise moral patronage over them with greater effectiveness.
The dissertation concludes that the Jordanian regime forces volun-
tary welfare associations into the role of dutiful partners in a regime-steered 
effort to ensure socio-political stability and peace. In this process, the associ-
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ations themselves enjoy a stake in cooperating with the state for the sake of 
their own service-delivery objectives. Regime authoritarianism and patron-
age seems to be mirrored in the associations’ internal patterns of decision 
making and in their relations toward the clientele. Apparently, it is also mir-
rored in the socio-ethical discourse of many Muslim associations, where an 
attitude of obedience and loyalty is expected from the “weaker,” such as the 
poor, women and children, and one of generosity, care and benevolence is 
expected from the stronger and wealthier individuals in society. Ironically, 
such an exchange is reminiscent of the way in which the Jordanian monarch 
is presented by the state-dominated media as a considerate father figure; 
while the Jordanian queen and princesses, concerned with the citizen’s well-
being, progress and needs, occupy the role of a kind and loving mother. The 
same kindness-centred discourse, of course, may also be said to dominate 
the citizens of the country.
This is not to say that, within these associations, things remain entire-
ly static. To varying degrees, the forces of modernization and change (to 
some degree promoted by the monarchy itself ) have at times profoundly 
affected these Muslim associations’ attitudes towards gender, family, edu-
cation and traditional habits. Moreover, it is possible that the potential for 
political opposition and protest might now be building beneath the docile 
surfaces of these associations. As this dissertation illustrates, the same asso-
ciations represent, therefore, a highly imperfect and frustrated, but never-
theless real, motivated and changing civil society.
e n g l I s h  s u m m a r y
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 Nederlandse samenvatting 
Deze dissertatie analyseert het religieuze discours en de sociale zorg 
van particuliere moslimwelzijnsorganisaties in Jordanië op basis van the-
orieën over het maatschappelijk middenveld. Ze begint daarom met een 
nadere beschouwing van dat begrip en de wijze waarop het zich verhoudt 
tot de islam, het islamisme en islamistische NGO’s.
Sommige wetenschappers, zoals Ahmed Mousalli, Giles Kepel, Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim, John L. Esposito en Sami Zubaida, erkennen de mogelijk-
heid van het bestaan van islamitische krachten binnen het maatschappelijk 
middenveld. Anderen gaan ervan uit dat de islam en het maatschappelijk 
middenveld onverenigbaar zijn of juist dat alleen de islam de basis kan zijn 
van een authentiek maatschappelijk middenveld in de Arabische wereld. 
Dit werk identificeert zich het meest met de gezichtspunten van bovenge-
noemde auteurs. De historische ontwikkeling van het maatschappelijk mid-
denveld in de Arabische en moslimwereld verschilt echter wezenlijk van die 
van het westen. Diverse krachten van het maatschappelijk middenveld in de 
machtige en welvarende westerse wereld hebben de vrijheid genomen om 
elk aspect van het traditonele bestaan, waaronder het huwelijk, het gezin 
en de religie als zodanig, ter discussie te stellen. Krachten binnen het maat-
schappelijk middenveld in de Arabische wereld echter ontwikkelden zich in 
de context van de noodzaak om een antwoord te formuleren op de westerse 
politieke, economische en ook culturele hegemonie. Deze defensieve hou-
ding gaf aanleiding tot het toenemende gewicht van relatief dogmatische 
en fundamentalistische islamitische stromingen, zoals de Moslimbroeder-
schap, in het Arabisch maatschappelijk middenveld.
Een van de wijzen waarop islamisten hun aanwezigheid in dat maat-
schappelijk middenveld hebben versterkt, is door het oprichten van particu-
liere welzijns-NGO’s. Een wetenschapper als Zubaida benadrukt dat particu-
liere verenigingen die door islamisten zijn opgericht zich inspannen om hun 
begunstigden religieus en moreel te koloniseren. Aan de andere kant bena-
drukken Janine A. Clark en Asef Bayat het karakter van islamitische NGO’s als 
instellingen die hun basis hebben in de middenklasse en die vooral de soci-
ale banden binnen die klasse versterken. Beide benaderingen werpen licht 
op een deel van de waarheid, maar het daadwerkelijke functioneren van 
islamistische NGO’s kan ook niet los worden gezien van repressieve over-
heidswetgeving en beleid. Deze repressie beperkt de mogelijkheden van 
deze NGO’s om hun behoeftige cliënten politiek te mobiliseren in ernstige 
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mate en belet hen om een openlijke rol te spelen van politieke oppositie en 
protest in de openbare sfeer. Daarom geven ze vooral uiting aan sociaal-
culturele waarden, ontleend aan de islamitische bronnen, als een alternatief 
voor de gevestige politieke, econonomische en sociaal-culturele orde.
Om het werk van islamistische en andere moslim-NGO’s in een breder 
perspectief te plaatsen, behandelt het tweede deel van de dissertatie de 
aard van de relaties tussen staat en samenleving in Jordanië in het kader van 
de inspanningen van de eerstgenoemde om de laatstgenoemde te bevoog-
den en te beheersen. Tot op de dag van vandaag neemt de Hashemitische 
dynastie de rol op zich van scheidsrechter voor de diverse krachten bin-
nen staat en samenleving in het kader van een autoritair pluralisme. Deze 
rol gaat vergezeld van een ideologisch flexibel en pluralistisch discours dat 
zowel islam als secularisme omvat, zowel tribale erfenis als moderniserende 
vooruitgang, zowel democratie en maatschappelijk middenveld als onvoor-
waardelijke loyaliteit aan het Hashemitische patrimonium. Feitelijke praktij-
ken van inkapseling hebben geleid tot de overheersing van het Jordaanse 
overheidsapparaat door de autochtone stammen en tot het overwicht van 
de Palestijnen in het bedrijfsleven, het professionele leven en het onderwijs. 
Verder beschermt het overheidsbeleid zowel etnische en religieuze minder-
heden als de politieke en culturele islam. Alhoewel instellingen van de par-
lementaire democratie en – tot op zekere hoogte – democratische rechten 
en vrijheden aanwezig zijn in het koninkrijk, worden die in de praktijk toch 
ernstig beperkt door de repressieve wetgeving en het overheidsbeleid. Het 
regime lijkt tot op de dag van vandaag succes te hebben gehad in het veilig-
stellen van zijn hegemonie over de Jordaanse samenleving door een combi-
natie van inkapseling en repressie toe te passen.
Dit beleid staat enerzijds de aanwezigheid toe van krachten van het 
maatschappelijk middenveld, zoals politieke partijen, beroepsorganisaties, 
werkgeversorganisaties, vakbonden en de islamistische beweging, vaak 
met het oogmerk om oppositionele sentimenten te kanaliseren in een rich-
ting die acceptabel is voor het regime. Aan de andere kant wil het regime 
zijn eigen greep op politiek en samenleving behouden. Daarom spant het 
zich in om de invloed van oppositiekrachten, die sinds de jaren tachtig wor-
den gedomineerd door de islamistische beweging, in te dammen en neemt 
het repressieve maatregelen tegen hen wanneer dat noodzakelijk wordt 
geacht.
Vanaf de vestiging van het Hashemitische staatsbestel in het begin 
van de twintigste eeuw groeiden niet-gouvernementele organisaties, die 
n e d e r l a n d s e  s a m e n v a t t I n g
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maatschappelijke belangen proberen te dienen en te bevorderen buiten de 
terreinen van staat en economie om, in aantal en in betekenis. Sommige van 
deze NGO’s richten zich op liefdadigheid en/of sociale ontwikkeling. Ande-
ren proberen wetgeving en beleid te beïnvloeden op terreinen als mensen-
rechten, gelijkheid tussen mannen en vrouwen, het milieu of democratise-
ring. Deze dissertatie richt zich in de eerste plaats op de eerste categorie 
van NGO’s, en vooral op de manier waarop religieus geloof en discours hun 
benadering van sociale zorg beïnvloeden op het vlak van motivaties en ide-
alen.
Het derde deel bekijkt de religieuze motivaties en idealen die bij mos-
lim-NGO’s aanwezig zijn van nabij. Deze zijn geworteld in een eeuwenoude 
religieuze sociale traditie waarbinnen de instellingen van zakah (belasting 
om de behoeftigen te ondersteunen), sadaqa (sociale hulp op vrijwillige 
basis) en de notie dat het dienen van de behoeftigen gelijkstaat aan het 
dienen van God de centrale elementen zijn. Het idee dat het helpen van de 
armen ter wille van God moet plaatsvinden en niet ter wille van het eigen-
belang is dominant in het motivationele discours van islamistische NGO’s. 
Deze islamistische waarde-rationaliteit kan vergezeld gaan van affectieve 
motivaties van compassie ten aanzien van de armen. Het is ook verbonden 
met visies op een morele en rechtvaardige islamitische samenleving die 
gebaseerd is op de juiste morele attitude en mentaliteit van al zijn leden. 
Zoals Jordaanse critici beweren, draagt het sociale werk van deze NGO’s 
inderdaad bij aan de politieke en maatschappelijke invloed van de islamis-
tische beweging. Zij zouden daarin echter niet zo succesvol zijn geweest als 
hun medewerkers niet door reëele religieuze en sociale motieven gedreven 
werden.
Er zijn ook moslim-NGO’s met een zeer vergelijkbare religieuze bena-
dering als NGO’s die met de Moslimbroederschap verbonden zijn, maar die 
geen duidelijke banden hebben met deze, of met welke andere politieke 
beweging dan ook. Dan zijn er nog de meer progressieve NGO’s die zich 
vooral de economische, sociale en psychologische empowerment van de 
behoeftigen ten doel stellen, samenwerken met niet-islamitische, waaronder 
westerse, ontwikkelingsactoren en meer modernistische en liberale interpre-
taties van de islamitische boodschap promoten. Zij richten zich niet zozeer 
op een fundamentalistische verdediging tegen de vermeende aanval van 
(westers) materialisme en immoraliteit die het discours van islamistische en 
conservatieve moslim-NGO’s beheerst.
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Het vierde deel van de dissertatie gaat in op het verband tussen het 
religieuze discours van de moslim-NGO’s en hun sociaal-economische hulp-
verlening. Islamistische zowel als niet-islamistische NGO’s houden zich gro-
tendeels met dezelfde vormen van financiële hulpverlening en hulp in natu-
ra bezig. In het geval van de met de Moslimbroederschap verbonden Islamic 
Center Charity Society wordt de hulprelatie echter ook gebruikt om druk 
op de cliënten uit eenoudergezinnen of “weesgezinnen” (die een reguliere 
kostwinner missen) uit te oefenen om deel te nemen aan educatieve pro-
gramma’s die sterk gekleurd zijn door een islamistische religieuze ideologie. 
Moslim-NGO’s houden zich ook bezig met werkgelegenheids-geörienteerde 
activiteiten voor hun cliënten op de terreinen van vakopleidingen, het vin-
den van banen en eigen werkgelegenheidsprojecten.
Het vijfde deel van de dissertatie behandelt de culturele en educa-
tieve activiteiten van moslim-NGO’s, en vooral de rol die het islamitisch dis-
cours daarin speelt. In het geval van islamistische en conservatieve moslim-
NGO’s is dit discours gericht op het verhogen van het niveau van vroomheid. 
Conformiteit aan normen van vroom gedrag, zowel in de rituele als in de 
sociale sfeer, wordt niet alleen gezien als het juiste pad naar verlossing in 
het leven na de dood, maar ook als de manier om sociale harmonie en geluk 
te verwezenlijken in zowel het gezin als in de wijdere samenleving. In het 
islamistische discours moet de sociale integriteit van de moslimsamenle-
ving verdedigd worden tegen de aanval van westers-gedomineerde globali-
sering, materialisme, consumentisme en hedonisme. Een meer progressieve 
moslim-NGO als Al-Faruq Society wordt geïnspireerd door UNICEF, die het 
belang benadrukt van de ontwikkeling van de individuele persoonlijkheid 
en creativiteit van kinderen en niet zozeer van hun conformiteit aan streng 
opgevatte religieuze normen. De islamitische boodschap wordt door Al-
Faruq Society in overeenstemming met moderne en mondiaal vastgelegde 
rechtenprincipes geïnterpreteerd. Ook enkele centra van the Islamic Center 
Charity Society zijn de laatste jaren echter deze weg in geslagen.
In hun educatieve en culturele activiteiten uiten moslim-NGO’s, vaak 
in naam van de islam, kritiek op de impact van de westers-gedomineer-
de globaliserende cultuur in hun samenleving, maar ook op traditionele 
gewoonten die als hindernissen worden gezien voor de ontwikkeling van 
de moslimsamenleving in moderne tijden. Beide vormen van kritiek komen 
het duidelijkst naar voren in hun discoursen over man-vrouwrelaties. De 
islamitische Al-‘Afaf Society probeert zijn visie op een betere islamistische 
samenleving, die gekenmerkt wordt door deugdzaamheid, bescheiden-
n e d e r l a n d s e  s a m e n v a t t I n g
AUP-ISIM-PS-Harmsen-BW-DEF6.indd   497 05-02-2008   11:13:57
498
I s l a m ,  c I v I l  s o c I e t y  a n d  s o c I a l  w o r k
heid en rechtvaardigheid, te promoten door jaarlijkse massabruiloften te 
organiseren als een alternatief voor de gebruikelijke dure familiebruiloften 
die vaak gekenmerkt worden door uiterlijk vertoon en luxe. In de ogen van 
zijn leden ondermijnen materialisme, consumentisme en zelfs doelbewus-
te westerse complotten het moslimgezin als de basis van de islamitische 
samenleving. Al-‘Afaf Welfare Society promoot zijn visie op het harmonieuze 
islamitische huwelijk en gezin ook door lezingen, workshops en cursussen 
te organiseren.
Vooral vrouwen die actief zijn in deze of in andere particuliere wel-
zijnsorganisaties benadrukken het on-islamitische karakter van traditionele 
gewoonten die vrouwen achterstellen in hun educatieve en maatschappe-
lijke kansen. Andere traditionele gewoonten die moslim-NGO’s in naam van 
de Islam veroordelen zijn stamvetes, het sociale isolement van gehandicap-
ten en het schieten in de lucht tijdens feesten.
De bevindingen van deze dissertatie bevestigen het middenklasse- 
karakter van islamistische NGO’s maar belichten tegelijkertijd hun inspannin-
gen om hun behoeftige begunstigden middels educatie tot hogere niveaus 
van vroomheid te brengen en te werken aan hun morele hervorming. In 
veel gevallen leven medewerkers van islamistische NGO’s in dezelfde buurt 
als hun cliënten, zijn ze persoonlijk bekend met hun lot en hebben ze etni-
sche en soms zelfs familiebanden met hen. Dat stelt hen in staat om deze 
cliënten des te effectiever moreel te patroniseren. Daarnaast concludeert 
de dissertatie dat het Jordaanse regime particuliere welzijnsorganisaties 
dwingt de rol te spelen van plichtsgetrouwe partners in een door het regime 
geleide inspanning om de sociaal-politieke stabiliteit en de binnenlandse 
vrede veilig te stellen. In dit proces raken die organisaties vanzelf geïnteres-
seerd in de samenwerking met de staat terwille van hun eigen doeleinden 
van dienstverlening. Het autoritarisme en paternalisme van het regime lijkt 
weerspiegeld te worden in de interne patronen van besluitvorming binnen 
deze organisaties en ook in hun relaties met de cliëntèle. Blijkbaar wordt 
het ook weerspiegeld in het sociaal-ethisch discours van vele moslim-NGO’s, 
waar een attitude van gehoorzaamheid of meegaandheid wordt verwacht 
van de “zwakkeren”, zoals de armen, de vrouwen en de kinderen, en een 
van edelmoedigheid, zorg en liefdadigheid van de sterkeren. Zo’n uitwis-
seling herinnert aan de manier waarop de Jordaanse monarch in de door 
de overheid gedomineerde media wordt gepresenteerd als een vaderfiguur 
en de Jordaanse koningin en prinsessen als moederfiguren die liefdadig en 
zorgzaam zijn ten aanzien van het welbevinden van de Jordaanse burgers, 
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maar die hen door deze houding tegelijkertijd ook domineren. Dat betekent 
niet dat de zaken er eenvoudig en statisch voorstaan in dit opzicht. Moder-
niserende veranderingen, die ook door de monarchie zelf worden gepro-
moot, hebben in verschillende mate invloed op het discours en de praktijk 
van moslim-NGO’s omtrent man-vrouwverhoudingen, gezin, onderwijs en 
traditionele gewoonten. Daarnaast kunnen onder de oppervlakte van poli-
tieke volgzaamheid en gezagsgetrouwheid politieke oppositie en protest 
wel degelijk aanwezig zijn bij hen. Deze organisaties vertegenwoordigen 
daarom een zeer onvolmaakt en gefrustreerd, maar desalniettemin echt, 
gemotiveerd en veranderend maatschappelijk middenveld.
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